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Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior: 
A New Theory and Empirics in the Post-WWII Era 
 
Akisato Suzuki 
 
Abstract 
 
Drawing on theories of nationalism and interstate rivalry, the thesis develops a new 
theory of nationalistic rivalry, i.e., a specific type of rivalry where dispute-prone states 
perceive each other as threatening and competing enemies due to a nationalist issue. 
Building on original data of nationalistic-rivalry dyads from 1946-2001, the thesis 
examines the validity of nationalistic rivalry theory through the combination of large-N 
statistical analysis and small-N case studies. It finds that nationalistic rivalry 
significantly increases the probability of revisionist foreign policy, and thwarts the 
effect of well-known conflict-mitigating factors. 
 
The literature has found that nationalism is a major cause of conflict. However, it is 
little known whether nationalism in the context of interstate politics increases revisionist 
state behavior specifically. While revisionist states have often been nationalistic (e.g., 
Imperial Japan or Milosevic Serbia), nationalism is not always revisionistic (e.g., the 
UK at the time of the Falklands War). What conditions cause nationalism to be a force 
of revisionist behavior? 
 
The thesis answers this question by explaining how nationalist politics could lead the 
state specifically to revisionist behavior. The major findings of the thesis are: (1) an 
ethnically heterogeneous society, political instability, and incongruence between 
ethnonational and state boundaries raise the likelihood of nationalistic rivalry; (2) 
nationalistic rivalry disproportionately increases revisionist behavior through the 
nationalist mobilization of society, in contrast to other rivalries and non-rivalries; (3) 
nationalism motivated by transborder ethnic groups is more revisionist-prone than 
nationalism framed by territorial statehood, only in dyads where the former targets the 
latter; (4) nuclear deterrence does not reduce the probability of revisionist war within 
nationalistic rivalry contrary to conventional nuclear deterrence theory; and (5) joint 
democracy, economic interdependence, and intergovernmental organizations do not 
decrease revisionist behavior within nationalistic rivalry. 
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Introduction 
Of the Nation, by the Nation, for the Nation 
 
The year of 2014 marked the 100th anniversary of the beginning of World War I. It was 
a year in which much more peaceful Europe faced the Ukraine crisis after the overthrow 
of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych by the pro-European opposition group. 
Russia annexed Crimea, where the majority are ethnic Russians, after a referendum 
revealed that nearly 96% of the Crimean voters chose to unify with Russia (BBC News, 
March 16, 2014). Russia was also accused of militarily supporting ethnic Russian rebels 
in Eastern Ukraine, which the Kremlin continuously denied. Why does nationalism 
sometimes result in these kinds of “revisionist” foreign policy? What are the causal 
mechanisms behind it? And how could it be prevented? 
  These questions deserve attention. To explain interstate conflict, material factors such 
as economy and military capabilities certainly matter, but focusing only on them limits 
our understanding of such conflict. Russia’s nationalist policy over Ukraine provoked 
economic sanctions from Western countries, which damaged Russian economy. 
President Vladimir Putin stated “[t]he times we are facing are hard and difficult” 
(quoted in BBC News, December 4, 2014), and even admitted that the sanctions were a 
cause of the rouble’s trouble in late 2014 (BBC News, December 18, 2014). Yet, now in 
February 2015 it remains unclear whether Russia will reach a rapprochement with the 
West over Ukraine any time soon. In the literature on ethnic conflict, it is widely 
recognized that nationalism as an ideational factor needs to be taken into consideration 
(Connor 1994b, chs.6, 8; Kaufman 2001; Kaufmann 2005; Varshney 2003), and 
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material and ideational factors are not mutually exclusive categories as the causes of 
conflict but constitute “complexly intertwined motives down the path toward conflict” 
(Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009, 324).1 However, such recognition is much less 
popular in quantitative research on interstate conflict, which has been heavily influenced 
by realpolitik and/or rationalist models. This is unfortunate, given that as the ongoing 
conflict between Russia and Ukraine indicates, nationalism – the political ideology 
which advocates national self-governance – often plays a significant role in interstate 
conflict as well. 
  This thesis intends to explain how nationalism enriches our understanding of states’ 
conflict behavior. Its main implication is that nationalism shapes the biased perceptions 
of interstate relations, and such perceptions explain why states engage in persistent 
hostility and violent foreign policy, and how nationalism as an ideational factor 
influences the way material factors matter in interstate conflict. It does not intend to 
argue that nationalism drives irrational state behavior. Rather, nationalism biases 
objectively rational calculations by making actors subjectively believe that a decision 
based on such objectively biased calculations is rational. 
  It is commonly believed that nationalism is dangerous (Pettman 1998, 155). 
Conforming to this belief, the literature has found that nationalism is a major cause and 
powerful force of conflict. The rise of nationalism by ethnic groups increases the 
probability of ethnic or civil conflict (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; 
Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009; Cederman and Girardin 2007; Kaufman 2001; 
Petersen 2002; Snyder 2000; Van Evera 1994; Wimmer and Min 2006); nationalism 
helps to mobilize people for warfare (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; 
                                                 
1
 For a materialist approach to the study of ethnic conflict, see Fearon and Laitin (2003). 
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Cederman, Warren, and Sornette 2011; Kaufman 2001; Gagnon 1994/95; Mansfield and 
Snyder 2005; Posen 1993; Snyder 2000); and nationalism increases interstate conflict 
(Mearsheimer 1990; Schrock-Jacobson 2012), particularly if transborder ethnic groups 
are involved (Miller 2007; Saideman and Ayres 2008; Van Evera 1994; Wimmer and 
Min 2006; Woodwell 2007). 
  However, it is little known whether nationalism motivates states to revise the status 
quo in interstate politics by military means, such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea. 
International Relations theory suggests that such revisionist state behavior is the major 
source of instability in the interstate system (Schweller 1996). Nazi Germany and 
Milosevic Serbia were revisionistic and nationalistic at the same time, yet nationalism is 
not always revisionistic. For example, in the European Union, “the strongest feeling of 
belonging is to a nation” (European Commission 2010, 34),2 yet the EU states enjoy 
positive peace. Thus, one’s pursuit of nationalism does not have to conflict with 
another’s. Once established, nation-states use “banal nationalism” to reproduce national 
identity, typically by national flags (Billig 1995), and it does not have to involve the 
threat or use of force against other states. Furthermore, nationalism may not necessarily 
be revisionistic even in a time of interstate conflict. Nationalism can solidify society and, 
thereby, facilitate self-defense as, for example, in the UK at the time of the Falklands 
War (see Billig 1995, 2-3). 
  As nationalism seeks political autonomy, it is apparent in the case of intrastate 
conflict that anti-government nationalist groups, such as secessionists, challenge the 
status quo of state governance, not always but occasionally by violent means 
                                                 
2
 According to a Eurobarometer survey report (European Commission 2010, 34), 94% of the 
respondents identify themselves by nationality, and this identity is the highest among the others 
(region = 91%, Europe = 74%, and the world = 64%). 
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(Cunningham 2013). On the other hand, in the case of interstate conflict, conflicting 
nations already have their own states (the most autonomous polity in the world), and it 
is less obvious how nationalism causes states to engage in conflict for the purpose of 
revision of interstate politics. Hence, this doctoral thesis aims to answer the following 
research question: What conditions make nationalism a force of revisionist behavior in 
interstate politics? 
 
Existing Literature and the Contribution of the Thesis 
The existing literature provides two causal mechanisms whereby nationalism leads to 
interstate conflict. First, domestic political instability causes elites to attract popular 
support in political competition, by using the nationalist discourse that they are the 
defender of the nation from an external threat (Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Snyder 
2000; Gagnon 1994/95).3 In this process, those elites purposively create an external 
threat in the interstate arena, thereby provoking interstate conflict. 
  This nationalist political competition explanation by itself is insufficient to explain 
the causality between nationalism and revisionist behavior specifically. For example, 
elites might describe the strong army of a neighboring state as an external threat which 
serves as the topic of nationalist discourse. Such discourse, however, can lead the 
society either to revisionist behavior such as preventive war or to non-revisionist 
behavior such as building up one’s own army. Furthermore, if elites’ motive for a 
nationalist rhetoric is to stay in power, it is also a plausible option for them to keep 
away from risky revisionist attempts which might cause a serious backlash from the 
                                                 
3
 The literature on diversionary use of force (e.g., Levy 1992; Davies 2002) is significantly 
relevant to the nationalist political competition explanation, but does not explicitly incorporate 
the theory of nationalism. 
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target state, and to use a nationalist rhetoric only towards domestic audiences. Some 
additional factor is necessary to theorize how nationalist political competition leads the 
state to revisionist behavior specifically. 
  Second, the incongruence between state borders and the nations defined by transstate 
ethnicity (hereafter “ethnonation-state incongruence”) 4  can specifically explain 
nationalist revisionism (Miller 2007; Woodwell 2007; Carment and James 1995; 
Gokcek 2011; Huibregtse 2010; Saideman and Ayres 2008; Van Evera 1994, 12, 14-15, 
17-18, 22; Wimmer and Min 2006, 874-875, 891).5 Ethnonation-state incongruence 
leads national homeland states to engage in conflict with other states where their ethnic 
kin live, to change the status quo on behalf of these co-nationals. In extreme cases, the 
homeland states will engage in territorial revisionism to annex part of the territory of 
other states where the ethnic kin reside (e.g., Pakistan’s irredentist claim over the Indian 
part of Kashmir), or to absorb the whole territory of a “divided” nation (e.g., China’s 
unification claim over Taiwan). 
  The argument of ethnonation-state incongruence also has a limitation, however. It 
cannot explain the cases where nationalism causes states to engage in revisionist 
behavior without ethnonation-state incongruence. For example, in China, anti-Japan 
nationalist sentiments among the masses have pressured the government to assertively 
challenge Japan’s control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, but there is no one residing in 
these islands. In other words, ethnonation-state incongruence is not a necessary 
condition for nationalism to cause revisionist behavior. 
                                                 
4
 “Ethnonation” here denotes that ethnicity rather than territorial statehood defines nationhood 
(see Smith 1991, 82-83). For detailed discussion on nations and ethnicity, see Chapter 1. 
5
 For the effect of transstate ethnic groups on the probability of civil war, see Cederman, 
Girardin, and Gleditsch (2009); Cederman et al. (2013). 
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  This thesis fills these gaps in the literature. To this end, it develops a new theory of 
nationalistic rivalry, which draws on social identity theory (Brewer 2001; Tajfel and 
Turner 1986) and interstate rivalry theory (Thompson and Dreyer 2012; Klein, Goertz, 
and Diehl 2006). Social identity theory reveals the mechanisms whereby different group 
identities cause hostility between groups, but focuses on social groups in general rather 
than nations in the interstate system in particular. Interstate rivalry theory captures the 
situation of threat-competitor perception or conflict-proneness between states, but lacks 
the explanation of the relevance of nationalism with that situation. The theory of 
nationalistic rivalry incorporates and glues together these different research programs by 
using the concept of nationalism, thereby developing a novel perspective on how 
nationalism could breed nationalistically charged rivalry between states. 
  Nationalistic rivalry is defined as the situation where dispute-prone states perceive 
each other as threatening and competing enemies due to a nationalist issue. The 
nationalist issue here means an issue which makes one’s desire to maintain the core of 
nationhood – national autonomy, unity, and identity (Smith 1991, 74) – incompatible 
with another’s. Territorial disputes such as the above Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute between 
China and Japan are a typical example of such an issue: Japan’s desire to keep national 
territorial integrity is incompatible with China’s desire to annex the islands, part of 
Japan’s territory, to achieve national territorial integrity. 
  Social identity theory suggests that when nations face this type of incompatibility, 
they see each other as a threat to their own nationhood and engage in competition to 
resolve the issue to one’s advantage and at the expense of the other, thereby resulting in 
the exchange of hostility along the line of the national “self” and “other.” The 
reciprocation of nationalistic hostility between states in turn increases the sense of the 
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righteous “self” and the threatening “other,” thereby creating a feedback effect to 
sustain the mutual nationalistic hostility. 
  The thesis relates this process of reciprocal nationalistic hostility to interstate rivalry, 
the situation where states perceive each other as threatening and competing enemies 
(Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007, 25), or the one where states have experienced 
more than one militarized dispute with issue linkage (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006). 
Two implications of nationalism are pointed out for theorizing the conceptual relation 
between interstate rivalry and nationalistic hostility. 
  First, the above two different concepts of interstate rivalry (threat-competitor 
perception vs. serial militarized disputes) are both important to capture reciprocal 
nationalistic hostility. Given the aforementioned mechanism suggested by social identity 
theory, threat-competitor perception is a necessary condition for identifying reciprocal 
nationalistic hostility. In addition, if groups are dispute-prone, they are theoretically 
distinctive from those which are not.6 Dispute-proneness indicates that identification 
between “self” and “other” is so salient that conflict rather than cooperation becomes 
routine. Therefore, if relations between nations are dispute-prone, it suggests a 
distinctive level of national identification from those which are not. In short, the 
concept of nationalism helps to merge the two rivalry concepts in a theoretically 
consistent way to capture mutual nationalistic hostility. 
  Second, a disputed issue in rivalry must be a nationalist one. The theory of 
nationalism suggests that the opposite of nationalism is internationalism, because 
nationalism divides the world by the unit of nations whereas internationalism transcends 
                                                 
6
 What constitutes “dispute-proneness” may not be so clear-cut. I rely on Klein, Goertz, and 
Diehl’s (2006) data on this regard when I operationalize nationalistic rivalry in Chapter 2. 
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such division. Hence, drawing on this nationalism-internationalism binary, the thesis 
identifies a nationalist issue in the merged concept of interstate rivalry. 
 
Figure I-1: Nationalistic rivalry in relation to the general rivalry datasets 
 
 
  These two implications of nationalism for the two rivalry concepts guide the 
operationalization of nationalistic rivalry. That is, the data of nationalistic-rivalry dyads 
are created based on the intersection between the two rivalry datasets (Thompson and 
Dryer 2012; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006) and the identification of a nationalist issue 
in this intersection – not all rivalries in the interaction have nationalist issues, as 
described in Appendix B. Thus, nationalistic-rivalry dyads are the subset of these two 
general rivalry datasets (see Figure I-1). In particular, the identification of nationalist 
issues is a novel contribution to existing rivalry datasets. The operational criterion 
deduced from the nationalism-internationalism binary finds that nationalist issues 
include not only irredentism and national unification movement but also non-ethnic 
territorial disputes, conflicting national identities, and state-sponsored insurgency 
warfare. Internationalist issues are found to be contending internationalist ideologies 
and competition for regional/global influence which does not have any transstate ethnic 
aspect. It is important to emphasize that these issues are not operational criteria for 
Rivalries in Klein, Goertz, 
and Diehl (2006)
Nationalisitc
rivalry
Rivalries in Thompson and 
Dreyer (2012)
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identifying nationalistic rivalry but empirical cases found by the deductive criterion of 
the nationalism-internationalism binary.  
  By definition, states engaged in nationalistic rivalry are dispute-prone, but this 
characteristic does not make nationalistic rivalry tautological to explain revisionist 
behavior. States may engage in either revisionist or non-revisionist behavior in 
militarized disputes. In other words, the definition of nationalistic rivalry does not mean 
by itself that states engaged in nationalistic rivalry are more prone to revisionist 
behavior than those without such rivalry. It is necessary to explain how nationalistic 
rivalry leads states specifically to revisionist behavior, which is a task for my theory. It 
is possible to imagine that states without nationalistic rivalry also have revisionist aims. 
For example, as Thucydides (1997, 307) wrote in ancient times that “the strong do what 
they can and the weak suffer what they must,” a powerful major power is likely to 
pursue revisionist foreign policy to change the status quo relative to a much weaker 
state. As rivals are competitors by definition, highly asymmetric revisionist warfare, 
such as the overthrow of the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States in 
early 2000s, is not the consequence of rivalry. It is necessary to investigate theoretically 
and empirically whether states engaged in nationalistic rivalry are more likely to resort 
to revisionist behavior than those without such rivalry. 
  The thesis theorizes that if states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more 
prone to revisionist behavior. Nationalistic rivalry creates domestic environments in 
which elites or masses mobilize nationalistic hostility against the rival state, and leads 
the state specifically to revisionist foreign policy for the sake of resolving the disputed 
nationalist issue to its own advantage at the expense of the rival. For example, China 
and Japan, two world-leading economies, have fuelled each other’s nationalist outrage 
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through a territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. 
Anti-Japan nationalist sentiments among the masses have pressured the Chinese 
government to assertively challenge Japan’s control of the islands, which Japan has 
perceived as a threat to its territorial integrity. In a crisis over the collision between a 
Chinese fishing boat and Japanese Coast Guard ships around the islands in 2010, the 
two states even sacrificed profitable economic interdependence for boosting their own 
nationalist cause. 
  India-Pakistan is another example of nationalistic rivalry, which has endured since 
their independence in 1947 up to today. Pakistani elites have believed that India intends 
to undo the partition and to annex Pakistan, although main Indian political leaders have 
stated that they have no such intention. Pakistan has also continued to hold an irredentist 
policy over Kashmir, which has continuously threatened the territorial integrity of India. 
Border skirmishes along the Line of Control in Kashmir have been almost routine 
events, while the hostility escalated to war four times so far. In particular, the Kargil 
War in 1999 under the shadow of nuclear deterrence was a risky adventure which might 
have resulted in nuclear war. 
  The theory of nationalistic rivalry does not intend to dismiss the existing explanations 
of nationalist political competition and ethnonation-state incongruence. Rather, these 
two explanations are integrated in the theoretical explanations and empirical analysis of 
nationalistic rivalry, and help to identify the causal mechanism between nationalism and 
revisionist behavior through nationalistic rivalry. Figure I-2 summarizes the 
relationships among nationalist political competition, ethnonation-state incongruence, 
and nationalistic rivalry, where the black objects are the main causal mechanism which 
the thesis identifies whilst the gray objects are what the existing literature indicates. The 
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existing literature argues that nationalist political competition causes interstate conflict 
but is unclear regarding whether it results in revisionist or non-revisionist behavior in 
conflict. The thesis argues that nationalist political competition causes nationalistic 
rivalry, thereby increasing revisionist behavior. Ethnonation-state incongruence is also 
incorporated as a cause of nationalistic rivalry, although it may not necessarily go 
through nationalistic rivalry to lead to revisionist behavior. 
 
Figure I-2: Causal mechanism between nationalism and revisionist behavior 
 
The black objects are the focus of this thesis 
The gray objects are what the existing literature indicates 
 
  In addition to nationalist political competition and ethnonation-state incongruence, 
the thesis identifies the third cause of nationalistic rivalry, i.e., ethnically heterogeneous 
society. If states have a higher number of politically relevant ethnic groups, their society 
is more likely to be deeply divided. To maintain and increase state-led national unity 
and integrity, the government will promote nationalism as the glue to hold together 
diverse ethnic groups, which in turn creates a starker difference between the “self” and 
Ethnically heterogeneous society
Nationalistic rivalry
Nationalist mobilization
Revisionist behavior
Conflict
Irredentism
National unification movement
Nationalist political competition
Non-revisionist behavior
(self-defense or concession)
Peace
Non-revisionist behavior
(no threat or use of force)
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the “other” in the arena of interstate politics. Thus, all other things being equal, the 
larger the number of politically relevant ethnic groups within states, the more likely they 
are to experience nationalistic rivalry. 
  Once these three factors cause nationalistic rivalry, nationalistic rivalry in turn 
provokes nationalist mobilization in society for revisionist attempts to resolve the 
disputed nationalist issue vis-à-vis the rival. While the nationalist political competition 
explanation provides the basics of this causal mechanism, the thesis significantly 
develops this explanation to specify how nationalist mobilization results in revisionist 
behavior specifically. 
  In terms of the dependent variable, peace always includes only non-revisionist 
behavior, because revisionist behavior is observable only if conflict exists. Meanwhile, 
one conflict situation may include both revisionist behavior and non-revisionist 
behavior or only either of them. For example, if a conflict were caused by an accident, 
both sides might not show any revisionist ambition, whereas if a conflict were provoked 
by two revisionist states, both conflict actors could resort to revisionist foreign policy. 
In short, conflict is a necessary but insufficient condition for revisionist behavior. Other 
factors determine the probability of states’ engaging in revisionist behavior in conflict, 
and nationalistic rivalry is expected to be a major one among such factors. 
  The thesis examines the validity and utility of nationalistic rivalry mainly by large-N 
statistical analyses but also complementarily through small-N case studies of 
India-Pakistan, Greece-Turkey, and China-Japan, using an original dataset of 
nationalistic-rivalry dyads from 1946-2001. Empirics strongly support the hypothesized 
causal mechanisms in Figure I-1. 
  Empirical analysis also allows for comparing the explanatory power of nationalistic 
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rivalry with that of other rivalries. Table I-1 summarizes the definition of nationalistic 
rivalry and that of other rivalries based on the two major rivalry datasets (Thompson 
and Dreyer 2012; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006),7 and the nationalist causes and 
effects of these rivalries. 
 
Table I-1: Comparison of nationalistic rivalry and other rivalries 
  nationalistic rivalry other rivalries by TD other rivalries by KGD 
definition dyads in which 
dispute-prone states 
perceive each other as a 
threatening and 
competing enemy due to 
a nationalist issue 
 
dyads in which states 
perceive each other as 
threatening and 
competing enemies but 
those which do not appear 
in the data of nationalistic 
rivalry 
dyads in which states have 
experienced more than one 
militarized dispute with 
issue linkage but those 
which do not appear in the 
data of nationalistic rivalry 
nationalist 
causes 
ethnically 
heterogeneous society, 
nationalist political 
competition, 
ethnonation-state 
incongruence 
 
ethnonation-state 
incongruence 
ethnonation-state 
incongruence (not robust) 
nationalist 
effects 
a significant effect on 
the level of nationalist 
mobilization and the 
probability of 
revisionist behavior 
none none 
TD: Thompson and Dreyer (2012) 
KGD: Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006)  
 
                                                 
7
 In terms of Figure I-1, other rivalries identified by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) are the white 
area of the left circle, and those specified by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) are that of the right 
circle. 
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  First, as expected, nationalist political competition and ethnically heterogeneous 
society raise the probability of nationalistic rivalry but have no significant effect on that 
of other rivalries. Second, while ethnonation-state incongruence increases the 
probability of all types of rivalries, empirical models in Chapter 3 report that its effect is 
highest in the case of nationalistic rivalry. In addition, there are plausible reasons why 
ethnonation-state incongruence is associated with a higher likelihood of other rivalries. 
In the case of other rivalries identified by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), most of those 
other rivalries which are caused by ethnonation-state incongruence are actually potential 
nationalistic-rivalry dyads which do not meet the criterion of dispute-proneness. In the 
case of other rivalries specified by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), ethnonation-state 
incongruence incorrectly “predicts” some of those rivalries in which ethnonation-state 
incongruence is irrelevant (e.g., the US-Canada rivalry over fishery rights). Finally, only 
nationalistic rivalry has a nationalist effect on the propensity of states for nationalist 
mobilization and revisionist behavior. In short, nationalistic rivalry is a theoretically and 
empirically distinctive subset of interstate rivalry for the explanation of the causality 
between nationalism and revisionist behavior. 
  In addition to the main causal mechanisms in Figure I-1, the thesis also considers the 
oft-used civic-ethnic dichotomy of nationalism. The civic-ethnic dichotomy has been 
not only analytically but also politically utilized to categorize nationalism into a benign, 
peace-loving one and a malign, conflict-provoking one (Brubaker 1999, 57). However, 
the thesis notes that a few nationalism studies reveal that the civic-ethnic dichotomy of 
nationalism is actually a flawed concept. To overcome this problem, it proposes the 
dichotomy of nationalism motivated by transstate ethnicity (hereafter, transstate-ethnic 
nationalism) and nationalism framed by territorial statehood (hereafter, state-territorial 
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nationalism). This dichotomy of nationalism is utilized in the context of nationalistic 
rivalry. It is found that transstate-ethnic nationalism is more revisionist-prone than 
state-territorial nationalism within nationalistic-rivalry dyads, only if the former type of 
nationalism is targeted at the latter type of nationalism (see Table I-2). If the two states 
in a dyad have the same type of nationalism, the type of nationalism does not 
significantly differentiate a revisionist propensity. This finding indicates that the simple 
dichotomy of nationalism is insufficient to capture the nuance of dyadic interactions. 
 
Table I-2: Revisionist propensity of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms in 
a dyadic context 
    target 
state-territorial transstate-ethnic 
actor 
state-territorial middle low 
transstate-ethnic high middle 
 
Objectives of the Thesis 
Using the theory and data of nationalistic rivalry, the thesis has two goals. One goal is to 
theorize and empirically investigate the causal mechanism whereby states develop 
nationalistic rivalry and engage in revisionist behavior. As already noted, rather than 
dismissing the two existing explanations of nationalist conflict (i.e., nationalist political 
competition and ethnonation-state incongruence), the thesis incorporates them in the 
above causal mechanism. Both nationalist political competition and ethnonation-state 
incongruence explanations suggest how nationalistic rivalry sets on and how 
nationalistic rivalry results in revisionist behavior. 
  As already mentioned, these two factors increase the probability of nationalistic 
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rivalry. Once nationalistic rivalry is established, the logic of nationalist political 
competition leads specifically to revisionist behavior through the nationalist 
mobilization of society. Irredentism or national unification movements are also found to 
be one of the major nationalist issues which enable such nationalist mobilization under 
the condition of nationalistic rivalry. Thus, the thesis advances an understanding of the 
causality between nationalism and revisionist behavior, thereby contributing to the 
literature on nationalist conflict. This literature has devoted more attention to intrastate 
conflict than interstate conflict, and the thesis amends this tendency by showing how 
nationalism influences state behavior in significant ways. 
  The other goal is to investigate the possibility of mitigating the effect of nationalistic 
rivalry to increase the probability of revisionist behavior. To this end, it examines 
theories on nuclear deterrence and liberal peace. Nuclear deterrence and liberal peace 
are the most well-established conflict-mitigating factors, respectively based on realism 
and on liberalism, in the literature on interstate conflict (e.g., Rauchhaus 2009). Hence, 
it is imperative to investigate whether these factors reduce a revisionist propensity in 
nationalistic-rivalry dyads. 
  Nuclear deterrence theory expects that the mutual possession of nuclear weapons 
(so-called “nuclear symmetry”) should reduce revisionist war. Yet, the thesis argues that 
nationalistic rivalry biases the objective cost-benefit calculation of nuclear deterrence by 
false optimism that one’s own nation is strong and the rival’s nation is easy to defeat, 
thereby thwarting the effect of nuclear deterrence. Empirical analysis finds that nuclear 
symmetry has no significant effect on the probability of revisionist war within 
nationalistic rivalry, whereas there is no observation of revisionist war outside the 
subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads, meaning that nuclear symmetry predicts the 
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absence of revisionist war perfectly outside nationalistic rivalry.  
  Liberal peace also fails to demonstrate its theoretical expectation. Both the rationalist 
and constructivist underpinnings of the theory are reexamined by adding the variable of 
nationalistic rivalry. The thesis argues that nationalistic hostility between states 
compromises the pacifying effect of three liberal peace factors – joint democracy, 
economic interdependence, and intergovernmental organizations – in the case of 
nationalistic rivalry. It is empirically found that these liberal peace factors have no 
significant effect on the probability of revisionist behavior within nationalistic rivalry, 
whereas in the observations of other rivalries or non-rivalries, no coherent evidence is 
found that nationalistic hostility thwarts the pacifying effect of the liberal peace factors. 
In particular, joint democracy, the most robust predictor of peace in liberal peace theory, 
loses its statistically significant pacifying effect only in the case of nationalistic rivalry. 
  In short, the theory of nationalistic rivalry suggests how existing understandings of 
nuclear deterrence and liberal peace can be altered once the dyadic conflictual situation 
of nationalistic rivalry is taken into consideration. Thus, as mentioned before, it is 
important to consider nationalism as a significant explanatory factor in explaining not 
only ethnic conflict but also interstate conflict. 
 
Implications of the Thesis 
In addition to the aforementioned arguments of the thesis, the general theoretical and 
empirical focus of this thesis has implications for other sets of the literature on interstate 
conflict. First, the large-N statistical analysis of the causation between nationalistic 
rivalry and revisionist behavior provides further explanations and empirics for the 
literature on revisionist states (Davidson 2006; Johnston 2003; Schweller 1994). While 
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this literature has offered significant insight into the cause of security dilemmas as will 
be discussed in Chapter 1, it has rarely provided a general theory to explain the origin of 
revisionist states (Davidson 2006, 11). Davidson (2006) exceptionally presents such a 
theory, yet it assumes that the presence of nationalists in domestic politics by definition 
increases the probability of revisionist foreign policy, rather than explaining why 
nationalists prefer revisionist to non-revisionist behavior (30). In addition, the literature 
has heavily relied on case studies for empirical evidence. There has been no systematic 
empirical investigation of the causes of revisionist foreign policy. In short, the statistical 
findings of the thesis complement the current status of the literature on revisionist 
states. 
  Second, the quantitative research design of nationalism and revisionist behavior in 
this thesis also suggests what the literature on quantitative studies of interstate conflict 
lacks now. This literature has mainly focused on the initiation or onset of militarized 
interstate disputes as the dependent variable and has rarely operationalized nationalism 
as the independent variable.8 However, the theoretical and empirical focus of the thesis 
on nationalism and revisionist behavior indicates that this literature will be enriched if it 
takes these two factors more seriously in empirics. Specific examples include the novel 
finding of the thesis that the pacifying effects of nuclear deterrence and liberal peace to 
reduce revisionist behavior are thwarted by nationalistic rivalry, suggesting that neither 
nuclear deterrence nor liberal peace can sufficiently tackle instability in the interstate 
system. 
  Third, the theory of nationalistic rivalry brings new insight to the literature on 
                                                 
8
 Exceptional quantitative studies on nationalism and interstate conflict include Cederman, 
Warren, and Sornette (2011), Mansfield and Snyder (2005), Schrock-Jacobson (2012), Wimmer 
and Min (2006), and Woodwell (2007). 
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interstate rivalry. As shown already, nationalistic rivalry as a distinctive subset of 
interstate rivalry has substantial explanatory power which other rivalries do not. Hence, 
the rivalry literature might find that its current status will be advanced by the theory of 
nationalistic rivalry. 
  Finally, the concept of nationalism suggests a way to overcome an ostensible gap 
between rational choice modelers and constructivists in the literature on international 
relations as well as conflict,9 since nationalism can be understood as the source of 
payoffs in rational choice terms and of identity in constructivist terms. In terms of 
rational choice theory, nationalism is the source of actors’ given preferences because it 
“has its own rules, rhythms and memories, which shape the interests of its bearers even 
more than they shape its contours, endowing them with a recognizably ‘nationalist’ 
political shape and directing them to familiar national goals” (Smith 2001, 3). In terms 
of constructivist theory, nationalism is the source of identity as it demarcates “self” and 
“other” along the lines of national identity. As the theory of nationalistic rivalry will 
imply, ideational factors such as nationalism influence how actors interpret material 
factors such as nuclear weapons or economic relations. 
  The thesis also has significant policy implications. If nationalism can be either a 
positive force of national integrity and self-defense or a negative force of revisionist 
foreign policy, it is essential to understand when the latter appears and how to prevent it. 
If nationalism is here to stay, will the catastrophe of the World Wars remain possible in 
the future, as “hyper-nationalism helped cause the two world wars” (Mearsheimer 1990, 
7)? This is a plausible concern, particularly given the analogy of the global financial 
crisis since late 2000s with the Great Depression in early 1930s. By the theory and 
                                                 
9
 For an exception, see Fearon and Wendt (2002). 
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empirical models of nationalistic rivalry, the thesis aims to develop an understanding of 
the causality between nationalism and revisionist behavior. It hopes that a better 
understanding of this causality will help to bring better insight into how to manage 
contemporary world politics. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of the thesis reflects a standard social-scientific research design: 
deductively develop a theory (including the clarification of key concepts), draw 
empirically testable hypotheses from this theory, test these hypotheses in light of 
empirical evidence by rigorous research methods, and discuss the implications of the 
results. The basic framework of the datasets to be analyzed in this thesis is created by 
EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000a), and the datasets unavailable in EUGene are merged 
by Stata (version 10.1). All replication datasets and codes are available on request. Most 
of the statistical analysis is conducted through Stata version 10.1 but the estimation of 
marginal effects is done on Stata version 13. The details of research designs for testing 
specific hypotheses are explained in the corresponding chapters. 
  The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 aims to set theoretical underpinnings for 
the argument of this thesis. To this end, it discusses a set of literature which is relevant 
to this thesis: revisionist states, interstate rivalry, nationalism, and social identity theory. 
The most important points of the chapter are summarized as follows. First, revisionist 
states are the fundamental source of instability in the interstate system, and should be 
measured by their behavior rather than by identity. Second, the chapter reviews the 
literature on interstate rivalry, and points out that the literature has failed to fully 
theorize the relationship between nationalism and interstate rivalry. Then, it defines 
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nationalism as the political ideology which advocates the norm that a community which 
is distinctive due to its territorial statehood, ethnicity, or both, should govern its own 
affairs; and argues that the nation is a community defined by this norm. These 
definitions of nationalism and the nation in turn suggest methodological points. The unit 
of analysis in this thesis is the state or a pair of states (dyads), and to overcome the 
ambiguity surrounding the concept of the nation, the state, and ethnic groups, their 
relations with one another are clarified. The chapter also points out that the thesis 
focuses on the post-WWII period, as in this period nationalism has gained a distinctive 
status in the interstate system. The section on nationalism ends with a detailed rationale 
for the dichotomy of state-territorial nationalism and transstate-ethnic nationalism. 
Finally, the chapter focuses on social identity theory, which suggests that nationalism 
causes conflict only if nations see others as a threat to nationhood. 
  Drawing on Chapter 1, Chapter 2 develops the theory of nationalistic rivalry. It firstly 
conceptualizes and operationalizes nationalistic rivalry, and describes the data of 
nationalistic-rivalry dyads for the period of 1946-2001. Then, the chapter theorizes what 
conditions cause nationalistic rivalry, how nationalistic rivalry leads society specifically 
to revisionist state behavior, and what implications the dichotomy of state-territorial and 
transstate-ethnic nationalisms have for the causality between nationalistic rivalry and 
revisionist behavior. 
  The theoretical discussions in Chapter 2 generate the following nine hypotheses, 
which are empirically examined by statistical analysis in Chapter 3. 
 
H1. The higher the absolute level of ethnic heterogeneity in a less ethnically heterogeneous 
state in a dyad, the more likely the dyad is to experience nationalistic rivalry. 
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H2. The higher the absolute level of political instability in a more politically stable state in a 
dyad, the more likely the dyad is to experience nationalistic rivalry. 
H3. If the power holder ethnic group of the state has transborder ethnic kin in another state, 
the dyad is more likely to experience nationalistic rivalry. 
H4. If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to revisionist 
behavior than those without such rivalry. 
H5. If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to nationalist 
mobilization than those without such rivalry. 
H6. If states have a higher level of nationalist mobilization within nationalistic rivalry, they 
are more likely to resort to revisionist behavior. 
H7. In nationalistic-rivalry dyads, state-territorial nationalism is less prone to revisionist 
behavior than transstate-ethnic nationalism. 
H8. Mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry and mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic 
rivalry make a similar propensity for revisionist behavior. 
H9. In state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, state-territorial nationalism is 
less prone to revisionist behavior than transstate-ethnic nationalism. 
 
In Chapter 3, the details of statistical modeling for each hypothesis test are explicated, 
and the results of analysis are discussed in depth. It is found that empirical analysis 
accepts all hypotheses, although Hypothesis 7 is only weakly supported. 
Chapters 4 and 5 consider what implications existing conflict-mitigating factors have 
for the effect of nationalistic rivalry on revisionist behavior. Chapter 4 investigates 
whether nuclear deterrence reduces revisionist war behavior in nationalistic rivalry, and 
Chapter 5 examines whether jointly democratic dyads, economic interdependence, and 
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intergovernmental organizations – the liberal peace elements – reduce revisionist 
behavior in nationalistic rivalry. In both chapters, large-N statistical analysis presents 
results unsupportive for nuclear deterrence and liberal peace theories, and small-N case 
studies of India-Pakistan, Greece-Turkey, and China-Japan illuminate causal 
mechanisms whereby nationalistic rivalry compromises the theoretically expected 
pacifying effects of nuclear deterrence and liberal peace. Since the null findings in 
statistical models do not automatically guarantee that there is no effect, case studies help 
to complement empirical analysis. 
  Finally, the concluding chapter sums up the arguments, notes the limitation of this 
thesis, discusses implications for the literature and further research, and presents policy 
implications for better international peace and security. Admitting that the focus of the 
thesis is limited, I argue that it still develops our understanding of the causality between 
nationalism and revisionist state behavior. 
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Chapter 1 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical underpinnings for this thesis. The first section 
explains how revisionist states destabilize the interstate system. The second reviews the 
literature on interstate rivalry. The third defines nationalism and the nation, and 
discusses their relations with states, ethnic groups, and the interstate system. Finally, the 
chapter focuses on social identity theory to explain how difference in social identity 
results in hostility and conflict between groups. 
 
Significance of Revisionist States in Interstate Politics 
As briefly mentioned in the introduction chapter, revisionist states increase instability in 
the interstate system. This section explains in greater detail how they do so, to make it 
clear why revisionist states are problematic for international peace and security. 
  While quantitative research on interstate conflict usually focuses on the initiation or 
onset of interstate conflict, International Relations (IR) theories sometimes use the 
dichotomy of revisionist and status-quo states (e.g., Davidson 2006; Johnston 2003; 
Morgenthau 2006; Schweller 1994).1 Revisionist states are referred to as those that are 
dissatisfied with the status quo in interstate politics and intend to revise it by military 
means. Status-quo states are defined as those which are satisfied with the status quo and 
are motivated to preserve it.2 Given the above definition of revisionist states, if states 
                                                 
1
 Morgenthau uses “imperialist” rather than “revisionist” to describe the states which challenge 
the status quo of distribution of power in the interstate system. 
2
 This definition parallels the one by Davidson (2006, 12-14). 
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seek to change the status quo only by peaceful means (such as negotiation and 
diplomacy), they should also be categorized as status-quo states. To avoid 
terminological confusion, the thesis uses “non-revisionists” as the antonym for 
revisionists. 
  It might be debatable which point of time should be regarded as the status quo to 
define a state as a revisionist or not. For example, if a territory used to belong to one 
state (e.g., a decade ago) but was annexed by another state, and if the former claimed on 
the territorial rights over it, it would be a revisionist in terms of the past decade but 
could be interpreted as a non-revisionist in reference to the time further back. The thesis 
assumes that the reference point of time is the situation immediately before a militarized 
dispute occurs. This assumption cannot avoid the problem entirely at the operational 
level, as the very reference point, i.e., when a militarized dispute starts and ends, might 
also be contested (which would raise a challenge not only to this thesis but also to the 
entire conflict literature). Admitting this ambiguity, the thesis relies on the existing data 
(Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996) to operationalize 
revisionist states in the next chapter. 
  Revisionist states are a source of fear for security-seeking states in interstate anarchy. 
Structural defensive realists argue that the security dilemma derived from the structural 
self-help imperative of interstate anarchy causes interstate conflict, due to fear of 
aggression by other states as well as uncertainty of the intentions of these states. For 
example, Waltz (1979, 63-64) argues that reductionist theories (i.e., those which 
attribute a systemic propensity for war and peace to characteristics of, and interactions 
between, units) would predict that, if there were more warlike states, the system would 
be more war-prone, and if there were more stable states, the system would be more 
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stable. Against this view, Waltz contends that even if all states were stable, they “would 
nevertheless remain insecure; for the means of security for one state are, in their very 
existence, the means by which other states are threatened” (64). 
Waltz is correct in that he emphasizes that reductionist theories lack the viewpoint of 
systemic causal effects on units. However, the security dilemma cannot occur unless 
states know from history that some state has a revisionist aim and resorts to aggression. 
This is because, as Schweller (1996, 119) argues, “the concept of the security 
dilemma…rests on the assumption that some states are misperceived to be either 
currently harboring aggressive designs, or that they may become aggressive in the 
future.” Schweller asks “why, in the absence of any history of aggressors, states would 
arm for security” (118). If there had never been a revisionist threatening the status quo 
of others in world history, there should be no idea of aggressors and, therefore, no 
rationale that states must be worried about aggressors. Therefore, if all states were 
non-revisionists, there should be no interstate conflict. History tells us that some states 
are non-revisionists and some are revisionists. 
According to Davidson (2006, 10), the Wars of the French Revolution and of 
Napoleon, the Second World War, the Korean War, and the Gulf War were all “driven by 
revisionists.” However, being revisionists does not necessarily mean being aggressors, 
namely initiators of conflict (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004, 138-139). A 
non-revisionist might be an initiator of conflict with a revisionist, if the latter incited the 
former to take a militarized action. The fear of revisionist aggression leads the 
non-revisionist to resort to conflict. In short, the potential/actual presence of revisionists 
increases conflict among states in the interstate system, and if interstate conflict is to be 
mitigated, it is essential to understand the causes of revisionism. 
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  The question is how states (and outside observers in general) perceive others as 
revisionists or non-revisionists. Whereas we can never be sure of what others think, 
behavior (namely, what they say and what they do) informs states of others’ intention. 
Surely revisionists are not only the matter of their behavior but also that of their 
nature/identity. However, as Davidson (2006, 14) points out, “revisionists and 
status-quo seekers [non-revisionists] do not by definition pursue revisionist and 
status-quo [non-revisionist] policies” (emphasis original). Behavior is much more 
influential on the decision making of other states than identity, because states can 
perceive the presence of revisionist states and fear aggression only through seeing what 
others do. As long as states with revisionist identity do not engage in revisionist 
behavior (which can range from a verbal threat to full-scale war), they are equal to 
non-revisionists for other states. On the other hand, even states with the identity of 
non-revisionists might be perceived as revisionists by others, based on what they do 
(e.g., preventive war for a self-defense purpose). Therefore, the thesis distinguishes 
revisionist states from non-revisionist ones by their behavior. 
 
Interstate Rivalry 
Scholars on rivalry used to focus on “enduring rivalries,” dyads which pass a certain 
threshold of temporal density of militarized interstate disputes.3 However, recently the 
focus has shifted to rivalry per se, such as issues in dispute or states’ perception, rather 
than a specific temporal dispute-density (e.g., Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007; 
Dreyer 2010, 2012; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006; Mitchell and Thies 2011; Thompson 
and Dreyer 2012). Issues at dispute are a necessary but insufficient condition for rivalry. 
                                                 
3
 For a brief summary, see Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007, 36-55). 
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Dreyer (2012, 472) states, “Rivalries are rooted in contending issue claims.” Yet, 
although many dyads have issues at dispute, only few of them are rivals in a 
conventional, military way. For example, while Japan and the United States experienced 
trade/currency disputes in the late 20th century, the two were not rivals in a 
conventional, military way. Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007, 25) provides a more 
rigorous definition of rivalry: a situation where states “regard each other as (a) 
competitors, (b) the source of actual or latent threats that pose some possibility of 
becoming militarized, and (c) as enemies.” 
  In this definition of rivalry, a competitor status is more complicated than it looks. 
Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007, 31-32) explain that if dyads had power 
asymmetry (such as Denmark-USSR in the Cold War), the weaker state would see a 
threat from the stronger state as being too difficult to address by itself, and the stronger 
would regard a threat from the weaker as being too insignificant to deal with seriously. 
However, Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson (2007, 32) also note that there are some 
exceptions in which rivalry emerged even in power asymmetry, and that “[u]ltimately, it 
depends on the decision-makers and their perceptions of sources of threat and who their 
enemies are.” 
What these two apparently inconsistent points suggest is that a competitor status does 
not mean power symmetry. Power symmetry (i.e., relative power) is one factor which 
causes threat perception; however, so are geography and the capability of power 
projection (i.e., absolute power). For instance, if two states in power asymmetry were 
proximate to each other, that power asymmetry could be reduced by the state-sponsored 
insurgency of the weaker state. Although India has been more powerful than Pakistan in 
terms of conventional military forces, India has still felt a threat due to Pakistan’s 
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state-sponsored insurgency in Kashmir. Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) even show that 
the majority of rivalries are power-asymmetrical. Thus, power symmetry is not a 
necessary condition for a competitor status. 
  In the rivalry literature, scholars have paid attention to largely two points (which are 
also related to each other). One is the effect of rivalry on interstate/domestic politics 
(e.g., Colaresi 2004; Colaresi and Thompson 2002; Mitchell and Prins 2004; Rasler and 
Thompson 2000; Vasquez 1996). The other is the process and dynamics of rivalry per se 
(e.g., Bennett 1996; Colaresi 2005; Cornwell and Colaresi 2002; Dreyer 2012; Goertz 
and Diehl 1995; Hensel 1999; Morey 2011; Rudkevich, Travlos, and Diehl 2013).4 As 
will be shown in Chapter 2, this thesis firstly illustrates the causes of nationalistic 
rivalry and then its effects on state behavior. 
  It is important to emphasize that interstate rivalry and interstate conflict are different 
concepts. Interstate conflict is defined as an event in which a state resorts to a specific 
militarized action against another state. This definition draws on the Militarized 
Interstate Disputes (MID) dataset (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996; Ghosn, Palmer and 
Bremer 2004), which is a widely used dataset of interstate conflict. Jones, Bremer and 
Singer (1996) define MIDs as “united historical cases in which the threat, display of use 
of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the 
government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another 
state” (168) and – citing Small and Singer (1982) – war as “[w]hen militarized interstate 
disputes evolve, or escalate, to the point where military combat is sufficiently sustained 
that it will result in a minimum of 1,000 total battle deaths” (171). 
                                                 
4
 A recent interesting application of rivalry is the one to transnational terrorism between 
international rivals by Findley, Piazza, and Young (2012). 
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  Interstate rivalry is a situation where states perceive each other as threatening and 
competing enemies (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007, 25). An interstate conflict 
can occur outside interstate rivalry. For example, the United States and Afghanistan 
were too asymmetric to be rivals, but the former initiated war against the latter in 2001 
after the 9.11 terrorist attacks. Meanwhile, interstate rivals may not always engage in 
interstate conflict. For example, India and Pakistan have been rivals since their 
independence from British India, but according to the MID dataset, have not engaged in 
armed conflict every year. Nonetheless, scholars of interstate rivalry, despite their 
different coding schemes, agree that a small number of rivals account for a large number 
of interstate conflicts (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007, 3; Maoz and Mor 2002, 
3-4).5 In short, rivals are a significant subset of dyads for the study of interstate conflict, 
especially given that, according to Wendt (1999, 314), the interstate system itself shifted 
from a war-dominant Hobbesian system to a limitedly conflictual Lockean system in the 
17th century, initially in Europe, and now is shifting to a peaceful Kantian system. In 
other words, interstate rivals are the residuals, or anomalies, left behind in the shift to 
more peaceful systems.6 
The concept of rivalry is significant in understanding the relationship between 
nationalism and interstate relations. A nationalist discourse often refers to a threatening 
“other” to mobilize society (Kaufman 2001; Snyder 2000). Rivalry could serve as a 
reference point for the governing nation of one state to interpret the intention and 
behavior of the counterpart of another state, not only when these states are engaged in 
                                                 
5
 According to the coding scheme of rivalry by Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007, 21), 
“rivals…have opposed each other in 58 (77.3 percent) of 75 wars since 1816,” “41 (87.2 
percent) of 47 wars” in the 20th century, and “21 (91.3 percent) of 23 wars” since 1945. 
6
 See also Rousseau (2006, 232). 
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 31
conflict but also when they are not fighting but still hostile to each other. In other words, 
rivalry captures a specific type of situation (rather than event like conflict) which could 
influences national decision-making in a particular way. 
The literature on interstate rivalry has failed to fully theorize the relationship between 
nationalism and interstate rivalry. The thesis intends to theorize this relationship in the 
next chapter. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to understand what nationalism 
is, and how it causes conflict. The rest of this chapter addresses these questions.  
 
Nationalism and the Nation 
Definition 
Any study on nationalism must define what it exactly means by saying “nationalism” 
and “nation,” as “perhaps the central difficulty in the study of nations and nationalism 
has been the problem of finding adequate and agreed definitions of the key concepts, 
nation and nationalism” (Hutchinson and Smith 1994, 3-4). In addition, as Motyl (1992, 
308) properly points out, “[t]he task before scholars is not to impose a uniform meaning 
[of nationalism] on their colleagues, which would be impossible both practically or 
epistemologically, but to ensure that the way nationalism is used in their own tests is 
uniform” and “[i]nternal consistency is the goal” (emphasis original). Therefore, it is 
imperative to define what nationalism and the nations mean in this thesis for its own 
purpose, although the meanings should not deviate too far from the ordinary ones if the 
thesis is to be communicative and realistic. 
  While nationalism is an oft-used term in discourse regarding political, social, or 
cultural phenomena, it is actually a daunting task to define it in a clear and consistent 
manner. This is because, as Motyl (1992, 307) states, nationalism is “a word that 
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resonates with a number of different meanings.” In the Oxford Dictionaries (2014b), 
nationalism is defined in three ways: (1) “Patriotic feeling, principles, or efforts”; (2) 
“An extreme form of patriotism marked by a feeling of superiority over other 
countries”; (3) “Advocacy of political independence for a particular country.” If we 
assume that the Oxford dictionaries reflect well what the term means in common usage, 
the problem of thinking about nationalism lies in its diverse meaning. On the one hand, 
the first two definitions assume that nationalism is equated with patriotism, or the 
feeling of loyalty and love for one’s own country, with or without a feeling of 
superiority. This means that these definitions assume that people who hold nationalism 
have their own state. On the other hand, the third definition says that nationalism seeks 
political independence as a state. It is sure that nationalism is relevant to both existing 
states, such as China, Japan, Russia, or Ukraine, and stateless groups, such as Kurds, 
Palestinians, Kashmiris, or Scots. Hence, we need a definition of nationalism 
overarching these ordinary meanings in a consistent way. 
  To this end, the thesis builds its own definition of nationalism based on the modernist 
and ethno-symbolist theories of nationalism.7 Both modernism and ethno-symbolism 
                                                 
7
 The thesis does not consider primordialism, which argues that nations have existed since 
primordial times and they are a natural form of human collectivity. Primordialism assumes that 
nations are out there waiting to be awakened. This assumption is problematic, because it 
implicitly supports the determinist view that conflict between nations is impossible to resolve 
due to “ancient hatred,” which is widely rejected in conflict studies these days (see Cederman 
2002, 414). According to Ozkirimli’s (2010, 67-69) survey of the recent primordialist literature, 
primordialism has some merit in that it sheds different light on the interpretation of the nation 
and nationalism by looking at pre-modern “nations” or “nationalism.” Even this new 
primordialist literature is not free from criticisms, however. First, its “understanding of national 
identities and cultures is static, at times essentialist, their account of nation formation 
reductionist and teleological,” and it commits “the tendency to project modern concepts and 
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argue that nationalism seeks the self-governance of a nation. For example, modernist 
Gellner (2006, 1) defines nationalism as “primarily a political principle, which holds 
that the political and the national unit should be congruent,” and ethno-symbolist Smith 
(2001, 9) defines it as “[a]n ideological movement for attaining and maintaining 
autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to 
constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’.”8 
  Modernism and ethno-symbolism disagree on the way nations have emerged. On the 
one hand, modernism argues that modernization processes brought about nationalism, 
and nations were the product of nationalism (Gellner 2006). Gellner (2006, esp. ch.4) 
attributes the emergence of nationalism mainly to industrialization, Anderson (2006, esp. 
ch.3) to “print-capitalism,” Breuilly (1993, esp. 20-21) to “modern state centralization,” 
and Hechter (2000, esp. 24-29, 35-37, ch.4) to the “direct rule” of people and territory 
by the central government.9 
  On the other hand, ethno-symbolism points out that ethnicity, which had existed 
before nations emerged, plays an important role as a baseline in forming a nation (Smith 
1991; Ozkirimli 2010, ch.5). Smith (1986, 22-30) defines ethnicity as the collective 
                                                                                                                                               
categories onto earlier social formations” (Ozkirimli 2010, 69). Second, it remains moot 
whether pre-modern nations and nationalism should be treated in the same way as modern 
nations and nationalism (Ozkirimli 2010, 70). 
8
 Derivatives of the terms nationalism and nations are used in the following senses: “national” = 
“relating to or characteristic of a nation; common to a whole nation” (Oxford Dictionaries 
2014a); “nationalist” = a person who holds or promotes nationalism; “nationalistic” = carrying a 
nationalist sentiment.  
9
 Quantitative empirical evidence for these modernist theories is mixed. Wimmer and Feinstein 
(2010) argue that their macro-historical empirical models do not support modernist theories. 
Meanwhile, Robinson (2014) finds from her micro-foundational empirical models that, among 
African states, modernization has contributed to the rise of state-based national identity. 
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identity of ethnic communities which are based on “a collective name,” “a common 
myth of descent,” “a shared history,” “a distinctive shared culture,” “an association with 
a specific territory,” and “a sense of solidarity.” Nieguth (1999, 160-161) suggests that 
ethnic groups may emphasize one of these criteria over the others as the basis of their 
ethnicity, and in terms of some remaining criteria, the members of these groups may be 
heterogeneous. The difference between ethnic groups and nations is that the former are 
cultural and social while the latter are political as well (Smith 1991, 99). As Connor 
(1994a, 45) argues, “a nation is a self-aware ethnic group” while ethnic groups that are 
not aware of their uniqueness are not nations.10 For ethno-symbolism, nationalism 
transforms ethnic groups to nations rather than creating nations out of nothing. 
  It would be a tough task to decide whether modernism or ethno-symbolism is more 
valid on the origin of nations. Fortunately, this debate is not relevant to this thesis, as it 
focuses on the time period when nationalism has already prevailed (more details later). 
The important point is that, in terms of either modernism or ethno-symbolism, 
nationalism forms nations. 
  The nation is well-conceptualized by Anderson (2006, 6): as an “imagined political 
community.” Because nationalism advocates the political norm of self-governance, a 
community engendered by it is also political. The nation is “imagined because the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, 
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion” (Anderson 2006, 6). To add to Anderson’s argument, the nation is 
voluntarily imagined. This is because “the nation is a self-defined rather than an 
                                                 
10
 The difference between Smith and Connor is that the former recognizes territorial statehood 
as the other basis of nations while the latter confines nations to ethnic nations. See Smith (1991) 
and Connor (2004). 
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other-defined grouping” and what the group members believe regarding the nation (e.g., 
the origin, nature, or destiny) do not have to be true (Connor 1994a, 37). 
  Because Anderson’s definition of the nation is so general, there is also a danger that 
the concept of the nation becomes a catchall and too ambiguous to be analytically useful. 
For example, the European Union or the United Nations can be thought as a type of an 
imagined political community, but it is unusual to regard them as “nations.” Other 
scholars suggest that either statehood or ethnicity can be the basis of nations. On the one 
hand, Breuilly (1993, 2) argues that nationalism is “political movements seeking or 
exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments.” This 
argument suggests that statehood shapes a national contour, given that nationalism 
defines nations. On the other hand, Connor (1994b, 2004) confines nations to ethnic 
nations; hence, he writes: “Is there a Basque, Polish, or Welsh nation? Yes. Is there an 
American, British, or Indian nation? No” (2004, 37). Smith (1991) provides a 
middle-grounded view; the basis of nations is either territorial statehood or ethnicity 
(82-83), or a mix of them (13).11 The thesis relies on this middle-grounded view to 
define nationalism and the nation. 
  While the aforementioned definition of ethnicity by Smith (1986, 22-30) is more 
objectivist and seems to conflict with the modernist ontology, ethnicity can also be 
understood as a social construction like the modernist understanding of the nation. 
Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009, 325) defines ethnicity as “a subjectively 
experienced sense of commonality based on a belief in common ancestry and shared 
culture” (emphasis added). This constructivist definition of ethnicity indicates that the 
                                                 
11
 See also Brubaker (1999) and Nieguth (1999). Further discussion follows later in terms of the 
civic-ethnic dichotomy of nationalism. 
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concept of ethnicity can be harmonious with the modernist ontology of the nation as a 
social construction. 
  Drawing on the discussions so far, the thesis now defines nationalism as the political 
ideology which advocates the norm that a community which is distinctive due to its 
territorial statehood, ethnicity, or both, should govern its own affairs and the nation as a 
community defined by this norm. The use of both territorial statehood and ethnicity as a 
criterion for nationhood allows both state-owning groups and stateless groups to be 
considered as the advocates of nationalism and, therefore, as nations. 
  Six implications of nationalism in terms of this thesis need to be mentioned. First, if 
nationalism advocates the political norm of self-governance, it guides a political 
movement, as Smith’s aforementioned definition of nationalism indicates. Nationalism 
leads to a political movement to achieve and maintain the self-governance of a socially 
constructed imagined political community, the nation, and national members are 
required to serve this nationalist objective. It is important to note that nationalism does 
not necessarily represent all members, as Smith’s aforementioned definition of 
nationalism also implies.12 In general, only parts of populations, particularly those who 
have power, can actually mobilize nationalism. For example, the nationalism of a 
dictatorial government may be mobilized only by a handful of elites in the government, 
and the voice of the masses may be suppressed. 
  Second, nation-states are a specific product of nationalism, i.e., the complete 
congruence of the nation and the state. Therefore, nation-states exist if and only if 
nationalism successfully creates them. The lack of a nation-state does not evidence the 
                                                 
12
 “An ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a 
population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’” (Smith 
2001, 9, emphasis added). 
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absence of nationalism; it may be in the process of nation-state formation. In the process 
of nation-state formation, nations might be seeking statehood, or might already have 
their own states yet be attempting to assimilate non-members and/or to incorporate 
members outside the state boundaries to the nation-state framework. The completion of 
nation-state formation does not mean the end of nationalism either. As Billig (1995) 
argues, nations are reproduced to maintain established nation-states in their everyday 
life by “banal nationalism.” To further this point, banal nationalism can be observed 
even if the nation and the state are not completely congruent. Nationalism may cease to 
be active in seeking a higher degree of congruence due to some political, social, or 
economic constraints. In this case, banal nationalism will maintain the status quo of 
incomplete nation-state congruence. 
  Third, nationalism in itself is not a driver of conflict. As mentioned in the 
introduction chapter, one’s pursuit of nationalism does not have to, and often does not, 
conflict with another’s. Hence, the common belief that nationalism is dangerous is 
actually a biased conceptualization of nationalism. This bias may be due to people’s 
tendency to see their own nationalism as benign patriotism and others’ nationalism as 
malign xenophobia (Billig 1995, ch.3). 
  Fourth, as Billig (1995) suggests, nationalism may be inactive or forgotten once 
nations are satisfied with a degree of congruence between the nation and the governing 
unit, but once a threat to nationhood emerges, it will be awakened as a powerful 
political force to counteract the threat. Thus, the saliency of nationalism and national 
identity is, at least partly, determined in reference to a specific “other.” 
  Fifth, the counter-principle of nationalism is internationalism: nations should not 
govern their own affairs but other political units which transcend national boundaries 
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should do. Internationalism is more likely to outweigh nationalism if individuals expect 
that their interest is maximized by international activities. The Responsibility to Protect 
(ICISS 2001) is a typical example of internationalism, as it insists that the international 
community should intervene in states where human rights violations are going on. The 
interest of the advocates is to enable the international community to prevent human 
rights violations within states, and it requires them to overcome the non-intervention 
principle of sovereignty; therefore, they pursue internationalism rather than nationalism. 
Neither nationalism nor internationalism is a binary phenomenon; both can exist to 
some degree, but the degree of one’s presence depends on that of the other’s. In other 
words, when nationalism waxes, internationalism wanes; and vice versa.  
  Sixth, the ontological implication of nationalism is that both nations and states are not 
fixed but fluid entities. Nationalism defines, namely socially constructs, a nation and 
aims to achieve and maintain its self-governance. However, the congruence of the 
nation and the governing unit waxes and wanes. If the nation and the governing unit are 
matched, nationalism attempts to preserve it. This congruence, however, can be broken, 
either if some internal group constructs its own nation and seeks political autonomy, or 
if a state tries to annex part of another state’s territory where its ethnic kin live (i.e., 
irredentism). This understanding of the nation and the state parallels the ontology of 
what Cederman (2002, 419) calls “systemic nation-constructivism,” i.e., a “doubly 
constructivist perspective, endogenizing not only nations but also states.” Both nations 
and states construct one another, and their boundaries are changeable. This ontological 
implication suggests that the concept of nationalism has significant methodological 
aspects, which are discussed in greater detail below. 
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Methodological Aspects of Nationalism and the Nation 
There are two methodological points which need to be explained. First, this thesis aims 
to examine the causality between nationalism and revisionist state behavior and, 
therefore, states (and a pair of states, i.e., dyads) are the unit of analysis. States and 
nations (and relevantly “interstate” and “international”) are often interchangeably used 
in IR literature but are not the same concepts. Likewise, nations are often equated with 
ethnic groups, although ethnic groups and states are not interchangeably used. Connor 
(1994b, 89) lamented this kind of a “terminological chaos” surrounding the study of 
nationalism. To clarify what the thesis means, I describe the definitions of ethnic groups, 
the state, and the nation as follows:13 
 
• Ethnic group: groups who have “a subjectively experienced sense of commonality 
based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture” (Wimmer, Cederman, and 
Min 2009, 325) 
• State: the political unit having sovereignty in the interstate system14 
• Nation: the political community of people which believe its affairs should be 
governed by themselves and not by other peoples, and which are distinguishable by 
territorial statehood, ethnicity, or both 
                                                 
13
 I refer to these definitions here, because how to relate nations, ethnic groups, and states to 
one another is a methodological (or ontological and epistemological) choice. For example, if 
one took “methodological nationalism,” an approach which assumes that nation-states are a 
natural unit of analysis, he/she would assume that a nation is equal to a state. Meanwhile, as 
already discussed, the thesis relies on Cederman’s (2003) “doubly constructivist perspective.” 
14
 By sovereignty, I denote that “states [have] a right to govern themselves however they chose, 
free from outside interference or intervention” (Glanville 2013, 1). According to Glanville, this 
meaning has actually prevailed since 1945 with the establishment of the United Nations (2, 7-9). 
As discussed later, the temporal scope of the thesis is also the post-WWII period. 
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 40
As in the case of defining nationalism and the nation, these definitions are set only for 
the analytical purpose of the thesis. The aim of the thesis is to study the causality 
between nationalism and revisionist behavior, and I do not intend to argue that the 
above definitions are superior to others in the literature. 
  Nations may or may not have their own state (state-owning nations and stateless 
nations). Stateless nations (such as Kurds) usually define their nationhood by ethnicity, 
because they do not have their own territorial statehood, but it is also possible that 
multiple ethnic groups seek common statehood under which all of them will compose 
the territorial-state nation. Because the unit of analysis in this thesis is states or dyads, 
stateless nations do not constitute observations in the dataset – though they could be 
used as a factor in explaining interstate relations (e.g., see Woodwell 2007). Hereafter, if 
the thesis simply refers to nations, it means state-owning nations. 
  State-owning nations usually use both territorial statehood and ethnicity as their 
national identifier in the arena of interstate politics. If there is only one ethnic group in a 
state, all of the nation, the ethnic group, and the state share the same boundary. This is 
the case where the terminological chaos “A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic 
Group” (Connor 1994a) is most likely to happen. 
  If there is more than one ethnic group in a state, each ethnic group can become a 
nation in terms of ethnicity but may not necessarily match the state boundary. If only 
one ethnic group aligns with the state government, it is the only state-owning nation 
(e.g., the Han Chinese in the People’s Republic of China) but its boundary still does not 
perfectly match the boundary of the state, because other ethnic groups occupy some 
space as stateless nations in the state (e.g., Tibetans and Uighurs in the case of the PRC). 
In this case, ethnicity (the Han Chinese) more than territorial statehood (the state of the 
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PRC) shapes the state-owning nation. If more than one ethnic group aligns with the state 
government, they compose one state-owning nation (e.g., British consisting of four 
ethnic groups: the English, the Scottish, the Welsh, and the Northern Irish – albeit not 
all people of each group, such as Scottish or Irish “nationalists,” would identify 
themselves with the British nation). In this case, territorial statehood (Britain) more than 
the ethnicity of each ethnic group forms the state-owning nation, although the British 
territorial-state nationhood might also be able to create the British “ethnicity.” Thus, it is 
difficult to clearly delineate purely ethnic or territorial-state nations (Brubaker 1999; 
Nieguth 1999), and this is why I define nations in terms of territorial statehood, ethnicity, 
or both. 
 
Figure 1-1: Types of relations between nations and states 
 
The squares: states 
The ovals/circles and their size: nations and the level of their political power 
The rounded rectangular shape: an internationalist norm 
 
  The types of relations between nations and states in the interstate system are 
summarized in Figure 1-1. They are ideal types, and the examples mentioned below 
may not necessarily match them exactly. Each of the six squares represents a state and 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
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composes the interstate system. Each oval/circle signifies a nation, and its size 
represents the level of political power and not the size of the group population. The 
white area within states can be considered as the ethnic groups which are not mobilized 
to be nations, or as remote areas where no one lives. Finally, for reference purposes, the 
rounded rectangular shape denotes an internationalist norm, such as communism, which 
covers more than one nation. I explain each of the three cases from left to right. 
  In Case 1, the national boundaries do not go beyond the state boundaries. In the 
above case, a state has only one nation and, therefore, an ideal type of nation-state, such 
as South Korea. Multiethnic states are also considered in this category if territorial 
statehood forms the nation, such as the United States. In the below case, a state has two 
nations but the number of nations may be three, four, or more. The point is that there are 
multiple nations within states, but one dominates the state apparatus (i.e., the sole 
state-owning nation) while the other(s) is/are marginalized (i.e., stateless nations). China 
is close to this type. 
  In Case 2, the above nation is the state-owning nation in the upper state but not in the 
lower state. This is a typical case of irredentism. India-Pakistan is an example, as 
Pakistan has an irredentist cause over Kashmir, wherein Pakistani transborder ethnic kin 
live but are marginalized in the whole Indian state. Although the figure does not indicate 
the presence of marginalized nations within either of the states, it is possible. 
  In Case 3, one nation covers two states. This is a typical case of a national unification 
movement. As in Case 2, while not indicated, it is possible that these states also include 
minority groups, but the transstate nation dominates the government in both states. 
China-Taiwan is an example, as both governments claimed that one was the 
representative government of the whole Chinese nation. 
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  If the state-owning nation includes more than one ethnic group, only the ethnic group 
which has the highest power is likely to be able to pursue irredentism and a national 
unification movement as the state-owning nation. If ethnic groups which are not 
powerful within a state attempted to pursue these foreign policies, other ethnic groups 
would be able to oppose and hinder such foreign policies that their success would 
change the balance of power among ethnic groups within the state. 
  The nation-state-ethnic boundaries are not static but dynamic, even though they do 
not change so often. For example, if an ethnic group had been part of the state-owning 
nation defined by the territorial statehood of multiethnic society but began to oppose the 
central government, it would become a stateless nation defined by ethnicity. Likewise, if 
an ethnic group had been part of the state-owning nation defined by the territorial 
statehood of multiethnic society but took over the whole government, the state-owning 
nation would be reframed as the nation defined by both territorial statehood and the 
ethnic group’s ethnicity whereas the remaining ethnic groups which had also constituted 
the state-owning nation could become stateless nations defined by ethnicity. The 
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia well-describes a dynamic process of 
nation-state-ethnic boundary making. The Yugoslav state-owning nation was defined by 
the territorial statehood of Yugoslavia while including several ethnic groups, such as 
Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, as coalition partners. However, after President Tito died 
and as the Cold War was ending, the Yugoslav territorial-state nationhood began to 
dissolve, as many of the ethnic groups began to define their nationhood by their own 
ethnicity rather than the territorial statehood of Yugoslavia. Croats, Bosniaks, Slovenes, 
and Macedonians chose to become independent from the state of Yugoslavia whereas 
Serbs became the dominant nation there. 
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 44
  The second methodological aspect of nationalism and the nation is that the thesis 
focuses on the post-WWII period, because it is the distinctive time in which nationalism 
has been the most influential (Connor 1994b, 37-38, 173). This focus is critical to 
develop an understanding of the causality between nationalism and revisionist behavior 
for policy making nowadays. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 101) quote Anthony 
O’Hear (1989, 43), who writes that, although “there may be no true universal theories, 
owing to conditions differing markedly through time and space,” “science could still 
fulfil [sic] many of its aims in giving us knowledge and true predictions about 
conditions in and around our spatio-temporal niche.” King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) 
argue that this point “applies even more strongly to the social sciences” (101) and that 
“[m]ost useful social science theories are valid under particular conditions…or in 
particular settings” (103). A (social) scientific theory needs not be idiosyncratic to each 
case and can be generalized, but to the extent that the preconditions for the theory to 
demonstrate its conditions exist in a specific spatial-temporal domain. Therefore, if the 
thesis aims to develop an understanding of the causality between nationalism and 
revisionist behavior for policy making nowadays, it needs to draw inference from 
empirical observations which share a similar context of world politics to the 
contemporary one. In other words, it is necessary to assure the “unit homogeneity” of 
nationalism. 
  Admittedly, nationalism began to spread in the world long before the Second World 
War (Smith 1991, 59). In particular, since the French Revolution, states have emulated 
and socialized nationalism as a powerful force of war (Kadercan 2012, 404-405; Posen 
1993).15 Wimmer’s (2013, 4) argument on the spread of nationalism and nation-states is 
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 Waltz (1979, 128) argues that “states will display characteristics common to competitors: 
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worth a lengthy quote:16 
 
Nationalism as a new principle of legitimacy emerged from Tilly’s war-making Western 
states. Increasing state centralization and military mobilization led to a new contract between 
rulers and ruled: the exchange of political participation and public goods against taxation and 
the military support by the population at large. The idea of the nation as an extended family 
of political loyalty and shared identity provided the ideological framework that reflected and 
justified this new compact. It meant that elites and masses should identify with each other 
and that rulers and ruled should hail from the same people. This new compact made the first 
nation-states of Great Britain, the United States, and France militarily and politically more 
powerful than dynastic kingdoms or land-based empires because they offered the population 
a more favorable exchange relationship with their rulers and were thus considered more 
legitimate. Ambitious political leaders around the world adopted this new model of statehood, 
hoping that they too would one day preside over similarly powerful states. These nationalists 
subsequently were able to establish new nation-states wherever the power configuration 
favored their ascent and allowed them to overthrow or gradually transform the old regime, 
leading to cascades of nation-state creations that altered the political face of the world over 
the past 200 years. 
 
In short, nationalism has influenced the shaping of world politics for more than two 
centuries. 
  Empirical evidence, however, also indicates the distinctive feature and significance of 
                                                                                                                                               
namely, that they will imitate each other and become socialized to their system.” 
16
 “Tilly” in the quote refers to Charles Tilly. 
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nationalism in the post-WWII period in comparison to the previous periods. 
Quantitatively, first, there has been a dramatic increase in the rate of colonial 
dependencies becoming independent states (Strang 1990, 849-850); in other words, as 
Anderson (2006, 113) says, “the nation-state tide reached full flood.” Second, a number 
of factors in explaining decolonization have different effects in the post-WWII period 
compared with the pre-WWII period, and a couple of such factors (the naval power of 
metropolitan states and self-governing institutions in the colonies) are statistically 
significant only in the post-WWII period (Strang 1990, 855-856). 
  Qualitatively, two significant (and mutually relevant) nationalist norms have been 
institutionalized in the interstate system. The United Nations (n.d.) has endorsed “the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” (Article 1). The meaning of 
sovereignty that “states [have] a right to govern themselves however they chose, free 
from outside interference or intervention” (Glanville 2013, 1) has prevailed since 1945 
with the establishment of the United Nations (2, 7-9). Furthermore, nationalism became 
influential even in absolute monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia (Determann 2014, esp. 
104; Nehme 1994). The absolute monarchy is a “least-likely” case for nationalism to 
function,17 because “Kingship organizes everything around a high centre” and “[i]ts 
legitimacy derives from divinity, not from populations, who, after all, are subjects, not 
citizens” (Anderson 2006, 19). 
  To recapitulate the two methodological points relevant to nationalism, the unit of 
analysis in this thesis is states or dyads. Nations, states, and ethnic groups are all 
somewhat related to one another, but are not the same things. The post-WWII period is 
distinctive from previous eras. The thesis focuses on it to assure the unit homogeneity of 
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 For generalization based on least-likely cases, see Levy (2008, 12). 
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nationalism. 
 
Civic-Ethnic Dichotomy Reconsidered 
Finally, this section discusses the oft-used civic-ethnic dichotomy of nationalism. As 
pointed out in the introduction chapter, nationalism can be characterized in 
contradictory ways to explain state behavior: a negative force of revisionist foreign 
policy on the one hand, and a positive force of self-defense and self-determination on 
the other hand. The dichotomy of “civic nationalism” and “ethnic nationalism” is the 
most well-known categorization to distinguish positive nationalism and negative 
nationalism (Brubaker 1999, 54). 
 
Figure 1-2: Relationship of the civic-ethnic dichotomy to the thesis’s definition of 
nationalism 
 
The left pole: the ideal type of territorial-statehood-based nationalism 
The right pole: the ideal type of ethnicity-based nationalism 
The dashed line: the point nationalism is based on territorial statehood and on ethnicity equally 
 
  According to Muller (2008, 20), civic nationalism is the idea that “all people who live 
within a country’s borders are part of the nation, regardless of their ethnic, racial, or 
Territorial-
statehood-based Ethnicity-based
Civic-ethnic dichotomy
Equally based on territorial
statehood and on ethnicity
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religious origins,” and ethnic nationalism is the idea that “nations are defined by a 
shared heritage, which usually includes a common language, a common faith, and a 
common ethnic ancestry.” In other words, in terms of this thesis’s definition of 
nationalism, civic nationalism is the ideal type of territorial-statehood-based nationalism 
(but implies the nationalism only found in democratic regimes, as pointed out later), and 
ethnic nationalism is the ideal type of ethnicity-based nationalism (see Figure 1-2). 
  It is widely accepted that civic nationalism is inclusive, liberal, democratic, and 
peaceful whereas ethnic nationalism is exclusive, illiberal, chauvinistic, and dangerous 
(e.g., Ignatieff 1993, 5-9; Muller 2008; Snyder 2000, 74, 80-82). The implication of the 
dichotomy for state behavior is that civic nationalism pursues a prudent, non-revisionist 
foreign policy while ethnic nationalism provokes a reckless, revisionist one.18 Brubaker 
(1999, 57) even points out that the use of the dichotomy “is often done in an ideological 
mode, to distinguish one’s own good, legitimate civic nationalism from the illegitimate 
ethnic nationalism of one’s neighbors or of other polities or movements, specified or 
implied” (see also Billig 1995, ch.3). Thus, the civic-ethnic dichotomy is both 
analytically and politically utilized and has a significant influence on the understanding 
of nationalism. 
  Despite its popularity, Brubaker (1999) and Nieguth (1999, 157-164) argue that the 
civic-ethnic dichotomy suffers from the conceptual ambiguity and ambivalence of 
definitional criteria. First, as Smith (1991, 13) points out, “every nationalism contains 
civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms.” On the one hand, 
Nieguth (1999, 161-162) contends that “even if the nation is not formally defined in 
                                                 
18
 For example, see Snyder (2000, 82). Snyder (2000) actually argues that “revolutionary” and 
“counterrevolutionary” nationalisms are the most conflict-prone. I do not consider them here, 
since they are specific categories for Snyder’s work. 
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terms of ethnicity, the culture of the dominant ethnic group will none the less be 
instituted as the norm.” The United States is such an example: it “allow[s] and 
require[s] immigrants to assimilate into the dominant mainstream culture” (Neiguth 
1999, 162). Thus, although “most often cited as paradigmatic of civic nationalism,” US 
nationalism also “involve[s] a crucial cultural component” (Brubaker 1999, 61). On the 
other hand, while it is often assumed that African states lack state-territorial nationhood 
due to the saliency of diverse ethnic identities and interethnic competition, 
cross-country empirical evidence actually suggests that modernization makes 
state-based national identity more salient than ethnic identity (Robinson 2014). Hence, 
it is difficult to draw a clear line between ethnic nationalism/nation and civic 
nationalism/nation in empirical cases.19 
  Second, as Brubaker (1999, 64) points out, “all understandings of nationhood and all 
forms of nationalism are simultaneously inclusive and exclusive” and “[w]hat varies is 
not the fact or even the degree of inclusiveness or exclusiveness, but the bases or criteria 
of inclusion and exclusion.” Thus, citizenship, the heart of civic nationalism, is also a 
form of exclusion for those who cannot obtain it (64-65). Therefore, it is implausible to 
attribute state behavior merely to the inclusiveness and exclusiveness of nationalism. 
  Third, the common usage of the concept of civic nationalism assumes democratic 
norms in its definition. Thus, civic nationalism “might be a proxy for democracy” 
(Schrock-Jacobson 2012, 838). Yet a non-democratic state can also be the framework of 
a nation (Brubaker 1999, 67), such as Tito’s Yugoslavia (see Smith 1986, 149-150). 
Hostile nationalism does not have to be based only on ethnicity either. A nation can be 
                                                 
19
 Other cases showing the duality of civic and ethnic components of nationalism are described 
in Smith (1991, 102-106). 
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multi-ethnic but agitated to hostile nationalism against others. Likewise, ethnic 
nationalism does not have to be violent. A nation can be ethnically homogenous but 
democratic and generally peaceful. Nationalism can be hostile, whether the nation is 
based on territorial statehood or ethnicity. 
  Brubaker (1999, 62) summarizes the difficulty of classifying nationalism based on the 
civic-ethnic dichotomy. If only either of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism were 
strictly defined, few cases would fit in the stricter category and the remaining would be 
too heterogeneous for the other one to be analytically useful. In terms of Figure 1-2, one 
category would cover all range except for the pole of the other category. Meanwhile, if 
both civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism were strictly defined, there would be “few 
instances of either one and a large middle ground that counts as neither,” and it would 
be no longer possible to “think of the civic-ethnic distinction as an exhaustive way of 
classifying types of manifestations of nationalism” (emphasis original). According to 
Figure 1-2, the dichotomy would not be able to cover the range apart from the two poles. 
Finally, if both of them were broadly defined, there would be “a large middle ground 
that could be classified either way, and one can no longer [think] of the civic-ethnic 
distinction as mutually exclusive” (emphasis original). In terms of Figure 1-2, the 
dichotomy would at best be unable to classify the middle point into either civic or ethnic 
nationalism and would at worst fail to differentiate a range around the middle point. For 
these reasons, the thesis’s definition of nationalism specifies a community which is 
distinctive due to its territorial statehood, ethnicity, or both. In other words, territorial 
statehood and ethnicity are not a dichotomy but continuum, unlike the civic-ethnic 
dichotomy. 
  To criticize the civic-ethnic dichotomy, Shulman (2002) proposes three categories of 
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nationalism (ethnic, civic, and cultural). In his definition, cultural components of 
nationalism, such as religion, language, and traditions, are removed from civic 
nationalism and ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism is defined only in terms of 
territory, citizenship, will and consent, political ideology, and political institutions and 
rights, while ethnic nationalism in terms of ancestry and race (559). However, this 
categorization also falls into the pitfall of ambiguity and ambivalence. It is doubtful that 
there are nations that do not promote cultural components of nationalism at all. Even 
Shulman himself argues that “an ethnic conception of the nation…logically leads to the 
promotion of the dominant ethnic group’s culture, because…a group’s common ethnic 
identity is expressed through its culture” (emphasis added). Shulman’s empirical 
analysis also shows that both civic and cultural components of national identity are, if 
not to the same degrees, observed within the same states in Western and Eastern/Central 
European regions (562-579). Thus, ethnic, civic, and cultural categories are not 
mutually exclusive either, and cannot be a plausible alternative to the civic-ethnic 
dichotomy. 
  Thus far, the civic-ethnic dichotomy has been rejected as a plausible analytical tool to 
distinguish different implications of nationalism. Then, the question is whether it is 
implausible to use a dichotomy to differentiate nationalism by any means. The answer is 
no; it is possible to differentiate nationalism by modifying the civic-ethnic dichotomy. 
For example, Brubaker (1999, 67-69) proposes as a “modest alternative” to the 
civic-ethnic dichotomy: “state-framed” nationalism and “counter-state” nationalism. 
Brubaker argues that “the notion of state-framed nationhood or nationalism enables us 
to talk about the way in which linguistic, cultural and even (narrowly) ethnic aspects of 
nationhood and nationalism may be framed, mediated, and shaped by the state” (68). In 
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counter-state nationalism, nationhood is “conceived as distinct from or in opposition to 
an existing state,” and “[needs] not be conceived in ethnic terms, or even, more loosely, 
in ethnocultural terms” (68). 
  Brubaker’s typology hints at how to differentiate state-based nationalism and 
ethnicity-based nationalism in a coherent way. Because the democratic aspect of civic 
nationalism makes the concept too narrow to cover state-based nations, it is plausible to 
replace it with territorial statehood, whether democracies or non-democracies. Although 
Brubaker himself argues that counter-state nationalism needs not be conceived in ethnic 
terms, ethnicity is still worth focusing on in the analysis of state behavior. This is 
because ethnicity has been one of the major identities that conflict studies have 
examined in recent decades (e.g., Carment and James 1995; Cederman, Gleditsch, and 
Buhaug 2013; Saideman and Ayres 2008; Wimmer 2013; Woodwell 2007). The focus on 
ethnicity, however, is not a rejection of Brubaker’s proposition but a fine-tuning in 
terms of conflict studies. 
Smith’s (1991) dichotomy of territorial/civic nationalism and ethnic/genealogical 
nationalism in independent states resembles Brubaker’s idea. Territorial nationalism 
seeks the establishment of a state where a group of people whose ethnicity is often 
diverse perceives themselves as a nation identified by the territorial state (Smith 1991, 
82). Thus, the basis of a nation in territorial nationalism is the territorial framework of a 
state and, therefore, it is state-framed nationalism. Ethnic nationalism pursues the 
creation of an ethnonational state, where an ethnic group is congruent as a nation by 
including the foreign territory wherein its ethnic kin reside (Smith 1991, 83). Thus, the 
basis of a nation in ethnic nationalism is transstate ethnicity and, therefore, it is 
counter-state nationalism. 
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  Focusing on transstate ethnic groups has merit in differentiating the effect of 
nationalism on state behavior for two reasons. First, previous studies have found that 
ethnonation-state incongruence causes interstate conflict (Carment and James 1995; 
Miller 2007; Saideman and Ayres 2008; Woodwell 2007).20  In other words, the 
presence of transstate ethnic groups undermines the state-territorial demarcation of 
nationhood. Second, and more importantly, the presence and absence of transstate ethnic 
groups rely on a (relatively) objective criterion, i.e., states. In the case of the 
civic-ethnic dichotomy, the demarcating criterion is whether nations are state-based or 
ethnicity-based, but this causes the ambiguity because a nation within states can include 
the elements of both civic and ethnic nationhood. However, in terms of transstate ethnic 
groups, the demarcating criterion is whether states have an ethnic group existing beyond 
territorial statehood, which is much clearer to distinguish. For these reasons, the thesis 
contrasts territorial statehood (which may include ethnic elements domestically) with 
transstate ethnicity (which could cause a motivation to expand territorial statehood to 
cover transstate ethnic groups beyond the current state borders). 
  Smith’s territorial-ethnic dichotomy, however, has three points to be discussed further. 
First, the term “territorial nationalism” might sound confusing as if it involved a 
territorial claim on an area outside the state framework based on transstate ethnicity, 
though this is actually the aim of ethnic nationalism. In Smith’s definition of territorial 
nationalism, not ethnicity but territorial statehood is the boundary shaping national 
identity. This thesis slightly modifies the term to state-territorial nationalism for the 
sake of clarification. 
                                                 
20
 Relevantly, it has been found that ethnicity-related territorial disputes are more prone to 
conflict and war than other types of territorial disputes and non-territorial ones. See Vasquez 
(2009, 373). 
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  Second, the term “ethnic nationalism” might also be ambiguous. According to the 
definition of state-territorial nationalism, the nationalism of ethnically homogenous 
states to seek status-quo statehood is state-territorial nationalism and not ethnic 
nationalism, even though the nation consists of the ethnic group. Miller (2007, 89) 
points out that both ethnically homogenous states and multi-ethnic states can be 
“[c]ongruent nation-states…in which there is a good match between the political 
boundaries of the state and the national loyalty of its population.” Ethnic nationalism, 
by Smith’s definition, must be targeted at ethnic kin outside the state territory. As the 
contrasting concept to state-territorial nationalism, the thesis uses the term 
“transstate-ethnic nationalism” rather than just “ethnic nationalism” to denote 
nationalism covering ethnic kin beyond state borders. 
  Finally, and most importantly, Smith’s definition of territorial nationalism and ethnic 
nationalism suggests that they pursue the physical integration of a nation. On the one 
hand, such a pursuit is always the case in state-territorial nationalism as its basis is the 
territory of a state; on the other hand, it may not necessarily be true of transstate-ethnic 
nationalism. For example, an ethnic homeland state might not necessarily aim to annex 
an ethnic enclave in another state into its own territory but might only provide indirect 
support for its ethnic kin (e.g., Turkey’s support of the partition of Cyprus into Greek 
and Turkish areas, i.e., taksim). Indirect support, however, also suggests the intention of 
the ethnic homeland state to exercise a political influence on its ethnic kin beyond state 
borders and, therefore, can be understood as the exercise of transstate-ethnic 
nationalism. 
To summarize the definition of the two types of nationalism, state-territorial 
nationalism defines nationhood in terms of territorial statehood, and transstate-ethnic 
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 55
nationalism defines nationhood in terms of transstate ethnicity. This does not mean that 
states concerned with transstate ethnicity do not care about their current territorial 
statehood. Depending on the situation, they would prioritize either transborder ethnic 
kin or the state for the nationalist objective of achieving and maintaining national 
autonomy, unity, and identity. The point is that if states have a transstate ethnic group, 
they are different from those that do not have such a group. Transstate-ethnic 
nationalism is more unique than state-territorial nationalism in the interstate system. 
Territorial statehood is the basis for survival of nations in interstate anarchy, while 
transstate ethnicity is observable only if states have transborder ethnic kin. 
The definition of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms suggests that the 
type of nationalism of one state varies depending on its relation with another state. 
Saideman and Ayres (2008, 12) argue that “[n]ationalisms define who is ‘us’ and who is 
‘them.’” Nationalism does not stand alone but needs a target, since without the “other” 
there is no distinction between “self” and “other.” 
I describe a few examples to illustrate this point more clearly. First, if states do not 
engage in conflict, this means that they mobilize neither state-territorial nationalism nor 
transstate-ethnic nationalism against each other, because their nationhood is already 
secured in relation with the other side.21 Second, if states are engaged in conflict, the 
type of nationalism they pursue differs depending on the nature of a nationalist issue at 
dispute. If both states have nationalist issues which do not involve transstate ethnic 
                                                 
21
 Of course these states may still have “banal nationalism,” or reproduce their nationhood 
throughout everyday unnoticed national symbols, such as a national flag (Billig 1995). Banal 
nationalism is irrelevant here, however, since it is about an internal practice for maintaining the 
nation while the nationalism that this paragraph focuses on is about an external relation with 
other states. 
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 56
groups, both pursue state-territorial nationalism against each other; if both of them have 
nationalist issues which involve transstate ethnic groups, both promote transstate-ethnic 
nationalism; and if only one side has a transstate ethnic issue and the other does not, the 
former pursues transstate-ethnic nationalism while the latter seeks state-territorial 
nationalism. Thus, the presence of a nationalist issue is a necessary condition for the 
pursuit of nationalism in dyadic relations, and the nature of the issue determines the 
type of nationalism dyad by dyad. 
As noted before, differentiating nationalism by state territory and transstate ethnicity 
avoids the problems that plague the civic-ethnic dichotomy, because what distinguishes 
state-territorial nationalism and transstate-ethnic nationalism is not homogenously civic 
or ethnic nationhood in the domestic realm like the civic-ethnic dichotomy but state 
territory and transstate ethnicity in the interstate realm. This point suggests that whilst 
nationalism frames “self” and “other,” who is “other” differs depending on whether the 
level of analysis is interstate or intrastate politics. The distinction in the level of analysis 
is important to avoid confusion about the implication of nationalism at different levels 
of analysis. On the one hand, both state-territorial nationalism and transstate-ethnic 
nationalism developed here deal with a relation between states. On the other hand, if a 
theory of nationalism focused on a relation between domestic actors within the same 
state (such as a relation between the government and a rebel group), its level of analysis 
would be intrastate and, therefore, a relation between a “self” and an “other” would be 
concluded within the state (e.g., the Turkish state government vs. the Kurdish 
separatists). 
Because state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms are defined at the level of 
interstate relations, they do not determine by themselves how a government treats 
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different ethnic groups from a dominant one within the state. It depends on its regime 
type rather than the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms. For 
example, on the one hand, if state-territorial nationalism were combined with a 
democratic regime, it would be so-called civic nationalism, inclusive to various ethnic 
groups within a state. On the other hand, if state-territorial nationalism were utilized in a 
military authoritarian regime, it could result in autocratic militarism, oppressive to 
ethnic minorities. Furthermore, it is possible for transstate-ethnic nationalism to be 
observed in democratic states. In such a case, the government could be tolerant to 
different ethnic groups within the state, even if one of these ethnic groups were the kin 
of a dominant ethnic group in the target state of one’s transstate-ethnic nationalism. This 
would be particularly likely if that ethnic group were not mobilized to oppose the 
transstate-ethnic nationalist foreign policy of the government. In short, the treatment of 
different ethnic groups at the intrastate level is a function of the regime type and 
domestic politics, rather than of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms. 
State-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms are theorized as factors determining a 
relation between states, not between actors within a state. The thesis supposes neither 
that state-territorial nationalism respects and protects the rights of all peoples inside a 
state, nor that transstate-ethnic nationalism necessarily creates a situation where the 
rights of different ethnic groups from a dominant one within a state are suppressed. 
 
Nationalism and Social Identity Theory 
As argued previously, nationalism defines a nation as a community which is distinctive 
due to its territorial statehood, ethnicity, or both. Hence, it delineates a group boundary 
between one’s own nation and the remaining others. This means that relations between 
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nations are a specific type of intergroup relation. Therefore, social identity theory 
(Tajfel and Turner 1986), which explains the dynamics of intergroup relations and 
conflict along the line of group/social identity, has many significant implications for 
studying the causality between nationalism and conflict. 
  According to Brewer (2001, 19-20), people have a cognitive process to categorize 
things. Cats and dogs are categorized to animals while apples and oranges to fruits. 
Likewise, people categorize others to different categories, such as family, local 
community, ethnicity, race, and nation, thereby creating social identity. Social identity 
helps to establish a “secure sense of self” (Seul 1999, 556), for example, to fulfill their 
needs for positive self-evaluations such as the sense of belonging, self-esteem, and 
self-actualization (Seul 1999, 554-556), and to overcome fear of mortality by the 
broader spatial and longer temporal realm of a group than that of individuals (Castano et 
al. 2002). To enable a secure sense of self through social identity, people seek group 
positivity (Seul 1999, 556; Tajfel and Turner 1986, 16). To this end, they differentiate 
their own group (in-group) from others (out-groups), and aim to feel superiority to 
out-groups (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 17). 
  Group identity makes its members have “a collective motivation to serve the 
purposes and goals on which the members’ individual identities, and the survival of the 
group, depend” (Seul 1999, 556). Group identity is not the mere sum of individual 
identity of the members nor is the individual identity of members the product of group 
identity (e.g., Hogg 1993); rather, both types of identity influence each other. This 
dynamic and endogenous relationship between group identity and individual identity 
parallels the structure-agency relationship (Giddens 1984; Archer 1995; King 2010). 
  National identity is a powerful social identity and persists in the long run because 
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nationhood has a much wider spatial and longer temporal realm than individuals (see 
Smith 1995, 160). Nationalism is a process whereby individuals seek their identity in 
and as a nation. In other words, national identity is both the cause and effect of 
individual identities. This endogenous relationship enables Cederman’s (2002, 419) 
aforementioned “systemic nation-constructivism,” i.e., a “doubly constructivist 
perspective, endogenizing not only nations but also states.” On the one hand, if agents 
(either individuals or subnational groups) find their current national identity illegitimate 
and have enough power to overcome the social structure of current national identity, 
they will reconstruct national identity in their own way. On the other hand, if agents are 
satisfied with their current national identity or do not have enough power to reconstruct 
it, the status-quo structure of national identity will last. 
  Tajfel and Turner (1986, 14) argue that people disproportionately favor in-group 
members against out-group members, even if disfavoring out-group members does not 
increase the benefits of the in-group.22 This in-group favoritism suggests that a simple 
cost-benefit calculation does not apply to intergroup relations, and that people see 
benefits in terms of “relative gains” rather than “absolute gains” when intergroup 
relations are present in their cognitive process.23 In other words, groups assess what 
in-group members gain relative to out-group members (or what the former lose relative 
to the latter) not in terms of an objective, purely mathematical way, but from the 
viewpoint of a subjective, biased way in favor of the in-group. This process does not 
mean that actors are irrational and emotion-laden; they are “rational” in their own way. 
                                                 
22
 In-group favoritism has received empirical support from psychological experiments (Tajfel 
and Turner 1986, 13-14). 
23
 For the relative-gain problem in International Relations, see Grieco (1990), Powell (1991), 
Snidal (1991), and Grieco, Powell, and Snidal (1993). 
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  However, the pursuit of group positivity and superiority and in-group favoritism do 
not need to end up with hostility towards out-groups. If group identity and intergroup 
relations are perceived as stable and legitimate among all groups, no group will need to 
challenge the status quo (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 22) and, therefore, there will be no 
conflict among groups. Brewer (2001, 27) and Tajfel and Turner (1986, 23) indicate that 
when people perceive out-group members as a threat to their own group, they feel 
hostility against the out-group. The objects to which people feel a threat may be 
material, such as economic resources, or may be non-material, such as power, status, or 
cultural homogeneity (Schneider 2008; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, 318; Meuleman, 
Davidov, and Billiet 2009, 354; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006, 428), as 
long as these objects are necessary for the good condition of one’s own group. 
  These insights from social identity theory illustrate the causality between nationalism 
and hostility. Nationalism by definition categorizes “self” and “other” through national 
identities. Nationalism is not a sufficient condition for hostility, but it causes hostility 
and conflict between nations when they perceive others as a threat to their own 
nationhood. For example, Smith (1991, 78) argues that “[t]he virtues [nationalism] 
celebrates are exclusively and solely those of the ‘national self’, and the crimes it 
condemns are those that threaten to disrupt that self.” Similarly, Gellner (2006, 1) writes 
that when the principle of nationalism (i.e., the congruence of the national and political 
units) is violated, it causes a nationalist sentiment of anger. 
  Hostility to out-groups is shaped in terms of intergroup relations, or social identities, 
rather than relations among individuals, or individual identities. Brewer (1991, 478) 
argues, “Evidence for the relative potency of group identity over personal identity is 
available from a number of research arenas.” For example, Cikara et al. (2014) 
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empirically show by a neuroscientific approach that people are less likely to be morally 
constrained to harm others when competing as a group than when competing as an 
individual. In other words, hostility is more likely to escalate in an intergroup context 
than an inter-individual one. Meanwhile, Tajfel and Turner (1986, 8) argue that “the 
more intense is an intergroup conflict, the more likely it is that the individuals will 
behave toward each other as a function of their respective group memberships, rather 
than in terms of their individual characteristics or individual relationships.” In short, the 
intensity of intergroup hostility and the saliency of group identity over individual 
identity constitute an endogenous relationship. 
  Tajfel and Turner (1986, 9) also note an important theoretical distinction between 
“social mobility” and “social change” to explain the relationship between individuals 
and groups. Both are “individuals’ belief systems about the nature and the structure of 
the relations between social groups in their society” (9). “Social mobility” here means 
that individuals can move from one group to another if they are dissatisfied with the 
group to which they belong. “Social change” denotes the opposite: it is impossible or 
difficult for individuals to move from one group to another even if they are dissatisfied. 
If group members have more of a “social change” than “social mobility” belief system, 
they are more likely to present uniform behavior toward out-groups and more likely to 
assess members of out-groups in terms of group characteristics rather than individual 
ones (10-11). In other words, in the “social change” belief system, group identity rather 
than individual identity shapes human behavior, and individuals who do not behave 
according to group identity will be accused of treason (9-10). Thus, the social structure 
of group identity increases a tendency for group members to show solidarity with or 
without personal acceptance of the group’s policy (McCauley 1989) and with or without 
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friendly relationships within the group (Hogg 1993). In short, if it is difficult for 
individuals to move from one group to another, intergroup competition in general and 
intergroup conflict in particular will create the social structure of group identity which 
constrains individual identity, and such a structure will overwhelm the agency of 
individual identity to shape intergroup relations. 
  Membership with the nation reflects the social change belief system rather than the 
social mobility one, as there are so many criteria for an individual to be qualified as a 
member of the nation, including both cultural and administrative aspects (e.g., language, 
culture, tradition, life-style, or citizenship). National members will risk being 
marginalized (or being killed in an extreme case) by fellow members if they act in 
opposition to their own nation, and because it is difficult to change their national 
affiliation, nationhood becomes a significantly powerful pivot of collective behavior in 
intergroup relations. Nationalism even enables the altruist self-sacrifice of individuals 
for the nation (Stern 1995). 
  To recapitulate, social identity theory has many implications for thinking about the 
causality between nationalism and conflict. The most important ones are, firstly, that 
nationalism causes hostility and conflict between nations if and only if they see others 
as a threat to their own nationhood; secondly, that national identity tends to be far more 
powerful than individual identity in shaping individual behavior and, therefore, if 
nationalism is mobilized, it results in a high possibility of collective behavior among the 
individual members of the nation. 
  One caveat is that the literature on social identity and intergroup conflict often 
assumes that relations are between a dominant group and a subordinate one (Tajfel and 
Turner 1986), such as natives vs. immigrants (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 
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2006; Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009; Schneider 2008). Meanwhile, rivals are 
competitors by definition, which suggests a smaller status gap. Actually, social identity 
theory predicts that the wider the status gap between groups, the more likely they are to 
accept the status quo (Brewer 2001, 25). Hence, intergroup conflict is likely to be 
intense in interstate rivalry. In the next chapter, the theory of nationalistic rivalry 
explains how intergroup relations and conflict between nations can be conceptualized as 
a type of interstate rivalry. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed revisionist states, interstate rivalry, nationalism, and social 
identity theory. The most important points of these discussions are summarized in Table 
1-1. Drawing on the theoretical underpinnings discussed in this chapter, the next chapter 
develops the theory of nationalistic rivalry. 
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Table 1-1: Summary of each section of Chapter 1 
section summary 
revisionist states Revisionist states are the fundamental source of instability in the 
interstate system. 
Revisionist states are measured by their behavior. 
 
interstate rivalry Rivalry is the situation where states see each other as threatening 
and competing enemies, based on which the governing nation of 
one state could interpret the intention and behavior of the 
counterpart of the rivaling state. 
 
nationalism and the nation Nationalism is the political ideology which advocates the norm that 
a community which is distinctive due to its territorial statehood, 
ethnicity, or both, should govern its own affairs. 
The nation is a community defined by nationalism. 
The unit of analysis is the state or a pair of states (dyads). 
The nation, the state, and ethnic groups are somehow overlapped 
but not necessarily the same. 
The post-WWII period assures the unit homogeneity of nationalism 
in the interstate system. 
Nationalism is categorized to state-territorial nationalism and 
transstate-ethnic nationalism. 
 
social identity theory Nationalism causes conflict only if nations see others as a threat to 
their own nationhood. 
National identity tends to be far more powerful than individual 
identity in shaping individual behavior and, therefore, if 
nationalism is mobilized, it results in a high possibility of collective 
behavior among the individual members of the nation. 
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Chapter 2 
Theory of Nationalistic Rivalry 
 
The last chapter has discussed the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis. The thesis 
now develops the theory of nationalistic rivalry. The structure of the chapter is as 
follows. The first and second sections respectively conceptualize and operationalize 
nationalistic rivalry. The third section theorizes the causes of nationalistic rivalry. The 
fourth section explains the causal mechanisms between nationalistic rivalry and 
revisionist behavior. The fifth section discusses the implications of the dichotomy of 
state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms for nationalistic rivalry. The 
concluding section describes the summary of the arguments and hypotheses derived 
from the theory of nationalistic rivalry, which will be tested empirically in the next 
chapter. 
 
Conceptualizing Nationalistic Rivalry 
To recapitulate the definition of nationalism and the nation in this thesis, nationalism is 
the political ideology which advocates the norm that a community which is distinctive 
due to its territorial statehood, ethnicity, or both, should govern its own affairs, and the 
nation is a community defined by nationalism. The demarcation of a national political 
boundary by nationalism in turn distinguishes the national “self” from all other nations, 
in terms of territorial statehood, ethnicity, or both. 
  The norm of national self-governance indicates that nationalism as a movement aims 
at “attaining and maintaining the autonomy, unity and identity of a nation” (Smith 1991, 
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74, emphasis original). The absence of national autonomy means the denial of 
self-governance, which contradicts nationalism; the absence of national unity and 
identity endangers the idea (and ideal) of the distinctive community and, therefore, the 
foundation of the nationalism. If any of these legitimacies of nationalism is challenged, 
the existence of the nation (or nationhood) is threatened, because nationalism does 
define the nation. Therefore, national autonomy, unity, and identity (whose boundary is 
drawn along the line of territorial statehood, ethnicity, or both) make up the core of 
nationhood. 
  As noted in the last chapter, people differentiate an in-group from out-groups, and 
aim to feel superiority to out-groups. Yet, even if they feel inferior to out-groups, 
intergroup competition is not a necessary consequence of pursuit for group positivity 
(Tajfel and Turner 1986, 19-20). They might move to a superior group or find a new 
dimension over which they can feel superiority (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 19-20). 
  In the case of relations between nations, the first option is infeasible. At the 
individual level, national boundaries are difficult for individuals to overcome, as 
national belonging is deeply rooted in history, culture, and citizenship. At the group 
level, assimilation is an unacceptable option, because if a nation assimilates to another 
nation, the former loses national autonomy, unity, and identity, meaning that 
assimilation contradicts the very idea of nationalism. The second option is possible, as 
long as nations can find dimensions that do not challenge each other’s senses of national 
superiority. For example, Japan’s feeling of national superiority in baseball and New 
Zealand’s feeling of national superiority in rugby are compatible, as baseball and rugby 
are different dimensions. 
  Groups engage in competition for superiority, if (and only if) group positivity can be 
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achieved only at the expense of the other (Brewer 2001, 24-26). In terms of relations 
between nations, competition occurs if they face an issue which makes one’s desire to 
achieve and maintain national autonomy, unity, and identity incompatible with the same 
desire of the other. This is because national autonomy, unity, and identity as the core of 
nationhood are essential for the feeling of national superiority. If one side fails to fulfill 
any one of them due to the incompatibility, it means that one nation is “incomplete” 
relative to the other “complete” nation. Thus, it is imperative that one feels national 
inferiority relative to the other. 
  For example, in the case of contemporary Sino-Japanese relations, the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is an issue in which Japan’s nationalist aim to maintain its own 
national territorial integrity is incompatible with China’s one to achieve its own national 
territorial integrity. The territorial rights of the disputed islands endow one of the two 
states, and only one of the two states, with its national superiority relative to the other as 
the legitimate governor of the islands. 
  In the case of Turkey-Syria, their respective national identities are related to the 
history of the Ottoman Empire but in a conflicting way. On the one hand, Turkey 
“considered itself as the main successor state [of the Ottoman Empire] with negative 
memories of Arabs” (Aras and Köni 2002, 50, emphasis added), and thought that “Arab 
nationalists in Damascus had once been disloyal subjects who took advantage of World 
War I to break free from Turkish rule” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 180). On the other 
hand, for Syria, “Turkey was the residual of the former Ottoman Empire against which 
Arab nationalism was first oriented” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 181, emphasis 
added). Thus, if the discourse of one’s national identity is supported, that of the other’s 
national identity is necessarily questioned. 
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  In a competition over national superiority, both sides believe that one is righteous and 
the other is illegitimately challenging it, due to in-group favoritism. Thus, they perceive 
each other as a threat to their own nationhood. It was argued in the last chapter that 
competing groups become hostile to each other if they see each other as a threat to their 
own group in terms of material aspects and/or non-material ones, and this logic applies 
to nations as well. Therefore, in the situation of a mutual threat perception, competing 
nations project nationalistic hostility towards each other. 
  The reciprocal projection of nationalistic hostility in turn makes the matter of 
competition not only the feeling of national superiority but also the assurance of 
national security1  from the threatening “other.” Once the competition involves a 
security aspect, the sense of endangered national security promotes one’s effort to 
increase the sense of national identity for in-group solidarity; this increased sense of 
national identity then hardens the perception of dangerous “other” for national security 
further, and so on and so forth. In short, the sense of endangered national security and 
the hardening of national identity constitute an endogenous relationship to sustain a 
mutual threat perception and, therefore, the reciprocal projection of nationalistic 
hostility.  
  The last chapter noted that the situation of interstate hostility can be defined as 
interstate rivalry – the situation where states perceive each other as threatening and 
competing enemies (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007, 25). Given the theoretical 
                                                 
1
 “Security” here denotes physical security. Although the meaning of security is sometimes 
broadened to denote psychological stability, I stick with the narrower meaning. This is because 
in IR, national security is usually assumed to be physical security from military threats and, 
therefore, using the term to denote both physical and psychological security could cause 
confusion.  
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mechanisms between group identity and hostility illustrated by social identity theory in 
the last chapter, this threat-competitor perception is a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for identifying reciprocal nationalistic hostility and conceptualizing 
nationalistic rivalry.2 
  Yet, it is also the case that even among the rivalry dyads identified by Colaresi, Rasler, 
and Thompson (2007), some experience more militarized disputes than others. The 
presence of “dispute-proneness” is theoretically distinctive from its absence in terms of 
social identity in general and national identity in particular. It indicates that 
identification between “self” and “other” is so salient that conflict rather than 
cooperation becomes routine. As I briefly noted in the introduction chapter, what 
constitutes “dispute-proneness” may not be so clear-cut. Instead of newly 
conceptualizing dispute-proneness, I refer to Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) rivalry 
data in order to operationalize nationalistic rivalry later. It is sure that among rivalry 
dyads specified by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), some period of dispute-prone 
relationships might be not due to national identity but because of different social 
identities. Rather, the period of dispute-proneness specified by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 
(2006) suggests hardened identification between states along the line of some social 
identity during this time period, and this characteristic should also apply to national 
identification where nationalism becomes relevant in rivalry. In short, in terms of 
nationalism, both threat-competitor perception and dispute-proneness are necessary to 
capture nationalistic rivalry in a consistent manner. 
  Finally, not all interstate rivalries develop nationalistic hostility. Rivalry holds 
                                                 
2
 The perception of threat and competitor is sufficient to suggest enemy perception (i.e., 
threatening opponents in competition are enemies) and, therefore, I shorten it to 
“threat-competitor” perception for the sake of brevity. 
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nationalistic hostility if and only if states are competing over a nationalist issue, i.e., an 
issue which makes it possible for only one of the rivals to complete the nationalist 
project of achieving national autonomy, unity, and identity. If states are competing over 
the sphere of influence beyond national borders, it reflects internationalism, and the 
sense of superiority is established based on an internationalist identity (e.g., the leader 
of communism, a region, or the world). In such a case, rivalry is due to an 
internationalist issue, i.e., an issue which makes it possible for only one of the rivals to 
complete an internationalist objective (e.g., capitalism vs. communism in the Cold War, 
or competition for regional/global hegemony). 3  Meanwhile, nationalism seeks to 
achieve and maintain the governance of one’s own national affairs based on territorial 
statehood, ethnicity, or both, and consequently generates national identity along the 
lines of a national political boundary. Hence, the sense of superiority is based on 
national identification vis-à-vis other nations. 
  It might be argued that even apparently internationalist issues are actually the result 
of nationalism, because such issues could also threaten national security whereas a 
successful internationalist movement could contribute to the improvement of national 
security and the feeling of national superiority. Three counter-arguments to this criticism 
are possible. 
  First, such a catch-all argument makes the concept of nationalism unhelpful for 
analysis. If a concept means anything depending on interpretation, any hypothesis 
derived from it will be unfalsifiable. For a concept to be useful for analysis, it must 
clearly demarcate what it captures and what it does not. Hence, if nationalism is to be a 
                                                 
3
 To avoid confusion, “international” in this thesis denotes “between/among nations” and not 
“between/among states.” 
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useful concept to study state behavior, its scope must first of all be clearly defined. Only 
by doing so can we assess the utility of a concept by empirical analysis. To demarcate 
the conceptual boundary of nationalism, it is helpful to contrast nationalist issues with 
internationalist issues. 
  Second, the criticism confuses the cause and the effect. Internationalist issues could 
lead to the sense of threat to national security and/or successful internationalist 
movements could result in the improvement of national security and the feeling of 
national superiority. However, these points do not automatically mean that these 
internationalist issues and movements are caused by the states’ pursuit of national 
autonomy, unity, or identity. 
  Third, to establish that nationalism is the main driver of rivalry, there must be some 
explicit evidence of a nationalist issue in the rivalry, because nationalism enables people 
to feel national identity and act collectively as the nation. Put differently, even if one 
could argue that an internationalist issue was actually caused by nationalism in a 
catchall way (which is problematic in itself as pointed out above), but if the society 
perceived the issue as an internationalist one anyway, not nationalism but 
internationalism would be the factor which leads people to behave collectively as the 
state (and not as the nation). As will be explained later, the causal mechanism between 
nationalism and revisionist behavior is based on the nationalist logic of mobilizing a 
society towards a specific collective action as the nation through the medium of the state. 
Hence, rivalry must be explicitly over nationalist issues to be nationalistically charged 
rivalry. 
  In short, nationalistic rivalry is defined as the situation where dispute-prone states 
perceive each other as a threatening and competing enemy due to a nationalist issue. It 
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is a specific subset of interstate rivalry. Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson’s (2007) 
definition of rivalry (threat-competitor perception) provides a necessary condition for 
identifying interstate hostility; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) definition of rivalry 
(dispute-proneness) indicates a distinctive level of identification between “self” and 
“other”; and the dichotomy of nationalism and internationalism differentiates 
nationalistic rivalry from non-nationalistic rivalry. The criterion of dispute-proneness 
might not be seen as a necessary condition for nationalistic rivalry. Rivalry could be due 
to a nationalist issue without dispute-proneness. However, the theory of nationalistic 
rivalry focuses on dispute-prone dyads, because separating dispute-prone rivalry dyads 
from those which are not makes sure to capture a distinctive level of national 
identification between “self” and “other.” National identification in the rivalry dyads 
which are dispute-prone and face a nationalist issue is expected to be more salient than 
in those which are not dispute-prone and experience a nationalist issue. The latter type 
of rivalry might be conceptualized as proto- or semi-nationalistic rivalry. I leave this 
task for future research. 
  The conceptual elements of nationalistic rivalry are graphically illustrated in Figure 
2-1. The horizontal solid lines denote a time span and the vertical dashed lines denote 
the period of nationalistic rivalry. In Case 1, threat-competitor perception and the 
presence of a nationalist issue match each other while dispute-proneness has a shorter 
span. In Case 2, dispute-proneness has a longer span than threat-competitor perception 
and the presence of a nationalist issue. In Case 3, all elements have different lengths of 
time whereas in Case 4 all have the same one. In every case, nationalistic rivalry is 
considered as present if and only if all three factors are observed during the same time 
period. 
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Figure 2-1: Variation in identifying nationalistic rivalry 
 
Horizontal solid lines: time span 
Vertical dashed lines: period of nationalistic rivalry 
 
  Nationalistic rivalry is a contextual factor to capture the causal effect of nationalism. 
Since nationalism is a belief, it is inherently impossible to observe directly and can be 
only inferred from some proxies. Nationalistic discourse, nationalistic behavior, and 
nationalist profiles often serve as such proxies but have limitations. First, the absence of 
these proxies does not guarantee the absence of nationalism. If someone said or did 
something nationalistic one day and did not another day, would this mean that he/she 
held nationalism the previous day but not the other day? If someone declared that he/she 
is no longer a nationalist, would it be plausible to believe? Second, these proxies are 
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conditioned by a context. Waltz (1979, 61) argues that “[f]rom attributes one cannot 
predict outcomes if outcomes depend on the situations of the actors as well as on their 
attributes.” Depending on the situation, “as peacemakers may fail to make peace, so 
troublemakers may fail to make trouble” (Waltz 1979, 61), and so “nationalists” may 
fail to make nationalistic discourse or behavior, or even to be nationalists. Thus, rather 
than behavior, discourse, or profiles, this thesis primarily measures nationalism and 
nationalistic hostility by a contextual factor of nationalistic rivalry.4  
  It might be questioned whether merging rivalry and nationalism into one single 
concept, i.e., nationalistic rivalry, makes it impossible to distinguish the effect of 
nationalism from that of rivalry on the probability of revisionist behavior. This concern, 
however, arises out of the misunderstanding of the theory of nationalistic rivalry. The 
concept of nationalistic rivalry does not measure the effect of rivalry on the probability 
of revisionist behavior in general. Rather, it is a specific type of interstate rivalry, 
capturing the situation where (state-owning) nations are engaged in competition over a 
nationalist issue and, therefore, see each other as threatening and competing enemies 
along the line of national identities. Hence, it is incorrect to argue that nationalistic 
rivalry cannot distinguish the effect of nationalism from that of rivalry on the 
probability of revisionist behavior, because it does not aim to do so. 
 
Operationalizing Nationalistic Rivalry 
The last section has conceptualized nationalistic rivalry by specifying the following 
three elements between states: threat-competitor perception, dispute-proneness, and 
                                                 
4
 Other examples of capturing nationalism by contexts are incomplete democratization by 
Mansfield and Snyder (2005) and ethnonation-state incongruence by Woodwell (2007). 
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nationalist issues. Although it is possible to create data of nationalistic rivalry out of 
scratch, at least threat-competitor perception and dispute-proneness can be measured by 
existing datasets (whereas the identification of nationalist issues needs new coding and 
its detail is explained later). 
  First, the article has argued that Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007) define rivalry 
as the situation where states perceive each other as threatening and competing enemies. 
They also created a dataset of rivalry through the identification of this threat-competitor 
perception at the government level, in reference to comprehensive historical literature 
on foreign policy (28-36).5 They admit that their data are subject to contestation but 
also contend that so are other conflict data (29-30). They expect that “[t]he most likely 
source of error lies in omissions of rivalries about which we know very little in the 
corners of the globe that are not well covered by historians or journalists” (36), which 
may be the case in conflict data in general. At least the number of citations of their 
project suggests a good level of intersubjective agreement among scholars.6 Thompson 
and Dreyer (2012) – an up-to-date version of Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007) – 
also provide rivalry narratives for those rivalry cases, thereby allowing third-parties to 
check the robustness of the data. I also read these narratives in the process of identifying 
nationalist issues as explained later, and made a few modifications when I had good 
justification in terms of the theory of nationalistic rivalry.7 In short, I primarily relied 
on Thompson and Dreyer (2012) to measure the element of threat-competitor perception 
                                                 
5
 Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007, 35) say that “[t]he list of references exceeds some fifty 
pages.” 
6
 According to Google Scholar as of April 26, 2015, a project article, Thompson (2001), is cited 
269 times and Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007) 119 times. 
7
 Those modifications are described in the rivalry narratives in Appendix B. 
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but also scrutinized their validity.8 
  Second, as for dispute-proneness, as mentioned before briefly, the article relies on 
Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006, updated to ver. 5.20), which operationalize rivalry by 
the presence of more than one militarized dispute per dyad with issue linkage. Their 
dataset is more objective than Thompson and Dreyer (2012) in that it relies on the 
arguably most widely used dataset of interstate conflict, the MID dataset. While there 
are other rivalry datasets using dispute-proneness as a definitional criterion (see a 
review by Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007, 36-71), Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 
(2006) are the most up-to-date. The popularity of their project is also apparent from the 
number of citations.9 
  If Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) capture 
threat-competitor perception and dispute-proneness respectively, the intersection of 
these two rivalry datasets can be used to identify both threat-competitor perception and 
dispute-proneness in the same dyads. While Thompson and Dreyer (2012) cover the 
period of 1494-2010 and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) that of 1816-2001, only the 
post-WWII period (1946-2001) is considered for the reason discussed in Chapter 1 (i.e., 
for the unit homogeneity of nationalism in the interstate system). The list of all rivalries 
during this period in these datasets is available in Appendix A. 
                                                 
8
 A potential alternative approach might be the measurement of foreign policy similarity 
between states, based on alliance portfolios, UN voting, or trade (e.g., Signorino and Ritter 
1999). However, foreign policy similarity is insufficient to capture threat-competitor perception. 
Even if states do not share similar foreign policy, it does not automatically mean that they 
perceive each other as threatening and competing enemies. They might see each other as threats 
but not as competitors or vice versa. 
9
 According to Google Scholar as of April 26, 2015, an older version of their project, Diehl and 
Goertz (2000), is cited 464 times and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) 179 times. 
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  If the end year of a rivalry in Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) is sometime between 
1987 and 2001, and if the end year of the counterpart in Thompson and Dreyer (2012) is 
after 2001, I checked whether there occurred some other incident after 2001 which 
could be qualified as one of the militarized actions according to the codebook of the 
MID dataset (Ghosn and Palmer 2003).10 In Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), rivalries 
are identified based on the series of MIDs with an issue linkage, and the timing of 
rivalry termination is at the year when the last MID ends. However, this criterion may 
be problematic if a rivalry is ongoing after 1986. Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) data 
are based on the MID data ver. 3.10, whose temporal scope is up to 2001; yet another 
militarized dispute may have occurred after 2001, or the last MID in a rivalry may have 
been ongoing after 2001. 
  It is debatable to determine how long a period should be to confirm that a rivalry has 
terminated before another militarized dispute would have occurred. Klein, Goertz, and 
Diehl (2006) themselves are ambiguous about this point.11 To determine whether a 
militarized dispute after 2001 extends the period of rivalry, I adopted the threshold of 15 
years – the maximum number of years to qualify the rivalry as terminated in Klein, 
                                                 
10
 As of May 22, 2013. 
11
 There are at least three conflicting claims on rivalry termination in their data. First, an issue 
linkage rather than a temporal proximity is a primary matter to decide rivalry continuation. 
Therefore, if two disputes are within 10-15 years (a criterion of rivalry in Diehl and Goertz’s 
[2000] data) but their issues are not related, they may not be considered as rivalry (338). Klein, 
Goertz, and Diehl (2006) also state that the 10-15 year rule to decide a rivalry end year “is at 
odds with our new coding rules…, in which some rivalries continued even though they 
experienced periods of 15+ years without a dispute” (338-339). Second, Klein, Goertz, and 
Diehl (2006) state that “the end of the last MID is the last ‘behavioral manifestation’ of rivalry,” 
and “consider[s] the rivalry to have ended in the 10-15 years after this time” (339). Finally, their 
actual data coding indicates that rivalry terminates at the end of the last MID, rather than 
sometime in the 10-15 years after it. 
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Goertz, and Diehl (2006, 339) – and the presence of an issue linkage. In short, if a 
rivalry is ongoing beyond 1986 in Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) as well as after 2001 
in Thompson and Dreyer (2012), and if it is found that a militarized dispute related to 
issues in the rivalry occurs after 2001 within 15 years since the end year specified by 
Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), its rivalry year is considered ongoing beyond 2001.12 
For example, the end year of the China-Japan rivalry is set as 1999 in Klein, Goertz, and 
Diehl (2006), which is the end year of the last MID in the dyad (MID #4180). However, 
in Thompson and Dreyer (2012) it is coded “ongoing” after 2001, and expert/news 
sources also report that disputes on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have occurred within 15 
years since 2001 (for examples, see the case study of China-Japan in Chapter 5). These 
events are considered as the evidence of rivalry continuation after 1999, making the 
Sino-Japanese nationalistic rivalry coded as ongoing after 2001. 
  Once the intersection of Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 
(2006) identified the dyads with threat-competitor perception and dispute-proneness, I 
referred to Thompson and Dreyer’s (2012) rivalry narratives to examine whether rivalry 
includes specifically a nationalist issue, i.e., an issue which makes one’s desire to 
achieve and maintain national autonomy, unity, and identity incompatible with the 
other’s. Among all rivalry issues in the intersection of the two rivalry datasets, 
nationalist issues were non-ethnic territorial disputes (e.g., China vs. Japan over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands), transstate ethnic issues including irredentism, national 
unification, and transstate ethnic leadership (e.g., Greece vs. Turkey over Cyprus, China 
vs. Taiwan for national unification, and Iraq vs. Egypt for Arab leadership), conflicting 
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 This method “upgrades” Ethiopia-Eritrea in Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) from an isolated 
conflict to a rivalry. 
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national identities (e.g., Turkey vs. Syria over the history of the Ottoman empire), and 
sub-conventional insurgency warfare (e.g., Uganda vs. Kenya over mutual rebel 
supports). This list of nationalist issues is not a theoretical guide for coding; it is a 
finding from coding. 
  Non-ethnic territorial disputes question the national superiority of the legitimate 
governor of a territory. A challenger sees a target territory illegitimately owned by the 
rival, and demands that territory should be “returned” to its original national owner. 
Meanwhile, a target state perceives the challenger making an illegitimate claim on its 
own national territory. Thus, these states experience rivalry over contending 
nationalisms framed by territorial statehood. An example is the aforementioned 
China-Japan rivalry over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Not all territorial disputes are a 
nationalist issue. Competition between great powers over colonial territory was 
motivated by internationalist imperialism rather than by the nationalist principle of 
territorial integrity. Such territorial disputes were not observed in the data, however, and 
all disputed territories were proximate to the rivaling states’ own territory,13 which 
suggests that the disputes were over national territorial integrity. 
  Transstate ethnic issues create incompatibility over the nationalist norm between 
states in three respects. First, if only one side has a transstate ethnic claim against the 
rival, the former’s nationalism is based on transstate ethnicity whereas the latter’s is 
based on territorial statehood. The ethnic homeland state supports transborder ethnic kin 
to advance its nationalist norm that the ethnically defined nation should govern its own 
affairs and should not be governed by another government. As in the case of territorial 
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 Proximity was checked by Google Maps (accessed October 13, 2014, 
https://www.google.ie/maps/). 
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disputes, the target state perceives this transborder ethnic support as a threat to its 
national unity. For example, Pakistan has provided assistance to Kashmiri militants for a 
long time as it believes that India’s part of Kashmir should belong to Pakistan, whereas 
India has seen it as a threat to its national unity defined by territorial statehood. Second, 
if both sides have transborder ethnic kin in some other state, they mutually seek an 
irredentist policy in the third state and engage in an ethnic proxy conflict. For example, 
Greece and Turkey have supported their respective ethnic compatriots in Cyprus, where 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots engaged in violent ethnic conflict. Third, if both 
sides have a transstate ethnic claim based on the same ethnic group, they compete over 
which is the “real” nation who should govern all ethnic members. China and Taiwan 
used to mutually claim that one is the real Chinese nation and the other should be 
unified. Iraq and Egypt would compete for Arab leadership in the Middle East as 
contending Pan-Arab nationalists. The presence of transborder ethnic kin is not a 
sufficient condition for the identification of nationalist issues. It must be framed as a 
topic of rivalry at the government level. 
  Conflicting national identities usually derive from history which is relevant to, but 
has different implications for, rival nations. The aforementioned Turkey-Syria rivalry is 
such an example. Finally, sub-conventional warfare through mutual rebel support, such 
as the case of the Uganda-Kenya rivalry, threatens each other’s national autonomy in 
governing one’s own affairs. 
  The above types of issue are not mutually exclusive but rather are often related to 
each other. For example, the extreme forms of irredentism and national unification 
movement require the annexation of outside territory, thereby making territorial disputes 
between rivals as well. Sub-conventional warfare often develops along the lines of 
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transstate ethnicity. Conflicting national identities are occasionally caused by 
incompatible territorial claims. 
  Even if specified by the intersection of Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, 
Goertz, and Diehl (2006), rivalry is not coded as nationalistic rivalry in the following 
cases. First, if only one side supported rebels against the rival (e.g., Democratic 
Republic of the Congo [Zaire] vs. Angola), it was not coded as nationalistic rivalry 
unless some other nationalist issue exists. This is because in such a case, it cannot be 
said that states are rivals due to incompatible desires for achieving national autonomy, 
as only the target state faces the problem of national self-governance while the 
rebel-supporting state does not. 
  Second, if rivalry issues were internationalist ones, it was not coded as nationalistic 
rivalry, as internationalism is the opposite of nationalism. Among all rivalry issues in 
the intersection of the two rivalry datasets, internationalist issues were contending 
internationalist ideologies (e.g., the US-Soviet rivalry over liberal capitalism vs. 
communism) and competition for regional/global influence (e.g., the Soviet-China 
rivalry over Asian regional leadership14) which did not have any transstate ethnic aspect 
(i.e., China-Taiwan rivalry for national unification or Egypt-Iraq rivalry for Arab 
leadership are coded as nationalistic rivalry due to their transstate ethnic aspect). In 
those cases, rivalry developed over competing ideologies beyond national borders.15 
  If rivalries had more than one issue, they were coded as nationalistic rivalry when 
                                                 
14
 The Soviet-China rivalry is coded as nationalistic rivalry after territorial disputes began in 
1963. See its narrative in Appendix B. 
15
 Appendix B lists and describes the rivalries that are identified by the intersection of 
Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) but not coded as nationalistic 
rivalry, and explains why. 
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they had at least one nationalist issue, as nationalism is a more powerful political 
ideology than internationalism.16 As Breuilly (1993, 68) points out, “the self-reference 
quality of nationalist propaganda and the theme of the restoration of a glorious past in a 
transformed future has a special power which it is difficult for other ideological 
movements to match.” 
  In short, the data of nationalistic rivalry are to some extent overlapped with, but not 
the same as, existing categories of rivalry, such as territorial (Vasquez 2009; Thompson 
and Dreyer 2012), dispute-prone (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 
2006), threat-competitor (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007; Thompson and Dreyer 
2012), and positional, ideological, or interventionary (Thompson and Dreyer 2012). 
Nationalistic rivalry is often territorial rivalry but also includes non-territorial rivalry 
based on other types of nationalist issue. Nationalistic rivalry is dispute-prone and 
involves threat-competitor perception, but not all dispute-prone rivalries or 
threat-competitor rivalries are nationalistic rivalry. Positional, ideological, and 
interventionary rivalry is nationalistic rivalry only if its rivalry issue is a nationalist one. 
  The data of nationalistic rivalry specifically record the presence of transstate ethnic 
issues, as the presence of transborder ethnic kin is known as a distinctive factor in 
explaining the effect of nationalism on interstate conflict (Miller 2007; Woodwell 2007; 
Carment and James 1995; Gokcek 2011; Huibregtse 2010; Saideman and Ayres 2008; 
Van Evera 1994, 12, 14-15, 17-18, 22; Wimmer and Min 2006, 874-875, 891). As 
transstate ethnic issues are the nationalist issue that involves one’s ethnic kin outside its 
state territory, it is assumed that the area which the government of a state controls with 
                                                 
16
 Those having both a nationalist issue and an internationalist one are Russia (Soviet 
Union)-China from 1963, China-India, Libya-Sudan, Yemen People’s Republic-Oman, 
Morocco-Algeria, and Uganda-Tanzania. 
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or without interstate recognition is inside the state framework.17 How to identify ethnic 
groups in general (Weidmann, Rød, and Cederman 2010) and transstate ethnic ties in 
particular (Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009, 421-422, 433) are certainly topics 
of a controversy. Here, transstate ethnic issues are identified if states resort to a 
transstate cultural, religious, or racial tie (all of which can constitute ethnicity) as a 
political boundary. The rationale is that states are unlikely to politicize such a tie, 
particularly in the form of interstate conflict, unless it matters for the ethnic aspect of 
their own nationhood. 
  Because the unit of analysis in the dataset is a dyad-year, if a transstate ethnic issue 
lasts less than six months within a year, it is ignored. This may miss some nuance; 
however, this kind of problem is not specific to this dataset but any dyad-year datasets 
(e.g., in the annual data of regime type, if a state were a democracy only for five months 
within a year, should it be coded as a democracy?). The exception for this rule is the 
change of territorial configurations during armed conflict. In these cases, territorial 
configurations are often temporary and unstable because of the repeated attempts of 
occupation and retrieval between conflicting states, thereby making it more difficult to 
decide in which side of territory an ethnic group exists. Therefore, the change of 
territorial configurations is ignored during armed conflict, and the original territorial 
configuration is used for identifying the side having a transstate ethnic issue. Only after 
the end of armed conflict, is it assumed that the control of the area is established and the 
new territorial configuration is used for coding. Finally, if a transstate ethnic issue 
disappears at a dyad-year during the ongoing years of nationalistic rivalry, it is coded as 
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 It must be noted that the thesis has no intention to make a political claim for specific states 
that a disputed territory should belong to one’s sovereignty. 
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present at that year and as absent from the following years. 
  There are a few ambiguous cases to code the presence and absence of transstate 
ethnic issues, mainly because of the lack of sufficient information. In these cases, a 
possible alternative way of coding is also recorded for robustness checks. 
  Table 2-1 is the list of nationalistic-rivalry dyads. Dyad IDs in the first column 
consist of the smaller one and the larger one of the Correlates of War (COW) state code 
of two states. The second column is the name of the nationalistic rivalry. The third 
column specifies the rivalry periods, and “ongoing” means whether a nationalistic 
rivalry is ongoing after 2001. Nationalistic rivalry specifically focuses on the 
post-WWII period and, therefore, the earliest year for observing nationalistic rivalry is 
1946. In the fourth column, the presence of transstate ethnic issues is recorded for each 
state in the dyads. The description and coding decision of all nationalistic-rivalry dyads 
are available in Appendix B. 
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Table 2-1: List of nationalistic-rivalry dyads 
Dyad 
ID 
Nationalistic rivalry Period Transstate ethnic 
issues 
91092 Honduras-El Salvador 1969-1992 El Salvador 
91093 Honduras-Nicaragua 1957-1961 neither 
100101 Colombia-Venezuela 1982-2001[ongoing] neither 
101110 Venezuela-Guyana 1966-1999 neither 
130135 Ecuador-Peru 1946-1955 neither 
1977-1998 neither 
155160 Chile-Argentina 1952-1984 neither 
160200 Argentina-United Kingdom 1976-1983 neither 
210850 Netherlands-Indonesia 1951-1962 neither 
230600 Spain-Morocco 1957-1975 Morocco 
260265 German Federal Republic-German 
Democratic Republic 
1961-1971 German Federal 
Republic 
325345 Italy-Yugoslavia 1946-1947 both 
1948-1954 Italy 
339350 Albania-Greece 1946-1949 Greece 
1994-1996 Greece 
344345 Croatia-Yugoslavia 1991 Yugoslavia 
1992-1995 both 
1996-2000 Yugoslavia 
344346 Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-1996 Croatia 
345346 Yugoslavia-Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-1994 Yugoslavia 
345355 Yugoslavia-Bulgaria 1946-1947 Yugoslavia 
350355 Greece-Bulgaria 1946-1947 Bulgaria 
350640 Greece-Turkey 1958-2001[ongoing] both 
355640 Bulgaria-Turkey 1946-1950 Turkey 
365710 Russia-China 1963-1989 neither 
371373 Armenia-Azerbaijan 1992-1994 Armenia 
  1994-2001[ongoing] Azerbaijan 
432439 Mali-Burkina Faso 1974-1986 neither 
452461 Ghana-Togo 1961-1963 both 
1964-1966 Ghana 
1966-1994 neither 
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Dyad 
ID 
Nationalistic rivalry Period Transstate ethnic 
issues 
471475 Cameroon-Nigeria 1981-2001[ongoing] neither 
483620 Chad-Libya 1976-1979 Libya 
1983-1987 Libya 
1988-1994 neither 
490500 Democratic Republic of the 
Congo-Uganda 
1996-2001[ongoing] neither 
490517 Democratic Republic of the 
Congo-Rwanda 
1996-2001[ongoing] Rwanda 
500501 Uganda-Kenya 1987-1995 neither 
500510 Uganda-Tanzania 1971-1979 neither 
500625 Uganda-Sudan 1968-1972 neither 
1994-1999 Uganda 
2000-2001[ongoing] neither 
501520 Kenya-Somalia 1963-1981 Somalia 
516517 Burundi-Rwanda 1964-1966 Burundi 
520530 Somalia-Ethiopia 1960-1985 Somalia 
522531 Djibouti-Eritrea 1996-2001[ongoing] neither 
530531 Ethiopia-Eritrea 1998-2001[ongoing] neither 
530625 Ethiopia-Sudan 1967-1982 Sudan 
1983-1997 both 
531625 Eritrea-Sudan 1994-1999 both 
541560 Mozambique-South Africa 1983-1984 both 
  1985-1987 South Africa 
551552 Zambia-Zimbabwe 1965-1979 Zambia 
551560 Zambia-South Africa 1968-1987 Zambia 
600615 Morocco-Algeria 1962-1984 Morocco 
620625 Libya-Sudan 1973-1984 Libya 
620651 Libya-Egypt 1975-1985 both 
625651 Sudan-Egypt 1991-1996 Sudan 
630645 Iran-Iraq 1958-2001[ongoing] both 
630670 Iran-Saudi Arabia 1984-1988 both 
630700 Iran-Afghanistan 1996-1999 Iran 
640652 Turkey-Syria 1955-2001[ongoing] neither 
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Dyad 
ID 
Nationalistic rivalry Period Transstate ethnic 
issues 
645651 Iraq-Egypt 1959-1962 both 
1990-1999 both 
645652 Iraq-Syria 1976-1991 both 
645666 Iraq-Israel 1948-1998 Iraq 
645670 Iraq-Saudi Arabia 1968-2001 both 
645690 Iraq-Kuwait 1961-2001 neither 
651663 Egypt-Jordan 1948-1962 both 
651666 Egypt-Israel 1948-1989 Egypt 
651670 Egypt-Saudi Arabia 1962-1967 both 
652663 Syria-Jordan 1949-1951 Jordan 
1952-1957 neither 
1958-1982 Syria 
652666 Syria-Israel 1948-2001[ongoing] Syria 
663666 Jordan-Israel 1948-1949 Jordan 
  1950-1966 neither 
  1967-1973 Jordan 
670679 Saudi Arabia-Yemen 1994-1998 neither 
680698 Yemen People's Republic-Oman 1972-1982 neither 
700770 Afghanistan-Pakistan 1949-1974 Afghanistan 
1975-1996 both 
710713 China-Taiwan 1949-1991 both 
1992-2001[ongoing] China 
710740 China-Japan 1996-2001[ongoing] neither 
710750 China-India 1950-1987 neither 
710816 China-Vietnam 1975-1977 neither 
1978-1986 China 
1987-1991 neither 
731732 North Korea-South Korea 1949-1960 both 
1961-2001[ongoing] North Korea 
750770 India-Pakistan 1947-2001[ongoing] Pakistan 
811816 Cambodia-Vietnam 1976-1979 both 
811817 Cambodia-Republic of Vietnam 1956-1967 Cambodia 
816817 Vietnam-Republic of Vietnam 1960-1975 both 
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  Despite the use of Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) rivalry data, it is possible that 
the whole period of nationalistic rivalry does not observe any dispute. It might sound 
contradictory with the theory of nationalistic rivalry (which requires dispute-proneness 
as a conceptual element), and I explain why it is actually consistent with the theory in 
detail here. 
 
Figure 2-2: Nationalistic rivalry without any dispute 
 
Horizontal solid lines: time span 
Vertical dashed lines: period of nationalistic rivalry 
White circles: onset of militarized disputes 
 
  The whole period of nationalistic rivalry without any dispute could be observed, if 
the period of rivalry specified by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and that of nationalist 
issues are much shorter than that of Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) rivalry; or if 
rivalry identification in Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) is mostly based on disputes 
before 1946. Figure 2-2 illustrates an example. While the dyad is considered as 
dispute-prone, nationalistic rivalry is observed without any dispute due to the short 
Threat-competitor perception
Nationalist issue
Dispute-proneness
Nationalistic rivalry
t t+x
P
p
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period of the nationalist issue. According to the last section, the whole period of 
dispute-proneness (P in Figure 2-2) indicates hardened identification between “self” and 
“other” along the line of some social identity during this time period. The last section 
has also noted that the indication of salient identification by dispute-proneness should 
also apply to national identification when nationalism becomes relevant in rivalry (p, 
which is a subset of P, in Figure 2-2). Hence, if dyads are dispute-prone for period P 
and if they face a nationalist issue for period p, hardened identification between “self” 
and “other” becomes the matter of national identities during p. In other words, 
dispute-proneness does not have to be established only within the period of nationalistic 
rivalry in order to capture a distinctive level of national identification between “self” 
and “other.” 
  The limitation of the coding scheme of nationalistic-rivalry dyads is that one of its 
coding criteria, dispute-proneness, makes coding retrospective. This limitation results in 
potential case exclusion. In other words, the current coding scheme cannot include the 
dyads which have engaged only in one dispute, but which will have experienced another 
dispute within fifteen years following the year of the first dispute in the future.18 Only 
if we could know what will happen in the future, would it be possible to code all 
nationalistic-rivalry dyads. This limitation, however, should have a minimum effect on 
the current dataset, because its temporal scope is up to 2001. As explained before, as of 
May 22, 2013, I checked whether there occurred a militarized dispute after 2001 in the 
dyads which are coded as rivalry by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) but not by Klein, 
Goertz, and Diehl (2006) due to their reliance on the MID dataset ver. 3.10. In other 
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 This problem is not only of nationalistic rivalry but also of dispute-density rivalry approaches 
in general. 
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words, eleven and a half out of fifteen years after 2001 were taken into consideration to 
remedy the retrospective nature of the data. 
 
Causes of Nationalistic Rivalry 
The conceptual definition of nationalistic rivalry in the first section of this chapter 
points out that nations experience reciprocal hostility when they engage in competition 
for national superiority to others. Such a situation occurs when nations have a 
nationalist issue which makes one’s desire to achieve and maintain national autonomy, 
unity, and identity incompatible with that of another. What conditions cause such 
incompatibility and, therefore, nationalistic rivalry? This section theorizes this point, 
which is the first phase of the thesis’s causal mechanism between nationalism and 
revisionist behavior (see Figure 2-3). 
 
Figure 2-3: First phase of the thesis’s causal mechanism between nationalism and 
revisionist behavior 
 
The black objects denote the focus of this section 
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Nationalist mobilization
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  First, if states in a dyad are ethnically heterogeneous, the dyad is more likely to 
experience nationalistic rivalry. If society is mobilized along the line of diverse ethnic 
groups, the central government is unable to achieve state-based nation-building and, 
therefore, to establish the competitive military for survival in interstate politics 
(Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012; Posen 1993). The sense of national superiority in the 
interstate system “can unify a country’s population and loss of [such] status can have 
the opposite effect” (Sambanis and Shayo 2013, 310). Hence, in a highly ethnically 
heterogeneous society, the government uses nationalism for national unity. This action 
increases national identification vis-à-vis others and strengthens the sense of the 
difference between “self” and “other” in the interstate system. 
  The intensification of national identification in the interstate system in turn hardens 
in-group favoritism. In such a situation, a minor disagreement or dispute is more likely 
to escalate to a significant nationalist issue. Thus, an ethnically heterogeneous society 
creates an environment where nationalistic rivalry is more probable to emerge 
(Sambanis and Shayo 2013, 320). 
  At the dyadic level, only if both states in a dyad are ethnically heterogeneous are they 
likely to experience nationalistic rivalry. If only one state in a dyad is ethnically 
heterogeneous, the other state does not have to promote nationalism as much as the 
ethnically heterogeneous counterpart and, therefore, is able to be more flexible in 
dealing with a dispute than simply reciprocating hostility. If both states must be 
ethnically heterogeneous to develop nationalistic rivalry, it is necessary to look at the 
absolute level of ethnic heterogeneity in a less ethnically heterogeneous state in the 
dyad. 
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Hypothesis 1: The higher the absolute level of ethnic heterogeneity in a less ethnically 
heterogeneous state in a dyad, the more likely the dyad is to experience nationalistic rivalry. 
 
  In terms of intrastate conflict, Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009, 317) argue, 
“Rather than high degrees of diversity, it is ethnic exclusion from state power and 
competition over the spoils of government that breed ethnic conflict.” Yet, in terms of 
interstate conflict, the ethnic heterogeneity of society itself increases the necessity of the 
government to promote nationalism for state-based nation-building, whether multiple 
ethnic groups are included in or excluded from state power, because either way the 
government is under pressure to keep national unity. In the case of multiethnic 
powersharing,19 the senior partner ethnic group gives political rights to the junior 
partner counterparts (“carrot”) whereas in the case of multiethnic authoritarian systems, 
the dominant ethnic group oppresses the other groups (“stick”). If the government fails 
to keep national unity in terms of territorial statehood, both cases can cause a 
secessionist movement, as have been seen in the powersharing regime of the United 
Kingdom or Spain or in the authoritarian regimes of China or Russia. Divided society in 
turn makes the central government ineffective to mobilize the military power for 
survival in the interstate system. In short, whether multiple ethnic groups are included in 
or excluded from state power, a highly ethnically heterogeneous society motivates the 
government to promote nationalism for national unity. 
  In addition to ethnically heterogeneous society, the aforementioned existing theories 
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 I rely on Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009, online appendix) regarding the definition of 
powersharing: “any arrangement that divides executive power among leaders who claim to 
represent particular ethnic groups. Such an arrangement can be either formal, as in Lebanon, or 
informal, as in Switzerland.” 
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on nationalist conflict, i.e., nationalist political competition and ethnonation-state 
incongruence, provide two potential causes of nationalistic rivalry. The nationalist 
political competition explanation expects that domestic political instability causes 
nationalist mobilization provoking conflict with other states (Mansfield and Snyder 
2005; Snyder 2000; Gagnon 1994/95). When domestic politics is unstable, elites resort 
to nationalist discourse as a strategy to attract popular support. For that purpose, they 
describe some other state as a threat to nationhood. For example, they might claim that 
some other state is lusting for part of its own territory and, therefore, is a threat to 
national unity and autonomy. Such a nationalist rhetoric creates a nationalist issue in the 
interstate arena. At the dyadic level, for the same reason as in the case of ethnically 
heterogeneous society, only if both states in a dyad use this kind of nationalist discourse 
are they likely to develop nationalistic rivalry. Thus, it is necessary to measure the 
absolute level of political instability in a more politically stable state in a dyad. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the absolute level of political instability in a more politically stable 
state in a dyad, the more likely the dyad is to experience nationalistic rivalry. 
 
  It is argued that ethnonation-state incongruence increases the probability of 
irredentism and national unification movements, thereby causing interstate conflict 
(Miller 2007; Woodwell 2007; Saideman and Ayres 2008; Van Evera 1994, 12, 14-15, 
17-18, 22; Wimmer and Min 2006, 874-875, 891). On the one hand, if states in a dyad 
have transborder ethnic kin in the other side, they are more likely to pursue 
transstate-ethnic nationalism in order to complete the goal of national self-governance. 
On the other hand, being the target of transstate-ethnic nationalism also poses a threat to 
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national autonomy, unity, and identity. If part of one’s national territory were governed 
by the government of another nation, neither national autonomy nor unity would be 
fulfilled, which could in turn endanger the sense of national identity. Hence, 
ethnonation-state incongruence creates a nationalist issue between states. 
  As states are not ethnic groups, it is necessary to consider exactly what condition is 
necessary for an ethnic group to pursue transstate-ethnic nationalism through the state 
apparatus. I focus on power holder ethnic groups, i.e., the ethnic groups who 
monopolize or dominate national politics, or those who are senior partners in a 
powersharing regime.   
 
Hypothesis 3: If the power holder ethnic group of the state has transborder ethnic kin in 
another state, the dyad is more likely to experience nationalistic rivalry. 
 
  The ethnic groups who are junior partners in a powersharing regime are not taken into 
consideration. It is reasonable to expect that junior partners have less power to pursue 
their irredentist/national unification foreign policy than senior counterparts in a 
powersharing regime. Senior partners are likely to oppose such a policy, because if the 
annexation of irredenta or national unification were successful, it would change the 
ethnic power balance in the regime in favor of the junior partners. Meanwhile, even if 
the junior partners oppose the senior partner’s transstate-ethnic nationalist policy, the 
senior partner is still able to pursue it due to its relative advantage in the powersharing 
regime, thus either ignoring or suppressing the opposing junior partners. 
  If there is more than one senior partner, ethnonation-state incongruence is likely to 
matter only when these senior partners share the same transborder ethnic kin. If senior 
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partners in a powersharing regime do not share the same transborder ethnic kin, the 
pursuit of an irredentist/national unification foreign policy by one senior partner is 
likely to be opposed by other senior partners. The latter senior partners have no moral 
motivation for such a policy due to the lack of an ethnic tie, whereas they would fear 
that the success of such a policy would change the ethnic power balance in the 
powersharing regime in favor of the former senior partner. Faced with opposition from 
other senior partners, the senior partner seeking an irredentist/national unification 
foreign policy might either give up such a policy, or hijack domestic politics to end the 
powersharing regime and to pursue its transstate ethnic policy, in which case that group 
is no longer regarded as a senior partner but as a dominant ethnic group. 
 
Nationalistic Rivalry and Mobilization towards Revisionist Behavior 
Nationalistic rivalry captures the interstate context where states project nationalistic 
hostility towards each other. However, hostility itself does not automatically result in 
revisionist behavior. Hence, some mechanism is necessary to connect nationalistic 
hostility to revisionist behavior. This section explains how nationalistic rivalry leads 
society specifically to revisionist behavior, which is the second phase of the thesis’s 
causal mechanism between nationalism and revisionist behavior (see Figure 2-4). 
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Figure 2-4: Second phase of the thesis’s causal mechanism between nationalism and 
revisionist behavior 
 
The black objects denote the focus of this section 
 
  In domestic politics, both elites and masses are able to mobilize society by 
nationalism (Kaufman 2001, 27-38). First, as for elite-led nationalist mobilization, as 
the nationalist political competition explanation indicates, elites seek a nationalist 
mobilization for their political survival (Gagnon 1994/95; Kadercan 2012; Mansfield 
and Snyder 2005; Snyder 2000).20 Political survival can be in terms of either domestic 
politics or interstate politics (or both). 
  In terms of domestic politics, elites attempt to divert the attentions of constituencies 
from domestic issues to foreign issues, such as an external threat to nationhood from the 
rival, in order to gain and maintain popular support (Mitchell and Prins 2004). These 
elites use, or purposively create, nationalistic hostility among the masses against the 
rival, to depict themselves as those who can protect their own nation and, therefore, 
                                                 
20
 By “elites,” I mean not only leaders but also other high-ranking political/military figures. 
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should remain in office. It might look counterproductive at first glance that elites seek to 
remove a threat from the rival, because this threat is the source of their popular support. 
However, after making the rival a central political issue in society, elites must in turn 
resolve this issue to enable a political achievement. Because diversionary use of 
nationalism increases nationalistic hostility against the rival, if elites could not address a 
threat from the rival, it would be seen as a diplomatic failure and would be 
counterproductive for political survival. Hence, elites would have to seek to remove a 
threat from the rival. For example, if elites persuaded the masses to believe that the 
rival’s control of the ethnic enclave is illegitimate, then they would have to address this 
issue by annexing that enclave. 
  In terms of interstate politics, if elites believed that the rival is a threat to their 
nationhood, they would provoke nationalistic hostility among the masses to mobilize 
them for a revisionist attempt to remove the threat.21 A threat to nationhood could also 
be a threat to the political survival of elites, because these elites might lose power if the 
rival interfered with national self-governance. 
  In short, for domestic or interstate political survival, nationalism is a powerful tool 
for elites to use in mobilizing the masses, whether those elites are true believers in 
nationalism or not (see also Connor 1994b, 76). An example of elite-led mobilization 
for domestic political survival is Serbia’s use of nationalistic hostility against Croatia 
and Bosnia in the Yugoslav war in the early 1990s. Serbian elites manipulated domestic 
politics to win political competition by emphasizing a threat to the Serbian nation from 
these neighboring states (Gagnon 1994/95). An example of elite-led mobilization for 
                                                 
21
 Protecting the nation does not mean protecting all people. Under the name of protecting the 
whole nation, some minorities might be sacrificed. 
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interstate political survival is Pakistan against India. Fearing that “India is waiting to 
undo partition by taking over Pakistan at some later stage” (Pande 2011, 19), Pakistani 
elites have appealed to Islam-based nationalism to mobilize the masses for conflict with 
India (Pande 2011, 21-22; Paul 2006, 614).22 
The masses can also mobilize nationalism.23 If they spontaneously felt a threat to 
their nationhood from the rival, they would pressure their government to remove the 
threat for peaceful everyday life. To gain and maintain popular support, even dovish 
elites would follow this mass-led mobilization to show their determination and 
capability of protecting the nation. Otherwise, they would risk being overthrown by 
those masses or other hardline political competitors who would mobilize the public 
instead (Colaresi 2004). In mass-led mobilization, if the elites demonstrated weak 
attitudes and could not deal with the nationalistic hostility of the masses to the external 
threat, they would risk being treated as a “traitor” to the nation – which was unthinkable 
in the age of dynasty (Anderson 2006, 85) and characteristic in the age of nationalism. 
Faced with mass-led mobilization, elites in the age of nationalism would be either 
compelled to act as hardliners or be taken over by other hardliners. In other words, 
mass-led mobilization is the other side of the same coin as elites’ political survival in 
terms of domestic politics. In short, forcing moderate elites to be hawkish or allowing 
hardline nationalists to hijack politics, the masses would lead the government to adopt 
revisionist policy in order to address a threat from the rival. 
                                                 
22
 Paradoxically, “most Indian leaders have accepted partition and the existence of Pakistan” 
(Pande 2011, 30), although minority Hindu right-wing nationalists in India have made claims 
concerning the undoing of the partition (56). Thus, Pakistan’s subjective suspicion plays a 
powerful role to shape its fear of being absorbed by India. 
23
 By “masses,” I mean those who are not elites. 
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  An example of mass-led mobilization is China’s anti-Japan nationalism among the 
masses, typically over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The Chinese government has 
needed to take a hardline policy in face of disputes with Japan, in order to prevent the 
masses who hold hostile anti-Japan nationalism from criticizing the regime and 
doubting its legitimacy (He 2007, 6-11, 14).24 The Chinese government “fears the force 
of public opinion being used by anti-authority elites to defy its rule, and chooses to 
co-opt rather than suppress the popular sentiment” (He 2007, 19). 
  To recapitulate, either the elites or the masses can initiate nationalist mobilization. 
Once initiated, however, both types of mobilizations can go hand in hand to reinforce 
one another. If elites initiate nationalist mobilization, it creates the threat perception of 
the rival among the masses, which in turn leads to mass-led mobilization constraining 
the policy choice of elites since the masses will punish dovish attitudes and favor a 
hardline policy. If the masses kick off nationalist mobilization, it gives elites an 
opportunity (if hawks) or an imperative (if doves) for elite-led mobilization. An 
important implication is that both elites and masses can use, and be influenced by, 
nationalism, unlike the common assumption that elites take advantage of nationalism 
while the masses are manipulated by such elites (see also Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012, 
esp. 193). As discussed in Chapter 1, nationalism is a social structure which constrains 
individual behavior, whether these individuals are the elites or the masses. More 
specifically, nationalistic rivalry institutionalizes nationalist mobilization towards 
revisionist behavior in domestic politics.25 
                                                 
24
 Ironically, the overt expression of Chinese anti-Japan feeling was originally accelerated by 
the Chinese government’s nationalist policy to increase regime legitimacy since the early 1980s 
(He 2009). For more detail on this, see the case study of China-Japan in Chapter 5. 
25
 Blumer’s (1958) group position theory posits a similar line of argument: “even though given 
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  The structural effect of nationalism for a specific collective action (here, revisionist 
state behavior) is particularly powerful in the case of nationalistic rivalry, because a 
threat perception increases national identification in society along the line of the 
righteous “self” vis-à-vis the threatening “other.” To quote Tajfel and Turner (1986, 8) 
again, “the more intense is an intergroup conflict, the more likely it is that the 
individuals will behave toward each other as a function of their respective group 
memberships, rather than in terms of their individual characteristics or individual 
relationships.” Thus, under the condition of nationalistic rivalry, nationalist mobilization 
is more likely to be successful in shaping national collective behavior and leading the 
state to a revisionist attempt against the rival. In short, as Brewer (1991, 479) argues, 
“the collective self dominates the individuated self.” 
It might be questioned why states seek to change the status quo by a military means 
rather than through a peaceful method. I argue that the Prisoners’ Dilemma is working 
in the case of nationalistic rivalry. States engaged in nationalistic rivalry are reluctant to 
cease threatening each other and reach a rapprochement by peaceful means for 
following reasons. If a state proposed negotiation, it would signal to the rival that it does 
not intend to behave aggressively. However, the state must also consider that if the rival 
were a real aggressor, it would take advantage of its conciliatory attitude and become 
even more threatening (Prins and Daxecker 2008, 24). This concern causes negotiation 
to be seen as implausible, even if both sides know that cooperation is better than 
conflict (Kelman and Fisher 2003, 316). 
                                                                                                                                               
individual members may have personal views and feelings different from the sense of group 
position, they will have to conjure with the sense of group position held by their racial group” 
(5). If “racial group” is replaced with “national group,” the argument clearly resembles what the 
thesis posits here. 
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The mistrust of the rival and the optimism of military success are derived from the 
combination of in-group favoritism and nationalist mobilization. Group members (here 
national members) significantly underestimate “the threat posed by their own group 
toward the other” (Brewer 2003, 113). An implication is that they believe their own 
position vis-à-vis the rival is righteous and justifiable. In addition, nationalist 
mobilization creates the image that the rival is “more threatening than it really is yet 
more easily defeated by united opposition than the true probabilities may warrant” 
(Snyder 2000, 50). In short, both sides in nationalistic-rivalry dyads hold a biased, 
chauvinist thought that their own nation is righteous and stronger while the rival nation 
is threatening but weaker. Locked in this chauvinist thought, society believes that it is 
more plausible to change the status quo by a military means than by a peaceful means.  
In short, it can be expected that states engaged in nationalistic rivalry are more likely 
to resort to revisionist behavior than those without such rivalry.  
 
Hypothesis 4: If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to 
revisionist behavior than those without such rivalry. 
 
  The above hypothesis is a structuralist approach to comparing nationalistic-rivalry 
dyads with other dyads regarding a revisionist propensity. Meanwhile, it has been 
theorized that the social structure of nationalistic rivalry allows for elite-led and 
mass-led nationalist mobilization in society, thereby leading the state to revisionist 
ambition. Thus, it is also possible to formulate the following causal-mechanistic 
hypotheses. 
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Hypothesis 5: If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to 
nationalist mobilization than those without such rivalry. 
 
Hypothesis 6: If states have a higher level of nationalist mobilization within nationalistic 
rivalry, they are more likely to resort to revisionist behavior. 
 
State-Territorial and Transstate-Ethnic Nationalisms in Nationalistic Rivalry 
The last chapter established the dichotomy of state-territorial nationalism and 
transstate-ethnic nationalism as an alternative to the civic-ethnic dichotomy. To 
recapitulate the reason for categorizing nationalism, it is for distinguishing the positive 
and negative aspects of nationalism. In other words, the dichotomy of state-territorial 
nationalism and transstate-ethnic nationalism must differentiate a propensity for 
revisionist behavior if it is to be a useful analytical concept for this thesis. 
  At first glance, it might seem obvious that transstate-ethnic nationalism is more prone 
to revisionist behavior than state-territorial nationalism, given the previous finding that 
ethnonation-state incongruence increases the likelihood of revisionist conflict (Miller 
2007; Woodwell 2007). Since ethnonation-state incongruence is a necessary condition 
for transstate-ethnic nationalism, it seems that transstate-ethnic nationalism is more 
revisionist-prone, whereas state-territorial nationalism favors the status-quo as its 
national boundary is already defined by the existent state framework. 
However, it is also possible to reason that this initial thought may not always be the 
case. If a state pursuing state-territorial nationalism concluded that the only way to 
resolve the nationalist issue is to conquer the threatening rival, it would take a 
revisionist policy of invading it. If a state pursuing transstate-ethnic nationalism just 
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supported the status quo of ethnic kin in another state by political/economic assistance 
rather than annexing them by force, it would be status-quo seeking rather than 
revisionist-oriented. Thus, the issue of whether transstate-ethnic nationalism is really 
more revisionist-prone than state-territorial nationalism requires more consideration. 
  As explained in the last chapter, it is a necessary condition for one’s mobilization of 
nationalism vis-à-vis another in dyadic relations that states experience incompatible 
desires to achieve and maintain national autonomy, unity, and identity; and the nature of 
a nationalist issue at dispute determines the type of nationalism dyad by dyad. 
Nationalistic rivalry captures such a condition.26 For example, if a state aims to annex 
an ethnic enclave in another state but the latter shows no compromise on territorial 
integrity, the former state’s transstate-ethnic nationalism conflicts with the latter state’s 
state-territorial nationalism. 
  The two types of nationalism generate three types of nationalistic rivalry: mutually 
state-territorial nationalistic rivalry, mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, 
and state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry. In mutually 
state-territorial nationalistic rivalry, both states in a dyad seek state-territorial 
nationalism. For example, nationalistic rivalry between two states claiming territorial 
rights without any transstate ethnic aspect, such as China-Japan over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, is mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry. 
In mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, both states in a dyad pursue 
transstate-ethnic nationalism due to a transstate ethnic issue. The nature of transstate 
ethnic issues can vary depending on contexts. Ethnic kin might reside in each other’s 
                                                 
26
 Nationalistic rivalry may not be the sole condition for identifying the presence of a 
nationalist issue at dispute in dyadic relations. However, it is a condition where such an issue is 
most likely to result in revisionist behavior. 
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areas, or in an outside area such as a third-party state’s territory or an unsettled/disputed 
area. The power holder ethnic group of the states either can be different (e.g., Iran-Iraq) 
or the same one which competes for ethnonational leadership (e.g. North Korea-South 
Korea).27 
In state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, one state in a dyad seeks 
state-territorial nationalism and the other pursues transstate-ethnic nationalism. The 
state-territorial nationalism side perceives the transstate-ethnic nationalism side as a 
threat to nationhood in terms of the existing state framework while the latter regards the 
former as a threat to nationhood in terms of transstate ethnicity. As in mutually 
transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, the ethnic kin of the transstate-ethnic nationalism 
side would reside in the rival’s area, or in an outside area such as the third-party state’s 
territory or an unsettled/disputed area. India-Pakistan over Kashmir is a typical example 
of the former case of state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry. The latter 
case of state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry may need an additional 
explanation. In state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, the 
state-territorial nationalism side might be worried about the transstate-ethnic 
nationalism rival’s support of ethnic kin, even if they do not reside in its own area. This 
is because the state-territorial nationalism side might fear that its nationhood would be 
even more threatened, if the transstate-ethnic nationalism rival were able to create a 
                                                 
27
 For a similar line of argument, see Woodwell (2007). Woodwell theorizes that, in transborder 
nationalism, “irredentist-type dyads contain a unilaterally revisionist (homeland state) and, by a 
unilaterally defensively oriented (kin state), while the states within contending government 
dyads are better characterized as both bilaterally revisionist and defensively oriented” (34-35). 
The weakness of this categorization is that it misses dyads containing mutually 
revisionist-irredentists. For example, the Greece-Turkey nationalistic rivalry is largely over their 
respective ethnic kin in Cyprus. 
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stronger national tie with transborder ethnic kin and became more powerful. 
  Does the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms matter in 
differentiating a propensity for revisionist behavior within nationalistic rivalry? This 
question can be answered at both monadic and dyadic levels of analysis. In terms of the 
monadic level of analysis, state-territorial nationalism should be less prone to revisionist 
behavior than transstate-ethnic nationalism. Transstate-ethnic nationalism actors feel 
more fear than state-territorial nationalism actors over their nationhood. This is because 
ethnic kin outside the state territory are more vulnerable to aggression from a rival than 
the population within the state territory. The rival could harass, discriminate, or even 
ethnic-cleanse the ethnic kin. State-territorial nationalism actors are more secure than 
transstate-ethnic nationalism actors, because their people live within the state territory 
and, therefore, can be defended more easily. For instance, if state-territorial nationalism 
actors feel a threat from a rival, they can enhance security by fortifying the borders, 
which would be impossible in the case of ethnic kin outside state territory. Hence, 
within nationalistic rivalry, state-territorial nationalism actors should be less inclined to 
resort to revisionist behavior. 
 
Hypothesis 7: In nationalistic-rivalry dyads, state-territorial nationalism is less prone to 
revisionist behavior than transstate-ethnic nationalism. 
   
  In terms of the dyadic level of analysis, however, the implications of the dichotomy 
are more complex. The nature of dyadic interaction suggests different dynamics 
between the symmetrical dyads of mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry and 
mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry and the asymmetrical dyad of 
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state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry. 
  In the symmetrical cases, because both sides share the same type of nationalism, they 
can anticipate what the other side thinks and feels, and have some degree of certainty 
about the other’s intention. In the case of mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry, 
both sides know the other does not feel as much threat as transstate-ethnic nationalism 
actors. As a result, they tend to take advantage of the other’s overconfidence in 
defending the nation. Meanwhile, in the case of mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic 
rivalry, both sides know that the other feels grave concerns about its ethnic kin and, 
therefore, can expect that conflict will easily escalate to war. Consequently, they are 
likely to engage in revisionist behavior only at a strategically appropriate moment and 
avoid reckless adventures. In other words, the dyadic strategic interaction of 
state-territorial nationalism (which is expected to be less prone to revisionist behavior 
than transstate-ethnic nationalism at the monadic level) makes dyads as likely to resort 
to revisionist behavior as that of transstate-ethnic nationalism (which is expected to be 
more prone to revisionist behavior than state-territorial nationalism at the monadic 
level). 
 
Hypothesis 8: Mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry and mutually transstate-ethnic 
nationalistic rivalry make a similar propensity for revisionist behavior.28 
                                                 
28
 I phrase the hypothesis in this way rather than as the null hypothesis, because the difference 
between two continuous sizes of effect (here, an effect to change the probability of revisionist 
behavior) can be very close to, but cannot be, zero and therefore the null hypothesis (i.e., the 
difference of effect sizes = zero) can never be true (Frick 1995, 133). However, given the prior 
common belief that ethnic nationalism is dangerous while civic nationalism is peaceful, a 
similar propensity for revisionist behavior between state-territorial nationalism and 
transstate-ethnic nationalism would be by itself a novel and counter-intuitive finding. 
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If this hypothesis is the case, what is deduced from the monadic argument is that a 
differentiated propensity for revisionist behavior should be observed only in 
state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry. Here, the dyadic interaction is 
asymmetrical. The state-territorial nationalism side seeks to resolve a nationalist issue in 
terms of the existing state framework, whereas the transstate-ethnic nationalism side 
aims to do so in terms of transstate ethnicity. 
The transstate-ethnic nationalism side is expected to be more prone to revisionist 
behavior than the state-territorial nationalism side, because the former feels more fear 
than the latter. As already noted, ethnic kin outside state territory are more vulnerable to 
aggression from a rival than a people within state territory. Although this point is the 
case in transstate-ethnic nationalism states for both mutually transstate-ethnic 
nationalistic rivalry and state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, the 
symmetrical and asymmetrical nature of dyadic interactions differentiates its 
consequence. 
In the case of mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, both states know that the 
other side has fear over its ethnic kin and conflict could easily escalate. Hence, they 
would be more careful to handle transstate-ethnic nationalist claims than 
transstate-ethnic nationalism states in state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic 
rivalry. In the case of state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, the 
transstate-ethnic nationalism side would fear aggression on their ethnic kin by the 
state-territorial nationalism rival, which is less vulnerable to aggression than the 
transstate-ethnic nationalism side. In turn, because the transstate-ethnic nationalism side 
is more likely to resort to revisionist behavior, the state-territorial nationalism 
counterpart has fewer opportunities to pursue its revisionist aim to resolve the 
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nationalist issue. More resources are spent on defense than on offense, because it is a 
primary imperative to have enough defensive capabilities and protect the state and 
counteract the transstate-ethnic nationalism rival’s revisionist aggression. Therefore, the 
state-territorial nationalism actor in state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic 
rivalry is less likely to engage in revisionist behavior than the transstate-ethnic 
nationalism counterpart. In short, because of its asymmetrical nature, state-territorial vs. 
transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry dyads demonstrate the asymmetric tendency of 
revisionist behavior. 
 
Hypothesis 9: In state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, state-territorial 
nationalism is less prone to revisionist behavior than transstate-ethnic nationalism. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has first of all theorized and operationalized nationalistic rivalry. 
Nationalistic rivalry captures the situation where dispute-prone states perceive each 
other as a threatening and competing enemy due to a nationalist issue. Then, the chapter 
has discussed the causes and effects of nationalistic rivalry, which are summarized as 
nine hypotheses in Table 2-2. Those hypotheses are tested empirically in the next 
chapter. 
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Table 2-2: List of hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 The higher the absolute level of ethnic heterogeneity in a less ethnically 
heterogeneous state in a dyad, the more likely the dyad is to experience 
nationalistic rivalry. 
 
Hypothesis 2 The higher the absolute level of political instability in a more politically stable 
state in a dyad, the more likely the dyad is to experience nationalistic rivalry. 
 
Hypothesis 3 If the power holder ethnic group of the state has transborder ethnic kin in 
another state, the dyad is more likely to experience nationalistic rivalry. 
 
Hypothesis 4 If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to 
revisionist behavior than those without such rivalry. 
 
Hypothesis 5 If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to 
nationalist mobilization than those without such rivalry. 
 
Hypothesis 6 If states have a higher level of nationalist mobilization within nationalistic 
rivalry, they are more likely to resort to revisionist behavior. 
 
Hypothesis 7 In nationalistic-rivalry dyads, state-territorial nationalism is less prone to 
revisionist behavior than transstate-ethnic nationalism. 
 
Hypothesis 8 Mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry and mutually transstate-ethnic 
nationalistic rivalry make a similar propensity for revisionist behavior. 
 
Hypothesis 9 In state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, state-territorial 
nationalism is less prone to revisionist behavior than transstate-ethnic 
nationalism. 
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Chapter 3 
Empirics of Nationalistic Rivalry 
 
The previous chapter has formulated nine hypotheses from the theory of nationalistic 
rivalry. This chapter empirically examines these hypotheses in order. For the list of all 
hypotheses, see Table 2-1 in the concluding section of the last chapter. 
 
Empirical Analysis of the Causes of Nationalistic Rivalry 
This section conducts the empirical analysis of Hypotheses 1-3, i.e., the causes of 
nationalistic rivalry. The first part explains a research design. The second displays and 
discusses the results of the analysis. 
 
Research Design 
The dependent variable is nationalistic rivalry, coded 1 if a dyad is engaged in 
nationalistic rivalry in a year; 0 otherwise. The data of nationalistic-rivalry dyads cover 
the period of 1946-2001, and to control for the endogeneity of simultaneity bias, the 
observations one year ahead (t+1) are used. The unit of analysis is non-directed 
dyad-years, as nationalistic rivalry is a non-directed dyadic phenomenon. 
  The explanatory variables of interest are as follows. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, according to the definition of nationalistic rivalry, states must mutually project 
hostility towards each other and, therefore, the source of nationalistic hostility must be 
observed in both states. Hence, societal causes are measured by the observation of a 
theoretically less nationalistic side in dyads in the unit of analysis of non-directed 
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dyad-years. 
  Ethnically heterogeneous society is measured by the number of politically relevant 
ethnic groups (PREGs) within states, according to the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) 
dataset (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). As Hypothesis 1 indicates, a smaller 
number of PREGs in dyads is used to identify a less ethnically heterogeneous side. 
Ethnic groups are politically relevant where “at least one significant political actor 
claims to represent the interests of that group in the national political arena, 
or…members of an ethnic category are systematically and intentionally discriminated 
against in the domain of public politics” (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009, 325). 
Thus, it can capture the ethnic division of domestic politics which causes the 
government to promote nationalism for national unity, unlike a mere ethnic demography 
which might just reflect cultural plurality and not a political division. The EPR data 
suppose that there is no PREG in the “countries or specific periods in which political 
objectives, alliances, or disputes were never framed in ethnic terms, thus avoiding using 
an ethnic lens for countries not characterized by ethnic politics, such as Tanzania and 
Korea” (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009, online appendix). In such cases, the 
number of PREGs is coded zero, where there is no ethnic heterogeneity which causes 
the government to promote nationalism. This situation is different from the one where 
there is only one PREG but politics is still characterized by the ethnicity of the PREG. 
  Political instability is measured by the Polity 2 score (complete autocracy = -10, 
complete democracy = 10) and its squared term (Marshall 2013). Following Hypothesis 
2, a larger score in dyads is used to capture the level of political instability in a more 
politically stable side. A more autocratic than democratic society has higher political 
instability, because competition for political survival tends to be more serious in that 
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losers could be expelled from a country or be killed. However, this effect of regime type 
is supposed to diminish as it approaches complete autocracy, where leaders have enough 
power to maintain their regime (Gates et al. 2006). Thus, the larger Polity 2 score 
measures the linear effect of regime type (autocracy vs. democracy) and its squared 
term captures the concave effect of regime type (complete autocracy, inconsistent 
regime, complete democracy). The expectations are, firstly, that if the larger Polity 2 
score has the same absolute number, dyads whose larger Polity 2 score is a negative 
number are more likely to experience nationalistic rivalry than those whose larger Polity 
2 score is a positive number; and, secondly, that if the squared term of the larger Polity 
2 score is bigger, dyads are less likely to experience nationalistic rivalry. 
  Ethnonation-state incongruence is coded 0 if there is no ethnonation-state 
incongruence in a dyad; 1 if the ethnic group who is the power holder of one state in a 
dyad has ethnic kin in the other state; 2 if the power holder ethnic group in both states 
has its transborder ethnic kin in the other side. 1  The data of ethnonation-state 
incongruence are created based on the specification of transborder ethnic kin in 
Cederman et al. (2013) utilizing the EPR dataset (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). 
The EPR dataset identifies not only ethnic demography but also power relations among 
ethnic groups in domestic politics. Therefore, it can measure the effect of 
                                                 
1
 The last chapter has defined power holder ethnic groups as those who monopolize or 
dominate the government or who are senior partners in a powersharing regime. Even if the EPR 
dataset regards an ethnic group as politically irrelevant due to the lack of ethnic politics in the 
domestic arena but if that group is the only ethnic group within the state (e.g., Koreans in 
South/North Koreas or Germans in Germany), I code it as the power holder ethnic group. The 
target transborder ethnic kin are identified, whether politically relevant or irrelevant in the 
domestic politics of the target state. This is because the political irrelevance within the target 
state does not mean that the homeland state has no political interest in the kin; the homeland 
state might have a motivation to politicize its kin by an irredentist foreign policy. 
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 113 
ethnonation-state incongruence on interstate relations better than a mere 
ethno-demographic variable, because while the ethnic majority is often the power holder 
of states, there are also some cases where an ethnic minority holds the executive office 
(e.g., Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as the regime of minority Sunni). If there is more than one 
senior partner, ethnonation-state incongruence is coded 1 only when these senior 
partners share the same transborder ethnic kin, as discussed in the last chapter. 
According to Cederman et al.’s (2013) data, only Pakistan and Israel are such cases 
during the period of 1946-2001. 
  The control variables are as follows. The literature on diversionary use of force has 
examined whether an economic downturn increases the probability of leaders’ use of 
conflict for a rally-round-flag effect (e.g., Oneal and Tir 2006). This point is empirically 
tested by the average of the growth rate of GDP per capita in the previous two years 
(Oneal and Tir 2006, 763). To correctly compare GDP per capita over time, the real 
price by 2000 US dollars is used. Data are from GDP and population data 5.0 beta 
(Gleditsch 2002). If a state in the dyad has experienced economic decline, it might be 
more likely to promote nationalism for a diversionary purpose. Since the unit of 
analysis is non-directed dyad-years whereas economic growth is a societal factor, a 
larger economic growth rate in a dyad is used to measure a theoretically less 
nationalistic side. I expect, however, that an economic decline is not a significant cause 
of nationalist foreign policy, and political instability is a more fundamental cause. 
Consolidated democracy can discourage the government from resorting to reckless 
diversionary nationalist foreign policy, because a diverse public opinion is adequately 
reflected. For example, Japan had a general election in December 2014, after economic 
policy called Abenomics failed to benefit the majority of the population. Despite a 
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technical recession in the last quarter of the year, the Party for Future Generations, the 
far-right nationalist party, lost 18 seats out of the 20 that it had before the election, 
whereas more left-leaning parties, such as the Democratic Party of Japan and the Japan 
Communist Party, increased the number of seats. Fully democratic society of Japan did 
not allow far-right nationalists to hold a greater sway on national politics even under the 
condition of economic difficulty. Actually, the literature on diversionary use of force 
admits that the theory “has not received consistent empirical support” (Sobek 2007, 29). 
  Standard realist conflict factors are also controlled for. The distance between states is 
measured by miles between the capitals, or another important city, of two states in a 
dyad. It is calculated by EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000a) utilizing the COW Direct 
Contiguity dataset (Stinnett et al. 2002) and then transformed to the natural logarithm to 
increase the normality of the distribution.2 The absolute power of a weaker side in a 
                                                 
2
 The binary measure of contiguity is also often used as a geographic predictor of conflict and 
rivalry in the literature. I do not include it here for two reasons. First, contiguity and distance are, 
by definition, conceptually overlapped things (and do not constitute causality) and, therefore, 
should not be included together (Ray 2003, 15-19). Second, distance is a more nuanced measure 
of geographic effect on interstate interaction, as it is a continuous measure. If contiguity is used 
instead of distance, the results do not change, except that the smaller number of PREGs in dyads 
becomes statistically insignificant in predicting nationalistic rivalry. It is unlikely, however, that 
contiguity is a confounder of an ethnically heterogeneous society, as it is difficult to imagine 
how the contiguity between two states changes the number of PREGs in these states. Rather, it 
is more likely that an ethnically heterogeneous society increases contiguous states. An ethnically 
heterogeneous society is more likely to be partitioned along ethnonational lines, but partition 
usually does not achieve ethnically homogeneous states but creates new ethnically 
heterogeneous states by leaving a fraction of various ethnic groups in the partitioned states (e.g., 
India and Pakistan after the partition of British India, or Balkan countries after the partition of 
the Ottoman Empire). Then, contiguity increases the chance of ethnic territorial disputes, 
thereby resulting in nationalistic rivalry. Thus, contiguity is an intervening variable between 
ethnically heterogeneous society and nationalistic rivalry and, therefore, should not be 
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 115 
dyad is measured by a smaller Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) (Singer, 
Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987) in a dyad (hereafter, “the smaller capability”),3 
which is transformed to the natural logarithm to increase the normality of the 
distribution.4 These two variables measure the possibility of interaction between states. 
Rivalry should emerge only if states can interact with each other. 
  Finally, the effect of dyadic power relationships is measured by the capability ratio, 
or the ratio of the weaker state’s CINC to the stronger state’s CINC, which is 
transformed to the natural logarithm to increase the normality of the distribution. Power 
transition theory (Organski and Kugler 1980; Levy 1998, 148) suggests that a closer 
power gap between states should provoke hostility between states and cause interstate 
rivalry. 
  In order to control for the temporal dependence of binary dependent variables in the 
time-series cross-sectional data, the cubic polynomials of year counters are also 
included as time controls (Carter and Signorino 2010). This counter sets as zero the first 
year of dyad-year observations and the first year after the last event of interest, and 
calculates the number of years until another event is observed. The cubic polynomials of 
both non-nationalistic-rivalry-year counters and nationalistic-rivalry-year counters are 
implemented (see Morey 2011, 270). 
  To highlight the distinctive nature of nationalistic rivalry, the chapter also examines 
whether statistical models produce similar or different results to explain other rivalries. 
                                                                                                                                               
controlled for to estimate the total effect of ethnically heterogeneous society on the probability 
of nationalistic rivalry (Ray 2003, 4-6). 
3
 The COW National Material Capabilities dataset version 4.0 is used. 
4
 If the smaller CINC is 0, the missing value is assigned, as the logarithm of 0 is not 
mathematically defined. 
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The first measure of other rivalries is coded 1 if interstate rivalries appearing in 
Thompson and Dreyer (2012) are not nationalistic rivalry. The second measure is coded 
1 if interstate rivalries appearing in Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) are not nationalistic 
rivalry. The time controls are implemented in the same way as nationalistic rivalry. The 
two rivalry datasets are not combined together, because there is no theoretical ground 
for that. They measure interstate rivalry in quite a different way, and simply combining 
them is atheoretical. The data of nationalistic rivalry utilize the intersection of these two 
rivalry datasets because the theory of nationalistic rivalry provides a theoretical ground 
for this practice. The number of the observations where rivalry exists in the non-directed 
dyad-year data during the period of 1946-2001 is 1,387 for nationalistic rivalry, 1,356 
for other rivalries identified by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), and 2,570 for other 
rivalries specified by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006). 
  Probit regression is used as the dependent variables are binary. Robust standard errors 
clustered on dyads are implemented to control for within-group correlations. 
 
Results 
The results of probit regressions are displayed in Table 3-1 and those of predicted 
probability estimations are presented in Figure 3-1 for the smaller number of PREGs, in 
Figure 3-2 for the larger Polity 2 score, and in Table 3-2 for ethnonation-state 
incongruence.5 In Table 3-1, the dependent variables are nationalistic rivalry in Models 
3-1 and 3-2, other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) in Models 3-3 and 3-4, and 
                                                 
5
 Those predicted probabilities are estimated while holding the remaining variables at the mean 
or mode, except that the time controls are set at the mean of nationalistic-rivalry years estimated 
within the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads (and, therefore, the counter of 
non-nationalistic-rivalry years is set as zero). 
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other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) in Models 3-5 and 3-6. One model for 
each dependent variable has only the main explanatory variables, and the other includes 
the control variables, to check whether the inclusion of control variables causes 
misleading results (Achen 2005). 
 
Table 3-1: Probit regression of nationalistic rivalry and other rivalries in the post-WWII 
period 
 Model 3-1 Model 3-2 Model 3-3 Model 3-4 Model 3-5 Model 3-6 
 nationalistic rivalry other rivalries (TD) other rivalries (KGD) 
Smaller # of  0.0355*** 0.0183** 0.0301*** 0.0105 0.0406*** 0.00833 
 PREGs (0.0106) (0.00896) (0.0106) (0.00839) (0.0124) (0.00707) 
Larger Polity2  -0.00468 -0.00866 -0.00772 -0.0111 0.00765 -0.000116 
 Score (0.00716) (0.00773) (0.00663) (0.00748) (0.00522) (0.00595) 
Larger Polity2  -0.00327*** -0.00520*** -0.000898 -0.00213 0.00181* -0.000122 
 Score2 (0.00125) (0.00155) (0.00130) (0.00159) (0.000998) (0.00118) 
Ethnonation-State 0.606*** 0.243*** 0.558*** 0.227*** 0.531*** 0.121** 
 Incongruence (0.0523) (0.0686) (0.0460) (0.0625) (0.0374) (0.0524) 
Larger Economic  -0.401  -0.783  -0.405 
 Growth  (0.573)  (0.751)  (0.519) 
Distance  -0.372***  -0.353***  -0.381*** 
  (0.0384)  (0.0418)  (0.0256) 
Smaller   0.207***  0.224***  0.237*** 
 Capability  (0.0330)  (0.0348)  (0.0205) 
Capability Ratio  0.0314  -0.0249  -0.160*** 
  (0.0373)  (0.0487)  (0.0206) 
Constant -2.270*** 3.132*** -2.390*** 2.694*** -2.274*** 3.101*** 
 (0.0924) (0.396) (0.0914) (0.413) (0.0737) (0.268) 
Observations 370,844 337,786 370,844 337,786 370,844 337,786 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
Time controls suppressed 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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Figure 3-1: Predicted probabilities of nationalistic rivalry, given the smaller number of 
PREGs in the dyad 
 
The solid lines are the mean; the dashed lines are the 95% confidence intervals 
 
Figure 3-2: Predicted probabilities of nationalistic rivalry, given the larger Polity 2 score 
in the dyad 
 
The solid lines are the mean; the dashed lines are the 95% confidence intervals 
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Table 3-2: Predicted probabilities of nationalistic rivalry, given ethnonation-state 
incongruence 
ethnonation-state incongruence mean 95% CI 
both sides .96 .91 .99 
only one side .94 .88 .97 
neither .90 .83 .95 
 
  First of all, I focus on the results of nationalistic rivalry. All the smaller number of 
PREGs, the squared term of the larger Polity 2 score, and ethnonation-state 
incongruence are statistically and substantively significant in predicting nationalistic 
rivalry. A dyad is more likely to experience nationalistic rivalry, if the number of PREGs 
in a less ethnically heterogeneous state in the dyad is larger, if the same absolute value 
of the larger Polity 2 is observed in the autocracy side (the negative Polity 2 score) 
rather than the democracy side (the positive Polity 2 score) and regime type is closer to 
imperfect democracy or autocracy, or if at least one state has transborder ethnic kin in 
the other state. Substantively speaking, ethnic heterogeneity, political instability, and 
ethnonation-state incongruence are all associated with a higher probability of 
nationalistic rivalry. Thus, all Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2, and Hypothesis 3 are 
supported. 
  In terms of other rivalries, the smaller number of PREGs is statistically significant 
only in the models without the control variables. Once probit regressions control for the 
distance and the smaller capability to measure the possibility of interstate interaction (a 
necessary condition for states to experience rivalry), the smaller number of PREGs is no 
longer a robust predictor for other rivalries. The squared term of the larger Polity 2 
score does not demonstrate its theoretically expected effect either. It is statistically 
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insignificant in explaining other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012). It is 
statistically significant in predicting other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), 
only in the model without the control variables, and its effect is the opposite of the 
theoretical expectation; inconsistent regime decreases the probability of rivalry. In short, 
other rivalries are not caused by the nationalist effects of ethnic heterogeneity and 
political instability. 
  Meanwhile, ethnonation-state incongruence is statistically significant and raises the 
likelihood of other rivalries, though its effect is lower than in the case of nationalistic 
rivalry. A possible explanation for other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) is 
that ethnonation-state incongruence has provoked interstate hostility which involves 
transstate ethnonationalist aspects but has not caused enough militarized interstate 
disputes that Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) would have identified as rivalry (e.g., only 
one dispute or no issue linkage across disputes). The theory and data of nationalistic 
rivalry focus specifically on the rivalries which have shown the highest level of national 
identification (i.e., the dispute-prone relationship). Yet, it is also possible that the dyads 
in Thompson and Dreyer (2012) have been caused by ethnonation-state incongruence 
but have not been dispute-prone (or have ceased to be so), thus having not been 
qualified as nationalistic rivalry. Unsurprisingly, many of such cases in the data are the 
dyads which used to engage in nationalistic rivalry but ceased to be dispute-prone, or 
those which are coded as nationalistic rivalry once they meet the criterion of 
dispute-proneness according to Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006). 
  A possible explanation for other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) is that 
ethnonation-state incongruence works as a proxy for another factor. The correlation 
between ethnonation-state incongruence and other rivalries needs careful consideration 
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before reaching the conclusion that ethnonation-state incongruence causes those 
rivalries (i.e., it must predict rivalries whose issue is over transstate ethnic groups). A 
closer investigation of Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) other rivalries reveals that 
ethnonation-state incongruence incorrectly “predicts” cases where ethnonation-state 
incongruence is irrelevant (e.g., the US-Canada rivalry over fishery rights; see Klein, 
Goertz, and Diehl 2006, rivalry narrative). Meanwhile, additional tests confirm that 
ethnonation-state incongruence increases the likelihood of nationalistic rivalry, even if 
the data of nationalistic-rivalry dyads are limited only to those with transstate ethnic 
issues. 
  As for the control variables, conforming to previous research, economic growth does 
not have a significant effect on any of rivalries, although its coefficient is negative. The 
distance between states and the smaller capability have a theoretically expected effect; 
the closer states and the larger the absolute power of a weaker state in a dyad, the dyad 
is more likely to experience all kinds of rivalries. Finally, the capability ratio 
demonstrates no theoretical expectation of power transition theory, suggesting that as 
discussed in Chapter 1, rivalries are not necessarily power-symmetrical. 
 
Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Nationalistic Rivalry 
This section empirically tests Hypotheses 4-6, namely the effects of nationalistic rivalry 
on the probability of revisionist behavior. The structuralist Hypothesis 4 is firstly 
examined. Then, the section investigates Hypotheses 5 and 6, the hypothesized causal 
mechanism between nationalistic rivalry and revisionist behavior. In each case, a 
research design is explicated and then the results of analysis are discussed. 
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Research Design for Testing Hypothesis 4 
To measure revisionist behavior as the dependent variable, I rely on the Militarized 
Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004; Jones, Bremer, and 
Singer 1996), which identifies revisionist states in each militarized dispute.6  The 
dataset bases its “indicator of what constitutes a revisionist state on the prevailing status 
quo of the issues in dispute prior to the onset of any militarized action and record[s] as 
revisionist the state or states that sought to overturn the status quo ante” (Jones, Bremer, 
and Singer 1996, 178). In each MID, one, both, or neither side in dyads can be a 
revisionist (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004, 138-139). 
  Revisionist behavior is coded 1 if a state is a revisionist and resorts to a militarized 
action against another state in disputes; 0 otherwise.7 In the MID data, not all recorded 
revisionists resort to militarized actions. Because the thesis as well as the literature in 
general deals with revisionism at the militarized rather than non-militarized levels, 
revisionist behavior is coded 0 if the MID data’s recorded revisionist states conduct no 
militarized actions. 
  The MID data include militarized disputes initiated not only by the intention of the 
government executive but also by other kind of actors, such as soldiers in deployment or 
even civilian activists. While this wide scope of militarized disputes has posed a 
challenge to theories relying solely on the decision-makings of the executives (Downes 
and Sechser 2012), the theory of nationalistic rivalry does not limit its theoretical scope 
to the executives. The structural effect of nationalistic rivalry institutionalizes 
mobilization towards revisionist behavior against the rival in the society, as suggested 
                                                 
6
 Version 3.10 is used. 
7
 Militarized actions include the threat to use force, the display of force, the use of force, and 
war (i.e., the MID whose total casualties exceed 1,000). 
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by the arguments on elite-led/mass-led mobilizations in the last chapter. Thus, the 
theory covers those cases where not the government executive but other agents behaved 
in a revisionist manner against the rival. For example, in the Kargil War, the operation 
was mainly planned by a number of generals in the Pakistani military, and it remains 
unclear whether Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif played a decision-making role in advance 
(Joeck 2009, 140n10). The Pakistani military sector saw as unacceptable the success of 
India’s counter-insurgency operation in Kashmir (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 151-153), 
as the source of its legitimacy is Islamic nationalism (Nasr 2005, 191).8 In the case of 
the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu crisis between China and Japan, Chinese fisherpersons 
entered an area around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. It provoked a political 
reaction from the Japanese government and then forced the Chinese government to take 
a firm stance against Japan, thereby constituting a militarized dispute between Japan 
and China.9 Although it is often difficult to make sure whether non-executive actors 
behave in a revisionist manner against the rival state independently from the 
government executives, the point is that either the government executives or other 
actors can engage in a revisionist attempt due to the structural effect of nationalistic 
rivalry and, therefore, the scope of the MID dataset is adequate. 
  Whereas nationalistic-rivalry dyads are motivated by some specific nationalist 
issue(s), those issues do not have to correspond to contested issues in each case of 
revisionist behavior. Vasquez (2009, 80) argues, “Leaders in a rivalry will adopt a 
negative affect calculus rather than a cost-benefit or interdependence calculus” and 
these leaders will “favor any position that will hurt their opponents and oppose any 
                                                 
8
 For a greater detail of the Kargil War, see Chapter 4. 
9
 For a greater detail of the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu crisis, see Chapter 5. 
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position that will help their opponents.” In nationalistic rivalry, nationalistic hostility 
leads a society into such a negative affect calculus. Such a situation “will lead each 
actor to link more and more stakes into a single issue, since the issue is being defined 
simply as what hurts one’s opponent” (Vasquez 2009, 80). For example, although 
Kashmir has been the core issue of the India-Pakistan nationalistic rivalry, even the 
1971 war over the independence of Bangladesh was relevant to their nationalistic rivalry. 
Gokcek (2011, 292) points out that for India, “the potential gain was tremendous, as 
supporting the Bengali secessionist movement would weaken Pakistan by jeopardizing 
its territorial integrity.” Thus, the 1971 India-Pakistan war, while its primary issue was 
the independence of Bangladesh, was actually fought in the wider context of the 
India-Pakistan nationalistic rivalry. Thus, nationalist issues in nationalistic rivalry are 
the basis of nationalistic hostility, yet dyads engaged in such rivalry can also experience 
armed conflict over another issue. 
  The unit of analysis is the directed-dyadic observations of militarized disputes, in the 
period of 1946-2001 due to the data availability of nationalistic rivalry. The 
directed-dyadic level is more adequate than the non-directed-dyadic or country level, as 
revisionist behavior is one state’s action towards another state. For example, the first 
Indo-Pakistani war (1947-49) is recorded as two observations: one for India’s action 
against Pakistan and the other for Pakistan’s action against India. All actors in the 
dispute (i.e., initiators, targets, and joiners) are included to create directed dyads, 
because all of them can resort to revisionist behavior. For example, a target state might 
have been dissatisfied with the original territorial arrangement with an initiator state 
before the onset of conflict, and might use the conflict as an opportunity of annexing 
some territory of the initiator while pretending as if it were for a self-defense purpose. 
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Another state might also have been dissatisfied with the regime of the initiator state, and 
might join the conflict to overthrow the regime. 
  Directed-dyad disputes are more suitable than directed dyad-years as the unit of 
analysis. Directed dyad-years are time-series cross-sectional data and, therefore, include 
non-dispute observations (i.e., the dyad-years when there is no dispute). The inclusion 
of non-dispute observations could severely bias the estimation of the effect of 
nationalistic rivalry in favor of Hypothesis 4. It is plausible to suspect that 
nationalistic-rivalry dyads are more prone to militarized disputes than 
non-nationalistic-rivalry dyads, as nationalistic-rivalry dyads are conflict-prone by 
definition. Because militarized disputes include at least one revisionist almost always,10 
logically speaking the absolute number of revisionist attempts should be higher in 
nationalistic-rivalry dyads than in non-nationalistic-rivalry dyads. Hence, it is obvious 
that nationalistic rivalry will have a statistically significant effect to increase revisionist 
behavior given all directed dyad-years, but it is also almost tautological.11 However, if 
the observations are limited to directed-dyad disputes, an empirical model compares the 
proportion of revisionist behavior to non-revisionist behavior in militarized disputes 
between states engaged in nationalistic rivalry and between those without such rivalry. 
For example, if nationalistic-rivalry dyad A has three militarized disputes and 
                                                 
10
 According to the non-directed dyad-year data of all dyads from 1946-2001 generated by 
EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000a), the number of the observations of militarized interstate 
disputes (including both originators and joiners and excluding ongoing years) is 3,606, and 
2,937 observations out of them include at least one revisionist state. 
11
 See Table C-1 in Appendix C for the results of directed dyad-year models including peace 
year time controls (Carter and Signorino 2010) and dropping the ongoing years of revisionist 
behavior (Bennett and Stam 2000b, 661) to control for temporal dependence. Unsurprisingly, 
nationalistic rivalry as well as other rivalries (which are also conflict-prone by definition) is 
statistically significant and associated with a higher probability of revisionist behavior. 
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non-nationalistic rivalry dyad B has only one militarize dispute, and if only one side has 
always behaved in a revisionist manner, the probability of revisionist behavior is equal 
in both cases (.5). In other words, if nationalistic rivalry is to have a statistically 
significant effect, the proportion of revisionist behavior to non-revisionist behavior in 
militarized disputes must be significantly higher than in the absence of nationalistic 
rivalry. 
  Even if some selection bias existed in the use of directed-dyad disputes as the unit of 
analysis, it would work against Hypothesis 4. I explain why it does so, along the line of 
Sartori (2003, 114). Nationalistic-rivalry dyads are by definition conflict-prone. 
Meanwhile, if non-rivalry dyads experience militarized disputes, it means that they have 
some characteristic other than rivalry to engage in those disputes. However, those 
non-rivalry dyads might not be representative of all non-rivalry dyads (if they were a 
representative sample, there would be no selection bias). They might be a subset unique 
to experience militarized disputes due to some characteristic which is not measured in a 
statistical model. Provided that this unmeasured characteristic also increases revisionist 
behavior, the inclusion of those non-rivalry dyads in the selected sample results in the 
underestimation of the effect of nationalistic rivalry on the probability of revisionist 
behavior, because those non-rivalry dyads have the zero value of the binary independent 
variable, i.e., nationalistic rivalry. Hence, assuming that this selection bias exists, if the 
results of ordinary probit regression which examines only dispute observations still 
support the hypothesis, it rather increases the confidence in the theory of nationalistic 
rivalry.12 
                                                 
12
 A selection model with directed dyad-year observations might be considered to correct this 
selection bias. I discuss this point later as a robustness check. 
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  The explanatory variables of interest are as follow. To examine the effect of 
nationalistic rivalry on a revisionist propensity in militarized disputes, nationalistic 
rivalry is coded 1 if an actor state is engaged in nationalistic rivalry with a target state. 
  The control variables are as follows. Ethnonation-state incongruence is coded 1 if the 
ethnic group who is the power holder of an actor state has ethnic kin in the target state, 
according to the same data as in the last section. The dataset of nationalistic rivalry only 
includes the information that rivals have transstate ethnic issues at dispute and, therefore, 
cannot be used to examine the potential effect of ethnonation-state incongruence to 
become a disputed issue. Ethnonation-state incongruence is a necessary condition for 
transstate ethnicity to become a disputed issue and might be a confounder of 
nationalistic rivalry to explain revisionist behavior. 
  Although the theory of nationalistic rivalry per se does not argue that rivalries other 
than nationalistic rivalry have no effect on the probability of revisionist behavior, it is 
useful to examine whether nationalistic rivalry has a distinctive effect in comparison 
with other rivalries. Hence, the effect of other rivalries is estimated by the binary 
variables of the aforementioned measures: other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer 
(2012), and those by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006). The number of the observations 
where each rivalry exists in the directed-dyad dispute data is 1,100 for nationalistic 
rivalry, 392 for other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), and 1,576 for other 
rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006). Thus, each rivalry measure has a sufficient 
number of observations over the total observations (4,344). 
  Contiguity is coded 1 if a dyad is contiguous through land or the water which is equal 
to or less than 150 miles; 0 otherwise, according to the Correlated of War (COW) Direct 
Contiguity dataset version 3.0 (Stinnett et al. 2002). Contiguous states may be more 
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likely to engage in territorial revisionism due to a shared border.13 
  To consider the effect of dyadic power relations on the probability of revisionist 
behavior, there are two contending propositions. On the one hand, to quote Thucydides 
(1997, 307) again, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” 
Therefore, if the capability difference is wider, the stronger state may be more likely to 
pursue revisionist attempts against the weaker state. On the other hand, power transition 
theory (Organski and Kugler 1980; Levy 1998, 148) suggests that a closing power gap 
may cause both the weaker side and the stronger side to resort to revisionist behavior. 
The weaker side may desire to improve its position relative to the stronger side if the 
power gap is small enough for this purpose. Meanwhile, the stronger side may resort to 
preventive war (which is also revisionist behavior) to forestall this revisionist attempt 
by the weaker side. 
  To test these contending propositions on the dyadic power relationship, the capability 
difference between states, calculated by an actor state’s CINC (Singer, Bremer and 
Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987) minus a target state’s CINC, and its squared term are 
included. For example, if state A has a CINC score of 0.7 and state B has a CINC score 
of 0.3, the difference is 0.4 for state A and -0.4 for state B; its squared term is 0.16 for 
both. If state C has a CINC score of 0.5 and state D has a CINC score of 0.45, the 
difference is 0.05 for state C and -0.05 for state D; its squared term is 0.0025 for both. If 
the first proposition were true, state A (the capability difference = 0.4) would be more 
likely to engage in revisionist behavior than states B (-0.4), C (0.05), and D (-0.05). If 
                                                 
13
 Unlike explaining nationalistic rivalry, contiguity is more suitable than distance, because not 
the possibility of interaction but a shared border is the potential cause of revisionist behavior. 
Given the observations here are limited to the dyads which have engaged in militarized disputes, 
it is redundant to measure the possibility of interaction. 
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the second proposition were the case, states C and D (the capability difference squared 
= 0.0025) would be more likely to pursue revisionist foreign policy than states A and B 
(0.16).14 
  Finally, democratic peace theory argues that democratic dyads share the democratic 
norms of nonviolent conflict resolution (Maoz and Russett 1993, 625).15 Therefore, it 
can be expected that they are unlikely to engage in revisionist behavior to resolve 
disputes. To measure this democratic peace effect, democratic actors are coded 1 if an 
actor state has a Polity 2 score equal to or more than six (Marshall 2013), and 0 
otherwise; democratic targets are coded 1 if a target state has a Polity 2 score equal to or 
more than six, and 0 otherwise. The interaction term between these two variables, 
namely democratic dyads, captures the democratic peace effect. Although the literature 
often includes only democratic dyads as a covariate, the omission of the constitutive 
terms can mislead statistical analysis (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). Democratic 
peace is the effect of jointly democratic dyads; in other words, the pacifying effect of an 
actor state’s democracy is conditional on the regime type of a target state (Gartzke and 
Jo 2009, 219). 
  The estimator of choice is probit regression, since the dependent variable is binary. To 
control for the endogeneity of simultaneity bias between the explanatory variables and 
revisionist behavior, the observations of all explanatory variables are those one year 
                                                 
14
 The capability ratio, or the ratio of the weaker state’s CINC to the stronger state’s, is 
inadequate here, because it is the non-directed dyadic measure of power relations and cannot 
distinguish actor and target states in a dyad. Distinguishing actor and target states in a dyad is 
necessary here to test the argument that the wider the capability difference, the more likely the 
stronger state is to pursue revisionist attempts against the weaker state. 
15
 The causality between democratic peace and interstate conflict, however, has been contested. 
For a summary, see Hayes (2011) and Ungerer (2012). 
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 130
before militarized disputes start. 
  If a dyad experiences more than one militarized dispute per year, all disputes are 
recorded. While the inclusion of multiple disputes within one dyad in a year might 
cause autocorrelations among them and violate the assumption of the independence of 
observations, it can be controlled for by robust standard errors clustered on dyads. 
  Because the observations do not have any non-dispute observation, peace year time 
controls for the temporal dependence of non-dispute dyad-years (Beck, Katz, and 
Tucker 1998; Carter and Signorino 2010) are irrelevant (e.g., see Asal and Beardsley 
2007; Schrock-Jacobson 2012).16 Potential dependence of current revisionist behavior 
on past revisionist behavior can be addressed by robust standard errors clustered on 
dyads as well as the rivalry variables. 
 
Results of Testing Hypothesis 4 
The results of testing Hypothesis 4 are displayed in Table 3-3. Model 3-7 uses only 
nationalistic rivalry to check whether the inclusion of control variables causes 
misleading results (Achen 2005). Model 3-8 includes all control variables except for 
other rivalries; Models 3-9 and 3-10 add one measure of other rivalries. In all models, 
the presence of nationalistic rivalry has a statistically significant effect to increase the 
probability of an actor state resorting to revisionist behavior in militarized interstate 
                                                 
16
 The inclusion of a peace year counter from previous revisionist behavior to next one does not 
affect the results of nationalistic rivalry. One significant change is that the variable of other 
rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) becomes statistically significant and increases 
revisionist behavior (see Table C-2 in Appendix C). However, its coefficient is smaller than that 
of nationalistic rivalry. Thus, this robustness check does not change the conclusion that 
nationalistic rivalry has more explanatory power than other rivalries in predicting revisionist 
behavior. 
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disputes. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is supported. 
 
Table 3-3: Probit regression of revisionist behavior in directed-dyad disputes 
 Model 3-7 Model 3-8 Model 3-9 Model 3-10 
Nationalistic Rivalry 0.289*** 0.225** 0.213** 0.249*** 
  (0.103) (0.0947) (0.0970) (0.0950) 
Ethnonation-State Incongruence  0.197** 0.196** 0.197** 
  (0.0897) (0.0895) (0.0896) 
Other Rivalries   -0.0718  
 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012)   (0.106)  
Other Rivalries    0.0401 
 (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)    (0.0575) 
Contiguity  0.0254 0.0352 0.0154 
  (0.0713) (0.0725) (0.0720) 
Capability Difference  0.800* 0.799* 0.800* 
  (0.444) (0.443) (0.443) 
Capability Difference2  -0.436 -0.434 -0.574 
  (2.668) (2.664) (2.646) 
Democratic Actor  -0.385*** -0.382*** -0.393*** 
  (0.0932) (0.0931) (0.0944) 
Democratic Target  0.259*** 0.262*** 0.251*** 
  (0.0731) (0.0722) (0.0735) 
Democratic Dyad  0.153 0.142 0.167 
  (0.132) (0.132) (0.133) 
Constant -0.223*** -0.233*** -0.230*** -0.243*** 
 (0.0338) (0.0654) (0.0656) (0.0662) 
Observations 4,344 4,136 4,136 4,136 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
 
  As for the control variables, ethnonation-state incongruence is statistically significant 
and increases the likelihood of revisionist behavior, conforming to the existing literature. 
Yet, its coefficient is smaller than that of nationalistic rivalry, suggesting that 
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ethnonation-state incongruence has a smaller impact on the likelihood of revisionist 
behavior than nationalistic rivalry.17 
  In addition, the statistically significant result of ethnonation-state incongruence might 
not necessarily reflect the substantive theory of irredentism and national unification 
movement. The theory of ethnonation-state incongruence basically argues that 
ethnonation-state incongruence causes either irredentism or national unification 
movements. However, revisionist behavior here is measured by the MID dataset, which 
includes not only disputes involving irredentism or national unification movements but 
also any kind of militarized disputes. This measure is not problematic to the theory of 
nationalistic rivalry, because within nationalistic rivalry, states fight conflict not only 
over the exact nationalist issue at dispute but also on other issues which harm the rival 
due to the “negative affect calculus” (Vasquez 2009, 80). On the other hand, it is less 
plausible to expect that ethnonation-state incongruence results in such a calculus, 
because it measures the demographic and political configuration of ethnic groups across 
state borders as a necessary condition for irredentism or national unification movements 
and do not capture interstate nationalistic hostility itself. Thus, for example, while 
Canada is coded as having transborder ethnic kin in the United States, such coding 
incorrectly “predicts” revisionist behavior by the former against the latter over fishery 
rights (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006, rivalry narrative), which is a territorial dispute 
but neither irredentist or national unification conflict. 
  Other rivalries, whether identified by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) or by Klein, 
Goertz, and Diehl (2006), are statistically insignificant, indicating that nationalistic 
                                                 
17
 Because both variables are binary, it is possible to compare their relative effect by the 
coefficient in probit models. 
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rivalry has distinctive explanatory power to predict a revisionist propensity in 
comparison with other rivalries.18 Contrary to the expectation, contiguity is statistically 
insignificant. This is possibly because nationalistic rivalry captures many of the dyads 
engaged in territorial conflict and, therefore, contiguity as a crude measure for 
territoriality loses its explanatory power. The capability difference is statistically 
significant and indicates that the stronger state in a dyad is more likely to behave in a 
revisionist manner. The squared term of the capability difference is statistically 
insignificant across all models. These findings suggest that the Thucydides proposition 
is more empirically valid than power transition theory in explaining the propensity of 
states for revisionist behavior in militarized disputes. 
  Somewhat surprisingly, democratic dyads, the robust predictor of dyadic peace, are 
statistically insignificant. As for democratic actors and targets (the constitutive terms of 
democratic dyads), if an actor state is a democracy, it is less likely to behave in a 
revisionist manner against autocratic targets, whereas democratic states are more likely 
to be a target of revisionist behavior by autocratic states. In short, democratic 
institutions or norms seem to constrain states from a revisionist attempt only against 
autocratic states and not against fellow democracies. Moreover, this constraint is 
exploited by the revisionist ambition of autocratic states. 
  Although these results seem to contradict democratic peace theory, it is necessary to 
                                                 
18
 It might be the case that the aforementioned selection bias dampens the effect of all rivalry 
variables, which might be why other rivalries are statistically insignificant. Yet, nationalistic 
rivalry still has a much larger coefficient than other rivalries in the models in Table 3-3, 
meaning that it is more influential. In addition, it is difficult to imagine why the selection bias 
has so much a larger dampening effect on other rivalries than on nationalistic rivalry that the 
order of the size of their coefficients will be turned around (0.213 vs. -0.0718 in Model 3-9 and 
0.249 vs. 0.0401 in Model 3-10). This point is revisited later as part of robustness checks. 
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remember that observations are limited to directed-dyad disputes. In other words, these 
effects of democratic regime are observed only in the cases where democratic states are 
already engaged in militarized disputes. The results can be compatible with those of 
democratic peace empirics prevalent in the literature: democratic states are less likely to 
engage in militarized disputes but once they do so, a foreign policy calculus changes. I 
infer what such a change is, as follows. In democratic dyads, states mutually expect that 
the fellow democracy will not resort to revisionist attempts because of shared 
democratic norms of peaceful conflict resolution. However, once a militarized dispute 
occurs, these democracies may not believe so anymore, because they find themselves 
engaged in militarized disputes contrary to their expectation. As a result, they may not 
be constrained from resorting to revisionist behavior. On the other hand, in 
democracy-autocracy dyads, a democratic state believes that the autocratic target is 
more revisionistic and, therefore, more likely to respond by revisionist behavior 
possibly with the justification of self-defense. Hence, the democratic state may be more 
cautious to embark on a revisionist attempt, even if a militarized dispute sets on. 
However, this caution mitigates the autocratic counterpart’s fear for counterattacks and 
causes lower deterrence credibility, thereby allowing the autocratic side to resort to 
revisionist behavior. 
  To understand the substantive effect of nationalistic rivalry, predicted probabilities are 
estimated, together with their 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 3-8, the 
estimation measures the effect of nationalistic rivalry and its absence on the probability 
of revisionist behavior in militarized disputes. All control variables are fixed at their 
mean (if continuous variables) or mode (if binary variables). The results are displayed in 
Table 3-4. If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they have a .51 probability of 
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 135
resorting to revisionist behavior in militarized disputes, whereas if not, it is .42. Thus, 
nationalistic rivalry substantively increases revisionist behavior in militarized disputes. 
 
Table 3-4: Predicted probabilities of revisionist behavior in militarized disputes 
nationalistic rivalry mean 95% CI 
present .51 .43 .58 
absent .42 .37 .47 
 
  The above models attempted to control for the expected endogeneity of simultaneity 
bias between nationalistic rivalry and revisionist behavior by the use of lagged 
explanatory variables. However, it is also possible to use instrumental variables in order 
to address this potential endogeneity. For a robustness check, I run instrumental-variable 
models to check whether the results change in any significant way. 
  Chiburis, Das, and Lokshin (2011, 2) say that if both dependent variable and 
endogenous regressor are binary, common approaches are either linear 
instrumental-variable (LIV) and bivariate probit (biprobit) estimation. A LIV model is 
particularly useful in that it provides a number of statistics helpful for diagnosing the 
validity of instruments. In addition, it can be expected that linear probability models 
work well here. In probit/logit models, “the effects of the independent variables are 
nearly linear when probabilities of success are between 20% and 80%” (Achen 2002, 
425). The positive outcome of nationalistic rivalry in the data used here amounts to 
1,100 and that of revisionist behavior to 1,915 whereas the number of the total 
observations is 4,344, which means the probability of success is .25 for nationalistic 
rivalry and .44 for revisionist behavior. Therefore, the advantage of a LIV model should 
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be enjoyed without worrying about the side effect of linear probability models.19 
  However, Chiburis, Das, and Lokshin (2011, 3-4) also notes that if a model includes 
continuous control variables, the confidence intervals of LIV models tend to be “too 
large for any meaningful hypothesis testing,” adding that in the case of excessive 
skewedness or kurtosis in the error terms, biprobit models “often lead to highly 
biased…estimates” and “overreject a true null hypothesis;” LIV models are “more 
robust in terms of size, but they are also less powerful.” In short, both LIV and biprobit 
models have advantages and disadvantages. Hence, I use both estimations and compare 
results. 
  The instruments are the explanatory variables which are statistically significant in 
predicting nationalistic rivalry in Table 3-1: the smaller number of PREGs in dyads, 
ethnonation-state incongruence, the larger Polity 2 score in dyads and its squared term, 
distance, and the smaller capability in dyads.20 All instruments are two-years lagged to 
control for the simultaneity bias between these instruments and nationalistic rivalry in 
the first equation, since nationalistic rivalry as an explanatory variable in the second 
equation is already one-year lagged. The control variables are the capability difference 
and its squared term. Contiguity is not used because contiguity and the distance by 
definition measures conceptually overlapped things and, therefore, should not be 
included together (Ray 2003, 15-19). For the same reason, an actor’s democracy, a 
target’s democracy, and democratic dyads are not included, as they are conceptually 
                                                 
19
 For LIV estimations, I use the ivreg2 command with the specification of the two-stage least 
square estimator (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2007). 
20
 While the constitutive term, the larger Polity 2 score in dyads, is statistically insignificant in 
Table 3-1, it must be included to estimate the effect of its squared term correctly (Brambor, 
Clark, and Golder 2006, 66-71). 
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overlapped with the larger Polity 2 score in dyads and its squared term. Finally, other 
rivalries is not controlled for, because they have been found to be irrelevant to two 
nationalist causes (ethnically heterogeneous society and political instability; see Table 
3-1) and to have no significant effect on the probability of revisionist behavior. 
  The results are presented in Table 3-5. Both LIV and biprobit models show that 
nationalistic rivalry remains statistically significant and increases the probability of 
revisionist behavior. In the LIV model, the statistics for the diagnosis of instruments 
support the validity of the instruments. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic rejects the 
null hypothesis that the equation is unidentified, meaning that the instruments are 
correlated with the endogenous regressor. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 
indicates that the instruments are strong. Finally, the Hansen J statistic allows for the 
inference that the instruments are valid, or “uncorrelated with the error term, and that 
the…instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation” (ivreg2 help file). 
In a nutshell, nationalistic rivalry is robust even if endogeneity is rigorously controlled 
for. 
  Finally, I conduct another robustness check by a selection model with the 
observations of directed dyad-years, to examine whether, assuming that the 
aforementioned selection bias exists, a selection model changes the results significantly. 
The cubic polynomials of a peace year counter are included to control for the temporal 
dependence of the dyad-years of no revisionist behavior (Carter and Signorino 2010) 
and the ongoing years of revisionist behavior are dropped to address the temporal 
dependence of the dyad-years of revisionist behavior (Bennett and Stam 2000b, 661). 
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Table 3-5: LIV and biprobit regressions of revisionist behavior 
 Model 3-11 (LIV) Model 3-12 (biprobit) 
 1st eq. 2nd eq. 1st eq. 2nd eq. 
 Nationalistic 
Rivalry 
Revisionist 
Behavior 
Nationalistic 
Rivalry 
Revisionist 
Behavior 
Nationalistic Rivalry  0.163**  0.403** 
   (0.0769)  (0.199) 
Capability Difference 0 0.0328 0.110 0.0835 
 (0.133) (0.183) (2.177) (0.473) 
Capability Difference2 -3.279*** -0.00523 -77.75*** -0.100 
 (0.862) (1.126) (20.84) (2.985) 
Smaller # of PREGs 0.0126***  0.0417**  
 (0.00347)  (0.0169)  
Ethnonation-State  0.147***  0.506***  
 Incongruence (0.0357)  (0.110)  
Larger Polity2 Score -0.00722**  -0.0274***  
 (0.00307)  (0.0106)  
Larger Polity2 Score2 0.00116*  0.00221  
 (0.000606)  (0.00228)  
Distance -0.120***  -0.436***  
 (0.0255)  (0.102)  
Smaller Capability 0.0318***  0.208***  
 (0.0113)  (0.0539)  
Constant 1.144*** 0.397*** -0.259*** 3.214*** 
 (0.212) (0.0227) (0.0581) (0.850) 
R-squared 0.268 0.010 - - 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic - 53.150*** a - - 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic - 25.802b - - 
Hansen J statistic - 0.797c - - 
Observations 3,900 3,900 3,900 3,900 
a H0 = the equation is underidentified 
b Pass the 10% maximal IV size and the15% maximal IV size (Stock and Yogo 2002) 
c H0 = the instruments are valid 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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  While a Heckman probit model is popular in the case of binary dependent variables to 
correct selection bias, it needs an explanatory variable which influences the selection 
(i.e., entering militarized disputes) but not the outcome (i.e., revisionist behavior). 
Unfortunately, it seems difficult to find such a variable, and the identification of the 
regressors in both selection and outcome equations causes poor performance (Sartori 
2003, 122). Sartori’s (2003) selection model overcomes this problem by assuming that 
the error terms in both equations are identical. This assumption is valid if 
“processes…involve similar decisions or goals,” “selection and the outcome of interest 
have the same causes,” and “the decision are close together in time and space” (117). 
Militarized disputes and revisionist behavior are likely to involve similar decisions (e.g., 
use of force), to have the same causes (e.g., rivalry), and to be decided within a close 
range of time and space. Thus, the above assumption seems plausible here. 
  The results of Sartori’s models are displayed in Table 3-6.21 A model including other 
rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) fails to converge if the other covariates are 
specified; thus the model uses only nationalistic rivalry and these other rivalries as 
regressors as well as the cubic polynomials of a peace year counter. It should still 
illustrate whether nationalistic rivalry or other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 
(2006) are more influential. All covariates (ethnonation-state incongruence, contiguity, 
the capability difference and its squared term, and democratic actors, targets, and dyads) 
can be expected to confound both nationalistic rivalry and the other rivalries in the same 
way. Therefore, the exclusion of them should not affect the estimation of the two rivalry 
variables in such a way that the results of only one of them would change drastically. 
                                                 
21
 Robust standard errors clustered on dyads cannot be implemented in Sartori’s STATA 
program. 
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Table 3-6: Sartori’s (2003) regression of revisionist behavior in directed dyad-years 
 Model 3-13 Model 3-14 Model 3-15 Model 3-16 
Nationalistic Rivalry 1.953*** 1.001*** 1.101*** 2.197*** 
  (0.0325) (0.0365) (0.0371) (0.0334) 
Ethnonation-State Incongruence  0.302*** 0.275***  
  (0.0285) (0.0283)  
Other Rivalries   0.659***  
 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012)   (0.0456)  
Other Rivalries    1.994*** 
 (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)    (0.0268) 
Contiguity  1.071*** 0.984***  
  (0.0224) (0.0230)  
Capability Difference  0.247* 0.214  
  (0.136) (0.135)  
Capability Difference2  12.50*** 12.81***  
  (0.850) (0.829)  
Democratic Actor  0.0561** 0.0542**  
  (0.0269) (0.0270)  
Democratic Target  0.212*** 0.210***  
  (0.0240) (0.0238)  
Democratic Dyad  -0.577*** -0.544***  
  (0.0473) (0.0472)  
Constant -2.526*** -2.748*** -2.759*** -2.869*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0269) (0.0267) (0.0225) 
Observations 1,072,540 848,110 848,110 1,072,540 
Standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
Peace year variables suppressed 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
 
  Nationalistic rivalry remains statistically significant and increases the probability of 
revisionist behavior. Other rivalries either by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) or by Klein, 
Goertz, and Diehl (2006) are also statistically significant and associated with a higher 
likelihood of revisionist behavior. If the assumption were true that the selection bias 
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exists, those results of Sartori’s models would be correct, indicating that the selection 
bias dampened the effect of these two types of other rivalries in the previous models to 
the extent that they became statistically insignificant. Meanwhile, if the assumption 
were wrong, Sartori’s method would overestimate the effect of the rivalry variables (see 
Sartori 2003, 122, Table 1), which is another possibility about why other rivalries are 
statistically significant and associated with a higher probability of revisionist behavior. 
Even if it is assumed that Sartori’s models are correct, however, the effect of other 
rivalries is still smaller than that of nationalistic rivalry. Thus, this robustness check 
does not affect the argument that nationalistic rivalry is more influential than other 
rivalries to cause revisionist behavior. 
 
Research Design for Testing Hypothesis 5 
This section has so far examined the structural causal relationship between nationalistic 
rivalry and revisionist behavior, but has assumed that the causal mechanism of 
nationalist mobilization works as theoretically expected. To examine this causal 
mechanism empirically, Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6 are tested. I firstly test 
Hypothesis 5, which expects that the presence of nationalistic rivalry leads to nationalist 
mobilization in the society to be prepared for a revisionist attempt against the rival. This 
mobilization is measured by the ratio of military expenditure to GDP per capita 
(ME-to-GDPpc ratio). If nationalism mobilizes a society for a revisionist aim, the 
government should spend more national wealth on the military to increase the chance of 
a successful revisionist attempt. The observations one year ahead (t+1) are used to 
control for the endogeneity of simultaneity bias. 
  The ME-to-GDPpc ratio is a good measure of nationalist mobilization for three 
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reasons. First, the state capacity to mobilize people for a military purpose indicates the 
strength of integrity between elites and the masses, namely national solidarity 
(Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012). If the government is able to spend more national wealth 
on the military, it suggests that the whole society allows for it due to a higher level of 
national solidarity. As argued in the last chapter, external threats increase national 
identification and, therefore, national solidarity. Hence, it makes sense that nationalistic 
rivalry increases the ME-to-GDPpc ratio. If society has weaker national solidarity due 
to the lack of external threats, it means that people identify themselves less with the 
nation and, therefore, care less about their nation. In such a case, the majority of people, 
who may be elites or masses but do not work in the military,22 see a high military 
budget as waste. Military spending could contribute to the whole economy through 
spillover effects on some other sectors (e.g., heavy industries). However, spending 
money on the military is not as good as spending the same amount of money directly on 
other sectors where the majority of people work (e.g., corporate tax reduction for 
business sectors or subsidies for agricultural sectors). Hence, if a society supports a 
higher ratio of military expenditure to GDP per capita, it is mainly not for economic 
reasons but because of national solidarity in face of external threats, whereby people 
perceive the strong military as good for their nation and for themselves. 
  Second, GDP per capita is more suitable than GDP. The former captures the average 
level of individual wealth whereas the latter reflects the aggregated level of national 
wealth. Because nationalism is a force amplifier of mass mobilizations for warfare 
(Posen 1993), it is important to see how much of individual wealth is spent on the 
                                                 
22
 21% is the highest number of the ratio of military personnel to the total population in 
country-year data from 1946-2001, according to the COW National Material Capabilities 
dataset and the GDP and population data 5.0 beta (Gleditsch 2002). 
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military sector. 
  Third, the ratio of military personnel to the national population also reflects a certain 
aspect of nationalist mobilization, but is limited to human resources. In modern warfare, 
the mass army is only one aspect of nationalist mobilization, and the mobilization of 
citizens for the military sector in a direct or indirect way (e.g., hiring people for military 
factories or increasing a tax) also needs to be taken into consideration. 
  For these three reasons, the ME-to-GDPpc ratio is suitable to capture the nationalist 
mobilization of society. It might be argued that it is natural for nationalistic-rivalry 
dyads to have a higher ME-to-GDPpc ratio because conflict requires the military. 
However, if only the necessity of the military for conflict in general matters, not only 
nationalistic rivalry but also other rivalries should increase the ratio. Given this point, 
the validity of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio as a measure of nationalist mobilization can be 
checked in light of empirical models which compare the effect of nationalistic rivalry 
with that of other rivalries. If only nationalistic rivalry has a statistically significant 
effect to increase the ratio, it will indicate that the ME-to-GDPpc ratio is a measure of 
nationalist mobilization. The data of military expenditure comes from the COW 
National Material Capabilities dataset and GDP per capita from the GDP and population 
data 5.0 beta (Gleditsch 2002). Military expenditure is measured by current US 
thousands of dollars, and GDP per capita by current US dollars. 
  The independent variable is nationalistic rivalry, coded 1 if a state is engaged in 
nationalistic rivalry with some other state; 0 otherwise.23 The control variables are as 
                                                 
23
 I do not consider the number of nationalistic rivalries in which a state is engaged, because the 
theory of nationalistic rivalry does not specify whether a higher number of nationalistic rivalries 
has a linear additive effect on the extent of nationalist mobilization. What the theory tells is that 
the presence and absence of nationalistic rivalry differentiates a propensity for nationalist 
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follows. Ethnonation-state incongruence is a binary variable, coded 1 if the power 
holder ethnic group has transborder ethnic kin in some other state, based on the same 
data as before. The presence of transborder ethnic kin is expected to motivate the 
homeland state to resort to nationalist mobilization for irredentist or national unification 
attempts. 
  Two measures of other rivalries, using the same specification as before, are coded 1 if 
a state is engaged in rivalries other than nationalistic rivalry with some other state; 0 
otherwise. If it were found that rivalries other than nationalistic rivalry increase the ratio 
of military expenditure to GDP per capita, it would question the validity of the ratio as a 
measure of nationalist mobilization. The number of the observations where rivalry 
exists in the country-year data is 1,888 for nationalistic rivalry, 2,088 for other rivalries 
by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), and 2,605 for other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and 
Diehl (2006). 
  Nuclear states are coded 1 if a state has nuclear weapons; 0 otherwise, according to 
Gartzke and Kroenig’s (2009) data. States possessing nuclear weapons are likely to 
spend more on the military sector to maintain them. Democratic states are coded 1 if a 
state has a Polity 2 score equal to or more than six; 0 otherwise. Democratic states 
should be more constrained to use budget for the military, as plural public opinions are 
more likely to be reflected. Finally, the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita (the 
data from Gleditsch 2002) is included. On the one hand, wealthier states might be more 
                                                                                                                                               
mobilization and revisionist behavior. It is expected that the relationship between the number of 
nationalistic rivalries and the level of nationalist mobilization is far more complex than a linear 
relationship. For example, a larger number of nationalistic rivalries would either encourage the 
state to further nationalist mobilization or lead it to stop military buildup due to a higher risk of 
arms race with rivals. I leave this point for future research. 
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efficient on budget management and, therefore, a lower ratio of military spending to 
GDP per capita. On the other hand, wealthier states might be a proxy for major powers 
and, therefore, a higher ratio of military spending to GDP per capita. 
 
Figure 3-3: Partial correlogram of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio of the United States 
 
 
  Country-years are the unit of analysis, since the ratio of military expenditure to GDP 
per capita is a country-level dependent variable. All country-years from 1946-2001 are 
included in the observations. Generalized estimating equation (GEE) models are used, 
as GEE allows for panel data analysis with controlling for temporal autocorrelations by 
identifying an autoregressive process. As a representative case, the partial correlogram 
of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio of the United States is presented in Figure 3-3, indicating that 
the first and second lags are significantly correlated. Thus, GEE models specify the 
second order of autoregressive process.24  As the dependent variable is normally 
                                                 
24
 The use of the first or third order of autoregressive process does not affect the main argument 
-
0.
50
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Pa
rti
al
 
a
u
to
co
rr
el
a
tio
n
s 
of
 
th
e
 
M
E-
to
-
G
D
Pp
c 
ra
tio
0 5 10 15 20 25
Lag
95% Confidence bands [se = 1/sqrt(n)]
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 146
distributed, the Gaussian distribution and the identity link function (y=y) are used. 
Semi-robust standard errors are specified. 
 
Results of Testing Hypothesis 5 
The results of testing Hypothesis 5 are displayed in Table 3-7. Model 3-17 includes only 
nationalistic rivalry, and Models 3-18 and 3-19 adds other rivalries measured by either 
by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) or by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) while including 
ethnonation-state incongruence, democracy, nuclear states, and the natural logarithm of 
real GDP per capita. Across all models, nationalistic rivalry is statistically significant 
and also has a substantively significant effect on the ME-to-GDPpc ratio, as 
nationalistic-rivalry dyads have an approximately 13% higher ME-to-GDPpc.25 Thus, 
Hypothesis 5 is supported. If a state is engaged in nationalistic rivalry with another state, 
it promotes nationalist mobilization. 
  Other rivalries have no statistical significance, measured either by Thompson and 
Dreyer (2012) or by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), indicating that the ME-to-GDPpc 
ratio adequately captures nationalist mobilization. Ethnonation-state incongruence is 
statistically insignificant. This finding suggests that ethnonation-state incongruence 
leads to nationalist mobilization in a society only through the medium of nationalistic 
                                                                                                                                               
here. One alternative approach to GEE models is fixed-effect models including lagged 
dependent variables (one-year, two-year, or three-year lags) as regressors and utilizing robust 
standard errors clustered on dyads. The results regarding nationalistic rivalry does not change 
and are consistent with the main argument. The control variables except for democracy are 
statistically insignificant in most models. For all regression tables, see Appendix C. 
25
 As the ME-to-GDP pc ratio is transformed to the natural logarithm form in the statistical 
models, the exponentiated value of the coefficient of nationalistic rivalry (a binary independent 
variable) is the ratio of the geometric mean for nationalistic-rivalry dyads over the geometric 
mean for non-nationalistic-rivalry dyads (Institute for Digital Research and Education, n.d.).  
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rivalry, given that ethnonation-state incongruence is a cause of nationalistic rivalry. As 
expected, nuclear states need more budgets for the military sector, and democracies 
have a lower level of military expenditure. GDP per capita is statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that wealthier states may have a lower or higher ME-to-GDPpc ratio, as the 
aforementioned two conflicting explanations indicate. 
 
Table 3-7: GEE regression of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio 
 Model 3-17 Model 3-18 Model 3-19 
Nationalistic Rivalry 0.118*** 0.122*** 0.119*** 
 (0.0297) (0.0310) (0.0295) 
Ethnonation-State Incongruence   0.0878 0.0877 
  (0.0684) (0.0683) 
Other Rivalries  0.0110  
 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012)   (0.0357)  
Other Rivalries   0.0242 
 (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)   (0.0219) 
Democracy  -0.109*** -0.110*** 
  (0.0360) (0.0359) 
Nuclear State  0.137*** 0.139*** 
  (0.0522) (0.0516) 
Real GDP per capita  0.0800 0.0815 
  (0.0866) (0.0866) 
Constant 4.002*** 3.768*** 3.754*** 
 (0.164) (0.725) (0.724) 
Observations 6,646 6,133 6,133 
Number of Countries 178 158 158 
Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
 
Research Design for Testing Hypothesis 6 
Next, to examine whether nationalist mobilization results in revisionist behavior within 
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nationalistic rivalry (Hypothesis 6), the chapter estimates the effect of the 
ME-to-GDPpc ratio on revisionist behavior in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads. 
The dependent variable is the binary variable of revisionist behavior, coded 1 if a state 
is a revisionist and resorts to a militarized action against another state in a year. The 
observations one-year ahead (t+1) are used to control for the endogeneity of 
simultaneity bias. The independent variable is the ME-to-GDPpc ratio. As control 
variables, ethnonation-state incongruence, contiguity, the capability difference and its 
squared term, democratic actors, democratic targets, and democratic dyads are included, 
to empirically check whether the effect of these factors changes in the subset of 
nationalistic-rivalry dyads in comparison with the subset of directed-dyad disputes. 
  It might be argued that, rather than focusing on the subset of nationalistic-rivalry 
dyads, all dyads should be analyzed and the interaction term between nationalistic 
rivalry and the ME-to-GDPpc ratio is used. This criticism would be plausible if and 
only if I argued that nationalist mobilization increases revisionist behavior only in the 
case of nationalistic rivalry (i.e., that the coefficient of the ME-to-GPDpc ratio is 
positive conditional on the presence of nationalistic rivalry; otherwise zero or negative; 
see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). However, I do not argue so; not all types of 
nationalist mobilization are covered by the theory of nationalistic rivalry, and nationalist 
mobilization can occur outside nationalistic rivalry as well. For example, the United 
States has mobilized its society to address terrorist networks, but target states such as 
Iraq or Afghanistan have been too weak to be rivals. The effect of nationalist 
mobilization on revisionist behavior in this kind of case might be even higher than in 
the case of nationalistic rivalry. What this section aims to do is not to show that 
nationalistic rivalry is the sole condition of nationalist mobilization causing revisionist 
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 149
behavior, but to empirically identify the causal mechanism between nationalistic rivalry 
and revisionist behavior. 
  Probit regression is used to estimate the binary-response dependent variable of 
revisionist behavior. The unit of analysis here is directed dyad-years in the subset of 
nationalistic-rivalry dyads, rather than directed-dyad disputes unlike the models 
designed to test Hypothesis 4, for two reasons. First, the compared subjects here are not 
states with nationalistic rivalry and those without such rivalry but the temporal trend of 
a revisionist propensity among states engaged in nationalistic rivalry. Therefore, the 
selection bias discussed in testing Hypothesis 4 is irrelevant. Second, whereas the main 
independent variable to test Hypothesis 4 was a binary indicator of nationalistic rivalry, 
the main independent variable here, the ME-to-GDPpc ratio, is a continuous variable. 
Hence, to examine its full variation (i.e., to identify the timing when revisionist 
behavior occurs between rivals depending on the level of nationalist mobilization), not 
only the observations of militarized disputes but also those of no militarized disputes 
need to be included. Otherwise, the estimation of the effect of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio 
could be biased. For example, even if a higher ME-to-GDPpc ratio increased the 
probability of revisionist behavior among militarized disputes, an even higher ratio 
might be associated with the absence of disputes. If only militarized disputes were 
included in the observations, a wrong conclusion would be reached that a higher 
ME-to-GDPpc ratio increases revisionist behavior.26 
  To control for the temporal dependence of the observations of no revisionist behavior, 
                                                 
26
 This concern did not apply when I tested Hypothesis 4, because the dyad-years of 
nationalistic rivalry are by definition more prone to militarized disputes and, therefore, cannot 
be associated with a higher probability of peace than dyads without such rivalry. In addition, the 
selection models using dyad-year observations supported the main argument anyway. 
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the cubic polynomials of a peace year counter for revisionist behavior are included 
(Carter and Signorino 2010). The ongoing years of revisionist behavior are dropped to 
control for the temporal dependence of the dyad-years of revisionist behavior (Bennett 
and Stam 2000b, 661). Both dispute originators and joiners, and both dispute initiators 
and targets are included, as any of them can be a revisionist in militarized disputes. 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are implemented to control for within-group 
correlations. 
 
Results of Testing Hypothesis 6 
The results of testing Hypothesis 6 are presented in Table 3-8. Model 3-20 includes only 
the ME-to-GPDpc ratio and the peace year variables, and Model 3-21 adds the 
remaining control variables. The ME-to-GDPpc ratio is statistically significant and has a 
positive effect in both models, indicating that a higher ratio of military expenditure to 
GDP per capita increases the probability of revisionist behavior within nationalistic 
rivalry. Thus, Hypothesis 6 is supported. As both Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6 have 
been accepted, the empirical findings of this section fit the causal mechanism from 
nationalistic rivalry through nationalist mobilization to revisionist behavior.27 
  Some of the control variables demonstrate the same effect as the models in Table 3-3. 
Democratic actors are less likely to engage in revisionist behavior against autocratic 
                                                 
27
 Additionally, I examined whether the social structure of nationalistic rivalry really causes 
both hawkish and dovish leaders similarly prone to revisionist policy. Horowitz and Stam 
(2014) find that if leaders have the experience of military service but no combat experience, 
they are more likely to initiate militarized disputes. Thus, such leaders are regarded as hawkish, 
and I added the dummy variable to identify them in Models 3-20 and 3-21. Conforming to the 
theory of nationalistic rivalry, those hawkish leaders have no statistically significant effect, 
whereas the ME-to-GDPpc ratio remains statistically significant (see Table C-8 in Appendix C). 
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states. Contiguity, the squared term of the capability difference, and democratic dyads 
are statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 3-8: Probit regression of revisionist behavior in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry 
dyads 
 Model 3-20 Model 3-21 
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio 0.0601*** 0.0549** 
 (0.0188) (0.0248) 
Ethnonation-State Incongruence  0.150 
  (0.0939) 
Contiguity  0.249 
  (0.161) 
Capability Difference  -0.824 
  (0.897) 
Capability Difference2  -0.874 
  (11.88) 
Democratic Actor  -0.228** 
  (0.0969) 
Democratic Target  0.0249 
  (0.105) 
Democratic Dyad  0.124 
  (0.181) 
Peace Years -0.197*** -0.194*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0243) 
Peace Years2 0.00900*** 0.00916*** 
 (0.00171) (0.00169) 
Peace Years3 -0.000111*** -0.000115*** 
 (2.83e-05) (2.77e-05) 
Constant -0.772*** -1.005*** 
 (0.151) (0.231) 
Observations 2,169 2,121 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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  On the other hand, the remaining control variables show different effects from the 
previous models. Ethnonation-state incongruence is statistically insignificant, indicating 
that if states are already engaged in nationalistic rivalry, ethnonation-state incongruence 
is not a distinctive factor in causing revisionist behavior. A more fine-grained measure 
of transstate-ethnic nationalism within nationalistic rivalry is proposed when testing 
Hypotheses 7-9 in the next section. The capability difference is statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that a dyadic power balance is not relevant within nationalistic rivalry. This 
is possibly because nationalistic rivalry causes states to behave not simply based on an 
objective assessment of material power relations but according to the cognitive bias of 
the chauvinist thought. It may lead a society to believe that revision to its own 
advantage is possible, whether the rival is stronger or weaker in terms of a purely 
objective assessment. Democratic targets also become statistically insignificant, 
indicating that democratic states are not more likely to be a target of revisionist behavior 
by autocratic states, if they are engaged in nationalistic rivalry. 
  The statistical insignificance of democratic dyads here has a different implication 
from the previous models. When it was found that democratic dyads are statistically 
insignificant in explaining a revisionist propensity in the observations of directed-dyad 
disputes, I inferred that a foreign policy calculus changes among democratic states once 
a militarized dispute occurs. Here, observations are nationalistic-rivalry dyad-years, and 
it is also plausible to suspect that nationalistic rivalry in particular (rather than 
militarized disputes in general) also influences a foreign policy calculus of democratic 
states. This point will be revisited in Chapter 5. 
  To understand the substantive effect of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio on the probability of 
revisionist behavior, predicted probabilities are estimated based on Model 3-21, holding 
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all other factors at the mean or mode. The results are presented in Figure 3-4. For the 
ease of interpretation, the original form rather than natural logarithm form of the 
ME-to-GDPpc ratio is used in the graph. An increase in the ratio drastically raises the 
probability of revisionist behavior if the ratio is quite small. Meanwhile, as the ratio 
becomes larger, its effect on the probability of revisionist behavior diminishes. In other 
words, if states engaged in nationalistic rivalry have barely resorted to nationalist 
mobilization before but initiates to do so, the size of the impact on a revisionist 
propensity is much bigger than when states engaged in nationalistic rivalry have already 
conducted nationalist mobilization to some extent before and have increased it. This 
finding suggests that the sudden emergence of a nationalist tendency is more dangerous 
than its long-term presence. 
 
Figure 3-4: Predicted probabilities of revisionist behavior, given the ME-to-GDPpc ratio 
 
The solid lines are the mean; the dashed lines are the 95% confidence intervals 
The ratio is calculated by using military expenditure at current US thousands of dollars and 
GDP per capita at current US dollars 
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Empirical Analysis of the Dichotomy 
Finally, this chapter empirically examines the remaining Hypotheses 7-9, derived from 
the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms in 
nationalistic-rivalry dyads. The first part explains research design. The second presents 
and discusses the results of analysis, including robustness checks of whether civic 
nationalism, or state-territorial nationalism in democratic regime, is less prone to 
revisionist behavior, as the original civic-ethnic dichotomy suggests. 
 
Research Design 
As in the last statistical models, the dependent variable is revisionist behavior, and the 
observations one year ahead (t+1) are used to control for the endogeneity of 
simultaneity bias. 
  The explanatory variables are the binary indicators of state-territorial and 
transstate-ethnic nationalisms within nationalistic rivalry, as follows. To test 
monadic-level Hypothesis 7, state-territorial nationalism is coded 1 if an actor state does 
not have a transstate ethnic issue vis-à-vis a target state; otherwise 0. Thus, the baseline 
category is transstate-ethnic nationalism. The use of transstate ethnic issues is more 
fine-grained than ethnonation-state incongruence to measure the dichotomy of 
state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms. The presence of such issues directly 
captures the concern and motivation of states for irredentism or national unification 
movement, whereas ethnonation-state incongruence is a structural condition for them. 
  To test dyadic-level Hypotheses 8 and 9, mutually state-territorial nationalisms are 
coded 1 if neither state has transstate ethnic issues vis-à-vis the other. Mutually 
transstate-ethnic nationalisms are coded 1 if both states have transstate ethnic issues 
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vis-à-vis the other. State-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalisms are coded 1 if an 
actor state does not have a transstate ethnic issue while a target state has such an issue. 
Finally, transstate-ethnic vs. state-territorial nationalisms are coded 1 if an actor state 
has a transstate ethnic issue whereas a target state does not have such an issue. 
  Table 3-9 displays the descriptive statistics of the type of nationalism within 
nationalistic rivalry at the non-directed dyad-year level. Mutually state-territorial 
nationalistic rivalry amounts to 33.2% to the total observations, mutually 
transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry 23%, and state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic 
nationalistic rivalry (i.e., either state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalisms = 1 or 
transstate-ethnic vs. state-territorial nationalisms = 1) 43.8%. Overall, state-territorial 
nationalism is the majority case. This is unsurprising, given that the pursuit of 
preserving the exiting statehood is consistent with the norm of sovereignty, while the 
seeking of a transstate ethnic policy violates the principle of nonintervention into other 
sovereign states. 
 
Table 3-9: Descriptive statistics of the type of nationalism within nationalistic rivalry 
type of nationalistic rivalry # of the observations 
% to the total 
observations (2,774) 
mutually state-territorial 920 33.2% 
mutually transstate-ethnic 638 23.0% 
state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic 1,216 43.8% 
 
  As before, the following factors are controlled for in explaining revisionist behavior 
within nationalistic rivalry: the ME-to-GDPpc ratio; the capability difference and its 
squared term; contiguity; and democratic actors, democratic targets, and democratic 
dyads. The unit of analysis is directed dyad-years, and the observations are a subset of 
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nationalistic-rivalry dyads. The estimation method is probit regression as the dependent 
variable is binary. To control for the temporal dependence of the observations of no 
revisionist behavior, the cubic polynomials of a peace year counter for revisionist 
behavior are included (Carter and Signorino 2010). The ongoing years of revisionist 
behavior are dropped to control for the temporal dependence of the dyad-years of 
revisionist behavior (Bennett and Stam 2000b, 661). Both dispute originators and 
joiners, and both dispute initiators and targets are included. Robust standard errors 
clustered on dyads are implemented to control for within-group correlations. 
 
Results 
Table 3-10 presents the results of the monadic-level analysis to test Hypothesis 7, and 
Table 3-11 displays the results of the dyadic-level analysis, where the baseline category 
is either mutually transstate-ethnic nationalisms or transstate-ethnic vs. state-territorial 
nationalisms, to test Hypothesis 8 and Hypothesis 9 respectively. In each type of the 
models, the results with and without the control variables are presented (the peace year 
time controls are included across all models). 
  First, the monadic-level analysis indicates that state-territorial nationalism is 
statistically significant and decreases the likelihood of revisionist behavior. Thus, 
Hypothesis 7 is supported. 
  Second, the dyadic-level analysis using mutually transstate-ethnic nationalisms as the 
baseline category shows that mutually state-territorial nationalisms do not have any 
statistical significance. The predicted probability estimation later also produces the 
results that there is no substantive difference either. In other words, the difference 
between state-territorial nationalism and transstate-ethnic nationalism is unlikely to be 
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relevant to differentiating a revisionist propensity, if both states in nationalistic-rivalry 
dyads have the same type of nationalism. Hypothesis 8 is supported. 
 
Table 3-10: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on the dichotomy of state-territorial 
and transstate-ethnic nationalisms in the subset of nationalistic rivalry (monadic 
models) 
 Model 3-22 Model 3-23 
State-Territorial Nationalism -0.229*** -0.154* 
  (0.0847) (0.0895) 
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio  0.0553** 
   (0.0248) 
Contiguity  0.264 
  (0.164) 
Capability Difference  -0.628 
  (0.825) 
Capability Difference2  2.897 
  (10.14) 
Democratic Actor  -0.203** 
  (0.101) 
Democratic Target  0.0244 
  (0.107) 
Democratic Dyad  0.0999 
   (0.191) 
Constant -0.288*** -0.884*** 
 (0.0933) (0.225) 
Observations 2,274 2,121 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
Peace year variables suppressed 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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Table 3-11: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on the dichotomy of state-territorial 
and transstate-ethnic nationalisms in the subset of nationalistic rivalry (dyadic models) 
 Model 3-24 Model 3-25 Model 3-26 Model 3-27 
Mutually State-Territorial  -0.0638 0.00648 -0.276** -0.262** 
 Nationalisms (0.0937) (0.101) (0.120) (0.128) 
Mutually Transstate-Ethnic  baseline  -0.212* -0.269** 
 Nationalisms category (0.119) (0.128) 
State-Territorial vs.  -0.231* -0.0719 -0.443*** -0.340** 
 Transstate-Ethnic Nationalisms (0.126) (0.133) (0.155) (0.155) 
Transstate-Ethnic vs. 0.212* 0.269** baseline  
 State-Territorial Nationalisms (0.119) (0.128) category 
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio  0.0642***  0.0642*** 
   (0.0243)  (0.0243) 
Contiguity  0.270  0.270 
  (0.176)  (0.176) 
Capability Difference  -0.762  -0.762 
  (0.782)  (0.782) 
Capability Difference2  3.502  3.502 
  (9.179)  (9.179) 
Democratic Actor  -0.218**  -0.218** 
  (0.102)  (0.102) 
Democratic Target  -0.0545  -0.0545 
  (0.104)  (0.104) 
Democratic Dyad  0.194  0.194 
   (0.185)  (0.185) 
Constant -0.399*** -1.071*** -0.187 -0.802*** 
 (0.0914) (0.243) (0.124) (0.238) 
Observations 2,274 2,121 2,274 2,121 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
Peace year variables suppressed 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
 
  Finally, the dyadic-level analysis using transstate-ethnic vs. state-territorial 
nationalisms as the baseline category indicates that state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic 
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nationalisms are statistically significant and decreases the probability of revisionist 
behavior. Hence, Hypothesis 9 is accepted. These results mean that the dichotomy of 
state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms really matters, but only in the case of 
state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry. 
  The results of the control variables are substantively the same as in the last section. 
The ME-to-GDPpc ratio is statistically significant, and a higher ratio increases the 
probability of revisionist behavior. Democratic actors are statistically significant and 
less likely to engage in revisionist behavior. Contiguity, the capability difference and its 
squared term, democratic targets, and democratic dyads are statistically insignificant. 
  As explained in the last chapter, in some cases, the alternative coding of transstate 
ethnic issues is possible. The results of using it for coding the type of nationalism are 
presented in Tables C-9, 10, 11, and 12 in Appendix C. Most of the findings are robust, 
whether the original coding or alternative coding of transstate ethnic issues is used to 
code the type of nationalism. The only exception is that state-territorial nationalism 
loses statistical significance in the monadic-level analysis if the alternative coding of 
transstate ethnic issues is used and the control variables are included. A possible reason 
for this is that the monadic models do not capture the nuance of dyadic interactions 
unlike the dyadic models. The dyadic models have found that transstate-ethnic 
nationalism is more prone to revisionist behavior only in the case of state-territorial vs. 
transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry and not in the comparison between mutually 
state-territorial nationalistic rivalry and mutually transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry. 
Hence, the effect of state-territorial nationalism is diminished in the monadic models 
which do not differentiate those different cases of dyadic interactions within 
nationalistic rivalry. Thus, it may be said that Hypothesis 7 is less robust and only 
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weakly supported. 
  To understand the substantive effect of the dichotomy of state-territorial and 
transstate-ethnic nationalisms, the predicted probabilities of revisionist behavior are 
estimated based on Model 3-25. The control variables are fixed at their mean (if 
continuous measures) or mode (if binary measures). The results are presented in Table 
3-12. Mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry and mutually transstate-ethnic 
nationalistic rivalry produce substantively the same results, supporting Hypothesis 8. 
Meanwhile, in the asymmetrical case of state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic 
nationalistic rivalry, the type of nationalism leads to a meaningful difference. In a 
relative term, the difference between state-territorial nationalism and transstate-ethnic 
nationalism is .07 (.09 vs. .16), which is substantively large. The probability of .16 is 
also significantly high in an absolute term, as it means that the transstate-ethnic 
nationalism side in the dyad of state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry 
is 16% probable to behave in a revisionist manner against the state-territorial 
nationalism side per year. 
 
Table 3-12: Predicted probabilities of revisionist behavior, given the dichotomy of 
state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms in nationalistic rivalry 
    target 
state-territorial transstate-ethnic 
    mean 95% CI mean 95% CI 
actor 
state-territorial .11 .08 .14 .09 .06 .14 
transstate-ethnic .16 .12 .22 .11 .08 .14 
 
  The findings of this section indicate that it is necessary to separate the symmetrical 
and asymmetrical combination of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms 
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within nationalistic rivalry, in order to correctly differentiate the effect of these 
nationalisms. Thus, it is too naïve to argue that transstate-ethnic nationalism is more 
probable to cause revisionist behavior than state-territorial nationalism in any case. 
Rather, it is confined to the case of state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic 
rivalry, and this point suggests that not only the dichotomy of state-territorial and 
transstate-ethnic nationalisms but also the nature of dyadic interactions of these 
nationalisms matters in explaining the relationship between nationalism and revisionist 
behavior. 
  Finally, for a robustness check, it is examined whether state-territorial nationalism in 
combination with democracy, or so-called civic nationalism, is less prone to revisionist 
behavior than the other cases. Democratic state-territorial nationalism should mitigate a 
propensity for revisionist behavior even under the condition of nationalistic rivalry, if 
the common belief that civic nationalism is peaceful were correct. 
  To check this possibility, I add the interaction term between democratic actors and 
state-territorial nationalism in the monadic-level analysis, and the ones between 
democratic actors and mutually state-territorial nationalisms and state-territorial vs. 
transstate-ethnic nationalisms in the dyadic-level analysis. Table 3-13 presents the 
results of monadic models and Table 3-14 those of dyadic models (for the results using 
the alternative coding, see Tables C-11 and C-12 in Appendix C). The interaction terms 
have no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of revisionist behavior in any of 
these models. In short, the common belief that civic nationalism is peaceful does not 
apply to the condition of nationalistic rivalry.
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Table 3-13: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on civic nationalism in the subset 
of nationalistic rivalry (monadic models) 
 Model 3-28 Model 3-29 
State-Territorial Nationalism -0.190** -0.157* 
  (0.0907) (0.0911) 
State-Territorial Nationalism 0.0117 0.0151 
 * Democratic Actor (0.196) (0.202) 
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio  0.0553** 
   (0.0248) 
Contiguity  0.264 
  (0.165) 
Capability Difference  -0.623 
  (0.818) 
Capability Difference2  2.804 
  (10.27) 
Democratic Actor -0.200 -0.214 
 (0.167) (0.192) 
Democratic Target  0.0246 
  (0.107) 
Democratic Dyad  0.102 
   (0.195) 
Constant -0.266*** -0.883*** 
 (0.0948) (0.224) 
Observations 2,239 2,121 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
Peace year variables suppressed 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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Table 3-14: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on civic nationalism in the subset 
of nationalistic rivalry (dyadic models) 
 Model 3-30 Model 3-31 Model 3-32 Model 3-33 
Mutually State-Territorial  -0.0344 0.00422 -0.240* -0.265** 
 Nationalism (0.0998) (0.105) (0.126) (0.129) 
Mutually State-Territorial  0.00623 0.00471 0.00623 0.00471 
 Nationalism * Democratic Actor (0.216) (0.216) (0.216) (0.216) 
Mutually Transstate-Ethnic  baseline  -0.205* -0.269** 
 Nationalism category (0.124) (0.128) 
State-Territorial vs. Transstate-Ethnic -0.189 -0.0638 -0.394** -0.332* 
 Nationalisms (0.149) (0.156) (0.177) (0.172) 
State-Territorial vs. Transstate-Ethnic 0.0147 -0.0285 0.0147 -0.0285 
 Nationalisms * Democratic Actor (0.255) (0.261) (0.255) (0.261) 
Transstate-Ethnic vs. 0.212* 0.205* baseline  
 State-Territorial Nationalisms (0.119) (0.124) category 
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio  0.0644***  0.0644*** 
   (0.0243)  (0.0243) 
Contiguity  0.270  0.270 
  (0.176)  (0.176) 
Capability Difference  -0.753  -0.753 
  (0.775)  (0.775) 
Capability Difference2  3.640  3.640 
  (9.210)  (9.210) 
Democratic Actor -0.190 -0.211 -0.190 -0.211 
 (0.182) (0.197) (0.182) (0.197) 
Democratic Target  -0.0538  -0.0538 
  (0.103)  (0.103) 
Democratic Dyad  0.188  0.188 
   (0.182)  (0.182) 
Constant -0.374*** -1.072*** -0.169 -0.804*** 
 (0.0940) (0.241) (0.128) (0.234) 
Observations 2,239 2,121 2,239 2,121 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
Peace year variables suppressed 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has empirically examined all nine hypotheses formulated in the last 
chapter: the causes of nationalistic rivalry, the effects of nationalistic rivalry, and the 
implications of the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms. The 
statistical analyses have found that all of these hypotheses are empirically supported 
(see Table 3-15). Thus, the thesis has now achieved its first goal: theorize and 
empirically investigate the causal mechanisms whereby states develop nationalistic 
rivalry and engage in revisionist behavior. The following two chapters address the other 
goal of the thesis: investigate whether two major conflict-mitigating factors, nuclear 
deterrence and liberal peace, can reduce a revisionist propensity within nationalistic 
rivalry. 
 
  
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 165
Table 3-15: Results of hypothesis testing 
Causes of nationalistic rivalry 
H1 The higher the absolute level of ethnic heterogeneity in a less ethnically 
heterogeneous state in a dyad, the more likely the dyad is to experience 
nationalistic rivalry. 
 
supported 
 
H2 The higher the absolute level of political instability in a more politically stable 
state in a dyad, the more likely the dyad is to experience nationalistic rivalry. 
 
supported 
H3 If the power holder ethnic group of the state has transborder ethnic kin in 
another state, the dyad is more likely to experience nationalistic rivalry. 
 
supported 
Effects of nationalistic rivalry 
H4 If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to 
revisionist behavior than those without such rivalry. 
 
supported 
H5 If states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry, they are more likely to resort to 
nationalist mobilization than those without such rivalry. 
 
supported 
H6 If states have a higher level of nationalist mobilization within nationalistic 
rivalry, they are more likely to resort to revisionist behavior. 
 
supported 
Implications of the dichotomy of state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms 
H7 In nationalistic-rivalry dyads, state-territorial nationalism is less prone to 
revisionist behavior than transstate-ethnic nationalism. 
 
weakly 
supported 
H8 Mutually state-territorial nationalistic rivalry and mutually transstate-ethnic 
nationalistic rivalry make a similar propensity for revisionist behavior. 
 
supported 
H9 In state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry, state-territorial 
nationalism is less prone to revisionist behavior than transstate-ethnic 
nationalism. 
supported 
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Chapter 4 
Nationalistic Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence 
 
The thesis has found so far that states engaged in nationalistic rivalry are more likely to 
resort to revisionist behavior. Is nuclear deterrence, a realist conflict-mitigating factor, 
able to mitigate this effect of nationalistic rivalry? Nuclear deterrence theory argues in 
terms of a pure cost-benefit calculation that it would be unreasonable for nuclear states 
to engage in war, because there would be no benefit that outweighs the cost of nuclear 
exchange (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 8-9, 11; Mearsheimer 1984/85, 21; Powell 1985; 
Rauchhaus 2009).1 If states seek survival, war under the mutual possession of nuclear 
weapons (nuclear symmetry) is too risky, even if the probability of nuclear exchange is 
so small that the expected utility of war and that of peace will come closer to each other. 
  This chapter argues that this strategic calculation based on nuclear deterrence theory 
can be biased by the lens of nationalistic rivalry. Nationalistic rivalry leads states to 
overestimate one’s deterrence power and underestimate the other’s resolve to counteract 
aggression. Hence, the strategic implication of nuclear deterrence is interpreted in a 
                                                 
1
 Theories and empirics on the relationship between nuclear weapons and interstate conflict 
also expand to the systemic effect of nuclear proliferation (Asal and Beardsley 2007; Bueno de 
Mesquita and Riker 1982; Intriligator and Brito 1981; Sagan 2003; Waltz 2003), nuclear 
asymmetry (Geller 1990; Rauchhaus 2009), the period of nuclear possessions (Asal and 
Beardsley 2007; Horowitz 2009; Sobek, Foster, and Robison 2012), the stability-instability 
paradox (Bajpai 2009; Rauchhaus 2009; Saideman 2005), extended nuclear deterrence (Huth 
1990; Weede 1983), nuclear postures (Narang 2013), and endogeneity (Gartzke and Jo 2009). 
Nonetheless, the chapter focuses on the traditional theory of nuclear deterrence because it is the 
most widely known theory, not only among academics but also among policy makers, to explain 
the causality of nuclear weapons to reduce interstate conflict. 
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different way from what nuclear deterrence theory expects, and states engaged in 
nationalistic rivalry are unlikely to be deterred by nuclear symmetry.  
  The chapter first highlights the theory of nuclear deterrence and discusses how 
nationalistic rivalry biases the interpretation of nuclear deterrence by actors, expecting 
that nuclear symmetry within nationalistic rivalry does not have any significant effect 
on the likelihood of revisionist behavior in interstate war. Next, the chapter presents 
statistical findings showing the null effect of nuclear symmetry within nationalistic 
rivalry. As this result is an outlier for nuclear deterrence theory and null findings do not 
guarantee the absence of an effect, the chapter then proceeds to a case study of 
India-Pakistan to support the hypothesized causal mechanism. 
 
Nuclear Deterrence and Nationalistic Rivalry 
Powell (1985) explicates the two “theoretical foundations” of nuclear deterrence. First, 
when a nuclear dyad (a pair of nuclear states) does not have a second strike capability, it 
finds itself in the “spectrum of risk.” Both sides in the dyad know that nuclear war 
destroys the whole state. Because neither can ever get rid of this risk, it is reluctant to 
take the risk of conflict escalation (77-78). The spectrum of risk will prevail when states 
believe the possibility of accidental and irrational use of nuclear weapons (84-85). Thus, 
“[s]omewhat paradoxically, nuclear deterrence, which had often been criticized for 
assuming rationality, actually presupposed irrationality” (80). 
Second, when a nuclear dyad has a second strike capability, it finds itself in the 
“spectrum of violence.” The mutual second strike capability clarifies that neither side 
can go to war so that both could conduct escalation against each other with the 
assurance of no nuclear war (78-82). However, even in this case, nuclear deterrence 
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works to deter war. First, states might still fear the possibility of accidental and 
irrational use of nuclear weapons, thereby fulfilling the logic of the spectrum of risk 
(83). Second, even only in terms of the spectrum of violence, neither side wants to, or 
can, use nuclear weapons to forestall each other, because both sides know that the 
expected benefits of escalation will not outweigh the expected costs of nuclear war due 
to mutual second strike capabilities (83). Powell argues that nuclear dyads capable of a 
second strike escalate crises by the rational calculation of strategic interaction as far as 
the cost of escalation does not exceed that of submission (87-92), which results in the 
stability-instability paradox (Bajpai 2009; Rauchhaus 2009; Saideman 2005). Thus, 
Hagerty (2009, 109-110) notes, “Not even the most optimistic of deterrence optimists 
claims that nuclear weapons deter every single kind or degree of military aggression” 
(emphasis added). In short, in terms of the spectrum of violence, limited conflict may be 
possible but war is too dangerous. 
In short, the crucial demarcation of nuclear deterrence theory is whether nuclear 
deterrence works because of the risk of irrational and accidental nuclear war (the 
spectrum of risk), or because of the rational calculation of strategic interaction over the 
possibility of nuclear war and that of the adversary’s submission (the spectrum of 
violence). In terms of both rationality and psychology, nuclear symmetry has a credible 
deterrence effect on conflict escalation to war, if not inhibiting any kind of conflict 
behavior. 
Empirical findings have been mixed so far. While nuclear deterrence theory largely 
draws on the US-USSR Cold War rivalry which avoided escalation to war, in 
quantitative research Rauchhaus (2009) argues that nuclear symmetry reduces the 
likelihood of war whereas Bell and Miller (2013) point out that Rauchhaus’s (2009) 
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research design is flawed and nuclear symmetry actually does not have any statistically 
significant effect on the probability of war. Yet, these quantitative empirical studies 
implicitly assume that the strategic implication of nuclear symmetry is the same across 
all dyads, as they include all dyads in statistical models. This neorealist-like assumption 
that all states are equal in the system is not necessarily warranted, given that a variation 
in the characteristics of states and dyads are now widely recognized in the IR literature.2 
Hence, it is plausible to reason that the logic of nuclear deterrence may not equally 
apply to all dyads. In terms of this chapter, the question here is whether states engaged 
in nationalistic rivalry interpret the strategic implications of nuclear symmetry in the 
same way as those without such rivalry. 
Nuclear deterrence works if and only if the expected utility of escalation to war is 
lower than that of non-escalation. As discussed above, nuclear deterrence theory 
assumes that with or without second-strike capabilities, the expected utility of escalation 
to war is always lower than that of non-escalation, because the cost of nuclear war 
exceeds any benefit from war (whereas limited conflict could be pursued in the 
spectrum of violence). This reasoning can be seen as an objectivist assessment of 
nuclear weapons. 
However, nationalistic rivalry can bias such an assessment. Chapter 2 has noted that 
states engaged in nationalistic rivalry perceive themselves as righteous and stronger 
while the other as threatening but weaker. The implication of this argument for nuclear 
deterrence is that if states engaged in nationalistic rivalry are both nuclear-armed, they 
should see each other as even more threatening but still possible to defeat by one’s own 
                                                 
2
 For example, the thesis mentioned the distinction between revisionists and non-revisionists or 
the one between rivals and non-rivals in Chapter 1. 
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nuclear strength. In other words, the strategic implications of nuclear deterrence are 
interpreted through the cognitive biases of nationalistic rivalry, in favor of oneself and 
in opposition to the other. 
Because nuclear deterrence hardens the image of the threatening “other” while 
causing overconfidence in one’s military might, one is still likely to attempt to engage in 
revisionist behavior in war (e.g., destroying all nuclear facilities of the rival). The 
hardened threat perception increases deterrence credibility of the other, but this 
increased credibility is cancelled out by one’s overconfidence in its national nuclear 
capabilities. Thus, all in all it is expected that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect 
on a revisionist propensity in war within nationalistic rivalry. I do not consider the 
probability of revisionist behavior in lower levels of militarized disputes than war, as 
nuclear deterrence theory mainly focuses on the likelihood of war. 
 
Statistical Analysis 
To examine the effect of nuclear symmetry on a revisionist propensity in war, this 
chapter firstly conducts large-N statistical analysis. This section is structured as follows. 
The first explains a research design, and the second presents and discusses the results of 
analysis. 
 
Research Design 
The dependent variable here is not revisionist behavior in any kind of militarized 
disputes unlike the last chapter, as nuclear deterrence theory expects that nuclear 
symmetry deters war and not any level of hostility. Instead, this chapter focuses on 
revisionist behavior in war (hereafter, “revisionist war”), a binary variable coded 1 if a 
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state in a dyad is a revisionist and engages in war against another state (Ghosn, Palmer, 
and Bremer 2004; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). The definition of war is a 
militarized interstate dispute whose total casualties exceed 1,000. The observations one 
year ahead (t+1) are used to control for the endogeneity of simultaneity bias. 
The explanatory variables of interest in this chapter are as follows. To measure the 
effect of nuclear weapons, nuclear actors are coded 1 if an actor in a dyad has nuclear 
weapons; 0 otherwise, and nuclear targets are coded 1 if a target in a dyad has nuclear 
weapons; 0 otherwise. These two variables are interacted to compose nuclear dyads and 
capture the effect of nuclear deterrence. 
Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that the probability of states possessing nuclear weapons 
is endogenous to the probability of interstate conflict. In other words, states under 
threats are more likely to develop nuclear weapons and a propensity for conflict is not 
the consequence of nuclear weapons per se but the presence of threats. To remedy this 
endogeneity issue, they propose the use of a propensity score for the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons as instruments, and argue that controlling for this endogeneity, the 
possession of nuclear weapons has no effect on the probability of conflict initiation. 
This endogeneity problem is irrelevant here, because the unit of analysis here is 
nationalistic-rivalry dyad-years and nationalistic rivalry is by definition a measure of 
threat perception. In other words, threat perception is a constant within nationalistic 
rivalry. Therefore, if it is not the possession of nuclear weapons but the presence of 
threats that determines a propensity for revisionist war, the above three nuclear variables 
should be statistically insignificant in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads. 
The effect of the period of nuclear possession is measured by the actor’s nuclear 
years and the target’s nuclear years (Sobek, Foster, and Robison 2012; Horowitz 2009). 
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To create these variables, I firstly count years since an actor state acquired nuclear 
weapons and those since a target state acquired nuclear weapons. 0 is assigned to all 
non-nuclear states, and the count of nuclear years begins with the value of 1, because 
the non-nuclear states and the nuclear states which just acquired nuclear weapons 
should be substantively different. Then, the values of nuclear years except for 0 are 
transformed to the exponents to the negative values of nuclear years, namely e-Actor’s 
Nuclear Years
 and e-Target’s Nuclear Years, to capture the proposition that new nuclear states are 
more likely to engage in conflict than both non-nuclear states and old nuclear states 
(Sagan 2003, 53-72). Information on all nuclear states is from Gartzke and Kroenig 
(2009), as summarized in Table 4-1.3 
 
Table 4-1: Information of nuclear states 
year nuclear states 
1945-1948 US 
1949-1951 US, USSR 
1952-1959 US, USSR,UK 
1960-1963 US, USSR,UK, France 
1964-1966 US, USSR, UK, France, China 
1967-1981 US, USSR, UK, France, China, Israel 
1982-1987 US, USSR, UK, France, China, Israel, South Africa 
1988-1989 US, USSR, UK, France, China, Israel, South Africa, India 
1990 US, USSR, UK, France, China, Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan 
1991- US, Russia, UK, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan 
Source: Gartzke and Kroenig (2009) 
 
The chapter also controls for other factors explaining a revisionist propensity in 
                                                 
3
 For why Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and North Korea are not coded as nuclear states, 
see Gartzke and Kroenig (2009, 154). 
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nationalistic rivalry: the ratio of military expenditure to GDP per capita (the 
ME-to-GDPpc ratio); ethnonation-state incongruence; the capability difference, or an 
actor state’s CINC minus a target state’s CINC (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; 
Singer 1987), and its squared term; contiguity, a binary variable coded 1 if states in a 
dyad are contiguous through land or the water which is equal to or less than 150 miles 
(Stinnett et al. 2002); and democratic actors, democratic targets, and democratic dyads, 
coded 1 if respectively an actor state, a target state, and both states in dyads are 
democracies (Marshall 2013). To control for temporal dependence, the cubic 
polynomials of a peace year counter for revisionist war are included (Carter and 
Signorino 2010) and the ongoing years of revisionist war are dropped (Bennett and 
Stam 2000b, 661). The unit of analysis is directed dyad-years as revisionist war is the 
most escalated form of one state’s revisionist behavior towards another state, i.e., 
revisionist behavior in the militarized disputes which cause at least 1,000 battle deaths. 
The total observations are the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads. The estimator of 
choice is probit regression, since the dependent variable is binary, and robust standard 
errors are clustered on dyads to control for within-group correlations. 
 
Results 
The results are presented in Table 4-2. Model 4-1 includes only the nuclear actor, the 
nuclear target, and nuclear dyads (as well as the peace year time controls) to see 
whether the inclusion of the control variables changes the results significantly. Model 
4-2 adds the actor’s and target’s nuclear years, as the possession of nuclear weapons and 
the period of nuclear possession are correlated and, therefore, the results might be 
significantly altered depending on whether they are included or not. Models 4-3 and 4-4 
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 174
add the remaining control variables. 
  In all models, nuclear symmetry is statistically insignificant and its coefficient is 
positive. As expected, there is no evidence that nuclear symmetry reduces the 
probability of revisionist war within nationalistic rivalry. The results echo Gartzke and 
Jo (2009), who suggest that the possession of nuclear weapons and the probability of 
interstate conflict are both the effect of existing threats. In other words, given that the 
subset of nationalistic rivalry makes threat perception a constant, the mere possession of 
nuclear weapons does not influence a propensity for revisionist war. Meanwhile, there 
has been no revisionist war between nuclear states outside nationalistic rivalry, during 
the period of 1946-2001 across all available dyads based on the COW State 
Membership data. Put differently, without the observations of nationalistic-rivalry dyads, 
nuclear symmetry predicts the absence of revisionist war perfectly. This point indicates 
the distinctive nature of nationalistic-rivalry dyads in comparison with other rivalries or 
non-rivalries. 
As for the control variables, nuclear actors, nuclear targets, and their nuclear years are 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that not only nuclear symmetry but also nuclear 
asymmetry and the period of nuclear possession do not matter in explaining revisionist 
war within nationalistic rivalry. The ME-to-GDPpc ratio is statistically significant and a 
higher ratio is associated with a higher probability of revisionist war. The higher 
nationalist mobilization, the more likely the state is to engage in revisionist war in 
particular, not only in revisionist behavior in general as already shown in Chapter 3. 
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Table 4-2: Probit regression of revisionist war on nuclear deterrence 
 Model 4-1 Model 4-2 Model 4-3 Model 4-4 
Nuclear Dyad 0.363 0.351 0.400 0.365 
 (0.484) (0.498) (0.580) (0.595) 
Nuclear Actor 0.216 0.265 0.148 0.219 
 (0.301) (0.308) (0.362) (0.382) 
Nuclear Target 0.0623 0.0833 -0.182 -0.157 
 (0.256) (0.261) (0.327) (0.340) 
Actor’s Nuclear Years  -2.843  -2.858 
  (2.205)  (1.973) 
Target’s Nuclear Years   -1.072  -1.175 
  (0.852)  (1.059) 
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio   0.0829** 0.0821** 
   (0.0396) (0.0401) 
Ethnonation-State Incongruence   0.476*** 0.486*** 
   (0.144) (0.146) 
Contiguity   -0.0326 -0.0346 
   (0.344) (0.345) 
Capability Difference   -1.566 -1.727 
   (2.591) (2.605) 
Capability Difference2   -0.114 -1.666 
   (41.40) (41.09) 
Democratic Actor   0.183 0.184 
   (0.179) (0.181) 
Democratic Target   0.419** 0.420** 
   (0.174) (0.175) 
Democratic Dyad   -0.493 -0.427 
   (0.360) (0.386) 
Constant -2.291*** -2.286*** -3.293*** -3.292*** 
 (0.198) (0.200) (0.458) (0.458) 
Observations 2,542 2,534 2,379 2,379 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
Peace year variables suppressed 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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Ethnonation-state incongruence is statistically significant this time and increases a 
propensity for revisionist war, conforming to the existing literature on the relationship 
between transstate ethnicity and a higher likelihood of war (e.g., Miller 2007). 
Contiguity, the capability difference and its squared term, and democratic dyads are all 
statistically insignificant, as in the models explaining revisionist behavior in general 
within nationalistic rivalry in Chapter 3. The insignificance of contiguity and the 
capability difference and its squared term suggests that these materialist factors fail to 
explain a propensity for revisionist war within nationalistic rivalry, and the 
ME-to-GDPpc ratio as the measure of nationalist mobilization is more explanatory 
instead. 
The results of democratic actors and democratic targets significantly change this time 
in comparison to those in the models which explain revisionist behavior in general 
within nationalistic rivalry in the last chapter. On the one hand, democratic actors are 
statistically insignificant while they were found to be less revisionist-prone in the last 
chapter. This result means that if the target state is an autocracy, democratic actors are 
not less likely to engage in revisionist war. On the other hand, democratic targets are 
statistically significant, indicating that democratic states are more likely to be the target 
of revisionist war behavior by autocratic states, although the last chapter found that 
democratic states are not more likely to be a target of revisionist behavior in general by 
autocratic rivals. This finding suggests that autocratic states take advantage of 
democratic states which, as noted in the last chapter, are more constrained from 
embarking on revisionist attempts in general (if not revisionist war in particular) against 
autocratic states, only if these autocratic states are committed to war efforts for a 
revisionist aim. 
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While the statistical analysis identifies no statistically significant effect of nuclear 
symmetry, the null finding does not mean that the null hypothesis is accepted. To 
increase the validity of the statistical findings, the following section presents a case 
study examining how nationalistic rivalry led India and Pakistan to interpret the 
strategic implication of nuclear deterrence in a different way from what nuclear 
deterrence theory would lead us to expect. 
 
Case Study: India-Pakistan 
India-Pakistan is the only dyad which has been the originator of revisionist war under 
nuclear symmetry.4 Thus, it is an obvious outlier to nuclear deterrence theory and 
should be examined in greater detail by qualitative analysis (Bennett and Elman 2007, 
176-178; Lieberman 2005).5 
  India and Pakistan fought war in 1999 over part of India’s Kashmir, Kargil. Although 
the scale of war was limited, several regional experts agree that it was actually “war” in 
the conventional sense, i.e., a militarized dispute exceeding the threshold of 1,000 battle 
deaths in total (e.g., Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 143; Ganguly and Kapur 2009). This 
section first describes the history of the dyad, and then explains the Kargil War. Next, it 
discusses how nationalistic rivalry influenced the interpretation of nuclear deterrence 
and foreign policy choice in the dyad, empirically illuminating the causal mechanism 
between nuclear symmetry and revisionist war under the condition of nationalistic 
                                                 
4
 According to the dataset generated by EUGene, the only other case where states engaged in 
revisionist war under nuclear symmetry is China against Russia in the Sino-Vietnamese War in 
1979. Russia is coded as a dispute joiner on the side of Vietnam. 
5
 For qualitative analysis and case studies in political science, see Brady and Collier (2004), 
George and Bennett (2005), and Gerring (2007). 
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rivalry. Finally, it provides insight into the future of the Indo-Pakistani nationalistic 
rivalry. 
 
Historical Overview 
Both India and Pakistan originally composed British India before their independence. 
The origin of the India-Pakistan rivalry can be traced back to a communal strife between 
majority Hindus and minority Muslims along with the rise of nationalism in British 
India. The Indian National Congress, a political party led by Mohandas Gandhi and 
Jawaharlal Nehru, planned the independence of India as a secular democratic state to 
govern a multiethnic society (Paul 2005, 6). However, Muslims feared that such an 
independent state would threaten their political position, and claimed separate 
electorates and established the Muslim League Party (Paul 2005, 6). After the Congress 
rejected the idea of separate electorates, the League then proposed two-nation theory 
and the creation of Pakistan as a Muslim homeland. Meanwhile, ethnic violence 
between Hindus and Muslims had increased, and the United Kingdom reached “the 
conclusion that the creation of Pakistan was inevitable” (Paul 2005, 7). 
  In the process of independence and partition, princely state Jammu and Kashmir 
became the focal point of conflict between Hindus and Muslims. The majority of the 
population was Muslim but the ruler was Hindu, Maharaja Hari Singh (Paul 2005, 7-8). 
The United Kingdom suggested that the princely state be merged with either India or 
Pakistan (Varshney 1991, 1007). However, Singh refused to be merged with either 
(Ganguly 2001, 16), and then Pakistan initiated an armed invasion into Kashmir in 1947. 
Asked for help by Singh, India counterattacked Pakistan, which resulted in the first 
Kashmir war. The United Nations mediated India and Pakistan in 1948 (Paul 2005, 8), 
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and a cease-fire line was established by the Karachi agreement in 1949 (Khan, Lavoy, 
and Clary 2009, 71). The line was set to divide Kashmir into India’s part and Pakistan’s 
one, later called the Line of Control (LoC) (Paul 2005, 8; see Figure 4-1). Since then, 
however, the LoC has remained the focal point of the India-Pakistan nationalistic rivalry. 
In other words, after independence, intrastate conflict between Hindus and Muslims in 
British India was transformed to interstate conflict between India and Pakistan (Suzuki 
2011). 
  India and Pakistan engaged in the second Kashmir war in 1965, and also fought a war 
over the independence of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) from Pakistan in 1971. Although 
the latter war was not directly related to the Kashmir issue, it still had a significant 
implication for the wider context of the Indo-Pakistani nationalistic rivalry. For example, 
Gokcek (2011, 292) points out that, for India, “the potential gain was tremendous, as 
supporting the Bengali secessionist movement would weaken Pakistan by jeopardizing 
its territorial integrity.” Meanwhile, the 1971 war led Pakistan to “believe that India’s 
role in Bangladesh stands as irrefutable proof that India will intervene whenever 
Pakistan presents any vulnerability” (Khan, Lavoy, and Clary 2009, 73). The war also 
“reinforced the belief that ‘Islamic’ Pakistan faced constant threats to its identity and 
that ‘Hindu’ India was committed to undoing partition” (Pande 2011, 42). Both India 
and Pakistan interpreted the war in terms of a wider context of their nationalistic 
hostility. 
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Figure 4-1: Map of Kashmir 
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons (2010) 
 
  Kashmir relates to irreconcilable national identities between the two countries, 
because it matters for state legitimacy – India as a multi-ethnic secular state and 
Pakistan as the homeland of Muslims in South Asia (Hagerty 1998, 67). For Pakistan, 
Kashmir is a land to be redeemed, and “Pakistan portrays Kashmir as part of the broader 
‘Hindu-Muslim’ conflict dating back to partition” (Pande 2011, 32). For India, Kashmir 
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is a symbol of multi-ethnic democracy, and India fears that allowing Kashmir to leave 
would have a domino effect on other disaffected groups (Ganguly 2001, 129). Thus, 
“Kashmir is a zero-sum test for each state’s legitimating ideology: one’s validity 
invalidates the other” (Hagerty 1998, 67). Because both Pakistan and India are 
culturally and socially divided societies (Basrur 2008, 39), the decline of state 
legitimacy can risk the territorial integrity of the “Indian” and “Pakistani” nations. 
  As Khan, Lavoy, and Clary (2009, 68) point out, “Pakistanis generally believe that 
the status quo in Kashmir is illegitimate” and “[t]he outcome of the partition…, in their 
view, was neither fair nor just.” This sentiment among Pakistanis about the illegitimate 
treatment of their nation was one of the major drivers for Pakistan to engage in 
revisionist attempts against India. Pakistan believes that India has mistreated Muslims, 
namely Pakistani ethnic kin, in Kashmir. Khan, Lavoy, and Clary (2009, 69) write that 
“Pakistanis, on the streets and in uniform, look across the LoC and see a long history of 
vote rigging, arbitrary arrest, torture, and rape by an occupying Indian force.” In 
addition, “India’s heavy-handed policies over the Kashmiri populace are taken as proof 
that only through extensive oppression can the Indian state suppress the desire for 
Kashmiri self-determination” (Khan, Lavoy, and Clary 2009, 69). Thus, Pakistan sees 
India’s control of Kashmir as illegitimate and humiliating to the Pakistani nation. 
  Along with the continuation of nationalistic rivalry, India and Pakistan began to 
develop nuclear weapons. According to Ganguly and Hagerty (2005, 10), India’s first 
nuclear device testing was in 1974. Meanwhile, Pakistan developed the capability of 
assembling a nuclear bomb by 1987 though it did not conduct a nuclear test at that time 
(Narang 2009/10, 48-49). Gartzke and Kroenig (2009, 154) report that India has 
possessed nuclear weapons since 1988 and Pakistan since 1990. India’s motivation for 
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nuclearization was derived from China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1964, 
whereas Pakistan’s desire for developing nuclear weapons was to offset the imbalance 
of conventional military power which resulted from the breakup of Pakistan to (West) 
Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971 (Pande 2011, 50-51). The nuclearization of the 
sub-continent reached completion in 1998 when India conducted nuclear tests, followed 
by Pakistan’s nuclear tests (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 10; The ICB Data Viewer). The 
public in both states widely supported the nuclear tests by its own government (Hoyt 
2009, 147). The history of nuclearization in the sub-continent, however, makes it more 
puzzling why India and Pakistan engaged in the Kargil War in 1999, after they 
“announced their arrival as overt nuclear weapon states” (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 
10). 
 
The Kargil War 
In 1999, members of the Pakistani military including Army Chief of Staff General 
Pervez Musharraf conducted an unofficial military operation to infiltrate into a 
mountain town called Kargil on the Indian side of Kashmir. In order to fully understand 
why the war occurred, it is important to examine the pre-war situations in Kashmir. 
According to Ganguly and Hagerty (2005, 146), “indigenous, ethno-religious 
insurgency” broke out in the Indian part of Kashmir in December 1989, and “shortly 
after its genesis…Pakistan became quickly involved in shaping the direction, scope, and 
intensity of the insurrection.” However, the Indian government was successful in 
cracking down on the insurgency, and a major indigenous insurgent group, the Jammu 
and Kashmir Liberation Front, abandoned armed struggle while the harsh treatment of 
local people by foreign militants resulted in the decline of local support for insurgency 
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(Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 147-148). Thus, the insurrection diminished. 
  However, Pakistan did not like this situation. Ganguly (2001, 122) argues, “The 
Pakistani leadership feared that this emergent normalcy in the Valley, once consolidated, 
would foreclose the possibility of further incitement to the insurgency”; therefore 
“Pakistan concluded that, if it wished to remain a relevant player in the Kashmir 
problem, it had to revive the insurgency.” The Pakistani military – which had a powerful 
influence on Pakistani politics and on the civilian government (Aziz 2007)6 – was 
particularly dissatisfied with India’s relative success in inhibiting the Kashmiri 
insurgency. This dissatisfaction within the military was because India’s successful 
crackdown on the Kashmiri insurgency was “clearly intolerable to the Pakistani 
politico-military establishment that had invested considerable blood and treasure in 
supporting the insurgency in Kashmir” (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 152). Even when 
the Pakistani and Indian governments were taking an initiative in reconciling with each 
other, the Pakistani military kept using force toward India’s Kashmir (Ganguly and 
Hagerty 2005, 149-150). 
  Meanwhile, the nuclear tests in 1998 provoked criticisms from the international 
community, which pressured Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime 
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to search for a rapprochement (Ganguly and Hagerty 
2005, 150-151). The two leaders publicized “the Lahore Declaration, which among 
other matters called for a series of nuclear-related confidence building measures and 
reaffirmed the two sides’ wish to resolve the Kashmir dispute through peaceful means” 
(Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 151). 
                                                 
6
 General Pervez Musharraf “described the military as ‘the central gravity in Pakistan’” (BBC 
News, December 30, 2013). 
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  The possibility of a rapprochement between India and Pakistan, however, was erased 
by the infiltration of Pakistani forces and Kashmiri insurgents into Kargil in April 1999. 
The Kargil operation was mainly planned by a few military senior officers, including 
General Pervez Musharraf, Lieutenant-General Mahmud Ahmed, Lieutenant-General 
Muhammed Aziz, and Major-General Javed Hassan (Qadir 2002, 25-26). The Kargil 
operation was authorized just weeks before Vajpayee visited Lahore, and Sharif did not 
cancel the operation even after the reconciliation process took place (Kahn, Lavoy, and 
Clary 2009, 86). It remains moot how much Sharif was involved in deciding the 
operation (Joeck 2009, 140n10) whereas Pakistani military leaders were worried that 
Prime Minister Sharif “might naively agree to measures ultimately harmful to Pakistan’s 
security” (Hoyt 2009, 155). Given the weak institution of civilian rule and the strong 
military establishment in Pakistan, it may be inferred that the military pressured the 
civilian government to accept the Kargil operation. 
  Pakistani forces succeeded in occupying several areas by the end of April.7 When 
Indian troops noticed the intrusion in early May, they thought that they were Kashmiri 
insurgents, and also underestimated their size. As Indian troops were unprepared for this 
unexpected intrusion, their reaction to the infiltration was slow and inefficient, and the 
initial attempts to retrieve the territory were unsuccessful. Faced with this problem, the 
Indian military introduced air forces to push back the intruders in late May. The use of 
air forces allowed the Indian troops to gradually overwhelm the Pakistani ones. 
Meanwhile, seeing a little sign of de-escalation of hostility, the United States pressured 
Pakistan to withdraw the troops. Pakistan failed to persuade great powers and the 
                                                 
7
 The summary of the process of the Kargil War in this paragraph draws from Ganguly and 
Hagerty (2005, 153-157) and Lavoy (2009, 20-23). 
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United States to support its position. Faced with these failures in both battlefield and 
diplomacy, Sharif sent a special envoy to New Delhi for negotiation to end the war. At 
first, the Indian government showed little interest, but agreed later. Afterwards, Sharif 
appeared in a nation-wide television and called for the withdrawal of insurgents from 
India’s Kashmir. The intruders began to withdraw and the war ended in mid-July. 
  For Pakistan, the Kargil operation was another attempt to challenge the status quo of 
Kashmir, as it “repeatedly has resorted to asymmetric military means to resolve the 
Kashmir dispute with India on the belief that India would refuse to negotiate a just 
solution for the Kashmiris” (Khan, Lavoy, and Clary 2009, 66; see also 69). Thus, the 
operation evidences the presentation of Pakistan’s transstate-ethnic nationalism over its 
ethnic kin in Kashmir. In short, as Khan, Lavoy, and Clary (2009, 69) point out, it “must 
be seen as an extension of Pakistan’s decades-long quest to make headway on the 
Kashmir issue.” 
  Khan, Lavoy, and Clary (2009, 74) also argue, “Contributing to the decision to 
execute the Kargil plan was the Pakistan army’s feeling of grievance resulting from 
India’s seizure of the Siachen Glacier in 1984 and a history of border skirmishes along 
the northern LoC.” In particular, the crisis over the Siachen Glacier in 1984 was “a 
major scar” for the Pakistani army (Khan, Lavoy, and Clary 2009, 75). In the crisis, 
India initiated the operation to seize the glacier, a contested territory since the Karachi 
agreement (Cheema 2009, 54). The operation succeeded, which caused the Pakistani 
army to be “deeply embarrassed” (Cheema 2009, 54-55). As Cheema (2009, 55) points 
out, “this loss reinforced the central lesson to the Pakistani armed forces that vulnerable 
areas, even of questionable strategic value, must be defended at all costs.” Thus, 
Pakistani transstate-ethnic nationalism was coupled with the national grievance of this 
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history, thereby triggering the Kargil War. 
  Interestingly, the MID dataset codes both India and Pakistan as revisionists in the 
Kargil War. Until then, in most MIDs, only Pakistan was coded as a revisionist. Why 
did India become a revisionist in this case? One plausible inference is that the rise of 
Hindu nationalism caused the Indian society to be dissatisfied with Pakistan’s support of 
Kashmiri insurgency. Varshney (1991, 1002) points out, “Nurtured by a widespread 
feeling among the Hindu middle classes that India’s secular state has gone too far in 
appeasing minorities (Sikhs in Punjab and Muslims in Kashmir and Muslims in general), 
Hindu nationalism has gained remarkable strength.” Saideman (2005, 216) also argues 
that the rise of Hindu nationalism and Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
“made it increasingly difficult for Indian elites to pursue moderate policies and 
increased the sense of threat and alienation perceived by Muslims in Kashmir and 
elsewhere in India.” Hence, it is possible to infer that India’s counterattack in Kargil 
was not only for the self-defense purpose but also for altering the situation in Kashmir, 
i.e., stopping Pakistani support for Kashmiri insurgency. 
 
Nuclear Deterrence vs. Nationalistic Rivalry 
Nuclear deterrence theorists argue that the mutual possession of nuclear weapons deters 
states from engaging in war, because the costs of nuclear war would be more than its 
benefits as nuclear war would cause huge damage. The Kargil War is the most 
anomalous case for nuclear deterrence theory. The year of 1999 was when it became 
apparent that both sides had secured nuclear capabilities. Hence, it was the most-likely 
case where nuclear symmetry should have prevented any war operation, especially 
initiated by Pakistan, the weaker side in a conventional sense, in the history of the 
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India-Pakistan nationalistic rivalry. Nonetheless, Pakistan embarked on the revisionist 
attempt to occupy part of Indian Kashmir, and the dyad escalated the crisis to war. In 
comparison with the past Indo-Pakistani wars, the Kargil War was limited in terms of 
casualties but not necessarily in terms of duration (see Table 4-3). 
 
Table 4-3: Comparative statistics of the Indo-Pakistani wars 
War Beginning date End date Battle deaths 
First Kashmir October 26, 1947 January 1, 1949 India: 2,500 
Pakistan: 1,000 
Second Kashmir August 5, 1965 September 23, 1965 India: 3,261 
Pakistan: 3,800 
Bangladesh December 3, 1971 December 17, 1971 India: 3,241 
Pakistan: 7,982 
Kargil War May 8, 1999 July 17, 1999 India: 474 
Pakistan: 698 
Source: Sarkees and Wayman (2010) 
 
  The statistical finding that nuclear deterrence has no significant effect on the 
likelihood of revisionist war is consistent with the variation in the propensity of 
India-Pakistan for war over time. The dyad has had nationalistic rivalry since their 
independence in 1947, and engaged in three wars until 1989 while one war since 1990 
(the year the mutual possession of nuclear weapons was indicated) until 2001, the latest 
year of observations in the dataset. Among them, there has been one occasion of India’s 
revisionist war behavior in the War of Bangladesh in 1971 and two occasions of 
Pakistan’s (the First and Second Kashmir Wars) for the period of 42 years without 
nuclear symmetry, and mutual revisionist war behavior in the Kargil War for the period 
of 11 years with nuclear symmetry. These simple statistics show that nuclear symmetry 
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was not associated with a lower likelihood of revisionist war at all in the Indo-Pakistani 
history. The period of nuclear asymmetry from 1988-89 saw no revisionist war, but two 
years are too short to determine whether nuclear asymmetry had an effect to inhibit 
revisionist war in the dyad. 
  Why did Pakistan resort to revisionist war against India under nuclear symmetry? 
Lavoy (2009, 25-26) argues that the strategy of asymmetric warfare allowed Kargil 
planners to believe that it is possible to win Kargil even under the condition of 
conventional military imbalance with India. However, strategy itself does not explain a 
motivation. 
  Ganguly (2001, 122) attributes Pakistan’s motivation for initiating the asymmetric 
warfare to its “false optimism.”8 Ganguly argues that Pakistan simply assumed that 
once the dispute began, the United States and other great powers would intervene on the 
side of Pakistan, because they would fear the potentiality of nuclear war in the 
sub-continent. Furthermore, Ganguly even points out that “Pakistani decision-makers 
had convinced themselves that their achievement of rough nuclear parity with India now 
enabled them to probe along the LoC with impunity.” Bajpai (2009, 163) agrees: 
nuclear weapons “led Pakistani leaders, civilian and military, to think that it [became] 
easier for their country to support terrorism and insurgency.” The strategic purpose of 
Pakistan was to draw international attention onto Kashmir by provoking fear of a 
nuclear war in the sub-continent among Western states (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 
152). Thus, Pakistan’s calculation of the strategic implications of nuclear deterrence was 
different from what nuclear deterrence theory would assume. Namely, rather than being 
deterred by India’s nuclear weapons, Pakistan predicted that its nuclear weapons would 
                                                 
8
 False optimism itself is theorized by Van Evera (1999). 
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deter India from counterattacking. The strategic implications of nuclear deterrence were 
interpreted in a way which favors what Pakistan desired to believe in order to satisfy its 
own political goal. 
  This false optimism of Pakistan parallels what nationalistic rivalry nurtures in the 
belief system: the rival is “more threatening than it really is yet more easily defeated by 
united opposition than the true probabilities may warrant” (Snyder 2000, 50). Pakistan 
has always feared that “Hindu” India would embark on aggression to reverse the 
partition and eliminate Pakistan although major Indian leaders have stated that they 
accepted the partition (Pande 2011, 29-31). This fear has been promoted by the minority 
of Hindu right-wing nationalists in India who have claimed that Pakistan must be 
annexed to India (Pande 2011, 56). Pande (2011, 57-58) argues that the fear for India’s 
ambition to undo the partition has not disappeared even after the nuclearization of 
Pakistan, because “it is not a fear rooted in realistic analysis but rather is 
psycho-political in nature.” Having this fear as a background, primary Kargil planners 
believed before the war operation that India might be preparing for aggression against 
Pakistan (although available evidence suggests that India had no such an intention) and, 
therefore, decided to preempt this risk (Lavoy 2009, 27). They perceived India as more 
threatening than it actually was. Pakistan’s interpretation of India was largely shaped by 
nationalistic hostility and fear, and not by purely strategic, objectivist cost-benefit 
calculations. 
  On the other hand, Pakistan has believed in general that Pakistanis are a stronger race 
than Hindu Indians (Pande 2011, 48), as suggested by the statement that “one Muslim 
Pakistani was equal to five Hindu Indians” (quoted in Pande 2011, 48). More 
specifically in the context of the Kargil War, Pakistan thought that asymmetric warfare 
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would allow it to make military achievements (Lavoy 2009, 26), especially due to the 
fear of nuclear war (Bajpai 2009, 163). Kargil planners underestimated India’s 
capability and willingness to defend. As Khan, Lavoy, and Clary (2009, 86-87) point out, 
these planners assumed that India could not launch massive counterattacks due to the 
difficult terrain of Kargil, could not respond to Pakistan’s infiltration quickly enough to 
enable effective counteroffensives, and would not be willing to escalate the conflict to 
general war due to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. In short, Pakistan perceived India as 
easier to defeat than it actually was. 
  Pakistan’s motivation for aggression against India can be explained by elite-led 
nationalist mobilization for political survival in terms of both interstate and intrastate 
politics. In terms of interstate political survival, nationalistic rivalry with India made 
Pakistan locked in a threat perception. As Lavoy (2009, 27) points out, “primary Kargil 
planners were convinced that India’s hostility toward Pakistan was a permanent fact of 
life in the subcontinent.” 
  In terms of domestic political survival, Mansfield and Snyder (2005, 241) argue that 
in Pakistan “the gap between demands for mass political participation and weak state 
institutions has repeatedly created incentives for both civilian and military politicians to 
play the nationalist card to gamble on establishing a base of mass legitimacy.” Tremblay 
and Schofield (2005, 233) point out that the Kargil War “was over an issue of significant 
symbolic value, carried out with widespread public support in Pakistan.” In culturally 
diverse Pakistan, its national identity has been significantly founded on Islam (Pande 
2011, 21-22; Richter 1979, 550; Smith 1991, 113). The significance of Islam also 
applies to the military, which is so powerful and influential an institution in Pakistani 
politics that Aziz (2008, 1) calls it a “parallel state.” Nasr (2005, 191) argues, “Since 
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1977 [when a military coup ended the civilian rule since 1972,] Islam has been 
important to legitimating military rule in Pakistan.” Hence, he continues, “the military 
needs Islamic identity to maintain its commanding position in Pakistan’s politics – 
which in turn is necessitated by the imperative of defending Pakistan in its rivalry with 
India” (see also Pande 2011, 22).  
  The Pakistani civilian government was ineffective on controlling the military. Sharif 
attempted to find a “face saving device” to end the war by visiting US President Bill 
Clinton, which did not produce any substantive achievement (Ganguly 2001, 119). 
Ganguly (2001,119) argues, “Although Sharif’s visit to Washington underscored his 
realization of the scope of his misadventure, various Kashmir groups who were 
participating in the Pakistani effort in Kargil showed little inclination to bring their 
fighting to a close.” Khan, Lavoy, and Clary (2009, 89) also point out that “the Sharif 
government attempted to disassociate itself from the Kargil operation” whereas “the 
military seethed over a Washington-brokered withdrawal that did not allow for the safe 
retreat of Pakistani forces.” Finally, Sharif did not consult details with the army staff as 
well as his cabinet before going to the US (Rizvi 2009, 344). In short, the Kargil War 
made the divide between the civilian government and the military establishment even 
wider, and contributed to the overthrow of the Sharif government by the army in 
October.9 This episode suggests that showing a dovish posture towards the rival nation 
risks the loss of political power, as nationalistic rivalry theory predicts. 
  India also had false optimism, which led it to interpret the strategic implications of 
                                                 
9
 According to Rizvi (2009, 341-342), Sharif’s decision to withdraw from Kargil also caused 
massive disappointment among the masses and political actors as well, because the government 
at first exaggerated to the public the successful operation of Kashmiri freedom fighters against 
India and therefore it appeared contradictory to withdraw Pakistani support. 
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nuclear deterrence in the way which is comfortable with its own image. One year before 
the Kargil, India conducted nuclear tests. It was motivated not by security concerns as 
IR realists expect but by the BJP’s nationalist ambition to “make a ‘strong’ Indian nation” 
(Vanaik and Islamia 2002, 323-326).10 From this observation it can be inferred that the 
nuclear tests gave the BJP-led government (over)confidence of national strength 
endorsed by nuclear weapons to deter Pakistan. Along the tide of the rapprochement at 
the political level, Indian decision makers and analysts expected and believed, as does 
nuclear deterrence theory, that India’s apparent nuclear capability would make it 
improbable for the dyad to engage in conventional armed conflict (Ganguly 2001, 
123-124; Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 153).11 On March 15, 1999, just before the Kargil 
War began, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee stated:  
 
Now both India and Pakistan are in possession of nuclear weapons. There is no alternative 
but to live in mutual harmony. The nuclear weapon is not an offensive weapon. It is a weapon 
of self-defence. It is the kind of weapon that helps in preserving the peace. If in the days of 
the Cold War there was no use of force, it was because of the balance of terror (quoted in 
Karat 1999). 
 
The majority of the public also supported the nuclear tests (Hoyt 2009, 146-147). Thus, 
                                                 
10
 For a summary of the political discourse of nuclearized strong India, see Chaulia (2002, 221). 
It is noteworthy that while the BJP-led government claimed that it changed the traditional 
course of foreign policy by a realpolitike model, actually previous governments also used such a 
model (Vanaik and Islamia 2002, 330-331). 
11
 In fact, Indian military leaders recognized that Pakistan would resort to conventional war 
even under the condition of nuclear symmetry (Hoyt 2009, 154). This fact suggests that contrary 
to Pakistan, the established institution of civilian rule did not benefit Indian national security. 
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both the elites and the masses agreed that the nuclear tests were a good thing for India, 
particularly for its security. 
  India’s nationalism led to false optimism in that the national capability of overt 
nuclear weapons misled India to underestimate the risk of Pakistan’s aggression. In 
other words, the possession of nuclear weapons allowed India to expect that united 
opposition with nuclear weapons would overwhelm Pakistan and the potentiality of 
national nuclear retaliation would be clear enough to deter Pakistan from resorting to 
adventure against India. 
  The presence of India’s threat perception is not as straightforward to identify as 
Pakistan’s, however. India assumed that the rapprochement after the nuclear tests in 
1998 improved its relation with Pakistan (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005, 159), and that 
given this rapprochement as well as operational difficulties in the mountains of Kargil, 
Pakistan would not have a motivation for launching aggression (Wirtz and Rana 2009, 
220). A simpler explanation is that India believed that Pakistan would remain 
threatening but would be weak enough to be deterred by nuclear weapons. A more 
complicated explanation is that India really perceived Pakistan as less threatening than it 
actually was, because India and Pakistan were on the way to rivalry termination before 
the Kargil War, at least at the level of the civilian governments. As far as available 
evidence is concerned, the Kargil operation was primarily organized by the Pakistani 
senior army officers rather than Sharif’s civilian government (Hagerty 2009, 102). This 
variable of the Pakistani “hybrid regime” (Tremblay and Schofield 2005) is what the 
theory of nationalistic rivalry fails to capture. 
  Even if the second explanation were correct, the mitigation of India’s threat 
perception of Pakistan would have been an exception in their history. Actually, the 
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Kargil War rather supports the structural causal effect of nationalistic rivalry on a 
revisionist propensity. Even if one side in a nationalistic-rivalry dyad begins to search 
for a peaceful settlement, the other side will exploit and take advantage of it, as Pakistan 
did. This situation can be summarized as the Prisoners’ Dilemma game; if India chose to 
cooperate, Pakistan chose to defect as the best response, because Pakistan’s highest 
payoff was to annex the Indian part of Kashmir (the rational choice defined by 
transstate-ethnic nationalism), and not to cooperate with India and accept the status quo 
of Kashmir. Pakistan believed that it could engage in the revisionist attempt because of 
nuclear deterrence. Once India realized that Pakistan defected, it could no longer keep 
cooperating with Pakistan and counterattacked in the battlefield. As already discussed, 
the status quo of India’s Kashmir is essential for Indian national identity. Some 
nationalists have even hoped for the annexation of Pakistan’s Kashmir and the BJP, 
among other political parties, has been least satisfied with a divided Kashmir (Vanaik 
and Islamia 2002, 337-338). Thus, Pakistan’s occupation of Kargil was unacceptable to 
India by any means. Once the rapprochement was betrayed by Pakistan, India realized 
that Pakistan was untrustworthy (Basrur 2009, 321-323). 
  In short, both Pakistan and India expected that their rival would be deterred by their 
own nuclear weapons. The way of interpreting the strategic implications of this 
expectation, however, was different between them because of their own national goals. 
For Pakistan, the national goal was to overturn India’s anti-insurgency program and to 
annex Kashmir, the land to be redeemed. For India, it was to keep cracking down on the 
insurgency and to secure territorial integrity for its national identity and state legitimacy, 
though also making an effort to mitigate nationalistic hostility in the dyad. To achieve 
these national goals, even under the condition of nuclear symmetry, firstly Pakistan 
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initiated the Kargil operation whereas India had to counteract it, which resulted in the 
Kargil War. 
  Ganguly and Hagerty (2005, 160-162) suggest that the mutual possession of nuclear 
weapons inhibited even the Hindu nationalist BJP-led government from expanding the 
war (if not resorting to limited war), for fear that escalation would cause Pakistan’s use 
of nuclear weapons. This argument implies that even nationalists might be rational 
enough to fear nuclear war, and nuclear deterrence might prevent escalation of 
revisionist behavior to full-scale war, although it did not inhibit a limited scale of war. 
This argument has two problems, however. First, it is unclear how one can define war as 
limited or full-scale in a clear manner. Unless a clear demarcating line is drawn between 
limited and full-scale wars, many empirical cases would be interpreted as “evidence” 
for the argument, depending on the position of analysts. Second, and more important, 
Prime Minister Vajpayee was actually oriented more to the Nehruvian tradition of 
prudent foreign policy than to the party’s position of hawkish foreign policy (Chaulia 
2002, 224-226). It can be inferred that this government-party divide helped the Kargil 
war to be constrained. If the government and political party had been monolithically 
hardliners, the result might have been different. 
 
Primed for Peace? 
Despite the violent history, the level of conflict escalation has certainly decreased over 
time since the nuclearization of the subcontinent. While the dyad experienced two other 
violent crises in 2001-02 after the Kargil War (Suzuki and Loizides 2011), the level of 
violence was more limited. Afterwards, India and Pakistan began a peace process in 
2004 when the leaders of both countries met in a SAARC meeting (Mukherjee 2009, 
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437n1; Patil 2008, 2). 
Mukherjee (2009) argues that the reasons for the peace process are threefold. First, 
they are now aware that war is an infeasible option, especially in the age of nuclear 
weapons (411-412). On the one hand, former Australian defense attaché in Islamabad, 
Brian Cloughley, says: “Musharaff has never been a nuclear hawk. As a soldier he 
realizes more than most the terrible consequences of a nuclear exchange” (quoted in 
Tremblay and Schofield 2005, 236). Given this point as well as the aforementioned 
arguments, Musharaff’s initiative in the Kargil operation was motivated by false 
optimism based on expected nuclear deterrence and not by adventurism towards nuclear 
war. Once he realized that India would counteract Pakistan’s aggression even under the 
condition of nuclear symmetry, Musharaff’s optimism seems to have declined over time, 
as the 2001-2002 crises under his incumbency did not escalate to war. 
On the other hand, after the Kargil War, India learned that nuclear symmetry itself 
would not be sufficient to deter Pakistan, and reached a conclusion that limited war is 
possible with Pakistan under the shadow of nuclear symmetry (Basrur 2009, 327-328). 
India reviewed its strategy and tactics vis-à-vis Pakistan in the context of nuclear 
symmetry, and was able to respond quickly in the 2001-2002 crises (Hoyt 2009, 
162-165). However, this hardline attitude weakened later. Former Indian National 
Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra, states: “it is only after the mobilization of 2002 that 
the peace process could begin. This was the realization: Having gone to the brink, a 
more rational view prevailed” (quoted in Stolar 2008, 31). The experience of conflict 
under nuclear symmetry updated India’s belief on how to manage its relationship with 
Pakistan: initially, being more efficient and firmer, and later, not being too hardline. 
According to Hoyt (2009, 158), nuclear rhetoric between India and Pakistan at an 
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early stage of overt nuclearization was “ad hoc, uncoordinated, and somewhat confused” 
as in the Kargil War and in the subsequent crises in 2001-2002, but they “took steps to 
tighten control over nuclear rhetoric in future crises.” In short, it is implied that the 
probability of revisionist war should decline after the first revisionist war under the 
condition of nuclear symmetry, possibly due to the learning of danger of conflict 
escalation between nuclear-armed states. Some studies point out that newer nuclear 
states are more likely to engage in conflict (Horowitz 2009; Sagan 2003). Yet, not only 
the period of nuclear possession but also the nature of experience may matter, as the 
experience of armed conflicts in the shadow of nuclear symmetry enabled India and 
Pakistan to learn how dangerous conflict escalation is – and also how to manage it more 
effectively (see Hoyt 2009, 161-169). 
The second reason for the initiation of the peace process is that both India and 
Pakistan are faced with the changing situations of internal and external threats. These 
changes include local and transnational terrorism, the US and NATO operations in 
Afghanistan, and the rise of China (Mukherjee 2009, 412-415). The third reason is that 
the sign of economic interdependence created an incentive for further cooperation 
(Mukherjee 2009, 416-417). 
However, it may be too early to conclude that India and Pakistan have now overcome 
their nationalistic hostility. They still experience a series of fatal militarized disputes. As 
both have accused each other, threat perception has certainly lingered on both sides. 
After all, the Kashmir issue remains unresolved. Lavoy (2009, 10) warns, “Pakistan 
would be willing to sacrifice even more than it did in 1999 to defend its stake in 
Kashmir and more generally protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” In 
India, while moderate Indian National Congress led the government since 2004 up to 
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early 2014, the BJP has now come back to power with Narendra Modi as Prime Minister, 
who was “the chief minister of the western state of Gujarat” and was “accused of doing 
little to stop the 2002 religious riots when more than 1,000 people, mostly Muslims, 
were killed” (BBC News, May 16, 2014). At this stage, it is difficult to argue that India 
and Pakistan, two nuclear states in the sub-continent, will no longer engage in 
nationalistic rivalry and revisionist war, let alone revisionist behavior in general. 
 
Conclusion 
The chapter has examined the efficacy of nuclear deterrence in inhibiting revisionist war 
in nationalistic rivalry. The theory of nuclear deterrence argues that the mutual 
possession of nuclear weapons deters war due to the tremendous cost of nuclear war. 
However, the chapter argues that nationalistic rivalry biases this objectivist assessment 
of nuclear weapons, and it is expected that nuclear symmetry does not have any 
significant effect on the probability of revisionist war within nationalistic rivalry. The 
statistical analysis does not find any statistically significant effect of nuclear symmetry. 
The case study of the Kargil War between India and Pakistan endorses the hypothesized 
causal mechanism. To conclude, it is implausible to expect that nationalistic-rivalry 
dyads will enjoy nuclear peace if both states in such dyads are nuclear-armed. 
  The chapter points out that the strategic implication of nuclear symmetry for 
nationalistic-rivalry dyads is significantly different from what nuclear deterrence theory 
expects. From this point, it is possible to draw an implication for the literature on 
nuclear weapons and interstate conflict in general. Although previous empirical research 
has implicitly assumed that all dyads are influenced by nuclear weapons in the same 
way, it may be another potential direction of research to distinguish the type of dyads to 
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examine the effect of nuclear weapons on interstate conflict in different contexts. 
Depending on the type of dyads, nuclear weapons might have a conflict-provoking, 
conflict-mitigating, or null effect on conflict. 
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Chapter 5 
Nationalistic Rivalry and Liberal Peace1 
 
The last chapter has found that the realist conflict-mitigating factor, nuclear deterrence, 
fails to reduce the probability of revisionist war within nationalistic rivalry. If realism 
cannot provide an approach to mitigating the effect of nationalistic rivalry on a 
revisionist propensity, can liberalism do so? This chapter discusses whether liberal 
peace theory is capable of reducing the probability of revisionist behavior within 
nationalistic rivalry.   
  Liberal peace advocates have long argued that joint democracy, economic 
interdependence, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) reduce interstate conflict 
(Russett and Oneal 2001; Oneal and Russett 2001; Oneal 2003; Pevehouse and Russett 
2006; Hegre, Oneal, and Russett 2010; Dafoe 2011; Dafoe, Oneal, and Russett 2013). 
Many scholars have challenged this liberal peace argument, 2  yet liberal peace 
advocates have robustly responded to these criticisms and have defended their 
arguments.3 
                                                 
1
 Part of the chapter (theoretical discussion on economic interdependence and the case study of 
China-Japan) is going to be published as Suzuki (forthcoming). 
2
 For joint democracy, Gartzke (2007), Gartzke and Weisiger (2013), Gibler and Tir (2010), 
McDonald (2010), and Mousseau (2009, 2013); for economic interdependence, Keshk, Pollins, 
and Reuveny (2004), Keshk, Reuveny, and Pollins (2010), and Kim and Rousseau (2005); for 
intergovernmental organizations, Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004). 
3
 See, for example, Dafoe (2011) as a reply to Gartzke’s (2007) capitalist peace argument; 
Dafoe, Oneal, and Russett (2013) as a reply to Mousseau’s (2013) contract-intensive economy 
argument and Gartzke and Weisiger’s (2013) dynamic difference argument; Hegre, Oneal, and 
Russett (2010) as a reply to Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny’s (2004) and Kim and Rousseau’s 
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  Somewhat surprisingly, none of these previous studies have seriously taken into 
consideration the implication of nationalism for interstate conflict. Yet, nationalism can 
be seen as the source of preference in the rational choice term and the source of identity 
in the constructivist term, both of which shape state behavior. Hence, this chapter aims 
to bring nationalism into the ongoing debate on liberal peace. As revisionist behavior is 
the major source of instability in the interstate system, if liberal peace is meant to reduce 
interstate conflict, it must decrease revisionist behavior first of all. 
  The chapter argues that none of joint democracy, economic interdependence, and 
IGOs is likely to reduce revisionist behavior. The rationale is that nationalistic rivalry 
makes it a rational choice for states to prioritize resolving a nationalist issue to their 
own advantage, and prevents a transnational identity which is essential for cooperation 
from emerging due to the saliency of national identification. This argument explains the 
reason why democratic dyads were statistically insignificant in explaining revisionist 
behavior within nationalistic rivalry in Chapter 3. The inefficacy of liberal peace is 
shown empirically by both large-N statistical analysis of all nationalistic-rivalry dyads 
and small-N case studies of Greece-Turkey for joint democracy and IGOs and 
Japan-China for economic interdependence. 
 
Liberal Peace and Nationalistic Rivalry 
Joint Democracy 
The arguably firmest leg of liberal peace is joint democracy, or the dyad of two 
democratic states. A strong negative correlation has been found between joint 
                                                                                                                                               
(2005) criticism of the pacifying effect of economic interdependence; and Pevehouse and 
Russett (2006) to provide a more robust measure of intergovernmental organizations. 
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democracy and interstate conflict, and Levy (1988, 662) even states that the “absence of 
war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in 
international relations.” While some have recently replaced this “democratic peace” 
with capitalist peace (Gartzke 2007; Mousseau 2009, 2010, 2013), liberal peace 
advocates have refuted these amendments (Dafoe 2011; Dafoe, Oneal, and Russett 
2013).4 
  Up to date, a large number of theories have been created to explain the democratic 
peace correlation (see a literature review by Gartzke 2007, 167-169; Hayes 2011; 
Ungerer 2012). This causes a challenge for critics who want to introduce a new 
dimension into the debate. As Gartzke (2007, 169) properly points out, it is “an 
impossible task” to “show that every conceivable attribute of democracy cannot 
possibly influence the propensity toward interstate violence,” because “[g]iven the 
malleability of assumptions, one should be able to develop numerous logically coherent 
explanations for almost any given empirical relationship.” 
  In his case, Gartzke (2007) emphasizes the findings from empirical models to 
compare the democratic peace argument and the capitalist peace one, rather than 
engaging in the endless battle among different but logically coherent theories which all 
aim to explain the same empirical pattern between democratic dyads and interstate 
conflict. In this chapter, normative and structural explanations (Maoz and Russett 1993; 
Russett and Oneal 2001) are used as a theoretical basis to consider the implication of 
nationalism for democratic peace, because they have been major pillars of democratic 
                                                 
4
 McDonald (2010) also argues that capitalist peace prevails over democratic peace, but his 
main empirical models take into consideration only a country-level regime type and not 
dyadic-level joint democracy. His supplementary analysis actually finds the pacifying effect of 
joint democracy (165). 
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peace accounts around which many other theories have developed (see Hayes 2011). 
Thus, the use and critique of these two explanations should have implications for the 
widest range of the literature of the democratic peace research program. 
  The normative explanation is that since democracies share the democratic norms of 
peaceful conflict settlement unlike non-democracies having the nondemocratic norms of 
violent coercion, they “are able to effectively apply democratic norms in their 
interaction, thereby preventing most conflicts from escalating to a militarized level” 
(Maoz and Russett 1993, 625). Democratic states are likely to fight with 
non-democracies, because the latter do not share democratic norms and therefore the 
former need to prevent the latter from taking advantage of their peaceful posture and 
conducting aggression (Maoz and Russett 1993, 625). 
The structural explanation is that a democratic political system constrains leaders 
from resorting to conflict more than a nondemocratic system “due to the complexity of 
the democratic process and the requirement of securing a broad base of support for risky 
policies” (Maoz and Russett 1993, 626). More specifically, Bueno de Mesquita and his 
colleagues illustrate the rationalist mechanisms of structural constraints. According to 
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992, 155-160), on the one hand, democratic dyads are 
unlikely to fight with each other, because democratic states mutually expect each other 
to be constrained from going to violent conflict by their democratic institutions. On the 
other hand, democracies are likely to fight with non-democracies, because the former 
expect the latter to be not as constrained as democracies from conducting aggression 
and, therefore, are willing to use force to avoid exploitation by those non-democracies. 
In addition, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) argue that democratic states are likely to 
try hard to win war and are not likely to fight a war they expect to lose, because defeat 
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causes constituencies to remove incumbent leaders from the government. Because 
democratic states expect that fellow democracies make a great effort to win war, they 
are unlikely to fight war with other democratic states, and prefer the settlement of 
conflict by negotiation. 
  The chapter identifies two explanations of how nationalistic rivalry thwarts these 
pacifying effects of joint democracy. First, Gibler and Tir (2010) argue that the peaceful 
settlement of territorial disputes causes both peace and democracy. In other words, the 
absence of territorial disputes is a confounder for the negative correlation between joint 
democracy and interstate conflict. Gibler and Tir explicate that in the presence of a 
threat to a homeland territory, states build large standing land armies. This practice 
requires the centralization of authority, and allows the army to gain power in domestic 
politics through the need of homeland defense or the army’s high capability of 
repressing other domestic actors. Therefore, territorial disputes lead to the 
autocratization of regime or the maintenance of autocracy. Meanwhile, once territorial 
disputes are peacefully resolved and there is no threat to the homeland territory anymore, 
states do not need large land armies and, therefore, the power of the army declines. 
Consequently, the decentralization of power follows, and so does democratization if the 
other factors meet the prerequisites of democracy (955-958). Gibler and Tir conclude 
that “both democracy and peace in a dyad may be a function of settling territorial 
threats to the state” (965, emphasis original). 
  In nationalistic rivalry, one of the major issues is territorial disputes (including ethnic 
ones due to irredentism and national unification movements) as seen in the rivalry 
descriptions in Appendix B. If the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes is the cause 
of both peace and democracy, democratic dyads in nationalistic rivalry are unlikely to 
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be the consequence of this causal pathway and, therefore, unlikely to experience peace. 
  Second, Hayes (2011, 776) contends that neither structural nor normative explanation 
is able to explain “how threat is constructed,” even though the “democratic peace is at 
its core about threat construction or the lack thereof.” On the other hand, constructivist 
and psychological approaches to democratic peace indicate that democracies do not see 
each other as a threat if – and only if – they have a shared identity of democracy, 
namely a transstate/transnational identity based on perceived democratic norms (Hayes 
2011, 779-782; Peceny 1997; Widmaier 2005). 
  These constructivist and psychological explanations of democratic peace suggest 
what role nationalistic rivalry plays in democratic dyads. States engaged in nationalistic 
rivalry perceive each other as a threat to their own nationhood, due to a nationalist issue. 
In such a situation, national identification is strongly hardened and the difference 
between “self” and “other” is clearly highlighted. Hence, there is little room for a 
transnational identity to emerge in nationalistic-rivalry dyads. The absence or weakness 
of transnational identity between democratic states means that they do not really see 
each other as the same “genuine” democracy (even if outside observers “code” them as 
democracies).5 In such a case, democratic peace cannot be fulfilled by the normative 
expectation of peaceful conflict resolution or by the rationalist expectation of 
institutional constraints or war-winning capabilities, because neither side in democratic 
dyads can expect that the other side, perceived as a “fake” democracy, has the same 
democratic norms or institutions as one’s own. 
  In short, according to the territorial-dispute explanation and the 
                                                 
5
 For example, India and Pakistan are coded as democracies in the Polity IV dataset (Marshall 
2013) from 1988-1998, but Pakistan believed that India’s control of Kashmir was unjustifiable 
and oppressive to Muslims there. Thus, India’s “democracy” was not democratic to Pakistan. 
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constructivist/psychological explanation, if democratic states are engaged in 
nationalistic rivalry, joint democracy is unlikely to reduce revisionist behavior. For 
example, as will be illustrated later, Greek-Turkish joint democracy did not inhibit 
nationalist attitude and revisionist behavior within their nationalistic rivalry. The 
nationalistic rivalry mainly developed over territorial disputes, and Turkish democracy 
needed to coordinate with the military. The public in both states perceived the other as a 
threat rather than a trustable democratic partner. As expected by the territorial-dispute 
explanation and the constructivist/psychological explanation, these conditions 
constrained the theoretically expected pacifying effects of joint democracy. 
 
Economic Interdependence 
Another leg of liberal peace is economic interdependence. Liberal peace theorists 
propose two causal mechanisms whereby deeper interdependence reduces the likelihood 
of interstate conflict (Russett and Oneal 2001, 127-131). First, according to the 
rationalist argument, economic incentives for profits from interdependence make 
conflict an irrational option, since conflict hinders economic activities. For most 
business sectors, conflict is an undesirable and uncertain factor that makes business 
harder to operate. For example, manufacturers need economic partner countries to 
provide them with raw materials and to buy their final products. This means that 
economic interdependence creates domestic constituencies which oppose conflict with 
these economic partners, for fear that conflict will damage their business (Mansfield and 
Pollins 2003, 3). Second, in terms of the constructivist argument, economic 
interdependence promotes interstate communication at both governmental and 
nongovernmental levels (Mansfield and Pollins 2003, 3) and creates a shared identity 
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(Russett and Oneal 2001, 130). This shared identity then prompts trust and cooperation. 
  The rationalist argument of economic interdependence is underlain by the assumption 
that states prefer economic profits to other things. However, in interstate anarchy (i.e., 
the absence of a supranational governing body), not economic prosperity but survival is 
the primary goal of states, and good economy is one means to achieve national survival 
(and interdependence is one means to boost economy). In anarchy, states must protect 
themselves from threats by themselves in order to survive (Waltz 1979, 91, 111). 
Therefore, if states perceive each other as a threat to their own nationhood, or are 
engaged in nationalistic rivalry, the primary rational choice is not to pursue economic 
profits by interdependence but to secure nationhood from the threat (i.e., to resolve a 
nationalist issue to one’s own advantage). 
  It is possible that rival states are economically interdependent, but if seeking 
economic profits from interdependence with the rival can endanger nationhood at some 
point, they will sacrifice these profits to secure nationhood. The lens of nationalistic 
rivalry leads these states to expect that economic cooperation with the rival is dangerous 
due to the “relative-gains problem” (Grieco, Powell, and Snidal 1993, 729), as a threat 
perception hardens the relative gains concern (Rousseau 2002). That is, in the presence 
of nationalistic rivalry, the worry that the partner will gain more is more severe than in 
the absence of such rivalry.6 This belief may even distort the objective assessment of 
gains. In other words, even if gains are equally distributed to both states from an 
objective viewpoint, the belief that the other is threatening will cause these states to 
subjectively assess that the other’s gain is more than its own, and/or national in-group 
                                                 
6
 In Grieco’s (1990, 45; see also Grieco, Powell, and Snidal 1993, 731) term, “the coefficient 
for a state’s sensitivity to gaps in payoffs – k” is high in nationalistic rivalry. 
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favoritism will lead them to think that the righteous “self” should have more gains than 
the threatening “other.” 
  According to the constructivist argument, economic interdependence creates a shared 
identity, thereby promoting interstate trust and reducing interstate conflict. In other 
words, the presence of shared identity by interdependence is a necessary step to peace. 
Again, since states engaged in nationalistic rivalry perceive each other as a threat along 
the line of national identity, it is difficult for a transnational identity to emerge, no 
matter how much communication these states exchange. 
  In short, in terms of both rationalist and constructivist arguments, economic 
interdependence is unlikely to reduce the probability of revisionist behavior under the 
condition of nationalistic rivalry. For example, as will be described later, China and 
Japan have engaged in revisionist behavior, particularly over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands, despite their high economic interdependence. It has been rational for both 
governments to take a firm stance against each other, even though such an action has 
damaged profitable bilateral economic relations. National identification vis-à-vis the 
other has been hardened in both states, and no clear sign of a shared identity has been 
observed. 
 
Intergovernmental Organizations 
The last leg of liberal peace is intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Russett and 
Oneal (2001, 163-166) argue that IGOs can cause interstate peace through any of the 
following functions: “coercing norm-breakers”; “mediating among conflicting parties”; 
“reducing uncertainty by conveying information”; “problem-solving, including 
expanding states’ conception of their self-interest to be more inclusive and longer term”; 
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“socialization and shaping norms”; and “generating narratives of mutual identification.” 
Liberal peace advocates later admitted that the third leg of liberal peace was less 
empirically supported than joint democracy and economic interdependence. Yet, they 
have developed a more robust indicator of IGOs. They argue that if IGOs largely consist 
of democracies (hereafter “democratic IGOs”), credible commitment, dispute settlement, 
and socialization are more likely (Pevehouse and Russett 2006). In other words, the 
pacifying effects of IGOs are enhanced by the incorporation of the democratic peace 
effect among member states, and in this sense, democratic IGOs can be seen as part of 
the democratic peace research program. 
  The functions of IGOs can be largely classified into two types: rationalist and 
constructivist. The rationalist functions are coercion, mediation, information exchange, 
self-interest expansion, and credible commitment; and the constructivist ones are 
socialization and identification. The rationalist functions suggest that coercion and 
self-interest expansion alter the payoffs of each state behavior choice whereby the 
primary goal becomes cooperation – or even coordination – with other states, and 
mediation, information exchange, and credible commitment facilitate this alteration and 
the achievement of cooperation/coordination (e.g., Keohane 2005). The constructivist 
functions imply that socialization and identification create a shared identity and reduce a 
threat perception between states as members of the same group (e.g., Wendt 1999, ch.6).  
If the rationalist functions are to mitigate nationalistic rivalry, they have to reduce the 
payoffs of revisionist behavior and increase those of non-revisionist behavior in 
nationalistic-rivalry dyads. None of existent IGOs, however, is likely to achieve this 
task, because no IGO can assure the national security of individual states perfectly. 
Even the UN Security Council, the only IGO which has legitimacy to authorize use of 
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force in the interstate system, often becomes the political arena where a Permanent Five 
state exercises veto if a resolution is against its interest. Intergovernmental institutions 
do not have an independent effect on state behavior but are the product of the interests 
of individual states (Mearsheimer 1994/95, 1995). This is especially so in the field of 
security, because the anarchic nature of the interstate system imposes a self-help 
imperative, as already noted. The primary interest of states engaged in nationalistic 
rivalry is to secure nationhood by resolving a nationalist issue to their own advantage, 
even if they share IGOs. 
If the constructivist functions are to mitigate nationalistic rivalry, they have to reduce 
a threat perception in nationalistic-rivalry dyads through socialization and identification. 
As explained in the case of joint democracy and economic interdependence, states 
engaged in nationalistic rivalry experience the hardening of national identification and 
the further differentiation between the righteous “self” and the threatening “other.” 
Hence, the constructivist functions of IGOs are compromised, and IGOs are unlikely to 
reduce revisionist behavior in nationalistic rivalry. 
As will be discussed later, Greek-Turkish relations were constrained rather than 
improved by two significant democratic IGOs, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the EU. Those IGOs became the place where the two states engaged in 
disputes, due to their conflicting national interests around those IGOs and to the 
saliency of their national identification vis-à-vis the other. 
To recapitulate, none of the liberal peace factors are expected to decrease the 
likelihood of revisionist behavior within nationalistic-rivalry dyads. Thus, statistical 
models expect to find no statistically significant relationship between each of the liberal 
peace factors and the probability of revisionist behavior in the subset of 
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nationalistic-rivalry dyads. 
 
Statistical Analysis 
This section conducts large-N statistical analysis to examine the above arguments. First, 
it explains a research design. Next, it presents and discusses the results of analysis. 
 
Research Design 
Unlike the case of nuclear deterrence, liberal peace theory covers not only war but also 
short-of-war disputes as the target of pacifying effects. Hence, the dependent variable of 
interest is the same measure of revisionist behavior as in Chapter 3, coded 1 if a state is 
a revisionist and resorts to a militarized action against another state; 0 otherwise. 
  The effect of liberal peace is measured by the following variables. First, to test the 
democratic peace proposition, democratic actors, democratic targets, and democratic 
dyads are coded 1 if the Polity 2 score of respectively an actor state, a target state, and 
both states in a dyad are equal to or greater than six; otherwise 0 (Marshall 2013). 
  Second, the effect of economic interdependence is estimated by examining how much 
the national economies of dyads depend on bilateral trade. To this end, an actor state’s 
ratio of bilateral trade to its GDP per capita (the actor’s trade dependence) and a target 
state’s one (the target’s trade dependence) are included in statistical models. Then, the 
interaction term between these two variables measures the effect of trade 
interdependence. Trade data draw from the Correlates of War Trade Dataset version 3.0 
(Barbieri and Keshk 2012; Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2009) and GDP per capita data 
come from the GDP and population data 5.0 beta by Gleditsch (2002). Both figures use 
current prices of US dollars. 
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  Third, the effect of democratic IGOs is measured by the number of democratic IGO 
memberships (Pevehouse and Russett 2006). Democratic IGOs are those whose average 
Polity score among all member states is equal to or more than the threshold of 
democracy in the Polity IV project (981). Pevehouse and Russett (2006) use a threshold 
of seven in the Polity score for democracy in the main analysis, but the Polity IV project 
actually employs a threshold of six to identify democracy. The chapter uses a threshold 
of six in the Polity score to measure the number of democratic IGO memberships.7  
  As in the previous empirical chapters, the control variables are the ratio of military 
expenditure to GDP per capita (the ME-to-GDPpc ratio); ethnonation-state 
incongruence; the capability difference, or an actor state’s CINC minus a target state’s 
CINC (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987), and its squared term; and 
contiguity, a binary variable coded 1 if states in a dyad are contiguous through land or 
the water which is equal to or less than 150 miles (Stinnett et al. 2002). Finally, to 
control for temporal dependence, the cubic polynomials of a peace year counter for 
revisionist behavior are included (Carter and Signorino 2010) and the ongoing years of 
revisionist behavior are dropped (Bennett and Stam 2000b, 661). The unit of analysis is 
directed dyad-years as revisionist behavior is one state’s action towards another state, 
and the total observations are the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads. The estimation 
method is probit regression as the dependent variable is binary, and robust standard 
                                                 
7
 I thank Jon Pevehouse for sharing the replication data, which contain both Polity ≥ 6 and 
Polity ≥ 7 thresholds of democratic IGOs. Unlike Pevehouse and Russett (2006), I do not 
include the number of shared IGO memberships in the statistical models for the following 
reasons. First, the number of shared IGO memberships conceptually overlaps with the number 
of shared democratic IGO memberships (see Ray 2003, 15-19). Second, as liberal peace 
advocates now admit that ordinary IGOs do not reduce conflict, they are redundant. Finally, the 
inclusion brings more missing values. 
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errors are clustered on dyads to control for within-group correlations. 
 
Results 
The results are presented in Table 5-1 for the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads, and 
for the sake of comparison, in Tables 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4 for respectively the subset of 
other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), that of other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, 
and Diehl (2006), and all directed dyad-years excluding nationalistic-rivalry dyads 
(hereafter, non-nationalistic-rivalries). 
  The three democracy variables (democratic actors, targets, and dyads) and democratic 
IGOs are separately used in each model, because the former and the latter are actually 
the overlapped measures of democratic peace and, therefore, should not be included 
together in one model (Ray 2003, 15-19). If an IGO largely consists of democratic states, 
its member states are more likely to be democracies by definition. Unsurprisingly, the 
correlation coefficient between democratic dyads and democratic IGOs in the subset of 
nationalistic-rivalry dyads is 0.61, which raises the concern of multicollinearity. 
Because the empirical models of the advocates of democratic IGOs, Pevehouse and 
Russett (2006, 984), do not suppose that democratic IGOs and democratic countries 
need to be interacted to produce their pacifying effect, it is more plausible to use the 
measure of democratic states and that of democratic IGOs separately for the statistical 
reason of avoiding multicollinearity.  
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Table 5-1: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on liberal peace in the subset of 
nationalistic rivalry 
 Model 5-1 Model 5-2 Model 5-3 Model 5-4 
Democratic Actor -0.221** -0.241**   
 (0.107) (0.111)   
Democratic Target 0.0591 0.0239   
 (0.126) (0.114)   
Democratic Dyad 0.0837 0.160   
 (0.183) (0.183)   
Actor’s Trade Dependence 0.251 0.170 0.269 0.186 
  (0.213) (0.184) (0.214) (0.178) 
Target’s Trade Dependence -0.0563 -0.190 -0.133 -0.266* 
  (0.150) (0.157) (0.160) (0.152) 
Trade Interdependence -0.0822 -0.0507 -0.0848 -0.0538 
 (0.0701) (0.0585) (0.0712) (0.0574) 
Democratic IGO Membership   0.00902 0.0128 
    (0.00765) (0.00783) 
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio  0.0564*  0.0533* 
  (0.0300)  (0.0273) 
Ethnonation-State Incongruence  0.162  0.202** 
   (0.104)  (0.0992) 
Contiguity  0.0417  0.0177 
  (0.177)  (0.186) 
Capability Difference  -0.698  -0.307 
  (1.462)  (1.379) 
Capability Difference2  11.57  9.397 
  (16.85)  (17.39) 
Constant -0.391*** -0.845*** -0.420*** -0.856*** 
 (0.0947) (0.249) (0.0879) (0.249) 
Observations 1,806 1,786 1,824 1,801 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
Peace year variables suppressed 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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Table 5-2: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on liberal peace in the subset of 
other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012) 
 Model 5-5 Model 5-6 Model 5-7 Model 5-8 
Democratic Actor 0.485** 0.0963   
 (0.196) (0.167)   
Democratic Target 0.683*** 0.423**   
 (0.178) (0.204)   
Democratic Dyad dropped due to the perfect   
 prediction of DV=0   
Actor’s Trade Dependence -0.0991 -0.180 -0.0436 -0.141 
  (0.0953) (0.147) (0.0815) (0.127) 
Target’s Trade Dependence -0.0492 -0.0884 -0.00669 -0.0542 
  (0.0610) (0.0894) (0.0550) (0.0806) 
Trade Interdependence 0.0334 0.0544 0.0265 0.0531* 
 (0.0244) (0.0367) (0.0204) (0.0310) 
Democratic IGO Membership   -0.0697 -0.109 
    (0.0458) (0.0671) 
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio  0.111***  0.139*** 
  (0.0318)  (0.0399) 
Ethnonation-State Incongruence  -0.448**  -0.515** 
   (0.205)  (0.205) 
Contiguity  0.475***  0.549*** 
  (0.116)  (0.113) 
Capability Difference  0.797  -0.304 
  (0.946)  (0.769) 
Capability Difference2  6.082  9.038** 
  (4.541)  (3.666) 
Constant -1.512*** -2.467*** -1.099*** -2.486*** 
 (0.146) (0.303) (0.170) (0.385) 
Observations 2,006 1,871 2,152 2,003 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
Peace year variables suppressed 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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Table 5-3: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on liberal peace in the subset of 
other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) 
 Model 5-9 Model 5-10 Model 5-11 Model 5-12 
Democratic Actor 0.127 0.156*   
 (0.0846) (0.0913)   
Democratic Target 0.295*** 0.326***   
 (0.0802) (0.0930)   
Democratic Dyad -0.302** -0.347**   
 (0.142) (0.161)   
Actor’s Trade Dependence -0.0381*** -0.0494*** -0.0147 -0.0327** 
  (0.0128) (0.0134) (0.0141) (0.0146) 
Target’s Trade Dependence -0.0433 -0.0530* -0.0294 -0.0450* 
  (0.0282) (0.0280) (0.0277) (0.0270) 
Trade Interdependence 0.0134*** 0.0157*** 0.00529 0.00898 
 (0.00478) (0.00494) (0.00540) (0.00546) 
Democratic IGO Membership   0.0230*** 0.0239*** 
    (0.00489) (0.00497) 
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio  0.0222  0.0476** 
  (0.0180)  (0.0193) 
Ethnonation-State Incongruence  0.0379  0.00726 
   (0.0858)  (0.0865) 
Contiguity  0.0134  -0.0465 
  (0.0758)  (0.0749) 
Capability Difference  0.370  -0.0834 
  (0.444)  (0.434) 
Capability Difference2  -8.083**  -6.459* 
  (3.342)  (3.507) 
Constant -0.879*** -0.998*** -0.770*** -1.023*** 
 (0.0789) (0.146) (0.0656) (0.150) 
Observations 3,745 3,632 3,859 3,707 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
Peace year variables suppressed 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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Table 5-4: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on liberal peace in all directed 
dyad-years excluding nationalistic-rivalry dyads 
 Model 5-13 Model 5-14 Model 5-15 Model 5-16 
Democratic Actor -0.0712 0.0737*   
 (0.0433) (0.0418)   
Democratic Target 0.0739* 0.166***   
 (0.0412) (0.0383)   
Democratic Dyad -0.343*** -0.559***   
 (0.0670) (0.0707)   
Actor’s Trade Dependence 0.149*** 0.0391*** 0.152*** 0.0400** 
  (0.0252) (0.0146) (0.0223) (0.0182) 
Target’s Trade Dependence 0.146*** 0.0290 0.138*** 0.0219 
  (0.0238) (0.0312) (0.0197) (0.0380) 
Trade Interdependence -0.0214*** -0.00325 -0.0236*** -0.00372 
 (0.00752) (0.00237) (0.00618) (0.00271) 
Democratic IGO Membership   0.0120*** -0.00486 
    (0.00254) (0.00317) 
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio  0.167***  0.173*** 
  (0.0104)  (0.0109) 
Ethnonation-State Incongruence  0.167***  0.145** 
   (0.0601)  (0.0604) 
Contiguity  1.044***  1.017*** 
  (0.0410)  (0.0421) 
Capability Difference  -2.483***  -2.677*** 
  (0.322)  (0.335) 
Capability Difference2  5.392***  5.507*** 
  (1.569)  (1.610) 
Constant -2.185*** -3.423*** -2.218*** -3.385*** 
 (0.0521) (0.0741) (0.0528) (0.0733) 
Observations 682,112 636,609 764,959 673,116 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
Peace year variables suppressed 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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  As for the results of the liberal peace elements, first, democratic dyads are 
statistically insignificant only in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads. Democratic 
dyads are statistically significant in the subset of other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and 
Diehl (2006) and in non-nationalistic-rivalries, and reduce revisionist behavior. In the 
case of other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), democratic dyads even predict 
the absence of revisionist behavior perfectly. 
  Second, economic interdependence is statistically insignificant across all model 
specifications only in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads.8 In the other subsets, one 
or more of model specifications produce a statistically significant effect of economic 
interdependence, although its direction is positive in the case of other rivalries and 
negative in that of non-nationalism-rivalries. The theory of nationalistic rivalry expects 
that nationalism compromises the pacifying effect of economic interdependence but 
does not argue that nationalism increases revisionist behavior the deeper economic 
interdependence becomes. It may be something else than nationalism that causes 
economic interdependence to increase revisionist behavior in the subset of other 
rivalries. One possible explanation is that in the case of other rivalries, rival states might 
engage in revisionist behavior for purely economic reasons. Higher economic 
interdependence is likely to create more economic disputes between states and, 
                                                 
8
 Since trade interdependence is the interaction term between the two continuous measures of 
trade dependence (i.e., the actor’s trade dependence and the target’s trade dependence), the 
regression tables give only part of the whole picture and the plot of the marginal effect is 
necessary to look at (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006, 73-77). However, it is found that the 
average marginal effect of the actor’s trade dependence is statistically insignificant across all 
range of the target’s trade dependence within nationalistic rivalry. Thus, there is no evidence 
that trade interdependence reduces revisionist behavior. 
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therefore, economically driven rivals might try to resolve those disputes by revisionist 
behavior.  
  Finally, democratic IGOs are statistically insignificant in both subsets of 
nationalistic-rivalry dyads and other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), whereas 
demonstrating a statistically significant, positive effect in the subset of other rivalries by 
Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), and in that of non-nationalistic-rivalries without the 
control variables. Again, according to the theory of nationalistic rivalry, nationalism 
compromises the pacifying effect of democratic IGOs, rather than increasing revisionist 
behavior as the number of shared democratic IGO memberships becomes larger. Hence, 
not nationalism but another factor should explain the statistically significant association 
between democratic IGOs and revisionist behavior in those subsets. Unfortunately, it is 
not straightforward to explain why democratic IGOs do not reduce revisionist behavior 
in other rivalries by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), and why democratic IGOs lead to a 
higher revisionist propensity in other rivalries by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) or 
non-nationalistic-rivalries. I must leave it to future research. 
  Nonetheless, all in all, only the subset of nationalistic-rivalry dyads produces the 
results which are consistent with the theoretical expectation of nationalist effects to 
thwart the pacifying effects of liberal peace. My theory expects neither that the three 
liberal peace factors increase revisionist behavior nor that only one of them is prevented 
from imposing a pacifying effect on dyads. The statistical findings indicate that only 
nationalistic rivalry reflects all theoretical expectations of nationalist effects on liberal 
peace. They suggest that the lens of nationalistic rivalry prevents society from 
interpreting the implications of shared democracy, economic interdependence, and 
(democratic) IGOs in the way in which liberal peace theorists expect. The saliency of 
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national identification makes it a rational choice to engage in revisionist behavior for 
the sake of resolving a nationalist issue to one’s own advantage, and prevents a 
transnational identity from overcoming the differentiation between the righteous “self” 
and the threatening “other.” 
  The statistical insignificance of democratic dyads and shared democratic IGO 
memberships in nationalistic rivalry poses a challenge to the democratic peace research 
program. It is particularly so because “[t]he democratic peace is thought to be most 
robust in the post-World War II period” (Gartzke 2007, 173), and the temporal scope of 
the analysis here is also the post-WWII period. Thus, the most-likely case of democratic 
peace cannot support the pacifying effect of joint democracy and shared democratic 
IGOs, if the unit of analysis is nationalistic-rivalry dyads. The pacifying effect of 
democratic actors against autocratic actors cannot be explained by democratic peace 
theory. Whereas some scholars argue that democracies are less conflict-prone than 
autocracies whatever the regime of target states is, democratic peace theory does not say 
that democracies are less conflict-prone only against autocracies. Rather, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, in democracy-autocracy dyads, a democratic state may expect that the 
autocratic target is more revisionistic and, therefore, more likely to reciprocate 
revisionist behavior if the democratic state makes a revisionist attempt. Hence, the 
democratic state may be more cautious to embark on a revisionist attempt. In short, 
there is no evidence that the liberal peace mechanisms reduce the probability of 
revisionist behavior if states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry. 
  Of course, the absence of statistical significance does not evidence the absence of the 
effect. Two arguments can be made regarding this point. First, given that most previous 
studies have found that democratic dyads have a statistically significant effect to reduce 
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conflict, it is rather surprising and alarming to come across the statistical insignificance 
of democratic dyads. Previous research has less agreed whether economic 
interdependence and IGOs decrease militarized interstate disputes; therefore, their 
statistically insignificant findings may be less surprising. Second, if another research 
method also indicates the same conclusion, it increases the validity of empirical analysis. 
The following two sections present a case study of Greece-Turkey, the most-likely case 
for democratic dyads and democratic IGOs, and China-Japan, the most-likely case for 
economic interdependence. 
  Finally, as for the control variables, one point should be discussed. It might be argued 
that the ME-to-GDPpc ratio is statistically significant and a higher ratio increases 
revisionist behavior not only in the subset of nationalistic rivalry but also in other 
subsets, questioning the specificity of the causal mechanism between nationalism and 
revisionist behavior within nationalistic rivalry. However, as already mentioned in 
Chapter 3, the thesis does not argue that a higher ratio of military expenditure to GDP 
per capita increases revisionist behavior only in the case of nationalistic rivalry. It can 
do so in other cases as well. Instead, Chapter 3 tried to empirically examine the causal 
mechanism from nationalistic rivalry through nationalist mobilization to revisionist 
behavior by using the ME-to-GDPpc ratio as a proxy for nationalist mobilization. The 
empirical analysis found that the presence of nationalistic rivalry significantly increases 
the baseline level of this ratio in comparison with the absence of nationalistic rivalry – 
the causal mechanism from nationalistic rivalry to nationalist mobilization (i.e., 
Hypothesis 5). Then, given this bottom-up of the baseline level, states having a higher 
ME-to-GDPpc ratio are more likely to engage in revisionist behavior – the causal 
mechanism from nationalist mobilization to revisionist behavior in nationalistic rivalry 
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(i.e., Hypothesis 6). In short, the point is not whether a higher ME-to-GDPpc ratio 
increases revisionist behavior only in the case of nationalistic rivalry but whether the 
causal mechanism between nationalist mobilization and revisionist behavior can be 
empirically supported. States without nationalistic rivalry may be more likely to engage 
in revisionist behavior when they have a higher ME-to-GDPpc ratio, but the baseline 
level of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio is significantly lower than states engaged in 
nationalistic rivalry, meaning that they are less nationalistically mobilized as a whole. 
 
Case Study: Greece-Turkey and Democratic Peace 
In terms of joint democracy and democratic IGOs, Greece-Turkey is the most 
interesting case. First, the dyad has experienced the highest number of revisionist 
behavior during the period of being democratic dyads and engaged in nationalistic 
rivalry (Greece resorted to revisionist behavior twice and Turkey seven times, excluding 
the ongoing years of revisionist behavior9). 
  Second, although Colombia-Venezuela has the highest number of shared democratic 
IGO memberships (the average of nineteen shared memberships during the period of 
nationalistic rivalry), the number of shared democratic IGOs in Greece-Turkey is the 
second highest (eleven by the same estimation) and a statistically significant deviation 
from the mean.10 In addition, as liberal peace advocates admit, not all IGOs have the 
same level of influence on state behavior and of function as security institutions 
                                                 
9
 The original year of revisionist behavior is used to calculate rather than t+1, as the use of t+1 
in the statistical models is due to the econometrical purpose of controlling for simultaneity bias 
and is irrelevant to qualitative analysis by case studies. 
10
 The mean of the number of shared democratic IGOs in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry 
dyads is 1.28 and the standard deviation is 4.39; eleven exceeds two standard deviations. 
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(Russett and Oneal 2001, 170). Russett and Oneal justify the use of the number of 
shared IGO memberships in large-N statistical analysis because “we lack a theory to 
guide us in assigning greater importance to different types of IGOs or in differentiating 
effective from ineffective institutions within particular categories” and “[a]ny prior 
weighting, therefore, would be arbitrary” (170). Although the above large-N statistical 
analysis also follows this justification, a case study can overcome this limitation by 
focusing on qualitative aspects of democratic IGOs. 
  Greece and Turkey have shared membership in NATO, a harbinger of highly 
institutionalized democratic IGOs. The two states have also been under the influence of 
the EU, the most densely democratic IGO (i.e., all member states are democracies), part 
of whose agenda is consolidating democracy and peace in Europe (see Higashino 2004, 
352-353). Although Turkey has not been its formal member state, the EU began “active 
involvement” in the Greek-Turkish relations in 1999 after “neutrality” in 1959-1981 and 
“restricted neutrality” in 1981-1999 (Tzimitras 2008, 117). In other words, Turkey was 
granted candidacy status at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, a decade after its application for 
full membership to the European Community (EC) in 1987 was rejected in 1989 (Öniş 
and Yilmaz 2008, 124-125).11 Membership is the most powerful “carrot” for the EU to 
influence outsider states (Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006, 572; Rumelili 2007, 106) and, 
therefore, the EU should have had maximum leverage over Turkey since 1999. 
Following the logic of a most-likely case, it is crucial to examine why NATO and the 
EU have failed to inhibit revisionist propensities in the dyad. In short, in terms of both 
quantity and quality, Greece-Turkey is suitable to studying the causal mechanisms in the 
effect of democratic IGOs on revisionist behavior within nationalism rivalry. 
                                                 
11
 In-between, Turkey joined the EU Custom Union in 1995. 
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Historical Overview of Greek-Turkish Relations 
The modern history of Greco-Turkish relations as states began with the Greek War of 
Independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1821-1828, followed by three other wars 
(the first Greco-Turkish War in 1897, the first Balkan War in 1912-1913, and the Second 
Greco-Turkish War in 1919-22).12 After the Second Greco-Turkish war, the two states 
sought to reduce bilateral tensions for common strategic interests, and the beginning of 
the Cold War in particular gave them an opportunity of a rapprochement in order to 
cooperate to tackle the common Soviet threat under NATO (Kalaitzaki 2005, 107-110). 
Conforming to the theoretical expectation of democratic IGOs, Greece and Turkey 
enjoyed a relatively friendly relationship for a while. 
  However, the development of this rapprochement was halted by the Cyprus issue 
around the mid-1950s. Cyprus, administered by the UK since the late 19th century, 
experienced the intensification of ethnic conflict between Greek Cypriots, who sought 
unification with Greece (enosis), and Turkish Cypriots, who demanded the partition of 
Cyprus into Greek and Turkish areas (taksim) in the 1950s. 
  However, after the 1959 Zurich-London agreement among the UK, Greece, and 
Turkey, Cyprus became an independent state in 1960. Ethnic tension between Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots remained (Papadakis, Perestianis, and Welz 2006, 2-3). 
Anastasiou (2009, 17) argues that “throughout the cold war, the fiercely anti-communist 
orientation of the American-backed governments of Greece and Turkey led them to 
support the most extreme rightwing nationalists among their respective ethnic 
counterparts in Cyprus.” In particular, after the civilian government was overthrown by 
the military in Greece in 1967, the newly established Greek junta assisted Greek 
                                                 
12
 The war data are from Sarkees and Wayman (2010). 
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Cypriot hardliners, such as pro-enosis ultranationalist EOKA-B, to attempt a coup in 
1974 (Papadakis, Perestianis, and Welz 2006, 3). In response, Turkey sent troops to 
Cyprus and occupied its northern part. The occupation resulted in the de facto partition 
of Cyprus into the Greek majority southern area and the Turkish majority northern one 
(see Figure 5-1). The latter declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus in 1983, and basically only Turkey has recognized it as a legitimate state so far. 
 
Figure 5-1: Map of Cyprus 
 
Source: The World Factbook 2013-14 (2013). 
 
  While Cyprus was the main nationalist issue between Greece and Turkey until the 
first half of the 1970s, territorial disputes over the Aegean Sea (see Figure 5-2) became 
the dominant nationalist issue since the latter half of the 1970s (Kalaitzaki 2005, 117, 
119). The Aegean dispute includes the following three issues: (a) “the dispute about the 
sovereign rights over the Aegean continental shelf,” (b) “the question of the territorial 
sea limits claimed by each country,” and (c) “a dispute over military and civil air traffic 
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control zones in the Aegean sea” (Kalaitzaki 2005, 117n18). The partition of Cyprus 
made Greek-Turkish nationalistic hostility persistent and difficult to resolve, while the 
Aegean dispute added to it. For example, a survey research conducted in November 
2001 shows that asked “what is the most important problem in Greek-Turkish relation,” 
Turkish people regarded Cyprus as the most important whereas the Aegean Sea as the 
second (Carkoglu and Kirisci 2005, 138-139). 
 
Figure 5-2: Map of Greece and the Aegean Sea 
 
Source: The World Factbook 2013-14 (2013). 
 
  Greece and Turkey have engaged in a series of revisionist behavior over time since 
1958, the time they began nationalistic rivalry. In particular, Turkey was more prone to 
revisionist behavior than Greece, and the tendency did not change even when both states 
had democratized and when the number of shared democratic IGOs had increased (see 
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Figure 5-3). 
 
Figure 5-3: Frequency of Greece’s and Turkey’s revisionist behavior over time 
 
The y-axis is the number of shared democratic IGOs; joint democracy and revisionist behavior 
are measured as either present or absent 
Source: for the number of shared democratic IGOs, Pevehouse and Russett (2006); for joint 
democracy, Marshall (2013); for revisionist behavior, Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer (2004); time 
period up to 2000 due to the availability of democratic IGO data 
 
Nationalistic Rivalry and Democratic Norms and Institutions 
The pacifying effect of joint democracy or of democratic IGOs is by no means clear 
from Figure 5-3. The presence of joint democracy and a higher number of democratic 
IGOs are irrelevant to the frequency of revisionist behavior.13 
                                                 
13
 While the original year of revisionist behavior is used in the figure, it is apparent that the use 
of t+1 (i.e., moving the X and O marks one year before) does not change the conclusion in any 
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  In terms of democratic IGOs, quantitatively, its number has increased over time but 
there is no sign that revisionist propensities have diminished. Qualitatively, the shared 
NATO membership began in 1952. However, Krebs (1999) argues that NATO actually 
facilitated the Greek-Turkish conflict in three respects. First, security assurance from 
NATO for the Soviet threat allowed the two states to engage in bilateral conflict. Second, 
better military equipment through the alliance enabled them to escalate the conflict. 
Finally, the function of issue linkage helped to expand the range of conflict. These three 
suggest that the strategic implication of NATO was interpreted through the lens of 
nationalistic rivalry and conflict rather than cooperation became the norm. Put simply, 
NATO did not change the payoffs of state behavior in the dyad. This does not mean that 
the dyad would have been in peace without NATO (Krebs 1999, 369). In addition, 
NATO’s mediation sometimes helped to deescalate hostility when crises broke out in the 
dyad (Kalaitzaki 2005). Nonetheless, its effect to resolve the nationalistic rivalry was 
clearly limited. Through seeing the handling of crises over Cyprus by the US from 
1964-1974, Greece and Turkey “realized that NATO membership was not a panacea for 
all security contingencies” (Kalaitzaki 2005, 116), indicating NATO’s failure of 
socializing the two states in the Western alliance system. 
  The effect of the EU on the dyad until 1999 was rather counterproductive as well. 
Being an EU member gave Greece a sense of being a member of the European 
civilization, thereby allowing it to highlight the difference between itself and Turkey, 
the “other” (see Tzimitras 2008, 125-126). Historically Greece invoked international 
law to “consolidate its position as a defender of international law and convince the 
international community that Greece’s concerns enjoyed objective foundations” while 
                                                                                                                                               
substantial way. 
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“trying to expose Turkey as an aggressively revisionist and expansive state, in constant 
violation of international law” (Tzimitras 2010, 133). The belief that Greece is a 
righteous, law-abiding state has shaped Greek national identity vis-à-vis Turkey, 
described as a revisionist, and it has been hardened even further by Greece’s joining the 
EU and Turkey’s being left out (Tzimitras 2010, 142-143). 
  Although Turkey joined the EU Custom Union in 1995, this partial development of 
institutional relations between Turkey and the EU, contrary to the constructivist 
argument, caused Greek-Turkish relations to deteriorate because of Turkey’s liminal 
position, i.e., partly “self” and partly “other”, with respect to the EU (Rumelili 2003, 
216).14 The ambiguity of identity difference between insider Greece and outsider 
Turkey threatened Greece’s already precarious sense of “self” with respect to the EU,15 
and this threat perception led Greece to highlight the difference from Turkey (Rumelili 
2003, 223). Greece’s act of marginalizing Turkey as non-European in turn caused 
Turkey to sustain the perception of Greece as the threatening “other” and to emphasize 
its European identity while constructing Greece as “fake-European” (Rumelili 2003, 
223-226). Thus, Europeanness became a reference point for their respective national 
identity to compete for, rather than a focal point for them to converge onto as a shared 
identity. 
  The institutional mechanisms of the EU served as a facilitator of conflict between 
Greece and Turkey. Rumelili (2007, 109) points out, “Given that EU Member States are 
                                                 
14
 For a more general theory and empirics on conflict between culturally similar states, see 
Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006). 
15
 According to Rumelili (2003, 223), “as a state situated on the periphery of the European 
community, economically and politically as well as geographically, Greece has not enjoyed a 
secure European identity.” 
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 230
able to exercise significant control over EU policy towards non-member states, there is 
the risk that the EU framework may work against conflict resolution by encouraging the 
Member State to adopt more uncompromising positions.” This is likely if an EU 
member and a non-member perceive each other as a threat to nationhood, like Greece 
and Turkey, rather than having a sense of shared “self” under the common institutional 
framework. 
  Rumelili (2007) observes domestic politics of nationalist competition for popular 
support in the dyad. Greece used the EC/EU to counteract Turkey and marginalized it 
vis-à-vis Europe, which was useful for popular support in Greek domestic politics 
(114-115). Rumelili finds from an interview that Prime Minister Costas Simitis (in 
office from 1996 to 2004) “advocated a fundamental change in Greek foreign policy 
towards supporting Turkey’s European orientation” but “had to give in to the hardliners, 
who favoured the continuation of the exclusionary policies of negative conditionality” 
(115). Similarly, perceiving that the EU fell into the hands of Greece, Turkey could not 
choose a policy conforming to the EU, since it could have been criticized in domestic 
society as a concession to Greece (116). In other words, the social structure of 
nationalistic rivalry constrained the capabilities of moderates in each country. 
  Like Krebs, Rumelili (2003) does not argue that the Greek-Turkish rivalry would 
have disappeared without EU involvement (217). Rather, “the EU’s 
community-building discourse reinforced and legitimated the already-existing 
representations in the two countries, and thereby ensured their sustenance in the context 
of the community formation process in Europe” (225). 
  The inability of NATO and the EU to mitigate revisionist behavior and resolve the 
Greek-Turkish nationalistic rivalry suggests that IGOs are more an effect than a cause of 
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international relations (Mearsheimer 1994/95, 1995). First, Greece and Turkey joined 
NATO due to the common Soviet threat. Second, Turkish candidacy in the EU was 
accomplished due to Greek-Turkish bilateral initiatives for cooperation (see Rumelili 
2004, 5-6). 
  It may also be true that even though bilateral initiatives preceded the EU providing 
candidacy for Turkey, “in the absence of this EU intervention, the positive momentum 
in relations would have been, once again, short-lived” (Rumelili 2004, 9). Since 1999, 
the dyad has certainly reduced the intensity of nationalistic hostility at the discursive 
level (Rumelili 2004, 17-18). At the behavioral level, however, the latest version of the 
MID dataset (ver. 4.01; Palmer et al. 2015) shows that the dyad, particularly Turkey, has 
occasionally engaged in revisionist behavior even after 2001, although the dyad has 
managed these militarized disputes not to escalate nationalistic hostility (see Rumelili 
2004, 8). 
  To recapitulate, NATO and the EU had both positive and negative effects on the 
Greek-Turkish relations. Thus, the case study indicates that the effect of democratic 
IGOs to reduce revisionist behavior within nationalistic rivalry is mixed, supporting the 
statistical findings that democratic IGOs do not have a statistically significant effect. 
  Joint democracy is not a sufficient condition for peace either. If the masses in 
democracy have nationalistic hostility against a rival, mass-led nationalist mobilization 
causes elites to adopt hawkish foreign policy. Hayes (2012, 69-70) argues that in 
democracy, a securitization move is the subject of political contention among political 
leaders, who are accountable to the public, and it is more difficult to describe fellow 
democratic states as a threat. However, if the public already perceives a nominally 
democratic state as a threat, leaders (who are accountable to the public) are compelled 
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to promote a securitization move. 
  This situation has been observed in Greek and Turkish democracies. Evin (2005, 8) 
points out, “A significant similarity between Greece and Turkey is that the foreign 
policies of both countries with respect to one another have been highly influenced by 
popular and populist constraints as well as public opinion.” The public in each state 
have been locked in a socially constructed perception of the threatening “other.” Both 
Greece and Turkey have nurtured selective memories of each other, in which the “other” 
is remembered as a threatening enemy to nationhood (Evin 2005, 5-8) and the history of 
peaceful cohabitation and shared affinities is purposively forgotten (Anastasiou 2009, 
17; Heraclides 2012, 126). 
  There is suggestive evidence for this argument within both states. In the case of 
Greece, after an incident in February 1999 in which Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of 
Kurdish separatist group PKK, was apprehended on his way out of the Greek embassy 
in Kenya, Greek women cancelled a trip to the meeting of Woman’s Initiative for Peace, 
a civil society taking initiative for Greek-Turkish cooperation, in Turkey for safety 
reasons (see Rumelili 2004, 5). 
  In the case of Turkey, the aforementioned survey research of Turkish public opinion 
shows that Turkish people are most likely to associate the worst enemy with Greece 
(Carkoglu and Kirisci 2005, 127); in particular, “about 15 percent of the entire sample 
seem to think that Turkey might be attacked and that that attack might come from 
Greece” (Carkoglu and Kirisci 2005, 130). Threat perception among the masses 
pressures dovish elites to be hardliners and allows hawkish elites to exploit this 
perception for popular support. Carkoglu and Kirisci (2005, 148) find that “party-based 
preferences are not present in Greek-Turkish…foreign policy attitudes” among the 
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Turkish public, suggesting that nationalist political competition is non-partisan. In short, 
a necessary condition for democratic peace, the deconstruction of threat perception, was 
not fulfilled, due to the structural effect of nationalistic rivalry. 
  To recapitulate, the pacifying effect of democratic norms and institutions, either 
through democratic IGOs or joint democracy, is, at best, limited on the Greek-Turkish 
nationalistic rivalry. Rumelili (2004, 1) argues, “The longer-term democratization and 
socialization influences of the EU in Greece and Turkey have cascaded with Turkey’s 
EU membership candidacy in 1999, enabling the pro-change domestic actors to 
convince the skeptics, mobilize coalitions, and to silence their opponents.” In particular, 
when earthquakes hit Turkey first and Greece later in 1999, they reciprocated rescue 
operations, creating sympathy and solidarity among the public in both countries 
(Ganapati, Kelman, and Koukis 2010, 168-170). Nonetheless, the rapprochement has 
not been full-fledged to the extent of “the genuine self examination and critique 
indispensable to any meaningful problem-solving prospect” (Tzimitras 2008, 115). This 
echoes the finding of the aforementioned survey research, conducted in November 2001 
(i.e., after the earthquakes), showing that Turkish people are most likely to associate the 
worst enemy with Greece (Carkoglu and Kirisci 2005, 127). Tzimitras (2008, 115) 
points out, “Even today, both sides retain the impression that they have made unilateral 
concessions that have not been matched” (115). 
  Why is it so? Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2006, 585) argue, “The significance of 
Greek-Turkish rapprochement since 1999 lies not so much in the actual resolution of the 
various disputed issues, but rather in the societal diffusion of a sustained 
desecuritization agenda.” Desecuritization is a process whereby issues deescalate from 
militarized to non-militarized levels. However, de-escalation is not equal to resolution. 
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If the disputed nationalist issues remain unresolved, nationalistic hostility can linger if 
not overtly but latently. To root out nationalistic rivalry, it is essential to resolve the 
issues of Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, and the de-escalation of nationalistic hostility is a 
prerequisite for this, not a sufficient condition for peace. 
  Domestic politics has a significant effect to make nationalistic rivalry persistent in 
Greek-Turkish relations. In Greece, “[s]oon after the Ocalan crisis, George Papandreou, 
an advocate of Greek-Turkish cooperation, was appointed as foreign minister and has 
since enjoyed continuously high levels of popular support in Greek polls” (Loizides 
2002, 435). The appointment of George Papandreou made Greece ready for cooperation 
with Turkey. However, Turkish domestic politics was “more complicated,” as “while the 
political system in Greece allows for stable single-party governments, forming a 
government in Turkey might involve as many as three parties and requires the consent 
of the military” (Loizides 2002, 436). Even if one side in nationalistic-rivalry dyads is 
eager for cooperation and reconciliation, if the other side is not, the former side will 
eventually abandon its cooperative attitude, or will be forced to do so due to the rise of 
hardliners in domestic politics, as was in the case of India-Pakistan which the last 
chapter discussed. It remains uncertain when the dyad will eventually resolve 
nationalistic rivalry, especially given that this rivalry emerged after years of bilateral 
cooperation.  
 
Case Study: China-Japan and Economic Interdependence 
The data show that China-Japan is the most economically interdependent 
nationalistic-rivalry dyad which has experienced revisionist behavior. Hence, it is a 
suitable subject for an in-depth case study of economic interdependence in nationalistic 
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rivalry. 
  The dyad has significant historical and contemporary implications for world politics. 
In terms of the historical implication, China and Japan fought two wars, one during the 
period of 1894-95 and the other during the period of 1937-1945 including part of WWII. 
This history has persistently shaped Chinese and Japanese nationalisms against each 
other. Meanwhile, in terms of the contemporary implication, on the one hand, the 
declining economy of Japan and the rising power of China have provided a fertile 
ground for the exchange of nationalistic hostility between the two states, especially over 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. 
 
Historical Overview of Sino-Japanese Relations 
In history, China and Japan had never experienced any protracted conflict until the late 
19th century. Alongside the decline of China’s position and the rise of Japanese 
imperialism in the great power competition of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
Japan and China engaged in interstate hostility, including the First and Second 
Sino-Japanese Wars (1894-1895 and 1937-1945). After Japan was defeated by the 
Allied Powers in WWII, the United States occupied Japan and governed post-war 
reconstruction. Meanwhile, in China, the Communists defeated the Nationalists to gain 
control and governance of the mainland. 
  In the post-WWII reconstruction process, in 1952 Japan signed a peace treaty with 
Taiwan, the state of the Chinese Nationalists, rather than with the People’s Republic of 
China (hereafter China), the state of the Chinese Communists, in line with US Cold War 
policy. Meanwhile, the rivalry between China and Japan also disappeared: for almost 
five decades after the end of WWII, the two states had relatively peaceful relations and 
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did not pose a threat to each other (Iriye 1996, 51). 
  After the dramatic improvement of the relationship between the United States and 
China in 1971, the Japanese government normalized diplomatic relations with China in 
1972. On the one hand, although the Chinese government still feared the revival of 
Japanese militarism, after the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations it preferred to 
cooperate with Japan from a strategic viewpoint as a means to deal with the Soviet 
threat, which accelerated diplomatic normalization (He 2009, 182-193). On the other, 
while the normalization was followed by a significant increase in bilateral trade (see 
Figure 5-4), Japan and China had been engaging with each other economically even 
before 1972 and this economic engagement was the basis of Japan’s rapprochement 
with China (Yahuda 2014, 67-68). 
 
Figure 5-4: Sino-Japanese bilateral trade in the decades before and after diplomatic 
normalization in 1972 
Unit: current US millions of dollars 
Sources: Barbieri and Keshk (2012); Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins (2009) 
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  Sino-Japanese relations, however, began to deteriorate in the 1980s. First, in the early 
1980s, China’s anti-Japan nationalism began to escalate. At that time, the Chinese 
government experienced domestic problems such as resistance to economic reform and 
the declining legitimacy of the communist ideology (He 2007, 6). In the context of 
social and political instability, nationalism is an important policy tool for governments 
to mobilize public support (Solt 2011; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Gagnon 1994/95). 
Conforming to this theoretical expectation, the Chinese government used nationalism as 
an alternative foundation for regime legitimacy (He 2007, 6; see also He 2009, 214-215) 
and nurtured nationalist sentiment by emphasizing the history of victimization in war by 
imperial powers, especially Japan (He 2007, 6-8). Second, bilateral relations underwent 
considerable change as a result of altered world and interstate politics in the 1990s: the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of Chinese power, and the decline of Japanese 
power. The first meant that the two states did not have a shared threat to tackle 
cooperatively anymore, and the latter two indicated that power transition, a source of 
conflict (Organski and Kugler 1980), was occurring in the China-Japan dyad.16 
  The bilateral relation did not immediately escalate to intensive conflict. Analyzing 
disputes in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 1990 and 1996, Downs and Saunders 
(1998/99, 145) argued that “fears that nationalism will interact with rising Chinese 
power to produce aggressive behavior are overstated, or at least premature.” According 
to their analysis, the Chinese government, while using nationalism to increase regime 
                                                 
16
 Statistical models in Chapter 3 indicated that the capability ratio is statistically insignificant 
in explaining the probability of nationalistic rivalry. I am not arguing that power transition 
between China and Japan was the major cause of their nationalistic rivalry. Rather, power 
transition influenced the course of bilateral relations by complexly interacting with other 
relevant factors such as China’s patriotic education program, the nationalist history of war, and 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. This complexity is what my statistical models cannot capture. 
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legitimacy, actually restrained its conflict behavior toward Japan to avoid disrupting its 
economic ties with Japan and Western states (124-139). 
  Yet, at the time of the 1996 dispute, these two states initiated nationalistic rivalry. 
This inference can be endorsed by qualitative analysis. While the Chinese government 
was experiencing domestic and interstate difficulties at the time of the 1990 dispute, by 
1996 it had recovered (Downs and Saunders 1998/99, 127-133; see also He 2009, 277), 
which enabled China to gain competitor status vis-à-vis Japan. In addition, the Taiwan 
issue contributed to inducing a mutual threat perception. On the one hand, “the 1996 
agreement on new guidelines for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation” provoked “Chinese 
fears that Japan still [sought] to exercise influence over the fate of Taiwan” (Yahuda 
2006, 167). On the other, China’s aggressive behavior in the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait 
crisis increased Japan’s concerns (He 2009, 253; Yahuda 2006, 171). Thus, 1996 was 
when both China and Japan began to perceive each other as threatening and competing 
enemies.17 The Sino-Japanese rivalry has been derived from the competing national 
(and nationalist) views of war history (He 2009) and is, therefore, nationalism-induced. 
Since the beginning of this nationalism-induced rivalry, the frequency of revisionist 
behavior has risen significantly, despite coinciding with the highest ever levels of trade 
interdependence (see Figure 5-5). This fact makes a stark contrast with Russo-Japanese 
relations, which have shared similar problems such as the history of war and territorial 
disputes but have been calmer despite their much lower trade interdependence. In other 
words, economic interdependence seems irrelevant to nationalistic rivalry and 
revisionist behavior within it.   
                                                 
17
 For an excellent summary of growing Sino–Japanese mutual threat perception in the 1990s, 
see Yahuda (2014, 30-36). 
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Figure 5-5: Sino-Japanese economic interdependence and revisionist behavior 
 
The y-axis is the ratio of bilateral trade to GDP per capita; revisionist behavior is measured as 
either present or absent 
Unit: current US millions of dollars 
Source: for trade data, Barbieri and Keshk (2012) and Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009); for 
GDP per capita data, Heston, Summers, and Aten (2012); for data on revisionist behavior after 
2001, the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset ver. 4.01 (Palmer et al. 
2015); trade-to-GPDpc ratio for 2010 is missing due to data availability 
 
Nationalistic Rivalry and Economic Interdependence 
Then, the puzzle is why economic interdependence has not prevented China and Japan 
from engaging in revisionist behavior. To solve this puzzle by the theory put forward 
earlier, the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu crisis is examined in detail. 
  The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are located in the southern part of the East China Sea 
and are claimed by Tokyo and Beijing, as well as Taipei (see Figure 5-6). After the first 
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Sino-Japanese war, Japan annexed the islands, and after WWII, the US administered 
them (He 2009, 194). The territorial dispute began when Washington made the islands 
over to Tokyo, along with returning the sovereignty of Okinawa to Japan, in 1971 (He 
2009, 194). However, Beijing did not escalate the dispute for a while since it needed to 
cooperate with Japan to tackle the Soviet threat. Once the Soviet threat disappeared, the 
sovereignty dispute began to dominate Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
Figure 5-6: Map of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
 
Source: VOA Photo (2012) 
 
  The 2010 crisis was “the most serious and dangerous bilateral incident since 1952” 
(Wan 2011, 73). On September 7, 2010, a Chinese fishing boat sailing around the 
islands collided with Japanese Coast Guard vessels after the latter had warned the boat 
to leave. The captain of the fishing vessel was arrested “on charges of obstructing 
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official duties” (The New York Times, September 14, 2010). In response, the Chinese 
government strongly criticized the Japanese government and demanded the immediate 
release of the captain (The New York Times, September 11, 2010). In protest, Beijing put 
off a negotiation for joint gas field development in the East China Sea (The Japan Times, 
September 13, 2010). Tokyo released the crew on September 13, but made a decision to 
extend the detention of the captain for another 10 days on the 19th. After this decision, 
Beijing threatened to take “strong countermeasures” (Fackler and Johnson 2010a). Four 
Japanese employees of a private company were detained under the allegation of 
“entering a military zone in Hebei Province without authorization and videotaping 
military targets” (Matsutani and Takahara 2010), and the export to Japan of rare earths, 
which are crucial to Japanese manufacturers, was blocked. The Japanese government 
released the captain on September 24. Yet the tension between Tokyo and Beijing 
remained: Beijing called for apology and compensation from Tokyo, which Tokyo 
refused to do (The Japan Times, September 26, 2010). China released three of the 
detained employees on September 30 and the remaining one on October 9, and the 
tension abated. 
  Three significant observations of the crisis can be pointed out. First, both China and 
Japan were revisionists according to the MID dataset (see Figure 5-5). While China has 
challenged Japan’s control of the Senkaku Diaoyu Islands and, therefore, is necessarily 
a revisionist, Japan’s behavior in the 2010 crisis was also coded as revisionistic, 
possibly for the following reasons. Japan had become more and more dissatisfied with 
the fact that China has made more and more assertive claims on the islands. In addition, 
Japan resorted to the unconventionally strong measure of arresting and detaining the 
Chinese captain, unlike in previous times when Tokyo would have quietly detained the 
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fisherpersons and released them shortly afterwards (Yahuda 2014, 55). 
  Second, during the period of the Great Recession since late 2000s, the crisis escalated 
to halt economic activities for both highly economically interdependent states. As 
already mentioned, China postponed negotiations for joint gas field development and 
restricted the exports of rare earths to Japan, even though “Japan [had] been the main 
buyer of Chinese rare earths for many years” (Bradsher 2010). In addition, it allegedly 
tightened custom procedures for bilateral trade (The Japan Times, September 28, 2010). 
  Finally, nationalism and nationalistic hostility among the masses escalated in both 
states, with anti-Japan street protests in China and anti-China demonstrations in Japan 
(Agence France Presse, October 18, 2010; Fackler and Johnson 2010b; The New York 
Times, October 18, 2010; The Sankei Shimbun & Sankei Digital, October 16, 2010). 
  These three observations suggest that, as Wan (2011, 79) points out, “the two 
governments have limited ability to manage emotionally-charged bilateral diplomatic 
disputes.” Rather than purely economic concerns, potential or actual nationalistic 
emotion in the public led both governments to behave in a way which is irrational in 
terms of economic interdependence but rational in terms of nationalistic rivalry. Japan’s 
and China’s nationalistic hostility, deeply rooted in the political history of bilateral 
relations,18 led them to strive to cope with the nationalist issue by coercive measures 
and not to behave according to the theoretical expectation of economic interdependence. 
  For China, as He (2007, 17-19) points out, the Chinese government needs to show to 
the nationalistic masses that it is the defender of the Chinese nation. It cannot prioritize 
economic profits over nationalist sentiments for fear of being accused of treason (see He 
                                                 
18
 For a detailed analysis of the political history of China’s anti-Japan and Japan’s anti-China 
nationalisms, see He (2009). 
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 243
2007, 17-19). Thus, Gries (2005, 849) argues that the Chinese government’s “Japan 
policies…are increasingly reactive to nationalist opinion, rather than proactive to 
China’s national [economic] interest.”19 The nationalist accusation of treason has been 
prevalent in Chinese society, particularly in online communities, and public figures and 
intellectuals who appeared close to Japan have been harshly criticized (Gries 2005, 
832-839). 
  Chinese people have interpreted Japan’s behavior through the lens of threat 
perception and nationalistic hostility (see He 2007, 10). An episode which illustrates 
this is Chinese people’s opposition to the use of private Japanese companies for a 
railroad project to connect Beijing and Shanghai in 2003 (He 2007, 19-20; Gries 2005, 
843-844). According to He (2007, 21), one of the reasons for the opposition “was that, if 
the project were granted to such large industrial conglomerates as Mitsubishi that were 
also big players in the Japanese defense industry, it would greatly boost Japanese 
military power and eventually threaten Chinese national security.” This suggests that 
Chinese people viewed the potential profit for Japanese private companies, and 
therefore for Japan, as a threat to Chinese nationhood. The same logic would not apply 
to, for instance, Japan-US; Japanese people would not imagine that Japanese airlines 
buying Boeing airplanes would eventually threaten Japanese nationhood, although 
Boeing makes military planes as well. Thus, the interpretation of another’s intention and 
behavior deeply depends on one’s perception of, and identity vis-à-vis, the “other.” 
Engaged in nationalistic rivalry, hardened Chinese national identity highlights the 
difference and threats from Japan, thereby creating the image of Japan as a threatening 
                                                 
19
 I add “economic” because national interest in Gries’s context is related to the economic and 
technical assessment of using Japanese companies for a Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway 
project. 
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“other.” 
  An irony is that the anti-Japan nationalism, first fostered among the masses by the 
Chinese government, now constrains the government’s policy towards Japan (see He 
2009, 229-230). This causes a dilemma with which the government must struggle. That 
is, it “[needs] to maintain stable relations with Japan to ensure China’s continued 
economic growth, but also [fears] appearing weak before nationalists at home” (Gries 
2005, 848; see also He 2009, 280). This dilemma was apparent in the 2010 crisis. 
According to Fackler and Johnson (2010b), “the fact that the detention took around the 
anniversary of Japan’s 1931 invasion of northeast China, spurred scattered street 
protests and calls by nationalistic Chinese bloggers to take a firm stand against Tokyo.” 
As expected, Beijing severely criticized Japan’s arrest of the captain (Johnson 2010). 
However, it also stated that Japan’s action would exacerbate the difficulties in 
Sino-Japanese relations (The New York Times, October 18, 2010), thus signaling a 
concern for bilateral relations. This suggests that while the Chinese government cannot 
make a concession regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute for fear that the rise of 
nationalism among the masses would cause domestic unrest and criticism of the 
government, it does not want to endanger economic relations with Japan either. 
  In Japan, anti-China nationalism among the masses has escalated to the extent that 
the government faces “public anger at . . . [being] weak in response to a rising China” 
(Wan 2011, 79) and “the Japanese popular antipathy to China [has] generated strong 
public opposition to conciliatory policy on bilateral disputes” (He 2009, 285). In the 
context of the 2010 crisis, the government was reluctant to disclose the video which 
recorded the scene of the collision between the Coast Guard vessels and the Chinese 
fishing boat, arguably due to the concern that it would fuel China’s anger further, while 
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opposition lawmakers urged the government to disclose it (Jiji Press Ticker Service, 
November 1, 2010). However, even after the 2010 crisis deescalated at the government 
level, protesters not only showed anger at China’s coercive attitude but also criticized 
the government for not disclosing the video (Japan Economic Newswire, November 6, 
2010; The Sankei Shimbun & Sankei Digital, November 6, 2010). 
 
Figure 5-7: Japanese feelings of being close and not close to China 
 
Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2013) 
 
  The exacerbation of the negative public perception of China over time is evident in 
survey data by the Cabinet Office of the Government of Japan (see Figure 5-7). In 1996, 
when the nationalistic rivalry began, the proportion of “not close” responses exceeded 
those of “close” and more than half of the respondents answered that they do not feel 
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close to China.20 This trend declined slightly in the next few years, but “not close” has 
constantly been a majority since 2001. Given the duration of nationalistic rivalry and 
the frequency of revisionist behavior since 1996, the survey data suggest that the image 
of China as a threatening “other” has been increasing over years in Japanese society. 
  The rise of Japanese nationalism is not merely due to China’s assertive foreign policy. 
Japanese society has suffered from economic depression since the mid-1990s (the “lost 
decades”).21 In addition, after the Koizumi administration of 2001-2006, Japan has also 
experienced political instability, such as the approximately annual change of Prime 
Minister. Alongside this, “Japan’s new nationalism” has emerged, and “various 
nationalist positions once considered radical are no longer thought outlandish” 
(Matthew 2003, 77). Japanese conservative politicians have used nationalism for 
popular support (see He 2009, 124-125). For example, some Japanese ministers and 
MPs often visit the Yasukuni shrine, where war criminals from WWII are among those 
enshrined. In particular, 2001-2006 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s persistence in 
visiting Yasukuni every year “won him considerable public admiration” (He 2009, 239). 
  The theory of nationalistic rivalry argues that in a competition over national 
superiority, both sides believe that one is righteous and the other is illegitimately 
challenging it, thereby creating mutual threat perception and nationalistic hostility. As 
                                                 
20
 The survey answers consist of “feel close,” “feel close if any,” “feel not close if any,” “feel 
not close,” and “don’t know.” In Figure 4, “close” is the aggregated data of “feel close” and 
“feel close if any,” and “not close” that of “feel not close if any” and “feel not close” (see He 
2009, 201).  
21
 As in the case of power transition, it was found from statistical models in Chapter 3 that the 
economic growth rate is statistically insignificant in explaining the probability of nationalistic 
rivalry. It seems that the Japanese economic downturn influenced the course of bilateral 
relations, conditional on other idiosyncratic factors and contexts. 
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 247
China has believed that it is the legitimate owner of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and has 
seen Japan as the threatening “other,” Japan has perceived China making an illegitimate 
claim on its own territory. In the 2010 crisis, the arrest and detention of the Chinese 
captain were regarded as righteous according to the rule of law,22 and China’s anger at 
it was seen as indicative of its disrespect for Japanese sovereignty and as evidence of its 
threatening character.  
  Just as Japan has been an external target of Chinese nationalism, China has become 
an external target of Japanese nationalism, and China’s assertive foreign policy has been 
seen as a major threat to Japanese nationhood. These days, Japanese national interest 
vis-à-vis China has been defined primarily in terms of settling the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
dispute according to Japan’s position, rather than earning economic profits from 
interdependence. After Beijing put off a negotiation for joint gas field development in 
the East China Sea, Japanese officials mentioned that they hoped the crisis would not 
escalate to worsen bilateral relations (The Japan Times, September 13, 2010). This 
suggests that, like Beijing, Tokyo knew that good bilateral relations with China – its 
“largest trading partner” since 2007 (Yahuda 2014, 64) – were important for the 
economy, especially given that the Japanese economy had deteriorated due to the Great 
Recession. Nonetheless, the government took a firmer, more nationalistic stance in the 
crisis than before; its handling of the crisis was a significant departure from the 
convention by which Tokyo would have quietly detained the fisherpersons and released 
them shortly afterwards (Yahuda 2014, 55). Furthermore, despite the government taking 
a firmer stance than ever, the secretary general of the major opposition party even 
                                                 
22
 After being summoned by Beijing, the then Japanese ambassador to China, Uichiro Niwa, 
stated, “We have maintained the position that we will solemnly handle the case in strict 
accordance with domestic law” (cited in The Japan Times, September 26, 2010).  
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claimed that the release of the captain was “diplomatically tone-deaf and a historic 
blunder” (cited in The Japan Times, September 27, 2010). The 2010 crisis indicates that, 
like the Chinese government, the Japanese state was unable to prioritize economic 
profits over nationalist sentiments vis-à-vis China due to the prevalence of nationalistic 
anti-China hostility in Japanese society. 
  In short, as expected by the theory put forward in this chapter, nationalistic rivalry 
thwarted the pacifying effect of economic interdependence in the 2010 crisis. Given 
their respective domestic political situations, neither the Chinese nor the Japanese 
government could hold a weak position regarding the territorial dispute involving strong 
nationalistic feelings. In terms of the rationalist argument, the primary rational choice 
was to address the territorial dispute, not to seek economic profits, because of the 
mutual threat perception produced by nationalistic rivalry. In terms of the constructivist 
argument, “the countries’ mutual image deteriorated despite the boom in mutual 
contacts” (He 2009, 265) due to the reinforcement of national identity, which made it 
impossible to promote a shared identity for cooperation. 
  It may be premature to conclude that economic interdependence does not contribute 
to reducing interstate conflict at all. Koo (2009, 207) argues that while both Beijing and 
Tokyo used interstate crises over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to mobilize political 
support, they did not escalate them to the extent that “contending Sino-Japanese 
nationalisms could snowball into a larger, possibly destabilizing movement that would 
undermine bilateral economic ties.” In other words, economic interdependence 
prevented conflict escalation, even if it did not prevent conflict initiation. 
  However, its effect may have become weaker over time as it seems that the 
Sino-Japanese conflict has become more intense in the last few years. Currently there is 
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no sign of a rapprochement in the dyad either. In November 2013, the Chinese defense 
ministry announced that it had established a new air defense identification zone over the 
East China Sea, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and Beijing stated that all 
airlines going through the zone must file flight plans to the Chinese authority. In 
response, the Japanese government asked Japanese private airliners, Japan Airlines and 
All Nippon Airways, not to do so (Kachi and Takahashi 2013). In April 2014, Tokyo 
decided to build a military radar station in Yonaguni Island, near the disputed islands, 
and approximately 150 personnel will be deployed there within two years (BBC News, 
April 19, 2014). Both actors remain locked in lasting reciprocal nationalistic hostility 
and threat perception. 
 
Conclusion 
The chapter has discussed whether the liberal peace factors mitigate revisionist behavior 
when states are engaged in nationalistic rivalry. It is theorized that none of joint 
democracy, economic interdependence, and IGOs can demonstrate its pacifying effect 
within nationalistic rivalry. Both large-N statistical analysis and small-N case studies 
endorse the inefficacy of the liberal peace elements. This finding, in combination with 
Chapter 4, suggests that the effect of nationalistic rivalry on state behavior is hard to 
mitigate. 
  The chapter has significant implications for liberal peace theory. While nationalism 
has been omitted from the scope of liberal peace theory, it actually has a powerful 
impact on the theory. As theoretically and empirically discussed, if nationalism 
dominates society and shapes state behavior as the source of rational choice and of 
identity, the causal mechanisms between each liberal peace element and peace fail to 
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work. To advance our knowledge of conflict management, it is necessary to take 
nationalism into consideration as a key confounding factor in theorizing liberal peace. 
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Conclusion 
Nationalistic Rivalry and Beyond 
 
The main purpose of the thesis is to give an answer to the research question of what 
conditions cause nationalism to be a force of revisionist behavior in interstate politics. 
To this end, the thesis has developed the theory of nationalistic rivalry and has tested its 
empirical implications. 
  The first three chapters aimed to theorize and empirically investigate the causal 
mechanism whereby states develop nationalistic rivalry and engage in revisionist 
behavior. Chapter 1 illustrated the theoretical grounds for the core argument of the 
thesis that nationalism causes revisionist behavior through nationalistic rivalry. Theories 
on revisionist states, interstate rivalry, nationalism, and intergroup conflict were 
reviewed and discussed. Based on those theoretical grounds, Chapter 2 developed the 
theory of nationalistic rivalry and operationalized it for empirical analysis. Then, it 
hypothesized that ethnically heterogeneous society, political instability, and 
ethnonation-state incongruence increase the probability of dyads experiencing 
nationalistic rivalry; nationalistic rivalry increases revisionist behavior through the 
nationalist mobilization of society; and state-territorial nationalism is less 
revisionist-prone than transstate-ethnic nationalism only in the asymmetrical case of 
state-territorial vs. transstate-ethnic nationalistic rivalry. Chapter 3 conducted a series of 
empirical analyses to test the hypotheses using statistical techniques, indicating that all 
hypotheses were supported (see Table 3-15). 
  Having found that nationalistic rivalry increases revisionist behavior, Chapters 4 and 
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5 attempted to examine whether well-known conflict-mitigating factors, nuclear 
deterrence and liberal peace, could reduce the probability of revisionist behavior within 
nationalistic rivalry. Empirical analysis by large-N statistical models and small-N case 
studies indicated that neither nuclear deterrence nor liberal peace contributes to a lower 
propensity for revisionist behavior. 
  The remaining sections of this concluding chapter discuss the limitations of the thesis 
and the implications of nationalistic rivalry theory for the wider literature and for 
policy-making in contemporary world politics. 
 
Limitations of the Research 
While I believe that this thesis has advanced our understanding of the causality between 
nationalism and revisionist foreign policy, it is also important to note its limitations. 
First, the operational definition of nationalistic rivalry poses a challenge to predict 
future state behavior, due to its retrospective nature as was discussed in the last 
paragraph of the section on operationalizing nationalistic rivalry in Chapter 2. To 
recapitulate, the coding scheme cannot include the dyads which have engaged only in 
one dispute, but which will have experienced another dispute within fifteen years 
following the year of the first dispute in the future. Only if we could know the future, 
could we code those dyads as nationalistic rivalry from the year of the first dispute 
(provided that they fulfill the other criteria of nationalistic rivalry). 
  The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine typically depicts this limitation. 
Until Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was overthrown by the pro-Europe 
opposition, no nationalistic rivalry had been observed. The initiation of reciprocal 
nationalistic hostility and mutual threat-competitor perception between the two states 
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was driven by the Ukraine crisis in 2014. As the current situation is a continuation of the 
first militarized dispute between Russia and Ukraine since the crisis broke out, it cannot 
be coded as nationalistic rivalry yet according to the coding scheme. If mutual 
threat-competitor perception continues over nationalist issues (such as territoriality in 
Eastern Ukraine) and the dyad experiences another militarized dispute within fifteen 
years (the maximum temporal threshold for the dispute-density rivalry criterion), it will 
be possible to argue ex post that the dyad will have been engaged in nationalistic rivalry 
since Yanukovych was overthrown, according to the operationalization of nationalistic 
rivalry. Unless we know what will happen in the future, the raw data of nationalistic 
rivalry would not give a sufficient guide for policy makers to compare the potential risk 
of each non-nationalistic-rivalry dyad. 
  However, this limitation can be mitigated, as it is possible to estimate the predicted 
probability of dyads experiencing nationalistic rivalry by using the estimates of 
empirical models in Chapter 3. For example, Model 3-1 estimates the probability of 
nationalistic rivalry by four regressors – the smaller number of PREGs in dyads, the 
larger Polity 2 score in dyads and its squared term, and ethnonation-state incongruence 
(as well as time controls). If we insert the value of these variables in the Russo-Ukraine 
dyad, we can calculate how probable the dyad was to initiate nationalistic rivalry in 
2014. Due to the data availability, the latest observation of the smaller number of 
PREGs and ethnonation-state incongruence is respectively 2010 and 2009, whereas that 
of the larger Polity 2 score is 2013. Based on these observations, it is estimated that the 
dyad was 0.23% probable to experience nationalistic rivalry. This probability might 
appear very small, but is much larger than the average predicted probability that dyads 
without nationalistic rivalry will initiate nationalistic rivalry in a year (0.033%). Thus, 
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the predicted probability estimation using the empirical model can provide significant 
insight into how to compare the potential risk of non-nationalistic-rivalry dyads 
developing nationalistic rivalry.  
  Another limitation of the thesis is that it cannot explain any kinds of cases in which 
nationalism becomes the cause of revisionist foreign policy. The theory of nationalistic 
rivalry is focused on the dyads in which states engage in competition for national 
superiority. If power asymmetry is huge, the dyad may not have competition but the 
stronger state may revise the status quo of the weaker state by asymmetric warfare. For 
example, the United States overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the 
Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. These US war operations were certainly influenced by 
nationalism. Americans were shocked by the 9.11 terrorist attacks and the sense of 
threat from terrorist organizations was salient. At least some Americans believed that 
the overthrow of the Taliban and Hussein was necessary to secure the national homeland. 
The sense of threat also hardened the identifications among Americans. The binary of 
the righteous Americans and the threatening “other” states was observed in American 
discourse, as typically signified by George W. Bush’s remark of the “Axis of evil.” In 
short, to explain nationalist motivations for hugely asymmetric revisionist warfare, it 
will be necessary to develop a different theory. 
  Finally, when coding nationalistic-rivalry dyads, it was found that a number of cases 
had multiple issues (see Appendix B). The data of nationalistic-rivalry dyads itself does 
not intend to count the number of issues in each dyad, because the thesis does not have 
a theoretical motivation for that. However, future research might consider if a larger 
number of issues makes any significant difference or the quality rather than quantity of 
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issues matters in explaining a revisionist propensity.1 
  Despite these limitations, however, the theory and data of nationalistic rivalry have 
useful analytical features, as the thesis has advanced an understanding of the causality 
between nationalism and revisionist behavior through examining a variety of relevant 
factors. In addition, the thesis also has significant academic and policy implications, as 
discussed in the following section. 
 
Implications 
The thesis has five important implications for broader literature. First of all, the 
systematic finding that nationalistic rivalry increases the probability of revisionist 
behavior advances our understanding of the causes of revisionist states, and encourages 
the literature on revisionist states to incorporate quantitative analysis into their empirical 
approaches. 
  Second, the theory of nationalistic rivalry advances the current literature on interstate 
rivalry. The theory is different from, though partly drawing on, existent rivalry theories 
in the following respect. That is, its primary purpose is to understand the implication of 
nationalism for interstate conflict by using the concept of interstate rivalry, rather than 
to offer an alternative general theory of rivalry. The existent literature on interstate 
rivalry certainly indicates some similar points to this thesis. Colaresi, Rasler, and 
Thompson (2007) find that high capabilities and geographic proximity increase the 
probability of rivalry, and that rivalry causes more interstate conflicts. Colaresi (2004) 
and Mitchell and Prins (2004) argue that interstate rivalry influences domestic political 
dynamics. It has also been discovered that territorial disputes significantly increase the 
                                                 
1
 Dreyer (2010) studies this point in terms of interstate rivalry in general. 
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probability of interstate rivalry (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001; Tir and Diehl 2002), 
particularly if they involve “issues of ethnic irredentism or national unification” (Huth 
1996, 19-20). Finally, rivals over territorial issues are more prone to frequent conflicts 
and severe rivalry (Tir and Diehl 2002) and more inclined to war (Vasquez 1996) than 
those over non-territorial issues. Nonetheless, the general implications of nationalism 
for interstate rivalry have barely been theorized in those studies.2 Thus, general rivalry 
theories are insufficient to answer the question of this thesis, and the theory of 
nationalistic rivalry is a distinctive category of rivalry theories. 
  Third, quantitative conflict studies should focus not only on the initiation or onset of 
militarized interstate disputes but also on specific state behavior in these disputes. If 
revisionist behavior is the major source of the security dilemma, it may not necessarily 
be plausible to ignore a type of state behavior in militarized disputes. For example, 
would it be theoretically adequate to treat both the attempt to annex foreign territory and 
the effort to defend one’s own territory just as the same “conflict onset”? By directing 
theoretical attention to state behavior, the thesis suggests a new direction of research in 
quantitative conflict studies.  
  Finally, the theory of nationalistic rivalry suggests how IR literature can be enriched 
by taking nationalism more seriously. Some IR scholars have recognized the importance 
of nationalism in interstate politics (e.g., Mearsheimer 1990; Posen 1993), yet 
nationalism remains undertheorized (Griffiths and Sullivan 1997, 55). However, the 
concept of nationalism has a potential to enrich our understanding of state behavior. 
Specifically in terms of this thesis, the theory of nationalistic rivalry indicates that 
                                                 
2
 The literature closest to this point is a study of rivalry over different identities. See, for 
example, Huth (1996) and Dreyer (2010). 
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simply materialist assumptions, such as taking material capabilities or economic profits 
as the basis of given preferences, do not always hold in explaining a revisionist 
propensity. Rather, conditioned by nationalistic rivalry, society is locked in the biased 
image of the righteous “self” and the threatening “other” and will not estimate the costs 
and benefits of revisionist attempts in terms of a purely objective calculation. 3 
Nationalism may drag states into engaging in revisionist attempts, even if such an action 
is risky and unreasonable purely in terms of strategic cost-benefit calculations (e.g., the 
Kargil War between India and Pakistan under the shadow of nuclear deterrence as 
explained in Chapter 4; see also Roy 1997). The statistical findings in Chapter 5 also 
illustrate the significance of nationalism as a key factor, as democratic peace, whose 
empirics have been established largely by quantitative analysis, failed to demonstrate its 
primary theoretical expectation of the pacifying effect of joint democracy in the subset 
of nationalistic-rivalry dyads. Although quantitative research on interstate conflict has 
mainly relied on realpolitik and/or rationalist models, the variable of nationalism may 
help to produce novel hypotheses, as in the case of this thesis. 
  More generally speaking, when states behave in a nationalist manner, not only 
material factors such as geography and military capabilities but also ideational factors 
such as fear and hostility in domestic society may influence state behavior. This is 
because nationalism entails both material and psychological aspects. For instance, a 
neighboring state’s greater military power would pose a graver threat to a nation 
residing in another state, if the national identification between them were salient. In 
other words, the interpretation of the neighbor’s military power would depend on the 
                                                 
3
 For other arguments on rationality and nationalism, see Kaufmann (2005) and Varshney 
(2003). 
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level of commonality and differentiation between nations. The perception of the threat 
would in turn provoke fear and hostility in the national society of the latter state. These 
psychologies would inform national members there of what to do vis-à-vis the 
threatening “other.” Nationalist mobilizations for the collective behaving as the state 
would require some individuals to sacrifice their self-interest (even life) to national 
survival, due to psychological ties evoked by nationalism (Stern 1995). That is, taking 
nationalism into consideration gives one way to combine the materialist and 
ideationalist explanations of interstate relations. 
  Explanations using only material aspects and ignoring identity cannot explain why 
individuals act collectively as the nation. Nationalism is the key explanatory factor for 
this question. It enables collective behavior in a society by generating national identity, 
because “[n]ational identity and the nation signify bonds of solidarity among members 
of communities united by shared memories, myths and traditions” (Smith 1991, 15). Put 
differently, “a sense of national identity provides a powerful means of defining and 
locating individual selves in the world, through the prism of the collective personality 
and its distinctive culture” (Smith 1991, 17). An individual cares about the fate of 
co-nationals, exactly because they are the members of the same nation. He/she identifies 
them with him/herself through the lens of national collectivity. From the elites’ 
viewpoint, in turn, this feature of national identity assumes an instrumental value, 
because they can appeal to national identity in order to legitimize “social order and 
solidarity” (Smith 1991, 16) and to mobilize supports and resources for their own 
interest (which they may disguise as the “national interest”). 
  The nation is not a materialistically efficient unit as it is too big an organization to 
manage business unlike a corporation, and too small a market to make a profit unlike 
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the global market. Nonetheless, it persists as the most fundamental collectivity of 
human beings, even in the current globalizing world. The formation of nations-states 
might have been motivated partly by material interests to win war (Posen 1993), but the 
fact that nationalism often defined an unpopular language as a national language (e.g., 
Hebrew for Jews, see Hobsbawm 1992, 110) calls into question the purely materialist 
explanation of human collective behavior, since choosing the most widely spoken 
language for the national language would have been most efficient. Human collectivities, 
especially since modernization, are too complex to explain simply by materialism. 
  More specifically in the context of conflict studies, without considering nationalism, 
it is difficult to explain the causal mechanism whereby people lead their society to 
rivalry and conflict.4 For example, while Vasquez (1995, 282) argues that “[w]hy 
human collectivities are more prone to fight over territory in the modern global system 
than other issues, even highly salient ideological issues, is not obvious,” the theory of 
nationalism can give an answer to this question. According to Smith (1991), nationalism 
contains the “concept of unity” (75) and “is about ‘land’” (70), as “nations are 
inconceivable without some common myths and memories of territorial home” (40). 
Territorial integrity is a prerequisite for nationhood and, therefore, nations fight severely 
over their national territory.5 
  Vasquez (2009, 367) argues that the explanation based on nationalism has a limitation 
because “nationalism and the ideational construction of national identity are fairly 
recent phenomena (nineteenth century), and war is very ancient.” Vasquez (2009, 367) 
                                                 
4
 In a similar respect, Kaufmann (2005) points to the necessity to take ethnic identity into 
consideration in the context of criticizing the rational choice models of ethnic conflict which 
assume that ethnic identity does not matter. 
5
 For a similar point, see Miller (2007, 6). 
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attributes the origin of territorial conflict to human biological nature, which he leaves 
“exogenous in the explanation because the topic lies in the purview of biology, ethology, 
psychology, and the other life sciences.” 
  This argument has two problems. First, it is debatable whether it is plausible to 
attribute the origin of territorial conflict to human biological nature, to claim that 
nationalism appears only since the 19th century, and to assume that a theory can explain 
war across time and space rather than focusing on narrower temporal/spatial domains. 
Second, more importantly, human biological nature cannot explain collective behavior. 
Why would one individual react to the invasion of some other individual’s land? To 
answer this question, the concept of collective/group identity is necessary. Among 
others, religious and ethnic identities often play a powerful role to connect people as an 
imagined community (Anderson 2006), as they entail emotional and cultural appeals 
(Smith 1991, 3-6). Although national identity may be a modern creation, ethnic and 
religious identities enabled collective behavior through creating an imagined 
community of ethnicity or religion before the age of nationalism. Once nationalism 
emerged and spread in the world, it has often utilized ethnicity and religion as the basis 
of national identity (e.g., Serbia’s nationalism largely shaped by ethnicity and Pakistan’s 
nationalism significantly referring to Islam). It is implausible to reduce collective 
actions for territorial conflict to mere human biology. Group identity is essential to 
explain collective behavior, and the concept of nationalism is particularly important to 
explain state behavior in contemporary world politics, as the political norm of 
nationalism has been institutionalized in the interstate system in the post-WWII era. 
  In short, nationalism is one of the essential terms in the equation to explain state 
behavior. This is because nationalism is, as noted several times throughout the thesis, 
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the principal source of payoffs in rational choice terms or of identity in constructivist 
terms. 
  The chapter finally presents the policy implications of the thesis. Nationalistic-rivalry 
dyads are highly dangerous for international peace and security, because they 
disproportionately produce revisionist behavior in the interstate system. Hence, it is 
apparent that the international community should pay attention to these dyads. Because 
revisionist behavior is a major source of dyadic, regional, or even global instability, the 
international community must devise a policy to inhibit revisionist propensities within 
nationalistic rivalry. However, as far as the findings of this thesis are concerned, this is 
not an easy task. Chapters 4 and 5 have found that most well-known conflict-mitigating 
factors in the literature, nuclear deterrence and liberal peace, are ineffective to curb 
revisionist behavior within nationalistic rivalry. It has been found that democratic states 
are less prone to revisionist behavior against autocratic targets within nationalistic 
rivalry. Yet, it would be controversial to allow only either of the states to be a 
democracy in order to reduce the probability of revisionist behavior.  
  Meanwhile, it is also important to consider how we could root out nationalistic 
rivalry per se. Chapter 3 has indicated that robust predictors of nationalistic rivalry are 
ethnically heterogeneous society (measured by the smaller number of PREGs in dyads), 
political instability (measured by the larger Polity 2 score in dyads and its squared term), 
ethnonation-state incongruence, the distance between states, and the absolute capability 
of a weaker state in dyads. It is difficult to manipulate ethnically heterogeneous society, 
ethnonation-state incongruence, the distance between states, and the absolute capability 
of a weaker state in dyads. To reduce ethnic heterogeneity and ethnonation-state 
incongruence, it is necessary to change status-quo territorial configuration in the 
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interstate system. However, it is difficult to draw borders perfectly along the lines of all 
ethnonational groups, as members of one group often live together with those of other 
groups in one region. Perfect separation might require population transfer, which is 
morally controversial. In addition, because ethnic groups and nations are socially 
constructed, there is always the possibility that even the previously perfect separation of 
all ethnonational groups will be broken due to the rise of new ethnonational groups. 
  It is also unrealistic to either put a large distance between all states or reduce the 
material power of all states drastically. The former solution is almost impossible 
because the land on earth is limited. So is the latter because states fear aggression from 
other states in interstate anarchy and, therefore, they would be unwilling to decrease 
their power (perhaps unless some global police force were created). 
  One relatively feasible option to reduce the probability of nationalistic rivalry is to 
address political instability in countries. Either complete democracy or complete 
autocracy is less likely to engage in nationalistic rivalry than inconsistent regimes. In 
particular, complete democracy is least likely to experience nationalistic rivalry. Hence, 
what the international community could do is to help incomplete democracy to achieve 
full democratization. 
  Apart from systematic causes of peace, idiosyncratic external shocks may increase 
the chance of mitigating nationalistic rivalry. The case study of Greece-Turkey supports 
this point: the earthquakes and reciprocal rescue activities helped to promote a 
rapprochement, even if positive peace has yet to come in the dyad. The external shocks 
are random events, and anyone who is interested in conflict resolution should not just 
wait for them to occur but should strive to find an alternative solution all the time. 
However, once such a shock occurs, it should be utilized to the maximum extent to 
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mitigate, and hopefully resolve, nationalistic rivalry. 
  More theoretically speaking, a high capability of agency for peace will be a 
significant factor in terminating nationalistic rivalry. Nationalistic rivalry is a social 
structure which institutionalizes nationalist mobilization towards revisionist behavior 
within national society. However, social structure does not always dominate agency. If 
leaders were strong and committed enough to counteract the social structure of 
nationalistic rivalry, they could successfully end the exchange of hostility. Future 
research might want to examine what kind of leadership will be more conducive to 
ending nationalistic rivalry. 
  All in all, it seems difficult to find easy, quick solutions to nationalistic rivalry. It will 
need long-term efforts among national and international leaders as well as local 
communities. Thus, to resolve nationalistic rivalry, to borrow Max Weber’s (1994, 369) 
phrase, we will have to do “slow, strong drilling through hard boards, with a 
combination of passion and a sense of judgement.” 
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Appendix A 
List of Rivalries 
 
The list of all rivalries in each dataset is displayed in Table A-1. Dyad IDs in the first 
column consist of the smaller one and the larger one of the COW state code of two 
states. The second column is the name of rivalry. The third column specifies the rivalry 
periods by Thompson and Dreyer (2012), in which “ongoing” means whether a rivalry 
is ongoing after 2010. The fourth column presents the rivalry periods by Klein, Goertz, 
and Diehl (2006). The beginning year of rivalries can be before 1946 if they existed 
throughout both pre- and post-1945. 
 
Table A-1: List of all rivalries in Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and 
Diehl (2006) in the post-WWII period 
Dyad 
ID 
Rivalry TD period KGD period 
2020 United States of America-Canada  1974-1997 
2040 United States of America-Cuba 1959-ongoing 1959-1996 
2093 United States of America-Nicaragua  1982-1988 
2130 United States of America-Ecuador  1952-1981 
2135 United States of America-Peru  1955-1992 
2315 United States of America-Czechoslovakia  1953-1961 
2345 United States of America-Yugoslavia  1992-2000 
2360 United States of America-Romania  1940-1951 
2365 United States of America-Russia 1945-1989 1946-2000 
2007-ongoing  
2620 United States of America-Libya  1973-1996 
2630 United States of America-Iran  1979-1997 
2645 United States of America-Iraq  1987-2001 
2651 United States of America-Egypt  1956-1968 
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2652 United States of America-Syria  1970-1996 
2700 United States of America-Afghanistan  1998-2001 
2710 United States of America-China 1949-1972 1949-2001 
1996-ongoing  
2731 United States of America-North Korea  1950-2000 
2816 United States of America-Vietnam  1961-1973 
20345 Canada-Yugoslavia  1998-2000 
20365 Canada-Russia  1999-2000 
41042 Haiti-Dominican Republic  1986-1994 
52101 Trinidad and Tobago-Venezuela  1996-1999 
80090 Belize-Guatemala 1981-1991 1993-2001 
90200 Guatemala-United Kingdom  1972-1977 
91092 Honduras-El Salvador 1840-1992 1969-1993 
91093 Honduras-Nicaragua 1844-1961 1957-2001 
1980-1987  
93094 Nicaragua-Costa Rica 1948-1990 1948-1957 
1977-1998 
93100 Nicaragua-Colombia 1979-1990 1994-2001 
100101 Colombia-Venezuela 1831-ongoing 1982-2000 
101110 Venezuela-Guyana 1966-ongoing 1966-1999 
110115 Guyana-Suriname  1976-2000 
130135 Ecuador-Peru 1830-1998 1891-1955 
1977-1998 
135155 Peru-Chile  1976-1977 
140160 Brazil-Argentina 1817-1985  
145155 Bolivia-Chile 1836-ongoing  
155160 Chile-Argentina 1843-1991 1952-1984 
160200 Argentina-United Kingdom 1965-ongoing 1976-1983 
160345 Argentina-Yugoslavia  2000-2000 
200345 United Kingdom-Yugoslavia  1992-2000 
200365 United Kingdom-Russia 1778-1956 1939-1999 
200395 United Kingdom-Iceland  1958-1976 
200645 United Kingdom-Iraq  1958-2001 
200651 United Kingdom-Egypt  1942-1958 
200678 United Kingdom-Yemen Arab Republic  1949-1967 
200710 United Kingdom-China  1950-1968 
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200713 United Kingdom-Taiwan  1949-1955 
200850 United Kingdom-Indonesia  1951-1966 
210345 Netherlands-Yugoslavia  1992-2000 
210645 Netherlands-Iraq  1990-1999 
210850 Netherlands-Indonesia 1951-1962 1951-1962 
211345 Belgium-Yugoslavia  1992-2000 
211490 Belgium-Democratic Republic of the Congo  1991-1993 
220255 France-Germany 1756-1955  
220345 France-Yugoslavia  1992-2000 
220365 France-Russia  1948-1961 
220616 France-Tunisia  1957-1961 
220620 France-Libya  1978-1987 
220630 France-Iran  1985-1988 
220645 France-Iraq  1990-1999 
220710 France-China  1949-1953 
220800 France-Thailand  1940-1952 
230345 Spain-Yugoslavia  1992-2000 
230600 Spain-Morocco 1956-1991 1957-1980 
235345 Portugal-Yugoslavia  1998-2000 
235433 Portugal-Senegal  1961-1973 
235438 Portugal-Guinea  1962-1973 
235551 Portugal-Zambia  1966-1973 
235750 Portugal-India  1954-1961 
255345 Germany-Yugoslavia  1992-2000 
255645 Germany-Iraq  1991-1999 
260265 German Federal Republic- 1949-1973 1961-1971 
  German Democratic Republic  
260315 German Federal Republic-Czechoslovakia  1984-1986 
260365 German Federal Republic-Russia  1961-1980 
290345 Poland-Yugoslavia  1999-2000 
290365 Poland-Russia  1993-1997 
305345 Austria-Yugoslavia  1991-2000 
310345 Hungary-Yugoslavia  1938-1952 
1991-2000 
310360 Hungary-Romania 1918-1948  
316345 Czech Republic-Yugoslavia  1999-2000 
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325339 Italy-Albania  1952-1957 
325345 Italy-Yugoslavia 1918-1954 1923-1956 
1992-2000 
325645 Italy-Iraq  1990-1999 
339343 Albania-Macedonia  1993-1997 
339345 Albania-Yugoslavia  1992-2001 
339350 Albania-Greece 1913-1996 1946-1949 
1994-1997 
343345 Macedonia-Yugoslavia  1994-1999 
344345 Croatia-Yugoslavia 1991-2002 1992-2000 
344346 Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-ongoing 1992-1996 
345346 Yugoslavia-Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-ongoing 1992-1994 
345350 Yugoslavia-Greece 1879-1953 1992-2000 
345355 Yugoslavia-Bulgaria 1878-1955 1913-1952 
345360 Yugoslavia-Romania  1993-2000 
345365 Yugoslavia-Russia 1948-1955 1998-2000 
345368 Yugoslavia-Lithuania  1998-2000 
345385 Yugoslavia-Norway  1998-2000 
345390 Yugoslavia-Denmark  1998-2000 
345395 Yugoslavia-Iceland  1998-2000 
345640 Yugoslavia-Turkey  1992-2000 
350355 Greece-Bulgaria 1878-1947 1913-1952 
350640 Greece-Turkey 1955-ongoing 1958-2001 
350645 Greece-Iraq  1982-1999 
352640 Cyprus-Turkey  1965-2001 
355640 Bulgaria-Turkey 1878-1950 1935-1952 
1986-1987 
359365 Moldova-Russia  1992-1993 
365367 Russia-Latvia  1994-1999 
365369 Russia-Ukraine  1992-1996 
365372 Russia-Georgia  1992-2001 
365373 Russia-Azerbaijan  1993-1999 
365380 Russia-Sweden  1952-1964 
1981-1992 
365385 Russia-Norway  1956-2001 
365630 Russia-Iran  1908-1987 
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365640 Russia-Turkey  1940-1962 
1993-2000 
365666 Russia-Israel  1956-1974 
365700 Russia-Afghanistan  1980-2001 
365710 Russia-China 1816-1949 1862-1994 
1958-1989  
365713 Russia-Taiwan  1949-1958 
365732 Russia-South Korea  1959-1983 
365740 Russia-Japan  1861-2001 
371373 Armenia-Azerbaijan 1991-ongoing 1992-2001 
371630 Armenia-Iran  1993-1994 
371640 Armenia-Turkey  1993-2000 
404433 Guinea-Bissau-Senegal 1989-1993  
411481 Equatorial Guinea-Gabon 1972-ongoing  
432439 Mali-Burkina Faso 1960-1986 1974-1986 
433435 Senegal-Mauritania 1989-1995  
435600 Mauritania-Morocco 1960-1969 1980-1987 
437452 Ivory Coast-Ghana 1960-1970  
438450 Guinea-Liberia  1999-2001 
438451 Guinea-Sierra Leone  1997-2001 
438452 Guinea-Ghana  1966-1966 
450451 Liberia-Sierra Leone  1991-2001 
450475 Liberia-Nigeria  1998-1999 
452461 Ghana-Togo 1960-1995 1961-1994 
452475 Ghana-Nigeria 1960-1966  
471475 Cameroon-Nigeria 1975-ongoing 1981-1998 
483517 Chad-Rwanda  1998-1999 
483620 Chad-Libya 1966-1994 1976-1994 
483625 Chad-Sudan  1964-1969  
2004-ongoing  
484490 Congo-Democratic Republic of the Congo  1963-1997 
484540 Congo-Angola  1995-1997 
490500 Democratic Republic of the Congo-Uganda 1996-2009 1977-2001 
490517 Democratic Republic of the Congo-Rwanda 1996-2009 1996-2001 
490540 Democratic Republic of the Congo-Angola 1975-1997 1975-1978 
1994-1997 
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490551 Democratic Republic of the Congo-Zambia  1971-1994 
500501 Uganda-Kenya 1987-1995 1965-1997 
500510 Uganda-Tanzania 1971-1979 1971-1979 
500517 Uganda-Rwanda 1999-2009 1991-2001 
500625 Uganda-Sudan 1963-1972 1968-2001 
1994-ongoing  
501520 Kenya-Somalia 1963-1981 1963-1989 
501625 Kenya-Sudan 1989-1994  
510516 Tanzania-Burundi  1995-2000 
510553 Tanzania-Malawi 1964-1994  
516517 Burundi-Rwanda 1962-1966 1964-1973 
520530 Somalia-Ethiopia 1960-ongoing 1960-1985 
522531 Djibouti-Eritrea 1996-ongoing 1995-1998 
530531 Ethiopia-Eritrea 1998-ongoing  
530625 Ethiopia-Sudan 1965-ongoing 1967-1997 
531625 Eritrea-Sudan 1993-ongoing 1994-1999 
531679 Eritrea-Yemen  1995-1999 
540560 Angola-South Africa 1975-1988  
541552 Mozambique-Zimbabwe 1975-1979  
541560 Mozambique-South Africa 1976-1991 1983-1987 
551552 Zambia-Zimbabwe 1965-1979 1965-1979 
551553 Zambia-Malawi 1964-1986  
551560 Zambia-South Africa 1965-1991 1968-1987 
552560 Zimbabwe-South Africa 1980-1992  
552571 Zimbabwe-Botswana  1969-1979 
560570 South Africa-Lesotho  1994-1994 
560571 South Africa-Botswana  1984-1988 
600615 Morocco-Algeria 1962-ongoing 1962-1984 
616620 Tunisia-Libya  1977-1985 
620625 Libya-Sudan 1973-1985 1972-1984 
620651 Libya-Egypt 1973-1992 1975-1985 
625651 Sudan-Egypt 1991-ongoing 1991-1996 
630640 Iran-Turkey  1981-2001 
630645 Iran-Iraq 1958-ongoing 1934-1999 
630651 Iran-Egypt 1955-1971  
1979-ongoing  
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630666 Iran-Israel 1979-ongoing  
630670 Iran-Saudi Arabia 1979-ongoing 1984-1988 
630700 Iran-Afghanistan 1996-2001 1979-1999 
640645 Turkey-Iraq  1958-2001 
640652 Turkey-Syria 1946-2004 1955-1998 
645651 Iraq-Egypt 1943-ongoing 1959-1962 
1990-1999 
645652 Iraq-Syria 1946-ongoing 1976-1991 
645666 Iraq-Israel 1948-ongoing 1948-1998 
645670 Iraq-Saudi Arabia 1932-1957 1961-2001 
1968-ongoing  
645690 Iraq-Kuwait 1961-ongoing 1961-2001 
645692 Iraq-Bahrain  1986-1994 
645696 Iraq-United Arab Emirates  1990-1999 
645698 Iraq-Oman  1991-1994 
651652 Egypt-Syria 1961-1990  
651663 Egypt-Jordan 1946-1970 1948-1962 
651666 Egypt-Israel 1948-ongoing 1948-1989 
651670 Egypt-Saudi Arabia 1957-1970 1962-1967 
652660 Syria-Lebanon  1963-1969 
652663 Syria-Jordan 1946-ongoing 1949-1982 
652666 Syria-Israel 1948-ongoing 1948-2001 
652670 Syria-Saudi Arabia 1961-1970  
660666 Lebanon-Israel  1948-2001 
663666 Jordan-Israel 1948-1994 1948-1973 
663670 Jordan-Saudi Arabia 1946-1958  
666670 Israel-Saudi Arabia  1957-1981 
670678 Saudi Arabia-Yemen Arab Republic  1962-1980 
670679 Saudi Arabia-Yemen 1990-2000 1994-1998 
670694 Saudi Arabia-Qatar  1992-1995 
678680 Yemen Arab Republic-Yemen People's Republic 1967-1990  
680698 Yemen People's Republic-Oman 1972-1982 1972-1982 
692694 Bahrain-Qatar 1986-2001  
700702 Afghanistan-Tajikistan  1993-2001 
700703 Afghanistan-Kyrgyzstan  1993-1997 
700704 Afghanistan-Uzbekistan  1993-2001 
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700770 Afghanistan-Pakistan 1947-ongoing 1949-2001 
704705 Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan 1991-ongoing  
710713 China-Taiwan 1949-ongoing 1949-2001 
710731 China-North Korea  1993-1997 
710732 China-South Korea  1950-1994 
710740 China-Japan 1996-ongoing 1873-1958 
1978-1999 
710750 China-India 1948-ongoing 1950-1987 
710775 China-Myanmar  1956-1969 
710790 China-Nepal  1956-1960 
710800 China-Thailand  1951-1971 
710812 China-Laos  1961-1979 
710816 China-Vietnam 1973-1991 1975-1998 
710817 China-Republic of Vietnam  1956-1974 
710840 China-Philippines  1950-2001 
710900 China-Australia  1950-1971 
710920 China-New Zealand  1950-1971 
713740 Taiwan-Japan  1995-1996 
713816 Taiwan-Vietnam  1994-1995 
713817 Taiwan-Republic of Vietnam  1965-1974 
731732 North Korea-South Korea 1948-ongoing 1949-2001 
731740 North Korea-Japan  1994-2001 
732740 South Korea-Japan  1953-1999 
750770 India-Pakistan 1947-ongoing 1947-2001 
750771 India-Bangladesh  1976-2001 
750780 India-Sri Lanka  1984-1992 
750790 India-Nepal  1962-1969 
800811 Thailand-Cambodia  1953-1998 
800812 Thailand-Laos  1960-1988 
800816 Thailand-Vietnam 1954-1988 1961-1995 
811816 Cambodia-Vietnam 1976-1983 1969-1979 
811817 Cambodia-Republic of Vietnam 1956-1975 1956-1967 
812816 Laos-Vietnam  1958-1973 
816817 Vietnam-Republic of Vietnam 1954-1975 1960-1975 
816840 Vietnam-Philippines  1998-1999 
820830 Malaysia-Singapore 1965-ongoing  
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820840 Malaysia-Philippines  1968-1988 
820850 Malaysia-Indonesia 1962-1966 1963-1965 
850910 Indonesia-Papua New Guinea  1982-1990 
910940 Papua New Guinea-Solomon Islands   1993-1996 
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Appendix B 
Narratives of Nationalistic Rivalry, 1946-2001 
 
This appendix provides the narratives of nationalistic-rivalry dyads and presents how 
each case is coded. The following sections are divided into six sections. The first five 
sections describe nationalistic-rivalry dyads in Europe, America, Middle-East, Asia, and 
Africa. The last section explains the dropped cases in the intersection of Thompson and 
Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) due to the lack of a nationalist issue. 
  Inter-regional dyads are listed only in one of the two regions. The name of the rivalry 
dyads consists of the smaller side of the COW state code plus the larger side. The name 
of states follows the COW state membership dataset (Correlates of War Project 2011), 
but when different during the time of rivalry, the name known at that time is also 
specified in parentheses. 
 
Europe 
 
Europe is the region where nationalism resulted in a number of catastrophic wars, from 
the French Revolution through the two World Wars to the Yugoslav wars. Particularly 
the presence of transstate ethnic groups in the continental was the issue of nationalistic 
rivalry in the majority of the cases. 
 
Albania-Greece 
Period: 1946-1949, 1994-1996 
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Transstate-ethnic issues: Greece 
Greece has its ethnic enclave in southern Albania (also known as Northern Epirus by 
Greek nationalists), which was the main issue for the hostility between Albania and 
Greece in the post-WWII era (as well as before) (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 88-89). 
 
Armenia-Azerbaijan 
Period: 1992-2001 [ongoing] 
Transstate ethnic issues: Armenia (1992-1994), Azerbaijan (1994-2001) 
The pivot of the Armenia-Azerbaijan rivalry is Nagorno-Karabakh, which has the 
Armenian majority but is located in Azerbaijan (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 178-179). 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, ethnic conflict erupted, and in 1994 Armenian 
forces occupied most of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as several neighboring areas where 
mainly Azeris live (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 178-179). Azerbaijan has not accepted 
Armenia’s control of the area and attempted to retake it (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 
179). In 2009, talking about a negotiation meeting hosted by the OSCE, Azerbaijani 
President Ilham Aliyev stated that if the negotiation “ends without a result then our 
hopes in the negotiating process will be exhausted in which case we will not have any 
other choice,” and continues that “[w]e have the full right to liberate our lands by 
military means” (quoted in Osborn 2009). This is a threat to use force. Thus, the rivalry 
can be seen as ongoing after 2001. 
 
Bulgaria-Turkey 
Period: 1946-1950 
Transstate ethnic issues: Turkey 
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The Bulgaria-Turkey rivalry in the post-WWII era was due to a Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 94). When Bulgaria expelled a quarter million of 
them, the border between the two states was closed (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 94). 
 
Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Period: 1992-1996 
Transstate ethnic issues: Croatia 
The Croatia-Bosnia rivalry began after Bosnia’s declaration of independence 
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 90). Croatia sought transstate-ethnic nationalist policy for 
its ethnic kin within Bosnia, which threatened the national autonomy and integrity of 
Bosnia. Even after the end of the Bosnia conflict in 1995 by the Dayton Agreement, 
“Croatia appears to have continued its support of Bosnian Croats” (Thompson and 
Dreyer 2012, 90). 
 
Croatia-Yugoslavia 
Period: 1991-2000 
Transstate ethnic issues: Yugoslavia (1991), both (1992-1995), Yugoslavia (1996-2000) 
The rivalry began with the Croatian War of Independence in 1991 (Thompson and 
Dreyer 2012, 94). A transstate ethnic issue emerged to Yugoslavia, as Croatian Serbs 
became an ethnic minority in the new state of Croatia. Yugoslavia sent troops into 
Croatia to occupy Serbian ethnic enclaves (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 94-95). In 1992, 
however, the conflict spread to Bosnia, and Croatia supported Bosnian Croats while 
Serbia supported Bosnian Serbs. After the end of the Bosnia war in 1995, ethnic 
tensions between Serbia and Croatia remained (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 95), and 
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“Croatia’s official position portrayed the return of Serb internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) and refugees as a threat to the country’s fragile peace and political stability” 
(Djuric 2010, 1639). The return of Croatian Serbs was accelerated in 2000, when “the 
authoritarian and hardline nationalistic regimes of the 1990s were replaced by more 
democratically oriented and reformist governments” (Djuric 2010, 1650). 
 
German Federal Republic-German Democratic Republic 
Period: 1961-1971 
Transstate ethnic issues: German Federal Republic 
Germany was divided into West (German Federal Republic) and East (German 
Democratic Republic) after the end of WWII. West Germany sought to unify East 
Germany (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 103), which was a threat to East German state 
integrity. 
 
Greece-Bulgaria 
Period: 1946-1947 
Transstate ethnic issues: Bulgaria 
The Greece-Bulgaria rivalry developed over territorial competition in the Balkan region, 
including the two Balkan Wars and the two World Wars in the early 20th century 
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 91-92). Bulgaria “sought to encompass populations 
considered to be Bulgarian” (a Greater Bulgaria idea), but it “would come at the 
expense of Greece and Serbia/Yugoslavia” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 91). After 
WWII, both Greece and Bulgaria claimed part of the other side’s territory in the process 
of territorial settlement. According to Campbell (1947, 215), on the one hand, “Greece, 
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which still had the large appetite for territory it had displayed in 1919, claimed a broad 
band of territory in southern Bulgaria as necessary to protect its northern provinces, 
invaded three times within a generation.” On the other hand, “Bulgaria countered by 
asking for western Thrace, the area between the Mesta and Maritza rivers, on the 
grounds that this outlet to the Aegean had been wrongfully taken from Bulgaria in the 
past” (216). Thus, Greece’s territorial claim was mainly motivated by a strategic 
consideration for national security while Bulgaria’s by irredentist nationalism aiming to 
recover and secure its lost territory. 
 
Greece-Turkey 
Period: 1958-2001 [ongoing] 
Transstate ethnic issues: both 
The Greece-Turkey rivalry emerged largely because of the resurgence of the Cyprus 
issue (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 96). Ethnic conflict between Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots was transferred into interstate rivalry between Greece and Turkey. The 
intensity of the rivalry culminated, when Turkey conducted military intervention in 
Cyprus in 1974 in the name of defending Turkish Cypriots after Greek Cypriot 
hardliners, who were seeking unification with Greece (enosis) and supported by the 
Greek junta, initiated a coup. The intervention resulted in the de facto partition of 
Cyprus. Since, the partition has remained despite several attempts to unify the two parts 
of Cyprus again, and inter-ethnic mistrust in Cyprus has helped to endure the 
Greece-Turkey rivalry. Even despite the UN’s effort and institutional pressure from the 
EU, the Cyprus issue has remained unresolved. In short, the major issue of the 
Greek-Turkish rivalry is their respective ethnic compatriots in Cyprus. According to the 
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MID dataset ver. 3.1 (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004), the last dispute MID #4320 is 
ongoing after 2001. Thus, the rivalry is also regarded as ongoing after 2001. 
 
Italy-Yugoslavia 
Period: 1946-1954 
Transstate ethnic issues: both (1946-1947), Italy (1948-1954) 
In terms of nationalistic rivalry, the most important issue between Italy and Yugoslavia 
in the post-WWII period was territorial disputes in Fiume and Trieste, as they are the 
key to determining the nature of nationalisms between the two states. Fiume, which was 
mainly populated by Slavs, was seized by Italy in 1923 but was ceded to Yugoslavia in 
1947 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 99). As for Trieste, during the Second World War, 
Yugoslavia occupied the Italian territory of Trieste and established a local government 
and, after an agreement between the UK and Yugoslav generals, Trieste was partitioned 
to the UK-US occupied area (Zone A) and the Yugoslav occupied one (Zone B), which 
constituted the Free Territory (M.K.G. 1954, 7). It seems that Yugoslavia was satisfied 
with the possession of Zone B, given the explanation by M.K.G. (1954, 12) that 
Yugoslavia signaled to Italy a compromising plan that “the Territory should be placed 
either under a joint Italo-Yugoslav condominium or under a neutral Governor” while it 
strongly opposed the Tripartite Declaration proposed by the UK, the US, and France in 
1948 that “the whole Free Territory should be returned to Italian sovereignty.” Although 
Yugoslavia opposed the decision in 1953 by the US and UK to leave Zone A and give 
the administration back to Italy, tension between Yugoslavia and Italy rose only for a 
while and decreased in a month (M.K.G. 1954, 14-17). In summary, Yugoslavia had a 
transstate ethnic issue vis-à-vis Italy until it obtained the Slav ethnic enclave, Fiume, in 
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1947. On the other hand, as Italy pursued irredentist nationalism for Trieste until it 
finally annexed it after the First World War (Kunz 1948, 99), “the Tripartite Declaration 
continued to be the basis of Italian policy regarding the Free Territory” (M.K.G. 1954, 
12). When an official Yugoslav news showed the government’s dissatisfaction with 
Italy’s attitude toward the issue of Trieste, Italy interpreted this as “a threat by 
Yugoslavia formally to annex Zone B” and mobilized troops against Yugoslavia (M.K.G. 
1954, 13). It can be inferred that, even before the Tripartite Declaration, Italy wanted to 
get all Trieste back from Yugoslavia, given that Trieste was an ethnic enclave for Italy 
until its annexation in the First World War and also that, according to M.K.G. (1954, 7n), 
in the Yugoslav occupied zone approximately a half of the population was Italian (and 
the remaining half was Slovenes). Thus, Italy kept having a transstate ethnic issue 
vis-à-vis Yugoslavia during the period of rivalry. 
 
Yugoslavia-Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Period: 1992-1994 
Transstate ethnic issues: Yugoslavia 
Yugoslavia, or more precisely Serbia, sought irredentist policy for its ethnic kin within 
Bosnia (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 91). Serbia’s irredentism culminated in the ethnic 
cleansing of Bosnian Muslims by Serbs (e.g., the infamous genocide in Srebrenica). 
Hence, Serbia was a grave threat to the majority Bosnian Muslims. 
 
Yugoslavia-Bulgaria 
Period: 1946-1952 
Transstate ethnic issues: Yugoslavia (1946-1947) 
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 A17 
The Yugoslavia-Bulgaria rivalry developed chiefly over territorial claims over 
Macedonia (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 94). Bulgaria had an irredentist claim on 
Macedonia as “[t]he Bulgarians argued that their claims over Macedonia were 
legitimate because historically Macedonia and its people belonged to the Bulgarian 
lands and community” (Mahon 1998, 391). However, its expectation or even actual 
attempts to obtain Macedonia in the two Balkan Wars and the First World War 
eventually failed, and as a consequence of the Second Balkan War Macedonia was 
partitioned among Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, with which Bulgarians were 
dissatisfied (Mahon 1998, 390-391). During the Second World War, Bulgaria, allied 
with the Axis Power, again attempted to gain Macedonia, occupied it, and introduced 
Bulgarian institutions (Mahon 1998, 395). However, this occupation was also 
short-lived, as “Bulgaria was forced to surrender Yugoslav territory in accordance with 
the terms of the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1947” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 94). 
Mahon (1998, 397) points out that “Bulgaria had to accept not only that it had lost 
Macedonia but also that Macedonian identity had been legitimised as a separate 
nationality” and therefore “the Macedonian question shifted to a debate about the 
existence of the Macedonian national minority within the Bulgarian borders.” 
Meanwhile, it seems that Yugoslavia had a Slav irredentist claim on Bulgaria-occupied 
Macedonia, as “[i]n the aftermath of World War II, Yugoslavia pushed aside defeated 
Bulgaria and took the initiative to raise the national consciousness of the Slav 
inhabitants of Macedonia” (Zahariadis 1994, 654). Therefore, Yugoslavia had a 
transstate ethnic issue vis-à-vis Bulgaria till 1947 when Yugoslav part of Macedonia 
was returned to Yugoslavia. Hence, in combination with Bulgaria’s acceptance of the 
Macedonian nation separate from the Bulgarian nation, the territorial dispute between 
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Bulgaria and Yugoslavia lost the transstate ethnic aspect afterwards. 
 
America 
 
In America, the nations were mainly framed by the colonial administrative units, which 
became the basis of a state framework after independence (Anderson 2006, ch.4). This 
tradition remained in the post-WWII era, as few nationalistic-rivalry dyads had 
transstate ethnic issues. 
 
Argentina-Britain 
Period: 1976-1983 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
The rivalry materialized when Argentina vigorously claimed its sovereignty over the 
Falklands/Malvinas Islands (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 124). Britain also insisted on 
its sovereignty over the islands. The rivalry culminated in the Falkland War in 1982. 
The islands became more important in the post-WWII era because of Antarctic claims 
and oil potentials (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 124). 
 
Chile-Argentina 
Period: 1952-1984 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
Chile and Argentina experienced rivalry over territorial disputes. While “the conflict 
situation between Chile and Argentina is at the same time a territorial, resources, and 
migration conflict” (Grabendorff 1982, 283), the rivalry in the latter half of the 20th 
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 A19 
century is characterized as conflicts over the territorial rights of strategically important 
areas such as Patagonia and the Beagle Channel (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 125). 
 
Colombia-Venezuela 
Period: 1982-2001 [ongoing] 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
The Colombia-Venezuela rivalry developed over a territorial dispute on a petroleum 
potential in the Gulf of Venezuela, and also over the infiltration of a Colombian rebel 
(FARC) since 1994 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 132; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006, 
rivalry narrative). Although Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) regard the rivalry as 
terminated in 2000 because of the temporal limitation of the MID dataset, their rivalry 
narrative actually says that the dyad experienced a militarized territorial dispute after 
2001. Thus, the rivalry is coded as ongoing after 2001. 
 
Ecuador-Peru 
Period: 1946-1955, 1977-1998 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
Before 1945, most territorial disputes between Ecuador and Peru were resolved even if 
at the expense of Ecuador, but territorial disputes over access to the Amazon continued 
in the post-WWII period (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 132-133). 
 
Venezuela-Guyana 
Period: 1966-1999 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
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Guyana and Venezuela experienced rivalry largely over the Essequibo territory, where a 
number of natural resources are available (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 133). 
 
Honduras-El Salvador 
Period: 1969-1992 
Transstate ethnic issues: El Salvador 
The Honduras-El Salvador rivalry in the post-WWII period is characterized as a 
territorial dispute and migration. Since the 1920s, a number of Salvadorans moved to 
and lived in Honduras but the Honduras government took a discriminatory policy 
against them (The ICB Data Viewer; Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 141). Cable (1969, 
659) points out that the presence of Salvadorans “aroused resentment among the 
Hondurans who…faced competition on their own labour market.” In this context, the 
rivalry erupted in the Soccer War in 1969 when, after national-level football matches, 
Salvadorans harassed Hondurans in El Salvador and in response Hondurans harassed 
Salvadorans in Honduras, which led the Salvadoran government to send troops, 
triggering border clashes with Honduras and causing Salvadorans in Honduras to try to 
flee to their home country (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 141). Given that El Salvador 
militarily responded to Hondurans’ harassment of its ethnic kin in Honduras, the 
security of ethnic kin in Honduras seems to have been significant for El Salvador 
foreign policy while Honduras needed to respond to it for its own state security. 
 
Honduras-Nicaragua 
Period: 1957-1961 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
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Honduras and Nicaragua experienced rivalry over a territorial dispute. According to  
Thompson and Dreyer (2012, 143), “Honduras’ desire to develop oil deposits in the 
disputed area led to border incidents in 1957” and “[t]he spatial dispute was then sent to 
the World Court, and by 1962 the conflict was finally resolved when Nicaragua 
accepted the court’s ruling.” 
 
Middle-East 
 
In order to consider the dynamics of nationalistic rivalry in the Middle-East, there are 
two outstanding characteristics to be noted in advance. One is that supra-state identity 
such as Arabism and Islam powerfully influences state behavior (Hinnebusch 2005, 
159-161). Hinnebusch points out that “precisely because boundaries lack the 
impenetrability of the Westphalian model, with ideological influences readily crossing 
state lines, each state has been highly sensitive to the actions of others and vulnerable to 
trans-state movements.” The strong presence of supra-state identity has made transstate 
ethnic issues ready in the region. Pan-Arab nationalism is a typical example. 
  Another outstanding character of the region is the Arab-Israeli conflict. From the 
birth of the Israeli state by the partition of Palestine after WWII, Israel continuously felt 
a threat from neighboring Arab states (which supported its Arab/Muslim kin 
Palestinians and opposed the establishment of the Israeli state) and counteracted their 
aggressive intention and action (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008, ch.1). In this 
process, Israel consequently expanded its area of control to the Gaza Strip, the West 
Bank, and the Golan Heights at the expense of Arab states, and this “had massive 
logistical, military and political implications for the Israeli government” 
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(Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008, 16). Thus, the primary motivation of Israel 
seems to have been to secure nationhood in terms of the existing state framework 
against external threats from Arab states. 
 
Iraq-Egypt 
Period: 1959-1962, 1990-1999 
Transstate ethnic issues: both 
Egypt and Iraq competed for regional influence in the Arab world (Thompson and 
Dreyer 2012, 149-150). For example, in the first period of rivalry, Iraqi leader Abdel 
Karim Kassim pursued policy to “challenge Egypt’s Arab leadership,” and in the second 
period of rivalry Egypt “chose to support quite strongly the effort to oust Iraq from 
Kuwait” in order to prevent “Iraq from increasing its regional power at Egyptian 
expense” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 150). Because both Egypt and Iraq are Arab 
states and competed for Arab leadership, both shared the same transstate ethnic issue. 
 
Egypt-Israel 
Period: 1948-1989 
Transstate ethnic issues: Egypt 
Egypt supported Arab kin Palestinians against Israel, even though its motivation was 
more the pursuit of being a regional leader in the Arab world than Palestinian concerns 
themselves (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 150). After Egypt lost territory as the 
consequence of the third Arab-Israel war in 1967, redeeming this lost territory was 
added to the agenda of Egyptian foreign policy framed by transstate ethnicity 
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 151). Meanwhile, Israel sought to protect itself from 
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Egypt’s aggression. 
 
Egypt-Jordan 
Period: 1948-1962 
Transstate ethnic issues: both 
Egypt and Jordan were competitors to expand its regional influence (Thompson and 
Dreyer 2012, 152). Thus, they had the common transstate ethnic issue, i.e., a 
competition for Arab leadership. 
 
Libya-Egypt 
Period: 1975-1985 
Transstate ethnic issues: both 
Libya and Egypt experienced rivalry over regional influence in the Middle East 
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 174-175). As the rivalry was over positional competition 
between Arab states for regional influence on the Arab region, both states shared the 
same transstate ethnic issue. 
 
Egypt-Saudi Arabia 
Period: 1962-1967 
Transstate ethnic issues: both 
The Egypt-Saudi Arabia rivalry was another competition by two regional powers to 
obtain regional leadership of the Arab world, but they were based on different 
ideologies – Egypt’s revolutionary claim vs. Saudi’s claim on religion (Thompson and 
Dreyer 2012, 153). Egypt was a pan-Arabism seeker, which was a threat to the Saudi 
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Arabian monarchy since pan-Arabists aimed to overthrow the monarchies (Ahrari 2011). 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia fought proxy wars in the Yemen civil war in the 1960s. 
According to Gerges (1995, 293), Egypt intervened in the civil war to reinvigorate its 
pan-Arabist reputation tarnished by the breakup of the United Arab Republic in 1961, 
while Saudi Arabia intervened because “the overthrow of the ruling Imamate in Yemen 
and its replacement with an Egyptian-style revolutionary regime endangered the 
survival of the kingdom.” Thus, these two Arab regional powers experienced rivalry 
over controlling the composition of regional politics in the Arab world, although 
Egypt’s motivation was pan-Arabist revisionist while Saudi Arabia’s incentive was to 
preserve conservative regime. 
 
Iraq-Israel 
Period: 1948-1998 
Transstate ethnic issues: Iraq 
Iraq supported Palestinians, who are its Arab/Muslim kin, against Israel (Thompson and 
Dreyer 2012, 155). This was a threat to the Israeli state. 
 
Iraq-Syria 
Period: 1976-1991 
Transstate ethnic issues: both 
The Ba’thist Party in both Iraq and Syria competed for Arab leadership. According to 
Thompson and Dreyer (2012, 156), “[s]ince the Ba’thists were committed to 
pan-Arabism, the question revolved around which branch of the party could more 
effectively speak for all Arabs.” Milton-Edwards (2000, 64) points out that Ba’thism “is 
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not just an expression of an Arab nationalist identity, but calls for a wider unity among 
the Arab people under a socialist agenda.” Thus, the two competing pan-Arabist states 
had transstate ethnic issues against each other. 
 
Jordan-Israel 
Period: 1948-1973 
Transstate ethnic issues: Jordan (1948-1949), neither (1950-1966), Jordan (1967-1973) 
Jordan and Israel experienced rivalry over the territorial rights of Palestine. The newly 
created state of Israel as a consequence of the partition of Palestine in 1948 was 
threatened by Jordan’s irredentism to annex Palestine to create a “Greater Syria under 
Hashemite control” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 157). They entered the first 
Arab-Israel war, ending up with Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem in 1949 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 157). Then, “[s]patial conflict between 
Israel and Jordan came to center primarily on competing claims over the West Bank and 
east Jerusalem” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 157). The West Bank and East Jerusalem 
became the target of Jordan’s foreign policy based on Arab kinship. Meanwhile, 
Kaufmann (1998, 146-147) argues that “Gaza, the West Bank, and the Old City of 
Jerusalem came under control of the Egyptian and Jordanian armies; no Jews remained 
in these areas.” Therefore, these areas did not raise transstate ethnic issues to Israel. 
After Israel annexed the West Bank and east Jerusalem in the Six-Day War in 1967, 
these two areas became Jordan’s transstate ethnic issues again. 
 
Syria-Israel 
Period: 1948-2001 [ongoing] 
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Transstate ethnic issues: Syria 
The Syria-Israel rivalry developed as Syria supported its Arab kin of Palestinians (both 
the PLO and Hamas) and Hezbollah (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 158-159). Israel has 
had to protect itself from Syria-supported terrorism. The rivalry is ongoing after 2001, 
as there have been several incidents between the two states. For example, in 2003, after 
a suicide terrorist attack in Haifa, “Israeli fighter jets struck a suspected terrorist training 
camp near Damascus used by Islamic Jihad and Hamas” (The ICB Data Viewer). 
 
Syria-Jordan 
Period: 1949-1982 
Transstate ethnic issues: Jordan (1949-1951), neither (1952-1957), Syria (1958-1982) 
[both (1979-1980) for robustness check] 
The Syria-Jordan rivalry developed with their contending Arab national identities, 
mainly due to the idea of Greater Syria covering both Syria and Jordan. Ma’oz (1994, 
95) argues, “The region of Greater Syria has for centuries been an 
historical-geographical term and, periodically, has also constituted a political-territorial 
unit.” While Britain supported the Arab nationalist movement against the Ottoman 
Empire, France and Britain secretly agreed in 1916 that the former would gain the 
region known as Syria and Lebanon now and the latter would receive Trans-Jordan, Iraq, 
and Palestine (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 160). This division of borders created a 
nationalist issue for both Syria and Jordan after their independence. The Hashemite 
monarchy Jordan sought to integrate Syria for a Greater Syria plan (Thompson and 
Dreyer 2012, 160-161). Jordan’s Greater Syria plan was a grave threat to Syria (Landis 
2001, 185-187). According to expert sources, the death of King Abdullah in 1951, who 
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was an ambitious advocate of Greater Syria, apparently led Jordan to cease seeking the 
Greater Syria plan in the rest of the rivalry period (see Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 
2001, 29-51; Ma’oz 1994, 95). Yet, the disappearance of an overt ambition for Greater 
Syria did not mean that the more profound issue of the contending national identities 
was also resolved, as the two states exchanged hostility in 1957 (Klein, Goertz, and 
Diehl 2006, rivalry narrative). Moreover, the rise of pan-Arabism in Syria in turn 
created Syria’s transstate ethnic issue vis-à-vis Jordan. After internal political turmoil, 
pan-Arabist the Syrian Ba’ath party decided to unite with the leading pan-Arabist 
Nasser’s Egypt in 1958, i.e., the birth of the United Arab Republic (Cleveland 2000, 
315-317). Along this line, Syria constantly criticized Jordan’s pro-Western inclination 
(Cleveland 2000, 322-323). In the Jordanian Civil War in 1970 between the Hashemite 
government and the Palestinians, Syria supported the Palestinians (The ICB Data 
Viewer). Finally, and ironically for Jordan, the idea of Greater Syria was resuscitated by 
Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad (Ma’oz 1994, 95), who was in office during 1971-2000. 
Thus, Syria had a transstate ethnic claim of pan-Arabism against Jordan. Meanwhile, it 
was alleged by Syria that Jordan supported a Syrian Islamic insurgent group the Muslim 
Brotherhood while Jordan strongly denied it (Ryan 2006, 36). If this were the case, it 
would make both states have transstate ethnic issues. As for the period of Jordan’s 
support for the Muslim Brotherhood, given Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001, 97) 
write that “Jordan’s ill-disguised role in supporting Syrian Islamists of the Muslim 
Brotherhood [mounting] a challenge to Asad’s regime in 1979 and 1980 backfired as 
Asad crushed his opponents and then turned his army back to the border with Jordan,” 
at least both states should be coded as having transstate ethnic issues during the period 
of 1979-1980 for robustness check. 
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Iran-Iraq 
Period: 1958-2001 [ongoing] 
Transstate ethnic issues: both 
Iran and Iraq experienced rivalry over rebel supports, territorial disputes, and 
competition for regional influence (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 164-166), and the 
presence of ethnic enclaves in both sides and conflicts over them raised transstate ethnic 
issues to both states. The Khuzestan province in Iran is a key factor for Iraq, because 
Iraq “wanted to acquire Iran’s Khuzestan province, due to its traditionally Arab 
population, its oil wealth, and its location vis-à-vis the Shatt al-Arab outlet to the Gulf” 
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 165, emphasis added). In other words, Khuzestan was an 
Iraqi ethnic enclave in Iran. Byman (2001, 154) argues that “Iraqi rulers before Saddam 
have claimed sovereignty over disputed parts of the Shatt and have even made claims to 
the Iranian province of Khuzistan,” and Swearingen (1988, 414) points out that “[t]he 
status of Khuzistan has been a point of contention between the two countries for more 
than sixty years.” This means that Iraq’s irredentist claim for Khuzestan has a long 
history even before hardline pan-Arabist Saddam Hussein, who initiated “the 1980-1988 
Iran-Iraq war in order to seize the Shatt al-Arab and Khuzestan” (Thompson and Dreyer 
2012, 165), came to power. Meanwhile, Iran also had its Shia ethnic enclave in southern 
Iraq. Swearingen (1988, 414) argues that “[h]istorically Iran long laid claim to southern 
Iraq” and “[a]t Karbala and Najaf are two of the holiest shrines in Shi’i Islam, and the 
region has the largest concentration of Shi’i, including many Farsi speakers, outside 
Iran.” In 2007, “[i]n a sharp escalation of a dispute over border fighting,” Iran “warned 
that if the Iraqi government cannot stop militants from crossing into Iran and carrying 
out attacks, the Iranian authorities would respond militarily” (Glanz 2007). This can be 
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seen as another militarized interstate dispute. Therefore, although Klein, Goertz, and 
Diehl (2006) regard rivalry as terminated in 1999, the additional source indicates that it 
is ongoing after 2001. 
 
Iran-Saudi Arabia 
Period: 1984-1988 
Transstate ethnic issues: both 
Iran intended to spread the Islamic revolution and this was a threat to the conservative 
Arab monarchy of Saudi Arabia, which sought to hinder Iran’s influence in the Middle 
East (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 166). Thus, the rivalry developed over a regional 
influence in the Middle East along the line of competing Islamic identities. 
 
Iraq-Kuwait 
Period: 1961-2001 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
The Iraq-Kuwait rivalry developed over Iraq’s intention to annex Kuwait, which was 
motivated by Kuwait’s oil reserves (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 167). It can be 
inferred that Iraq wanted oil for state wealth, but Kuwait’s objection was an obstacle to 
Iraq’s pursuit of this goal. Iraq’s intention of invasion was a threat to the state of 
Kuwait. 
 
Iraq-Saudi Arabia 
Period: 1968-2001 
Transstate ethnic issues: both 
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Iraq was a pan-Arabism revisionist while Saudi Arabia was a monarchical status-quo 
seeker. Their rivalry evolved over competition for a regional interest/influence in the 
Arab world (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 169). Thus, both states had transstate ethnic 
issues against each other. 
 
Yemen People’s Republic-Oman 
Period: 1972-1982 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
The main issues in the South Yemen-Oman rivalry were twofold. Oman had 
strategically and economically important territories and South Yemen challenged them, 
and the two states also had ideological conflicts over South Yemen’s socialism and 
Oman’s conservatism (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 170). 
 
Saudi Arabia-Yemen 
Period: 1994-1998 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen experienced rivalry due to territorial disputes in 
strategically/economically important areas (Okruhlik and Conge 1999, 236-239). 
Although Yemen also challenged Saudi regional hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula, 
unlike other inter-Arab rivalries Yemen was too weak to compete for regional 
hegemony in the Arab world, as “Yemen was simply mismatched against Saudi Arabia” 
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 171). Therefore, the rivalry was not motivated by a 
regional competition based on Arab transstate ethnicity. 
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Turkey-Syria 
Period: 1955-2001 [ongoing] 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
The Turkey-Syria rivalry has a historical context in which Syria became independent 
with Arab nationalism against the Ottoman rule (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 181). 
Although the rivalry developed along the line of the Cold-War division as Western ally 
Turkey and Eastern supporter Syria, it was actually not motivated by the two 
internationalist ideologies (i.e., liberal capitalism and communism) as neither Turkey 
championed liberal democracy nor Syria implemented a communist government. Rather, 
Syrian nationalism and Turkish nationalism are contending over the historical 
implication of the Ottoman Empire, as Arab nationalism was formed against the 
Ottoman rule while Turkish national identity was partly based on the history of the 
Ottoman Empire. On the one hand, Turkey “considered itself as the main successor 
state [of the Ottoman Empire] with negative memories of Arabs” (Aras and Köni 2002, 
50, emphasis added), and thought that “Arab nationalists in Damascus had once been 
disloyal subjects who took advantage of World War I to break free from Turkish rule” 
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 180). On the other hand, for Syria, “Turkey was the 
residual of the former Ottoman Empire against which Arab nationalism was first 
oriented” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 181, emphasis added). In other words, it is more 
plausible to argue that the line of the Cold-War division was the consequence of 
nationalist foreign policy to counteract each other. Rivalry issues later shifted to water 
sharing of rivers flowing from Turkey to Syria and Syrian supports for Turkey’s Kurdish 
rebels (PKK), and these two issues persisted even after the end of the Cold War 
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 180-181). Syria’s rebel support is not motivated by 
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transstate ethnicity as Syria is not a Kurdish state. In 2012, a Turkish airplane was shot 
down by Syria (BBC Worldwide Monitoring, June 25, 2012). This can be seen as 
another militarized interstate dispute, and therefore, although Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 
(2006), regards the rivalry as terminated in 1998 because of the temporal limitation of 
the MID dataset, the additional source indicates that it is ongoing after 2001. 
  
Asia 
 
After long-term colonization by imperial powers, Asian people sought their own 
national self-determination. However, these new nations were, like other nations, 
framed by their cultural or ethnic boundaries, whereas state frameworks only sometimes 
matched them. Thus, transstate ethnic issues have been often observed. 
 
China-Japan 
Period: 1996-2001 [ongoing] 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
The major sources of the China-Japan rivalry are the rising power of China, the 
persistent bitter memory of Japanese aggression against China in World War II, and a 
territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea (Thompson 
and Dreyer 2012, 191). The end of the Cold War (i.e., the disappearance of common 
Soviet threats) and the rise of China’s economic and military power created an 
opportunity for rising regional power China and (at least economically) declining 
regional power Japan to experience rivalry. The bitter memory of rivalry and war before 
the end of WWII is a historical source of the current rivalry. The two states had 
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managed their relationship in a calm and pragmatic way during the Cold-War period. 
However, Chinese anti-Japan nationalism began to develop in the early 1980s since 
nationalism replaced communism as a tool of sustaining regime legitimacy (He 2007, 6; 
see also He 2009, 214-215). Meanwhile, China’s nuclear test and the Taiwan Strait 
crisis in 1995-96 “spelled the end of what Japan called its ‘friendship diplomacy’ 
towards China” (Yahuda 2014, 74). The arguably most contentious issue in the dyad is 
the territorial right of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. The dispute is 
over natural resource and strategic sea lanes (BBC News, August 18, 2012) as well as 
national identity and pride (McDonald 2012), but not about ethnic kin as no one lives on 
the islands. Although Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) regards the rivalry as terminated 
in 1999 because of the temporal limitation of the MID dataset, both states have 
experienced displays of force occasionally since 2001 over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, 
including “the most serious and dangerous bilateral incident since 1952” in 2010 (Wan 
2011, 73). Thus, the rivalry is seen as ongoing after 2001. 
 
Russia (Soviet Union)-China 
Period: 1963-1989 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
During the Cold War, two communist regimes China and Russia began “a contest for 
ideological leadership within the communist world by the late 1950s” (Thompson and 
Dreyer 2012, 193). “Russia’s policy toward China…was strongly influenced by 
positional concerns in which Russia sought to prevent China from regaining the 
capability to be fully competitive in Asia” whereas China “sought…to establish China 
as a formidable major power” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 193). The two states began 
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a territorial dispute in 1963 “when the Chinese government raised the issue of China’s 
historical claim to territory Russia had acquired.” They clashed along the border of the 
Usuri River in 1969, and negotiations to end the crisis could not reach a decisive 
conclusion about setting up clear border lines (The ICB Data Viewer). 
 
China-Taiwan 
Period: 1949-2001 [ongoing] 
Transstate ethnic issues: both (1949-1991), China (1992-2001) 
Since China was split into the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), these two states have experienced persistent rivalry. Both states claimed 
on their legitimacy as the sole Chinese representative government (Thompson and 
Dreyer 2012, 194) and sought to annex the other one (Campbell and Mitchell 2001, 15). 
Thus, the China-Taiwan rivalry began with reciprocal transstate ethno-nationalist claims. 
However, as Ku (2002, 61) argues, “[a]s Taiwan became more stable and retaking the 
mainland became unattainable, the KMT government began to place more emphasis on 
Taiwan’s economic development in the early 1970s.” The ROC’s realization of 
difficulty in transstate-ethnic nationalism policy clearly materialized in 1991. In 
reference to The Republic of China Yearbook 2000, McDevitt (2004, 416) explains that 
in 1991 “ROC President Lee Teng-hui orchestrated a change in the ROC Constitution,” 
which “abandoned the vision that the ROC represented the only legitimate government 
of China and accepted that the PRC was the legitimate government of the part of China 
that the PRC controlled.” This suggests that the ROC abandoned, or at least put aside, 
its transstate ethno-nationalist claim on the mainland in 1991. Meanwhile, the PRC kept 
its transstate ethno-nationalist claim, as the former president of the PRC Jiang Zemin (in 
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office during 1993-2003) “emphasized the goal of unification,” although the current 
president Hu Jintao “has emphasized the short-to-medium-term goal of deterring 
Taiwan independence, postponing unification into the indefinite future” (Saunders and 
Kastner 2009, 88). The PRC has been highly concerned with Taiwanese independence 
movements (Chang and Wang 2005, 30, 44n2) as after democratization a choice 
between unification and independence has been a major issue of Taiwanese politics. In 
2005, China enacted the “anti-secession law,” which authorizes “the use of force against 
Taiwan if it moves toward formal independence” (Pan 2005). This is China’s threat to 
use force against Taiwan, which compose a militarized interstate dispute. Thus, the 
rivalry is ongoing after 2001. 
 
North Korea-South Korea 
Period: 1949-2001 [ongoing] 
Transstate ethnic issues: both (1949-1960), North Korea (1961-2001) 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Soviet-stationed North Korea and 
US-stationed South Korea respectively gained their state sovereignty. However, the two 
Koreas “claimed legitimacy as the sole Korean state” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 
201). Thus, the rivalry started with reciprocal transstate ethno-nationalist claims. In 
1960, however, South Korea “formally announced that it would not seek a coerced 
reunification with the North” although “in the following year the ROK pledged to move 
into the North should the DPRK attempt to conquer the South” (Thompson and Dreyer 
2012, 201). This means that transstate ethnic issues remained only in North Korea’s side, 
as South Korea abandoned its transstate ethno-nationalist claim against the North while 
still feeling a threat from it. The rivalry is ongoing after 2001, as North Korea has kept 
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threatening South Korea. One of the most serious incidents is that North Korea 
allegedly sunk South’s submarine and they exchanged artillery fires in 2010. 
 
Iran-Afghanistan 
Period: 1996-1999 
Transstate ethnic issues: Iran 
Iran has its Shi’ite ethnic enclave in western Afghanistan, to which the Taliban 
government embracing a quite conservative form of Sunni Islam posed a threat 
(including the killing and kidnapping of Iranian diplomats), and the Iranian government 
responded by mobilizing troops along the border (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 204). 
 
Afghanistan-Pakistan 
Period: 1949-1996 
Transstate ethnic issues: Afghanistan (1949-1974), both (1975-1996) 
The Afghanistan-Pakistan rivalry began when Afghanistan demanded the establishment 
of a Pashtun independent state “Pashtunistan” integrating a Pakistani Pashtun area along 
the border (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 205). The Pashtuns are a major ethnic group in 
Afghanistan (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 205), and according to Gartenstein-Ross and 
Vassefi (2012, 39), “[h]istorically, the idea of being ‘Afghan’ was tied to being from the 
Pashtun ethnic group.” Hence, Afghans’ demand on behalf of Pashtuns can be seen as 
ethnically motivated, which posed a threat to the Pakistani existing statehood. However, 
transstate ethnic issues emerged to Pakistan as well when Pakistani President Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto began to support Islamic militants inside Afghanistan in the 1970s to 
counterattack the Afghan government (Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi 2012, 43). Haqqani 
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(2004, 90) argues that “Pakistan’s emphasis on its Islamic identity increased 
significantly as the civilian semiauthoritarian government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
(1971-1977) channeled Pakistan’s Islamic aspirations toward foreign policy.” Given that 
Islam is the national identity and state legitimacy of Pakistan (vis-à-vis secularism of its 
archenemy India) (see Hagerty 1998, 67), Pakistan’s support for Islamic militants in 
Afghanistan was motivated by transstate ethnicity. The year of the beginning of the 
support can be seen as 1975 when “Pakistan employed its Afghan irregulars in an 
abortive raid on Afghan government targets in the Panjsher Valley” (Wirsing 1987, 66). 
In the Afghan civil war, Pakistan supported Islamic militants against the Soviet troops 
and the communist regime and, after the Soviet withdrawal, assisted the Taliban to take 
over the regime (Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi 2012, 43; The ICB Data Viewer; 
Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 205). This finally allowed for the establishment of the 
Taliban regime in 1996. Although both Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, 
and Diehl (2006) code the period of 1997-2001 as part of the rivalry period, Pakistan 
and the Taliban regime actually had a warm relationship (Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi 
2012, 43), indicating that the rivalry disappeared. Certainly, in 2001, Pakistan supported 
the United States to invade Afghanistan and topple the Taliban regime. This is, however, 
a new and different constellation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict, given Pakistan’s 
past support for Taliban. In addition, recently the Pakistani intelligence agency (the ISI) 
has been accused of supporting Taliban insurgents against the new Afghan regime and 
NATO troops. Thus, the 2001 militarized dispute is more an exception than a part of the 
historical process of rivalry and, therefore, should not be regarded as evidence for the 
continuity of rivalry. 
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Cambodia-Republic of Vietnam 
Period: 1956-1967 
Transstate ethnic issues: Cambodia 
The major cause of the Cambodia-South Vietnam rivalry was a territorial dispute in 
Kampuchea Krom (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 208). Vietnamese annexed it as well as 
other parts of the Khmer kingdom in the 19th century and “[t]he Khmers were left to 
adopt the religious practices, customs, and language of [Vietnamese]” (Pouvatchy 1986, 
440-441). Cambodia sought to recover lost ethnic territories from South Vietnam, which 
constituted a threat to South Vietnam’s existing state framework. 
 
Cambodia-Vietnam 
Period: 1976-1979 
Transstate ethnic issues: both 
After the end of the Vietnam War, North Vietnam became the government of the whole 
Vietnam and, therefore, inherited South Vietnam’s rivalry over a territorial dispute with 
Cambodia (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 208-209). This time, however, the rivalry 
developed with both sides having transstate ethnic issues. Cambodia kept seeking to 
recover Kampuchea Krom from Vietnam, while Vietnam tried to overthrow Pol Pot in 
1976 as the Khmer Rouge government conducted hostile policy toward Vietnamese in 
Cambodia including a massacre (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 208-209). Hence, 
Vietnam felt a threat to the security of its ethnic kin and eventually militarily intervened 
into Cambodia in 1977. Vietnam occupied Cambodia and established a puppet 
government in 1979 (The ICB Data Viewer), indicating the end of rivalry. 
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China-Vietnam 
Period: 1975-1991 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither (1975-1977), China (1978-1986), neither (1987-1991) 
China posed a threat to the Vietnamese state, as China “began exploration for oil in the 
Gulf of Tonkin in violation of boundary agreements reached between China and France 
in 1887” as well as it seized the Paracel Islands and claimed territorial rights of the 
Spratly Islands for oil discovery (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 210). However, the 
ill-treatment of the ethnic Chinese minority called Hoa in Vietnam became a diplomatic 
issue in 1978 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 210-211). This transstate ethnic issue ended 
in 1986 when the Vietnamese government’s reform policies enabled Hoa to revive in 
southern Vietnam’s economy (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 211). The rivalry ended in 
1991 when both states normalized their relationship (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 210). 
Storey (2008) points out that, although territorial issues remained after the 
normalization, “[d]espite frequent flare-ups, mutual suspicions and distrust, and 
political grandstanding, substantial progress was achieved and, most importantly, 
conflict between their armed forces has been avoided.” 
 
Netherlands-Indonesia 
Period: 1951-1962 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
Indonesia and the Netherlands experienced rivalry over a territorial dispute in West New 
Guinea (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 212). The Netherlands had colonized West New 
Guinea since 1855 (Scott and Tebay 2005, 599) but Indonesia sought to annex it under 
the cause of anti-colonial nationalism, which was a threat to Dutch sovereignty. 
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However, West New Guinea itself developed its own national identity as Papuans, and 
Indonesia’s motivation seemed to be not transstate ethnicity but the annexation of West 
New Guinea under the rule of majority Indonesians, given that, after Indonesia annexed 
West New Guinea from the Netherlands, it ignored a plebiscite promised by a UN 
resolution and pursued suppressive policies (Pouwer 1999, 171). Thus, it can be inferred 
that Indonesia wanted West New Guinea for its own state interest rather than for a 
transstate ethnic tie.  
 
Vietnam (North Vietnam)-Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) 
Period: 1960-1975 
Transstate ethnic issues: both 
The North Vietnam-South Vietnam rivalry developed with reciprocal transstate 
ethno-nationalist claims, as “two Vietnams, governed by ideological 
opposites,…[claimed] that they should rule all of Vietnam” (Thompson and Dreyer 
2012, 214). Interstate violence between the two Vietnamese states eventually escalated 
to the Vietnam War. 
 
China-India 
Period: 1950-1987 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
The sources of the China-India rivalry were territorial disputes in Tibet, China’s support 
for Pakistan (which is India’s archenemy), economic interest in the Indian Ocean, and 
leadership in the third world and particularly in Southeast Asia (Thompson and Dreyer 
2012, 216-217). In summary, China was a major threat to the Indian state while India 
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was a major threat to the Chinese state. It seems that there was no transstate-ethnic issue 
between them. First, Tibetans are neither Indian nor Chinese ethnic kin. India is a 
multi-ethnic state advocating civic nationalism (and later the rise of Hindu nationalism) 
and its ruling majority is Hindus. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Indian government 
had a transstate ethnic claim for Tibet. As for China, citing Goldstein (1989), Hoffmann 
(2006, 175) points out that “the Tibetans were one of the minority populations sharing 
the Chinese state with the Han people, and therefore that Tibet was an integral part of 
China.” Thus, China sees Tibetans as a minority rather than Han ethnic kin, although it 
regards Tibet as a part of the Chinese state. This point may be endorsed more, given that 
the Chinese government has cracked down Tibetan dissidents harshly. Second, Pakistani 
is not Chinese ethnic kin either. Pakistan’s national identity is Islam while China’s is 
Han. Third, ethnic compositions in Southeast Asia are too complex to simply establish a 
direct link of India and China with ethnic groups in the whole region of Southeast Asian. 
For example, China’s support for North Vietnam was ideologically rather than 
ethnically motivated.  
 
India-Pakistan 
Period: 1947-2001 [ongoing] 
Transstate ethnic issues: Pakistan 
The conflict between the Hindu majority and a Muslim minority within British India 
was transformed to the India-Pakistan rivalry by partition in 1947 and the main 
contentious issue has been the belonging of Kashmir (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 218; 
Suzuki 2011, 55-57), whose majority is Muslims but part of which was given to, and 
has been governed by, India. Pakistan has supported Kashmiri insurgency in India and 
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also directly fought war with India over Kashmir three times (1947, 1965, and 1999). 
Because Pakistan’s national identity (which endorses state legitimacy) is a Muslim 
homeland in South Asia (Hagerty 1998, 67), it has a transstate ethno-nationalist cause 
for Muslims in the India-controlled part of Kashmir. On the other hand, the Indian 
government has generally sought civic secular nationalism as state legitimacy to 
accommodate the multi-ethnic population (Hagerty 1998, 67) and, therefore, Kashmir is 
a symbol of successful civic politics. Faced with irredentism by Pakistan, India has had 
to protect its own statehood. The rivalry is ongoing after 2001, as the two states resorted 
to uses of force in a crisis over Kashmir again in 2002 (Suzuki and Loizides 2011). 
 
Africa 
 
By the rise of nationalist movements against imperial colonization, people in Africa 
obtained their own statehood belatedly in comparison to the other regions. However, 
state frameworks were based on those drawn by imperial powers, which did not match 
ethnic boundaries. The incongruence of ethnonational groups with state boundaries is 
prevalent in the region, which makes transstate ethnic issues ready to emerge. 
 
Morocco-Algeria 
Period: 1962-1984 
Transstate ethnic issues: Morocco 
The issues in the Morocco-Algeria rivalry included a territorial dispute over oil and 
mineral resources in Tindouf and Bechar, ideological conflict between the Algerian 
socialist-revolutionary regime and the Moroccan monarchy, Morocco’s expansionist 
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policy to establish a Greater Morocco (including Mauritania, the Western Sahara, and 
parts of Algeria and Mali), and Algeria’s support for a rebel movement the Polisario in 
the Western Sahara (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 173-174). Although Thompson and 
Dreyer (2012, 174) describes that “[b]eginning in the mid-1970s, Morocco’s desire to 
control the Western Sahara has been at the heart of Algeria and Morocco’s positional 
conflict,” given that Morocco had claimed on the idea of a Greater Morocco since 
independence (Mercer 1976, 503) it can be argued that Morocco had irredentism 
vis-à-vis Algeria in the first place. Weiner (1979, 22) points out: 
 
While “Greater Morocco” included far flung territories, all of them had, at one time or 
another, been under direct Moroccan control. Much of the area had recognized the religious 
authority of Moroccan sultans for even longer periods. To Moroccans this reinforced their 
claims to the areas because in Morocco, as throughout the Islamic world, religious and 
political life are [sic] intricately and inseparably intertwined. 
 
To put differently, Islam plays a role of transstate ethnonational identity to tie Morocco 
with those “Greater Morocco” areas. Meanwhile, Algeria sought to prevent Morocco 
from increasing its power and regional influence and for this purpose it supported the 
Polisario in the Western Sahara (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 173-174). Salehyan, 
Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011, Appendix A) show that the Polisario was not 
Algeria’s transnational constituency and, therefore, Algeria’s support for the group was 
not motivated by transstate ethnicity.  
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Sudan-Egypt 
Period: 1991-1996 
Transstate ethnic issues: Sudan [both for the robustness check] 
Sudan and Egypt experienced rivalry over the control of the Nile River basin, which is 
essential for water access, and also these two states “occasionally encouraged dissent in 
the adversary’s political system” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 175-176). In this rivalry, 
rebel supports are the key to specify the presence of transstate ethnic issues. On the one 
hand, Egypt felt a threat from Sudan because it believed that Sudan supported Egyptian 
Islamic insurgents against the Egyptian regime. Ronen (2003, 95) argues that “[t]he 
Islamist ideology of the Bashir regime, allied with the radical Muslim and Arab 
anti-Western camp in the Middle East, was a constant source of concern for Cairo; 
Egypt accused Sudan of providing a base for anti-Mubarak Egyptian Islamists.” Given 
the Omar al-Bashir regime is an Islamist (O’Fahey 1996, 263-264), its support for 
Islamic militants in Egypt can be seen as motivated by transstate ethnicity. On the other 
hand, “[t]he regime in Khartoum, for its part, feared subversion by Egypt, with or 
without American military backing, and was preoccupied by what it viewed as Egyptian 
determination to undermine it” (Ronen 2003, 95). It seems that there is no clear 
evidence to decide whether Egypt supported Sudanese rebels for the reason of 
transborder ethnic kin; what can be inferred is that, given that the Islamist regime of 
Sudan was a threat to the Egyptian state, there was a good rationale for Egypt to aim to 
subvert the Bashir regime in order to cut off rebel supports. In other words, a threat to 
the existing statehood, such as the survival of regime and the territorial dispute in the 
Nile River, seemed to be more salient than the security of Sudanese rebels. Nonetheless, 
for robustness check, transstate ethnic issues are coded as present in both sides of the 
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dyad as well. 
 
Libya-Sudan 
Period: 1973-1984 
Transstate ethnic issues: Libya 
Libya and Sudan competed for regional influence, engaged in the Cold-War ideological 
conflict, and mutually attempted to overthrow the adversary’s regime (Thompson and 
Dreyer 2012, 176). On the one hand, Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi was an 
advocate of pan-Arabism and “ventured into the geopolitical triangular area of Libya, 
Sudan, and Egypt, hoping to make the region the center of gravity for his Arab unionist 
vision” (Ronen 2011, 3). On the other hand, Sudanese President Jaafar Muhhamad 
al-Numayri “rejected all of [Qaddafi’s] unionist proposals, being cautious not to pour 
more oil on the fire of the Sudanese civil war” while even the end of the civil war “did 
not change Sudan’s reluctance to enter any unity framework with Libya” (Ronen 2011, 
4). This tension between Arab expansionist Libya and more conservative Sudan was 
more embroiled over Egypt’s rapprochement with Israel, which Libya harshly opposed 
and Sudan basically supported (Ronen 2011, 5-6). Libya’s pan-Arabism was motivated 
by transstate ethnicity and posed a threat to the Sudanese state. It can be inferred that 
the aim of Sudan’s attempt to overthrow the Qaddafi regime was to counteract Libyan 
transstate ethnic policy for the security of the Sudanese state. Neither Thompson and 
Dreyer (2012) nor an expert source (Ronen 2011, 3-9) shows that Sudan had transstate 
ethnic issues against Libya. There is also suggestive evidence that Sudan wanted to 
remove Qaddafi from office due to a threat to the existing statehood. Faced with Libya’s 
announcement to unite Chad, Numayri as well as Egyptian President Sadat “intensified 
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their opposition to Libyan machinations, the Sudanese leader calling openly for 
[Qaddafi’s] overthrow” (Brewer 1982, 211). Prior to this event, Qaddafi was thought to 
be involved in a failed coup of 1976 by Islamic insurgents (Brewer 1982, 209-210). 
Libya’s seizure of Chad, the country sharing the problem of Islamic insurgents (Brewer 
1982, 210), could have escalated Islamic insurgency in the region and threatened the 
Numayri regime. Brewer (1982, 206) quotes from Los Angeles Times on October 18, 
1981, a Sudanese spokesman’s ominous warning of “taking all the necessary defensive 
measures to safeguard the security and stability of our country.” Given these points, it 
can be inferred that Sudan’s motivation to topple the Qaddafi regime was a threat from 
Islamic insurgency to the regime. 
 
Spain-Morocco 
Period: 1957-1975 
Transstate ethnic issues: Morocco 
The Spain-Morocco rivalry developed over territorial disputes over the Western Sahara 
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 177). The Western Sahara was a part of a “Greater 
Morocco” idea, firstly proposed in 1956 when Morocco became independent 
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 173-174; Mercer 1976, 503). Weiner (1979, 22) points 
out: 
 
While “Greater Morocco” included far flung territories, all of them had, at one time or 
another, been under direct Moroccan control. Much of the area had recognized the religious 
authority of Moroccan sultans for even longer periods. To Moroccans this reinforced their 
claims to the areas because in Morocco, as throughout the Islamic world, religious and 
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political life are [sic] intricately and inseparably intertwined. 
 
To put differently, Islam plays a role of transstate ethno-national identity to tie Morocco 
with those “Greater Morocco” areas. Hence, as in the Morocco-Algeria rivalry, it can be 
inferred that Morocco had a transstate ethnic claim against the Spanish-controlled 
Sahara. Meanwhile, Spain ceded the Spanish Sahara to Morocco in 1975 but did not 
pull out of the Spanish-populated and controlled enclaves there (Martinez 2003, 875). 
The Spanish government responded by sending gunboats to Morocco’s claim that 
enclaves Ceuta and Melilla belong to Morocco’s control (Martinez 2003, 875). Because 
those enclaves are under Spanish control, they are regarded as within the framework of 
the Spanish state according to the coding scheme of nationalistic rivalry. While both 
Thompson and Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) include 1976-1980 
as the rivalry period, 1975 would be a more plausible end year, given that one expert 
source (Martinez 2003, 875) states that “[t]he transfer of the Spanish Sahara gave the 
enclaves a respite from Moroccan claims for at least a decade” (i.e., 1985). After 1987, 
it seems that hostility over the enclaves resumed (Martinez 2003, 875-876); however 
this is outside Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) coding of rivalry years. Thus, the 
rivalry period is coded as 1957-1975. 
 
Mali-Burkina Faso 
Period: 1974-1986 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
Burkina Faso and Mali experienced rivalry due to a territorial dispute in the Agacher 
Strip, which was thought to be rich in natural resources, and due to ideological conflict 
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between Mali’s conservative regime and Burkina Faso’s revolutionary and expansionist 
regime (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 225). In 1985, the two states clashed in the 
Agacher Strip and it is estimated that 400 people died (The ICB Data Viewer). 
 
Cameroon-Nigeria 
Period: 1981-2001 [ongoing] 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
The major issue in the Cameroon-Nigeria rivalry is a territorial dispute in the Bakassi 
peninsula, which has various natural resources such as offshore oil, natural gas, and fish 
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 226). Thus, the rivalry has been mainly over economic 
interest. In 2002, both states mobilized their troops over the dispute in the Bakassi 
peninsula (Africa News, July 28, 2002). This can be seen as another militarized 
interstate dispute. Thus, although Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) regard the rivalry as 
terminated in 1998 because of the temporal limitation of the MID dataset, the additional 
source indicates that it is ongoing after 2001. 
 
Ghana-Togo 
Period: 1961-1994 
Transstate ethnic issues: both (1961-1963), Togo (1964-1966), neither (1967-1994) 
The Ghana-Togo rivalry developed over post-colonial territorial arrangements and 
dissident supports (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 227). In 1959, Ghanaian President 
Kwame Nkrumah claimed that Togo should be integrated into Ghana (Thompson and 
Dreyer 2012, 227). Brown (1980, 583) points out that this “reflected his concern to win 
the support of Ghanaian Ewes by promoting the pan-Ewe cause.” Ewes were an ethnic 
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group living across the Ghana-Togo border (see Brown 1980, 577). Thus, Ghana had a 
transstate ethnic issue vis-à-vis Togo. It seems that this issue disappeared after the 
removal of Nkrumah from power in 1966. Togo also pursued transstate ethnic policy at 
first and called for “the transfer of British Togoland to Togo,” but this policy “came to 
an end in 1963” (Brown 1980, 583). Although Togo covertly supported a Ghanaian 
dissident group the National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland (Tolimo), it had 
“no commitment to the ideal of Ewe nationalism” and its support had “been, rather, on 
the regime’s dominant concerns of fostering economic growth and inhibiting political 
unrest amongst its Ewe populace” (Brown 1980, 586). Ghana also allegedly supported 
the Togolese rebel group MTD, which was not Ghana’s transnational constituency 
(Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, Appendix A). 
 
Democratic Republic of the Congo-Rwanda 
Period: 1996-2001 [ongoing] 
Transstate ethnic issues: Rwanda 
Rwanda invaded the DRC to suppress Hutu rebels who fled from Rwanda to the DRC 
since the ethnic conflict between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, and Rwanda occupied 
eastern Congo while the DRC required Rwanda to leave the country (Thompson and 
Dreyer 2012, 231-232). Kalron (2010, 31) points out that “the Rwandans’ ethnic 
solidarity with the Banyamulenge [Kinyarwanda-speaking Tutsi pastoralists] and their 
helplessness against the attacking government supporters served as justification for their 
consecutive interventions in the Congo.” In other words, Rwanda had a transstate ethnic 
issue against the DRC. Although Rwanda also had an economic incentive to intervene 
(Kalron 2010, 32), the coding scheme prioritizes the presence of ethnic solidarity (i.e., 
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transstate ethnic issues) to economic incentives. Meanwhile, eastern part of the DRC 
was a safe haven for Rwandan Hutu rebels (most notoriously the FDLR), and the DRC 
even directly supported them to fight with militias assisted by Rwanda (Rodriguez 2011, 
178); however, it is doubtful to regard this as the DRC’s transstate ethnic issue. Neither 
Thompson and Dreyer (2012) nor two expert sources (Kalron 2010; Rodriguez 2011) 
show that the DRC supported Hutu rebels due to their ethnic tie and beyond its borders 
(these two are the necessary conditions for qualifying an issue as a transstate ethnic one). 
Rather, as noted above, it was for the strategic purpose of counteracting militias backed 
by Rwanda, and actually the FDLR was “a barrier to the Congolese government in its 
efforts to reestablish its authority and an obstacle to the transparent exploitation of the 
DRC’s natural resources that could help the national economy” (Rodriguez 2011, 178). 
Both the DRC and Rwandan governments even “committed to reinforce their 
collaboration on the issue of Rwandan armed groups in the DRC” since 2007 
(Rodriguez 2011, 179). This suggests that the DRC government does not feel ethnic 
sympathy with the FDLR and temporarily supported it only for the strategic purpose. 
The rivalry is ongoing after 2001, as the two states experienced a crisis in 2004 which 
was triggered by a Banyamulenge rebel, causing minor clashes (The ICB Data Viewer). 
 
Democratic Republic of the Congo-Uganda 
Period: 1996-2001 [ongoing] 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
Uganda invaded the DRC to suppress Ugandan rebels who were operating from the 
DRC, and like Rwanda, it occupied eastern Congo whereas the DCR tried to evict it. 
Kalron (2010, 32) argues that “Uganda’s motives to enter the wars in the Congo seem to 
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be less apparent and have little, if no, real moral justification (as may be the case with 
Rwanda)” and “Uganda’s intervention in the Congo was more likely to be a way of 
establishing regional power” and also it “enjoyed the extraction of economic wealth 
from Congo as a means of empowering and enriching specific individuals.” Meanwhile, 
Ugandan rebels (most notably the ADF) used eastern part of the DRC as a “rear base” 
(Scorgie 2011, 85). The DRC government did not have a substantial control of the 
region (Scorgie 2011, 85-88). According to Scorgie (2011, 87), ex-combatants stated 
that, although they were welcomed by local Congolese, this may have been partly 
because the locals “preferred being in the territory of a rebel group such as the ADF to 
being under the so-called protection of the Congolese government forces.” Given these 
points, it seems unlikely that the DRC government actively supported Ugandan rebels 
as it could not establish even control in the region after all. Still, the rebels were a threat 
to the Ugandan state. The two states clashed in Lake Albert, their border lake in 2007, 
causing casualties (Africa News, September 26, 2007). Thus, the rivalry is ongoing after 
2001. 
 
Burundi-Rwanda 
Period: 1964-1966 
Transstate ethnic issues: Burundi 
The Burundi-Rwanda rivalry emerged due to ethnic conflict between Hutus and Tutsis 
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 236). Tutsi-led Burundi supported Tutsi rebels against the 
Hutu-led Rwandan government (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006, rivalry narrative). 
Burundi’s support for its ethnic kin Tutsi rebels posed a threat to the Rwandan state. 
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Chad-Libya 
Period: 1976-1979, 1983-1994 
Transstate ethnic issues: Libya [both for robustness check] (1976-1979, 1983-1987), 
neither [Chad for robustness check] (1988-1994) 
Chad and Libya experienced rivalry in the context of Chad’s internal ethnic conflict, 
where Northern Muslims revolted against Southern non-Muslims (Thompson and 
Dreyer 2012, 237). As Libya “shared a common Muslim-Arabic identity with northern 
Chadians and accused Chad’s central government of suppressing Islam, persecuting 
Arabs, and discrimination against the Arab language and culture,” it supported its ethnic 
kin Northern Muslims (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 237). The northern rebel group 
FROLINAT finally overthrew the government and took power in 1979 (Decalo 1980, 
506). However, this new government of Chad was also “overthrown by rebels supported 
by Sudan and Egypt” in 1983, which consequently resulted in the virtual partition of the 
state to the South and the North (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 237). Libya kept 
supporting ethnic kin in the North, but the South eventually forced Libyans out of Chad 
in 1987 and Libya’s support for the North ended (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 237). 
Given that ethnic groups in the North are largely different from those in the South (see 
Decalo 1980, 492-494), it can be inferred that Chad’s attempt to reestablish governance 
in the North was not motivated by transstate ethnicity. Libya and Chad also had 
territorial disputes in the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad with uranium deposits and in 
Fezzan in Libya with Chad’s supporting “Libyan dissidents to develop Chadian bases” 
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 237). After 1987, those territorial disputes were the source 
of Libya’s hostility towards Chad. It is not clear whether Chad had transstate ethnic 
issues in those disputes. The Aouzou Strip dispute does not seem to have been 
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motivated by transstate ethnicity, given that it is over economic interest of uranium 
deposits. As for the Fezzan dispute, no evidence could be found that Chad got involved 
in it due to transstate ethnicity. For robustness checks, it is coded that Chad had a 
transstate ethnic issue in the Fezzan dispute. Although both Thompson and Dreyer 
(2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) code the period of 1980-1982 as the rivalry 
period, it should actually be excluded, given that after the FROLINAT took power, 
“Libya and Chad temporarily no longer engaged in conflict” (Thompson and Dreyer 
2012, 237). 
 
Djibouti-Eritrea 
Period: 1996-2001 [ongoing] 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
The issues in the Djibouti-Eritrea rivalry were the territorial dispute over a Djibouti 
town (Ras Doumeira), and possibly the proxy conflict of Eritrea against Ethiopia as 
Djibouti is Ethiopia’s important trade partner and Ethiopia is Eritrea’s enemy (Klein, 
Goertz, and Diehl 2006, rivalry narrative; Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 239). Ras 
Doumeira is “home to the Afar, an ethnic group living in the disputed area” (Mesfin 
2008, 2). The Afar have been oppressed by the Djiboutian government of the 
Issa-Somali ethnic group and have formed an insurgency group against it (Yasin 2010, 
90, 92). According to Yasin (2010), “the Afar in Djibouti…are occasionally aided by 
relatives residing in Ethiopia and Eritrea” (86), but it seems unlikely that the Eritrean 
government itself has a reason to support the Afar in Djibouti in terms of a transstate 
ethnic tie. This is because “due to their unionist sentiment (aiming at reunification with 
Ethiopia) and opposition to Eritrean independence, the Afar in Dankalia (the Afar region 
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of Eritrea) are in deadly conflict with the Eritrean government” (Yasin 2010, 90). In 
other words, if the government is hostile to the ethnic group, there should be no reason 
that it is worried about the security of the transborder ethnic kin of the group. The 
reason for Eritrea’s territorial ambition for Ras Doumeira is unclear from either 
Thompson and Dreyer (2012) or an expert source (Mesfin 2008). Eritrea’s aggression 
was a threat to Djibouti. In 2008 Eritrea and Djibouti clashed in Ras Doumeira (BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring, June 13, 2008), which can be seen as another militarized 
interstate dispute. Thus, although Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) regard the rivalry as 
terminated in 1998 due to the temporal limitation of the MID dataset, the additional 
resource indicates that it is ongoing after 2001. 
 
Eritrea-Sudan 
Period: 1994-1999 
Transstate ethnic issues: both 
Insurgents based in Sudan infiltrated to Eritrea and Sudan supported the Islamic militant 
group Jihad Eritrea while Eritrea supported Sudanese rebels (Thompson and Dreyer 
2012, 241). According to Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011, Appendix A), 
Sudan explicitly supports the Eritrean rebel group EIJM (an alias of Jihad Eritrea; see 
START Terrorist Organization Profiles), which is Sudan’s transnational constituency as 
an Islamic group, whereas Eritrea also explicitly assists the Sudanese rebel group SPLM, 
which is Eritrea’s transnational constituency as ethnic kin (a church group). 
 
Ethiopia-Eritrea 
Period: 1998-2001 [ongoing] 
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Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
After Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1993, these two states began rivalry with a 
border conflict, primarily on the town of Badme (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 240). 
The border conflict did not involve ethnic issues (The ICB Data Viewer). While Klein, 
Goertz, and Diehl (2006) classifies this dyad as an isolated conflict because of the 
temporal limitation of the MID dataset, the ICB Data Viewer reports that the dyad 
experienced two crises, which resulted in minor military clashes, on the same issue in 
2005 and 2007 respectively after the initial border war in 1998. Given these events, the 
dyad now meets the criterion of Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) for rivalry. 
 
Somalia-Ethiopia 
Period: 1960-1985 
Transstate ethnic issues: Somalia 
The major issue of the Somalia-Ethiopia rivalry was a territorial conflict in the Ogaden 
region of Ethiopia (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 242). Somalia pursued irredentist 
policy to “encompass the Ogaden and its Somali population” (Thompson and Dreyer 
2012, 242). This was a threat to the Ethiopian state. 
 
Kenya-Somalia 
Period: 1963-1981 
Transstate ethnic issues: Somalia 
The Kenya-Somalia rivalry developed over Somalia’s irredentist policy to annex 
“Kenya’s Northern Frontier District, which was dominated by ethnic Somalis and 
Oromo, many of whom wished to secede from Kenya” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 
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243). This Somalian irredentism was a threat to the Kenyan state. 
 
Ethiopia-Sudan 
Period: 1967-1997 
Transstate ethnic issues: Sudan (1967-1982), both (1983-1997) 
The Ethiopia-Sudan rivalry developed over their support of ethnic kin in the other state. 
Sudan supported its Arab Muslim kin in Eritrea for independence from Ethiopia 
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 242), which was a threat to the Ethiopian state. Even after 
the independence of Eritrea, Sudan kept supporting Islamic militants in Ethiopia (as 
well as in Eritrea) (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 243). Ethiopia also began to support 
Sudanese rebels in southern Sudan (SPLA) in 1983, which are mainly non-Muslims and 
non-Arabs (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 242-243). According to Salehyan, Gleditsch, 
and Cunningham (2011, Appendix A), the SPLM (an alias of SPLA; see START 
Terrorist Organization Profiles) is Ethiopia’s transnational constituency as ethnic kin (a 
church group). 
 
Uganda-Kenya 
Period: 1987-1995 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
Kenya and Uganda accused each other of rebel supports (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 
244). Kenya’s support for the Ugandan rebel group LRA was not based on Kenya’s 
transnational constituency (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, Appendix A). 
Meanwhile, according to Tekle (1996, 502), the Kenyan dissident group “The February 
18 Movement (FEM) is allegedly based in Uganda.” No evidence could be found that 
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the group had a transnational ethnic tie with Uganda. 
 
Uganda-Sudan 
Period: 1968-1972, 1994-2001 [ongoing] 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither (1968-1972), Uganda (1994-1999), neither (2000-2001) 
Uganda “viewed Sudan’s first civil war as a war of Arabs against Africans” and “[a]s a 
consequence, relations between Sudan and Uganda deteriorated as soon as Uganda 
gained its independence in 1962” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 244). Thus, their 
national identities in terms of ethnicity were conflicting. In the first period of rivalry, 
Uganda supported the rebel group Anya Nya in the first Sudanese civil war but without 
a transnational ethnic tie (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, Appendix A). 
South Sudanese rebels went back and forth through the border between Uganda and 
Sudan, which caused the Sudanese government to invade Uganda (Klein, Goertz, and 
Diehl 2006, rivalry narrative). During the second period of the rivalry, the Ugandan 
government supported non-Arab southern Sudanese rebels (SPLA) against the 
Arab-Islamic Sudanese government whereas the Sudanese government also supported 
the Ugandan rebel group LRA (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 245). According to 
Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011, Appendix A), the SPLM (an alias of 
SPLA; see START Terrorist Organization Profiles) is Uganda’s transnational 
constituency as ethnic kin (a church group) while the LRA is not Sudan’s transnational 
constituency. In 1999, both governments agreed to stop supporting rebels, but Uganda 
was not convinced that Sudan ceased supporting the LRA (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 
245). In 2010, the SPLA “attacked a village in the West Nile District of Moyo” in 2010 
(BBC Worldwide Monitoring, November 11, 2010). This is another militarized interstate 
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dispute and, therefore, the rivalry can be seen as ongoing after 2001. 
 
Uganda-Tanzania 
Period: 1971-1979 
Transstate ethnic issues: neither 
Tanzania and Uganda experienced rivalry over a territorial dispute in the Kagera River 
and an ideological difference between Ugandan authoritarianism and Tanzanian 
socialism (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 245). The territorial dispute was initiated by 
Ugandan revisionism (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 245). Uganda occupied the Kagera 
Salient in the October of 1978 but withdrew in the following month in face of 
Tanzania’s counterattack (The ICB Data Viewer). This Tanzania-Uganda war was not 
irredentist conflict (The ICB Data Viewer; see also Nayenga 1984, 69). Meanwhile, 
Tanzania supported Ugandan dissidents (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 245), the UPA 
and the UNLA, which were not Tanzania’s transnational constituency (Salehyan, 
Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, Appendix A). Thus, no issues in the 
Tanzania-Uganda rivalry were over transborder ethnic kin. 
 
Mozambique-South Africa 
Period: 1983-1987 
Transstate ethnic issues: both (1983-1984), South Africa (1985-1987) 
Mozambique sought anti-apartheid transstate-ethnic nationalist policy against South 
Africa, as Mozambique “opposed South Africa’s exclusionary apartheid regime and 
supported African National Congress (ANC) rebels intent on destabilizing South 
Africa’s central government” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 249). Meanwhile, “South 
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Africa opposed Mozambique’s multiracial socialist government and supported the 
Mozambican RENAMO opposition” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 249). According to 
Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011, Appendix A), the ANC is Mozambique’s 
transnational constituency (black nationalists) while the RENAMO is South Africa’s 
one (a church group). While “Mozambique and South Africa signed an accord in which 
Mozambique pledged to no longer provide sanctuary for ANC rebels” in 1984, South 
Africa kept supporting the RENAMO (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 249). 
 
Zambia-Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 
Period: 1965-1979 
Transstate ethnic issues: Zambia 
Zambia pursued anti-White policy against white-led Rhodesia, as “Zambia opposed 
white-minority rule in Rhodesia and…provided support for Zimbabwean guerillas 
seeking to destabilize the Rhodesian regime” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 249). 
Zambia had the transnational constituency of black nationalists in Rhodesia (Salehyan, 
Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, Appendix A). In response to this, “Rhodesia in turn 
attacked bases and pursued insurgents across the border” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 
249). 
 
Zambia-South Africa 
Period: 1968-1987 
Transstate ethnic issues: Zambia 
Zambia sought anti-apartheid policy against South Africa, as “Zambia criticized the 
apartheid government for its racist policies” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 250). Zambia 
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had the transnational constituency of black nationalists in South Africa (Salehyan, 
Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, Appendix A). Meanwhile, South Africa “was hostile 
toward Zambia for harboring South African dissidents and supporting groups viewed as 
terrorists by South Africa” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 250). 
 
Dropped Cases 
 
This section contains the list of rivalries specified by the intersection of Thompson and 
Dreyer (2012) and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) but excluded from nationalistic 
rivalry, and the reasons for this decision. 
 
Yugoslavia (Serbia)-Bulgaria 
Period: 1948-1952 
Since 1948 the rivalry issue was mainly along intra-communist conflict between 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the superpower which had an influence on 
Communist Bulgaria (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 94; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006, 
rivalry narrative; Mahon 1998, 398). This means that the rivalry issue was framed in 
terms of contending internationalist communisms. 
 
United Kingdom-Russia (Soviet Union) 
Period: 1946-1956 
Both the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union experienced rivalry around European 
great power politics (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 53-56). The rivalry developed along 
the line of the Cold War in the post-WWII period, as UK Prime Minister Winston 
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Churchill used the term “Iron Curtain.” Thus, the issue was framed in terms of 
contending internationalist ideologies (communism vs. liberal capitalism). 
 
United States of America-Russia (Soviet Union) 
Period: 1946-1989 
In the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, the 
capitalism-versus-communism ideological competition was the main issue (Thompson 
and Dreyer 2012, 109-114).  
 
United States of America-Cuba 
Period: 1959-2001 
The United States and Cuba experienced rivalry with several proxy conflicts/wars 
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 138-139). Their rivalry developed in the context of the 
Cold War, i.e. communism vs. liberal capitalism. 
 
Nicaragua-Costa Rica 
Period: 1948-1957, 1977-1990 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica felt a threat to each other due to ideological rivalry where 
liberal democratic Costa Rica and authoritarian Nicaragua “actively advocated the 
overthrow of the political regime of the other state due to their ideological differences” 
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 137). Thus, the rivalry developed over a threat to the 
existent regime of each state. The ideological rivalry turned to be the Cold War rivalry 
after 1979 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 137). In both periods, the rivalry issues are 
framed in an internationalist term, as the political ideology of democracy and 
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communism are not specific to one’s nation but beyond national borders. 
 
Honduras-Nicaragua 
Period: 1980-1987 
In the second period of the rivalry, the cause of the Honduras-Nicaragua rivalry was that 
both states advocated “regime change in the opposing state” mainly because of 
ideological conflict between Marxist Nicaragua and anti-Marxist Honduras (Thompson 
and Dreyer 2012, 143-144). 
 
Russia (Soviet Union)-China 
Period: 1958-1962 
During the Cold War, two communist regimes China and Russia began “a contest for 
ideological leadership within the communist world by the late 1950s” (Thompson and 
Dreyer 2012, 193). Both states posed to each other a threat, as “Russia’s policy toward 
China…was strongly influenced by positional concerns in which Russia sought to 
prevent China from regaining the capability to be fully competitive in Asia” whereas 
China “sought…to establish China as a formidable major power” (Thompson and 
Dreyer 2012, 193). Thus, until the two states began a territorial dispute in 1963, their 
rivalry issues were framed in an internationalist term. 
 
Malaysia-Indonesia 
Period: 1963-1965 
In the rivalry, Indonesia sought to prevent the establishment of the Federation of 
Malaysia to keep its regional influence by verbal attacks and then the support of 
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insurgents’ infiltration, while Malaysia resisted these attempts of Indonesia (Thompson 
and Dreyer 2012, 211-212). Indonesia’s support for the rebel group the Clandestine 
Communist Organisation, or CCO, was not motivated by a transstate ethnic tie 
(Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, Appendix A; see also Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program 2012). The issues were regional influence and asymmetrical rebel support, 
thereby not making rivalry as nationalistic rivalry. 
 
Thailand-Vietnam 
Period: 1961-1988 
Thailand and Vietnam experienced rivalry over the Cold-War ideological differences 
and regional influences. Thailand felt a threat from communist Vietnam and pursued 
foreign policy to counteract the spread of communism in the region, such as support for 
South Vietnam during the Vietnam War (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 214). It also 
assisted Cambodian resistance during Vietnam’s military intervention there (Thompson 
and Dreyer 2012, 214). These actions of Thailand were a threat to the Vietnamese state. 
The issues were communism and asymmetrical rebel support, thereby not making 
rivalry as nationalistic rivalry. 
 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) -Angola 
Period: 1975-1978, 1994-1997 
Zaire supported dissidents (the FNLA and the UNITA) against the MPLA government 
in Angola, according to a belief that the MPLA was trying to spread communism in 
Southern Africa and a more right-wing regime would suit Congo’s regional interest 
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 230-231). Zaire’s support for the FNLA and the UNITA 
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was a threat to the Angolan state, but it was not motivated by a transstate ethnic tie 
(Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, Appendix A). The issues were ideological 
conflict and asymmetrical rebel support, thereby not making rivalry as nationalistic 
rivalry. 
 
Uganda-Rwanda 
Period: 1999-2001 
Uganda and Rwanda experienced rivalry because of “strong disagreements over how 
best to intervene in the [DRC]” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 235). Put differently, the 
DRC was a place where two states’ interest clashes. The rivalry issue was for regional 
influence without transstate ethnicity between the two states, thereby not making rivalry 
as nationalistic rivalry. 
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Appendix C 
Supplementary Statistics 
 
This appendix lists the results of all supplementary analysis mentioned in Chapter 3. 
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Table C-1: Probit regression of revisionist behavior in directed dyad-years 
 Model C-1 Model C-2 Model C-3 Model C-4 
Nationalistic Rivalry 1.896*** 0.917*** 0.991*** 1.410*** 
  (0.0534) (0.0600) (0.0631) (0.0609) 
Ethnonation-State Incongruence  0.254*** 0.244*** 0.248*** 
  (0.0482) (0.0498) (0.0451) 
Other Rivalries   0.546***  
 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012)   (0.0750)  
Other Rivalries    1.419*** 
 (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)    (0.0455) 
Contiguity  1.110*** 1.047*** 0.732*** 
  (0.0396) (0.0432) (0.0415) 
Capability Difference  0.252 0.250 0.178 
  (0.287) (0.288) (0.240) 
Capability Difference2  11.49*** 11.65*** 9.302*** 
  (0.870) (0.872) (0.929) 
Democratic Actor  0.0677* 0.0663* -0.0454 
  (0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0354) 
Democratic Target  0.253*** 0.254*** 0.157*** 
  (0.0364) (0.0362) (0.0321) 
Democratic Dyad  -0.617*** -0.590*** -0.384*** 
  (0.0631) (0.0618) (0.0576) 
Peace Years -0.108*** -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.0789*** 
 (0.00733) (0.00737) (0.00743) (0.00688) 
Peace Years2 0.00378*** 0.00351*** 0.00352*** 0.00270*** 
 (0.000332) (0.000338) (0.000341) (0.000322) 
Peace Years3 -3.60e-05*** -3.10e-05*** -3.12e-05*** -2.32e-05*** 
 (4.14e-06) (4.27e-06) (4.29e-06) (4.07e-06) 
Constant -2.483*** -2.710*** -2.724*** -2.892*** 
 (0.0394) (0.0385) (0.0391) (0.0382) 
Observations 1,072,540 848,110 848,110 848,110 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
  
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 A67 
Table C-2: Probit regression of revisionist behavior in directed-dyad disputes (with 
peace years) 
 Model C-5 Model C-6 Model C-7 Model C-8 
Nationalistic Rivalry 0.374*** 0.281*** 0.265*** 0.435*** 
  (0.0754) (0.0775) (0.0794) (0.0793) 
Ethnonation-State Incongruence  0.162** 0.161** 0.160** 
  (0.0720) (0.0717) (0.0704) 
Other Rivalries   -0.0894  
 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012)   (0.0992)  
Other Rivalries    0.262*** 
 (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)    (0.0597) 
Contiguity  0.0917 0.105* 0.0318 
  (0.0628) (0.0628) (0.0622) 
Capability Difference  0.658* 0.655* 0.643* 
  (0.383) (0.381) (0.368) 
Capability Difference2  0.482 0.481 -0.248 
  (2.376) (2.369) (2.310) 
Democratic Actor  -0.304*** -0.299*** -0.347*** 
  (0.0769) (0.0762) (0.0763) 
Democratic Target  0.230*** 0.235*** 0.179*** 
  (0.0644) (0.0631) (0.0648) 
Democratic Dyad  0.0997 0.0844 0.185 
  (0.120) (0.119) (0.119) 
Peace Years -0.153*** -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.164*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0170) 
Peace Years2 0.00693*** 0.00679*** 0.00677*** 0.00777*** 
 (0.000967) (0.000961) (0.000962) (0.00102) 
Peace Years3 -7.90e-05*** -7.95e-05*** -7.92e-05*** -9.24e-05*** 
 (1.45e-05) (1.48e-05) (1.48e-05) (1.55e-05) 
Constant -0.0520 -0.115* -0.112* -0.167*** 
 (0.0344) (0.0589) (0.0590) (0.0583) 
Observations 4,344 4,136 4,136 4,136 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
  
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 A68 
Table C-3: GEE regression of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio (AR1) 
 Model C-9 Model C-10 Model C-11 
Nationalistic Rivalry 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0330) (0.0304) 
Ethnonation-State Incongruence   0.120* 0.120* 
  (0.0678) (0.0678) 
Other Rivalries  0.00238  
 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012)   (0.0370)  
Other Rivalries   0.0194 
 (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)   (0.0221) 
Democracy  -0.0896*** -0.0897*** 
  (0.0335) (0.0334) 
Nuclear State  0.167*** 0.168*** 
  (0.0638) (0.0636) 
Real GDP per capita  0.155* 0.156* 
  (0.0901) (0.0901) 
Constant 4.061*** 3.180*** 3.171*** 
 (0.164) (0.749) (0.749) 
Observations 6,646 6,133 6,133 
Number of Countries 178 158 158 
Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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Table C-4: GEE regression of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio (AR3) 
 Model C-12 Model C-13 Model C-14 
Nationalistic Rivalry 0.124*** 0.130*** 0.126*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0309) (0.0298) 
Ethnonation-State Incongruence   0.0834 0.0833 
  (0.0686) (0.0685) 
Other Rivalries  0.0132  
 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012)   (0.0359)  
Other Rivalries   0.0256 
 (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)   (0.0220) 
Democracy  -0.114*** -0.114*** 
  (0.0360) (0.0358) 
Nuclear State  0.128** 0.130** 
  (0.0511) (0.0505) 
Real GDP per capita  0.0794 0.0810 
  (0.0873) (0.0872) 
Constant 4.037*** 3.755*** 3.740*** 
 (0.159) (0.732) (0.730) 
Observations 6,640 6,130 6,130 
Number of Countries 176 157 157 
Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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Table C-5: Fixed-effect regression of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio (using the one-year lagged 
dependent variable)1 
 Model C-15 Model C-16 Model C-17 
Nationalistic Rivalry 0.0704*** 0.0758*** 0.0677*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0185) 
Ethnonation-State Incongruence   -0.000482 0.00315 
  (0.0254) (0.0262) 
Other Rivalries  0.0307  
 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012)   (0.0195)  
Other Rivalries   0.0200 
 (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)   (0.0193) 
Democracy  -0.0270 -0.0318 
  (0.0236) (0.0229) 
Nuclear State  -0.0353 -0.0235 
  (0.0650) (0.0674) 
Real GDP per capita  0.0246 0.0235 
  (0.0214) (0.0214) 
ME-to-GDPpc ratiot-1 0.827*** 0.835*** 0.835*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0200) 
Constant 0.811*** 0.614*** 0.624*** 
 (0.0919) (0.160) (0.162) 
Observations 6,430 6,018 6,018 
R-squared 0.765 0.772 0.772 
Number of Countries 178 158 158 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
  
                                                 
1
 Because the dependent variable is at t+1, the one-year lagged dependent variable is actually 
the original observations (t+/-0). For the sake of simplicity, I use t-n signs in the regression 
tables. 
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Table C-6: Fixed-effect regression of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio (using the one-year and 
two-year lagged dependent variables) 
 Model C-18 Model C-19 Model C-20 
Nationalistic Rivalry 0.0559*** 0.0617*** 0.0567*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0169) 
Ethnonation-State Incongruence   -0.0228 -0.0203 
  (0.0259) (0.0265) 
Other Rivalries  0.0212  
 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012)   (0.0178)  
Other Rivalries   0.00575 
 (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)   (0.0164) 
Democracy  -0.0348 -0.0379* 
  (0.0222) (0.0214) 
Nuclear State  -0.0391 -0.0296 
  (0.0556) (0.0560) 
Real GDP per capita  0.0237 0.0226 
  (0.0177) (0.0179) 
ME-to-GDPpc ratiot-1 0.810*** 0.805*** 0.805*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0202) (0.0203) 
ME-to-GDPpc ratiot-2 0.0471*** 0.0561*** 0.0560*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0179) (0.0180) 
Constant 0.681*** 0.517*** 0.528*** 
 (0.0460) (0.138) (0.140) 
Observations 6,186 5,813 5,813 
R-squared 0.779 0.785 0.785 
Number of Countries 177 158 158 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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Table C-7: Fixed-effect regression of the ME-to-GDPpc ratio (using the one-year, 
two-year, and three-year lagged dependent variables) 
 Model C-21 Model C-22 Model C-23 
Nationalistic Rivalry 0.0532*** 0.0587*** 0.0551*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0169) 
Ethnonation-State Incongruence   -0.0156 -0.0137 
  (0.0264) (0.0268) 
Other Rivalries  0.0135  
 (Thompson and Dreyer 2012)   (0.0185)  
Other Rivalries   0.00890 
 (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006)   (0.0158) 
Democracy  -0.0391* -0.0413* 
  (0.0220) (0.0212) 
Nuclear State  -0.0434 -0.0378 
  (0.0523) (0.0507) 
Real GDP per capita  0.0271 0.0267 
  (0.0172) (0.0175) 
ME-to-GDPpc ratiot-1 0.800*** 0.794*** 0.794*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0219) (0.0220) 
ME-to-GDPpc ratiot-2 0.0729*** 0.0849*** 0.0850*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0223) (0.0223) 
ME-to-GDPpc ratiot-3 -0.0121 -0.0147 -0.0149 
 (0.0124) (0.0136) (0.0137) 
Constant 0.670*** 0.476*** 0.480*** 
 (0.0474) (0.135) (0.137) 
Observations 5,952 5,614 5,614 
R-squared 0.777 0.784 0.784 
Number of Countries 175 158 158 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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Table C-8: Probit regression of revisionist behavior in the subset of nationalistic-rivalry 
dyads (including the dummy variable of hawkish leaders) 
 Model C-24 Model C-25 
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio 0.0605*** 0.0587** 
 (0.0190) (0.0260) 
Hawkish Leader -0.0512 -0.124 
 (0.0837) (0.0964) 
Ethnonation-State Incongruence  0.148 
  (0.0927) 
Contiguity  0.243 
  (0.151) 
Capability Difference  -0.868 
  (0.904) 
Capability Difference2  -4.473 
  (12.51) 
Democratic Actor  -0.263** 
  (0.105) 
Democratic Target  0.0160 
  (0.101) 
Democratic Dyad  0.135 
  (0.180) 
Peace Years -0.196*** -0.194*** 
 (0.0250) (0.0241) 
Peace Years2 0.00898*** 0.00912*** 
 (0.00170) (0.00167) 
Peace Years3 -0.000111*** -0.000115*** 
 (2.82e-05) (2.75e-05) 
Constant -0.763*** -0.982*** 
 (0.150) (0.222) 
Observations 2,169 2,121 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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Table C-9: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on the dichotomy of state-territorial 
and transstate-ethnic nationalisms in the subset of nationalistic rivalry (monadic models; 
alternative coding of transstate ethnic issues) 
 Model C-26 Model C-27 
State-Territorial Nationalism -0.222*** -0.145 
  (0.0846) (0.0899) 
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio  0.0556** 
   (0.0249) 
Contiguity  0.262 
  (0.163) 
Capability Difference  -0.642 
  (0.833) 
Capability Difference2  3.062 
  (10.17) 
Democratic Actor  -0.204** 
  (0.101) 
Democratic Target  0.0256 
  (0.107) 
Democratic Dyad  0.101 
   (0.191) 
Constant -0.292*** -0.890*** 
 (0.0931) (0.225) 
Observations 2,274 2,121 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
Peace year variables suppressed 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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Table C-10: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on the dichotomy of 
state-territorial and transstate-ethnic nationalisms in the subset of nationalistic rivalry 
(dyadic models; alternative coding of transstate ethnic issues) 
 Model C-28 Model C-29 Model C-30 Model C-31 
Mutually State-Territorial  -0.0813 -0.00327 -0.252** -0.235* 
 Nationalisms (0.0916) (0.0994) (0.124) (0.132) 
Mutually Transstate-Ethnic  baseline  -0.212* -0.171 
 Nationalisms category (0.119) (0.121) 
State-Territorial vs.  -0.247** -0.0946 -0.418*** -0.327** 
 Transstate-Ethnic Nationalisms (0.126) (0.135) (0.157) (0.160) 
Transstate-Ethnic vs. 0.171 0.232* baseline  
 State-Territorial Nationalisms (0.121) (0.131) category 
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio  0.0633***  0.0633*** 
   (0.0245)  (0.0245) 
Contiguity  0.266  0.266 
  (0.175)  (0.175) 
Capability Difference  -0.755  -0.755 
  (0.796)  (0.796) 
Capability Difference2  3.150  3.150 
  (9.285)  (9.285) 
Democratic Actor  -0.217**  -0.217** 
  (0.103)  (0.103) 
Democratic Target  -0.0481  -0.0481 
  (0.105)  (0.105) 
Democratic Dyad  0.182  0.182 
   (0.186)  (0.186) 
Constant -0.378*** -1.043*** -0.207 -0.811*** 
 (0.0874) (0.242) (0.129) (0.238) 
Observations 2,274 2,121 2,274 2,121 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
Peace year variables suppressed 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
  
Nationalism, Rivalry, and Revisionist State Behavior Akisato Suzuki 
 
 
 A76 
Table C-11: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on civic nationalism in the subset 
of nationalistic rivalry (monadic models; alternative coding of transstate ethnic issues) 
 Model C-32 Model C-33 
State-Territorial Nationalism -0.180** -0.146 
  (0.0907) (0.0916) 
State-Territorial Nationalism 0.00126 0.00440 
 * Democratic Actor (0.196) (0.202) 
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio  0.0556** 
   (0.0249) 
Contiguity  0.263 
  (0.163) 
Capability Difference  -0.640 
  (0.826) 
Capability Difference2  3.035 
  (10.29) 
Democratic Actor -0.193 -0.208 
 (0.167) (0.193) 
Democratic Target  0.0257 
  (0.107) 
Democratic Dyad  0.102 
   (0.195) 
Constant -0.272*** -0.890*** 
 (0.0946) (0.223) 
Observations 2,239 2,121 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
Peace year variables suppressed 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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Table C-12: Probit regression of revisionist behavior on civic nationalism in the subset 
of nationalistic rivalry (dyadic models; alternative coding of transstate ethnic issues) 
 Model C-34 Model C-35 Model C-36 Model C-37 
Mutually State-Territorial  -0.0492 -0.00315 -0.215* -0.235* 
 Nationalism (0.0981) (0.104) (0.129) (0.133) 
Mutually State-Territorial  0.00283 -0.00380 0.00283 -0.00380 
 Nationalism * Democratic Actor (0.214) (0.214) (0.214) (0.214) 
Mutually Transstate-Ethnic  baseline  -0.205* -0.166 
 Nationalism category (0.124) (0.126) 
State-Territorial vs. Transstate-Ethnic -0.200 -0.0904 -0.365** -0.323* 
 Nationalisms (0.149) (0.161) (0.179) (0.179) 
State-Territorial vs. Transstate-Ethnic 0.00907 -0.0164 0.00907 -0.0164 
 Nationalisms * Democratic Actor (0.253) (0.262) (0.253) (0.262) 
Transstate-Ethnic vs. 0.166 0.232* baseline  
 State-Territorial Nationalisms (0.126) (0.131) category 
ME-to-GDPpc Ratio  0.0634***  0.0634*** 
   (0.0246)  (0.0246) 
Contiguity  0.266  0.266 
  (0.175)  (0.175) 
Capability Difference  -0.754  -0.754 
  (0.793)  (0.793) 
Capability Difference2  3.235  3.235 
  (9.338)  (9.338) 
Democratic Actor -0.189 -0.210 -0.189 -0.210 
 (0.178) (0.195) (0.178) (0.195) 
Democratic Target  -0.0479  -0.0479 
  (0.104)  (0.104) 
Democratic Dyad  0.179  0.179 
   (0.183)  (0.183) 
Constant -0.355*** -1.044*** -0.189 -0.812*** 
 (0.0897) (0.239) (0.133) (0.235) 
Observations 2,239 2,121 2,239 2,121 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses 
Peace year variables suppressed 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 by two-tailed tests 
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